Today marks the 149th anniversary of the second day of the two-day battle of Antietam.
And chances are, you just did a double-take. Being that Antietam was only a one-day battle.
But that's exactly my point. Today should be the anniversary of the second day of what should have been the two-day battle of Antietam. The fact that it isn't can be attributed to one man - George B. McClellan. And the fact that it nearly was a two-day battle instead of a one-day battle can also be attributed to one man - Robert E. Lee.
I seriously wonder about both of these decisions. Which I'm just sure would bother the heck out of both men, if they were still around and knew about it. If the three of us were to sit around and compare military knowledge, one of us would be dismissed from the table in short order. Odds are incredibly high this person would not be named George B. McClellan or Robert E. Lee.
Still, I seriously wonder about the decision each man made at Antietam. Lee's decision on the evening of September 17th to stay put and offer battle again the next day; and McClellan's equally surprising decision to decline the offer.
Let's start with Lee. Without recounting the battle or the events leading up to it, I'll just say that I can understand his reasons for entering Maryland when he did. It's a bit oversimplified to put it like this perhaps, but you could sum it up by saying it was mostly about keeping the momentum going.
Things took a very unexpected turn following the loss of Special Order 191, and immediately after South Mountain, Lee decided, understandably, to retreat. But then a funny thing happened. He got word that Harper's Ferry was about to fall, and that Jackson would be available to join him again.
Lee being Lee, and not being me, he changed his mind about retreating. He would stand and fight, along the banks of Antietam Creek.
Good decision? Well, it was Lee. Much like Grant, when Lee had a choice between retreating or fighting....actually, I'm not sure it wasn't even a choice in his mind. If he could fight, he fought. Period. Never mind that he was vastly outnumbered or that Little Mac was acting uncharacteristically aggressive. Or that his back was now to a river with only one good fording sport nearby. Major stuff when you're me. Minor stuff when you're Robert E. Lee, commanding the Army of Northern Virginia.
So he offered battle to McClellan, and after hemming and hawing for a couple of days, Little Mac said sure, why not. So they spent the day of September 17th, 1862, going about the business of getting more Americans killed in a single day than any other day in our history. It was about as awful a day as you could possibly imagine. When it was over, Lee's men had held their own. But it was an incredibly near thing.
Pretty much everyone in his army seemed to assume they'd be retreating that night. Since it was obviously madness to stay and fight anymore. Madness to everyone, apparently, except the one guy charged with making the decision.
Lee said that if Little Mac wanted round two the following day, well by golly we're going to give it to him. Never mind that his army barely survived round one, had both eyes swollen nearly shut from the pounding, and needed help lifting up either glove to ward off another blow. Or that the men could barely stand up, let alone fight. None of that mattered. If McClellan wanted another fight, they would give it to him.
It's obvious that to Lee, this was the right thing to do. To me, it's something else, equally as obvious.
I have no earthly idea what Lee hoped to gain by offering battle on the 18th. What was he going to do, route McClellan's army and send it flying back to Washington? His army was battered all to heck, vastly outnumbered, and his men could barely raise their guns they were so worn out from the previous day. Antietam was as epic a battle as that war or this continent ever saw. It lasted one day. One day was more than enough to place it in the forever book of records.
The best that Lee could have done on the 18th was what he had managed by his teeth's skin to do on the 17th - a draw. That was the absolute, top of the chart, best possible outcome he could have achieved on September 18th. A draw.
And for that possibility, he risked a complete, total, unmitigated disaster.
Had McClellan attacked, Lee's army would have been destroyed as a fighting unit. Goes without saying they would have put up another hellacious fight. The problem was they only had so much hellacious left in them. And it simply was not enough to ward off another such attack as what they just - just - fended off the day before.
I've seen reasons given for why Lee elected to stay and fight rather than pull back across the Potomac. Bottom line, I do not agree with any of them. Lee had nothing to gain that compensated for the enormous risk he was running. The risk to reward ratio was so skewed against him, it probably doesn't even register. The reward of a potential draw vs the risk of quite literally losing his army, thereby effectively ending the war in the East in 1862.
For my money, this decision by Lee was the worst he made during the war. It beats anything he did at Gettysburg by a country mile.
Which brings us to the other player in this odd little drama - George B. McClellan.
Little Mac had at least one golden chance to insert the dagger on September 17th, when his army pierced Lee's line in the center. Reverse the roles here, and put Lee in McClellan's place at that moment. What do you think Lee would have done? Easy answer, isn't it. The guy risked losing his army and the war just because he didn't want to retreat. You think he's going to hesitate to rip his enemy to shreds the instant the chance is there?
But McClellan was no Lee, and McClellan was no Grant. Grant was someone else who would not only have inserted the dagger right there, but twisted the blade around to boot. McClellan would not even unscabber the sword.
I've often wondered what must have run through his mind on the morning of the 18th, when he realized that Lee had not retreated during the night. Did he find his fears of being outnumbered realized? Did he really and truly think Lee's army along that little creek actually outnumbered his own? Lee had poured in virtually every reserve body he had available to him. McClellan still had like an entire corps in reserve, with more men on the way. Yet Lee was the one opting to roll loaded dice, with not prayer of hitting seven. McClellan was the one refusing to bet on a sure thing.
Little Mac would later write, "Those in whose judgment I rely tell me that I fought the battle splendidly & that it was a masterpiece of art."
Read up on Antietam then read that above sentence again. And keep in mind that he's being serious.
McClellan has his defenders, and they make some good points about the man. But there is no getting around the fact that Little Mac lacked that killer instinct it takes to win battles and wars. Never was that more evident than on September 18th, 1862. The victory, the end of the war, enduring fame, probably the presidency at some point in the near future, all awaited him. All he really had to do was give the order to renew the attack.
It was an order he never gave, because he simply did not have it in him to give it.
Maybe, when you get down to it, this is the reason why Lee offered battle on the 18th. Maybe he knew, deep down, that McClellan did not have the stomach for it. Maybe he had it all figured out, and maybe that explains everything.
There's only one problem with that for me. McClellan did attack, on the 17th. What he had done once, he might very well do again. And had he done so, Lee's army could not have withstood it.
I'm not a military expert, and deserve no seat at the table with Lee or McClellan either one. But what each of these men did outside the little town of Sharpsburg Maryland in September of 1862 has always put a good bunch of confused into my thinking.
One man risked everything to gain nothing. The other refused to risk anything to gain everything.
The beginning of the end of the American Civil War should have arrived on September 18th, 1862, on the second day of the two-day battle of Antietam. That it did not, will forever remain one of the greatest what-ifs of that incredibly bloody war.