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  1. Earlier
  2. Treatment of Myer vs. Behr Behr and the 6th Morton Indiana Battery · Brigaded with 1st Brigade (McDowell) of Sherman’s Fifth Division; · After early morning April 6th operations in vicinity of Owl Creek Bridge, all 5th DIV forces were ordered to fall back [towards the crossroads] at about 10 am. · This “backward movement” became confused as racing mule teams pulling wagons headed east along the Purdy Road, blocking the redeploy of Buckland’s Brigade further north, across that road… and Waterhouse’s Battery was captured… and the charging Rebels continued to press north. · In desperation, BGen Sherman seized control of Behr’s Battery [opportunely arriving from the west, to near Sherman] and ordered Behr to unlimber and commence firing. Behr unlimbered, but before firing a shot, Captain Behr was shot down; his artillery men fled the scene, leaving their guns behind. · Behr was killed; his men fled; five guns were captured [a sixth gun (Mussman) was on independent duty with the 1st Brigade and remained in action til nightfall]. · After Shiloh, the 6th Morton Indiana was re-armed and returned to service under Lieutenant Michael Mueller. Myer and the 13th Ohio Battery · Not brigaded; under control of Hurlbut’s Fourth Division (from 4 APR 1862); · Apparently a poorly-trained, inexperienced artillery unit; · On the morning of 6 APR 1862 BGen Hurlbut led two brigades of his Fourth Division south “towards the sound of the guns” at the request of BGen Prentiss for support; · Approaching to within half a mile of Prentiss’s camp, Federal soldiers fleeing north streamed to either side of Hurlbut’s advance; Hurlbut shook his division into line and BGen Prentiss in company with Hickenlooper’s Battery and Munch’s Battery allowed to pass through; Prentiss gathers his available force and will extend Hurlbut’s line towards the west; · Myer arrives [possibly after repeated calls to “Come forward”] and takes position; this position appears to have been directed by an aide of BGen Hurlbut, who may have received a specific order, or maybe a general order, from Hurlbut to “Unlimber here.” · Myer takes position [Hurlbut says “on wrong side of military crest”]. THIS appears to be point of contention: “Did Hurlbut order Myer to take position ‘Right Here,’ or did Hurlbut give instructions to an aide to position Myer “about there” and rely on Myer’s artillery knowledge to position his Battery to best advantage?”] · In process of unlimber, a lucky hit from Robertson’s Alabama Battery explodes an ammunition chest; · Myer and [all? most of?] his men abandon the guns and flee to the Landing. [Another Federal regiment spiked the abandoned guns of Myer's Battery.] · Myer is not seen again until a day or two after completion of the Battle of Shiloh. · After Shiloh the artillery unit formerly known as 13th Ohio Battery was disbanded. Comparison: · There is no doubt Sherman told Behr to unlimber “Right here; right now.” There were witnesses. And Sherman’s order directly led to what happened to Behr. · There is debate about “who told Myer WHAT?” Hurlbut has no way of knowing what the aide ACTUALLY told Myer to do. [Did more than one aide speak to Myer, resulting in confusing orders? It is reported, "Several attempts were made to bring Myer forward."] · Behr had no room to maneuver; Myer may, or may not, have had room to maneuver; depends on the orders. · Behr was killed; and his men fled. · Myer fled, along with his men. · Behr had no opportunity to “gather his force and try again.” Myer was away for days and did not attempt (no obvious attempt) to gather his force and try again. [Brigadier General Prentiss withdrew from his initial position, gathered together what force was available, and took position to Hurlbut’s right; many of Prentiss’s men continued their flight all the way to the Landing. If Prentiss joined them at the Landing, and did not reappear until days later, the same fate that befell Myer would have been visited upon Prentiss.] [Notice at top of this post, the title: "Treatment of Myer vs. Behr." It was (and is ) understood that when talking about the Commander of a unit, you may be speaking of/ referring to his Unit as well. After the Battle of Shiloh, there would likely be little difficulty getting volunteers and new recruits for the "battle hardened, hard-done by Sixth Morton Indiana Battery, which lost its brave commander at Shiloh." And from the available records, that appears to have been the case.]
  3. Brigadier General Hurlbut Although originally from South Carolina (where Lieutenant William T. Sherman met him during the Second Seminole War mobilization) Stephen Hurlbut relocated north and practiced Law in Illinois and was active in local politics in that state. Following Lincoln’s Inauguration during the Secession Crisis, Stephen Hurlbut offered to go south and investigate “the true state of affairs in and around Charleston.” Upon his return north, after revealing his intelligence that “There were no Union men to be found there; they are preparing for war” Hurlbut was awarded with appointment to Brigadier General and was soon commanding troops in northern Missouri protecting railroads. Too great a fondness for alcohol was Hurlbut’s undoing: he was removed from command and returned to Belvidere Illinois in disgrace. Almost simultaneously, William T. Sherman suffered a nervous breakdown and was removed from command in Kentucky. When Sherman’s friend from California, Henry Halleck, took over command of the Department of Missouri, he took special pains to rejuvenate Sherman’s career by placing him “in charge” of Benton Barracks (really just an opportunity for Sherman to rest and settle his nerves.) Brigadier General Sherman learned of the plight of his old friend, Stephen Hurlbut, and suggested to Halleck that a similar effort be made to rejuvenate Hurlbut’s career: Brigadier General Hurlbut was installed as commander of Benton Barracks (really just an opportunity for Hurlbut to dry out, and regain composure.) A third officer, newly-minted Brigadier General William K. Strong, an outstanding accountant but not a military man, was also installed at Benton Barracks as Commandant of that facility (and benefited from the schooling provided by Sherman to become an effective officer who was placed in command at Cairo in 1862.) Sherman was installed at Paducah, ostensibly to “forward troops and supplies to Grant’s operation against Fort Donelson.” But Sherman was also “allowed” to syphon away sufficient troops to establish his own division. A similar opportunity awaited Hurlbut, who arrived at Fort Donelson just after it surrendered, and was placed “in command of the Post” during U.S. Grants frequent departures to Clarksville (and Nashville.) The Divisions of Sherman and Hurlbut were subsequently advanced to Savannah and Pittsburg Landing in March 1862, under Expedition command of C.F. Smith. Sherman took charge of probes against the M & C Railroad; Hurlbut landed his troops at Pittsburg Landing and went into camp. The amount of “training” provided by BGen Hurlbut is unknown (although Regimental drill was accomplished.) The Third Iowa Infantry, familiar with Hurlbut in Missouri and aware of his alcohol problem, were aghast at his return to command… of THEM. They make mention of their displeasure in letters home during March 1862. Along the way, the 13th Ohio Battery arrived at Pittsburg Landing, and became one of several units that “slipped through the cracks” and remained, unassigned, in vicinity of the bluff overlooking the Tennessee River. As “acting Campground Commander, in temporary absence of the injured C.F. Smith” William T. Sherman was responsible for assigning new units to camps (and should have confirmed their assignment to Brigades and Divisions.) Those command assignments should have been performed by U.S. Grant after 18 March; and anyone that arrived at Pittsburg Landing earlier (under C.F. Smith’s command) should have been identified by Grant (or Sherman) and assigned to a brigade… but many were not. This was not Hurlbut’s problem, as he had no official role in such assignments, or the placing of units not belonging to him, in camp. By available accounts, Myer’s 13th Ohio Battery joined Hurlbut’s Fourth Division, physically, within 48 hours of the Rebel attack on 6 April 1862. With perhaps twenty or twenty-five units of infantry, cavalry and artillery assigned to his division, 48 hours (if Hurlbut knew the attack was coming) was insufficient time to concentrate on ONE unit of artillery, and make sure that one battery was properly trained. There does not appear to have been much opportunity for Live Fire exercises, so observing how the 13th Ohio Battery conducted this activity, from unlimber to fire, and back to limber, would likely not have been possible. On the morning of April 6th with the sound of guns getting louder, Hurlbut detached Veath’s Brigade; then responded to Prentiss’s request for assistance by personally leading what remained of the Fourth Division south. Intending to join Prentiss at his camp, BGen Hurlbut was surprised by masses of Union troops streaming north towards the Landing; Hurlbut halted his advance and threw out a defensive line in order to arrest the advance of Rebels pursuing Prentiss’s fleeing Division. When BGen Prentiss was encountered, in company with two batteries of artillery and making solid effort to reform his shattered division, Hurlbut permitted Prentiss to “pass through his defensive line” and ultimately accorded Prentiss and his troops placement at the extreme right end of Hurlbut’s line (which after the casualty that befell Myer’s Battery was readjusted into a more defensible position, a bit further north.) Prentiss donated a section of guns (Munch’s Minnesota Battery under Peebles) to Hurlbut; one section (Pfaender) was defended by the 14th Iowa Infantry of WHL Wallace shortly after the Second Division joined on Prentiss’s right; and a third section of one gun was briefly defended by the 12th Iowa Infantry before it suffered a casualty and withdrew to the Landing. Hurlbut held his ground; met with U.S. Grant when that officer visited on horseback about 10:15 -10:30; and the Fourth Division shared in the use of the Missouri Light Artillery (positioned just behind the Second Division, firing over the top of the infantrymen 200- 400 yards to their front; but occasionally called forward in sections to provide direct support.) These were Stone’s, Welker’s and Richardson’s Batteries, under supreme command of Major Cavender. Mann and Ross applied their guns more forward of Cavender, in direct support of Hurlbut. (And Hickenlooper supported Prentiss.) And at about 1:30- 2 p.m. Ross’s Michigan Battery was sent to the rear, to their camp, for rest and ammunition (with no instruction to return to the line.) Hurlbut was under increasing enemy pressure, and appears to have made correct adjustments to defend his Division as it conducted a controlled “detachment from engagement” and reposition further north. And it is my belief, based on documents viewed over the years, that Stephen Hurlbut INTENDED to re-establish his line at the new position occupied by Ross’s Battery. But Lindsey’s Cavalry rushed north across ground abandoned by Stuart’s Brigade and arced towards the west… and there was Ross, horses hitched to guns and caissons, unable to take aggressive action. This capture of Ross occurred just before, or simultaneous with Hurlbut’s redeploy north; and Hurlbut continued his withdrawal (which resulted in all but elements of the Third Iowa Regiment making it to safety at the Landing.) The loss of Ross is inadequately explained by Hurlbut; and is part of the reason I believe there was more intended for Ross than merely “rest and re-arm.” Hurlbut took control of men returning to the Landing as they arrived; and assigned them new positions in Grant’s Last Line. Hurlbut fought his Division well; benefited from actions of Lauman and Pugh (and Reed’s 44th Indiana Infantry is often accorded “best performer Day One at Shiloh.”) And Hurlbut successfully redeployed his Division (unlike Prentiss and half of WHL Wallace) and was able to continue the fight. Following the battle, letters written by men of the Third Iowa repeat their suspicions regarding Stephen Hurlbut; but acknowledge that the General had overcome that earlier flaw, and had proven himself to be a Leader they would follow to Hell, if necessary. References: The Bloody Third (3rd Iowa History soon to be released by SDG contributor, Tim Jeffers.) "Stephen A. Hurlbut" by Ozzy, SDG topic of 17 MAY 2015. Letters of William T. Sherman [on file at University of Notre Dame.]
  4. Perhaps most revealing: on page 210 of OR 10 part 1 General Hurlbut admits, "...the transaction [of the 13th Ohio Battery abandoning their post in disarray] was seen by 4000 brave men, who never showed their backs to the enemy..." Knowledge of this unpalatable event would have been witnessed, become subject of camp rumours... and more than passing interest would have prompted fellow soldiers (who stood and fought) to enquire... to demand, "What became of them?" The tragic stampede of the 13th Ohio Battery can be explained, but not excused. To condone such "cowardice" (lack of resolve, dissipating fortitude, failure to hold their post) could be fatal to morale and discipline. However the 13th Ohio Battery ended up in their predicament, the Division commander, BGen Hurlbut, had no choice but to make an example of their unacceptable conduct. Chinese proverb: "Punish one, teach one hundred."
  5. Unsure where this video has been hiding for seven years... only today ran across it. And for those concerned about "lack of emphasis on the Union Right at Shiloh, Day One," this video attempts to address some of the Hornet's Nes... oops... THICKET bias. And John McClernand's "inability to play nicely with others" is revealed as root cause of his problems. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2FGFzBDFErY History Reclaimed: McClernand by Dark Sarcasms 7 APR 2014.
  6. From my reading of the Battle of Shiloh, BGen Hurlbut was required by Sherman to provide him reinforcements: Hurlbut sent Veatch’s Brigade west, and it supported McClernand. BGen Prentiss also requested reinforcement: Hurlbut took personal command of his remaining two brigades and led them south, towards the sound of the guns. Acting-commander Sherman did not order Hurlbut south; and U.S. Grant was yet to arrive by boat from Savannah. BGen Stephen Hurlbut moved his force south, intending to join Prentiss in vicinity of the Sixth Division camps, but Prentiss’ withdrawing men were encountered 1000 or so yards north of Camp Prentiss. So Hurlbut quickly arranged a defensive line to halt the Rebel advance; and that initial defensive line was not ideally placed… Part of that hurried initial placement was Myer’s 13th Ohio Battery. One source indicates Hurlbut ordered the battery into position, expecting it to take advantage of local terrain, and was surprised when Myer went into battery on the wrong side of the crest. Another source states: “General Hurlbut ordered Myer to that exact position.” And another source indicates Hurlbut ordered Myer’s Battery moved forward to the desired position, via orders sent through an aide who brought Myer and his battery up from the rear. Will we ever learn the Truth? Unlikely, due the bias of all the key witnesses and participants. But based upon Stephen Hurlbut’s subsequent actions, at Shiloh and afterwards, I do not believe he intentionally sacrificed Myer and his 13th Ohio: there was either a communication breakdown; or General Hurlbut assumed Captain Myer knew his job better than was actually the case. References: SDG topic “Stephen A. Hurlbut” Major David W. Reed’s “Battle of Shiloh and the Organizations Engaged” OR 10 part 1 page 209 [Hurlbut indicates, “Myer positioned his battery too far forward, so as to lose advantage of the slope.” I believe this refers to “wrong side of the military crest” of a hill, or local prominence: by taking position slightly in rear of the true crest (the military crest) the terrain itself provides some protection from enemy fire.] Page 208 – Stephen Hurlbut: “I ordered Captain Myer to come into battery ON THE REVERSE SLOPE OF A CREST OF GROUND…” (emphasis by Ozzy.) Page 208 – Stephen Hurlbut: “The 13th Ohio was brought forward by repeated orders through my aides.”
  7. Seemingly a study on any unit being reported as having cowardly conduct could be an interesting topic. The 71st Ohio's story of flight has been fairly well proven to be an exaggeration, and seemingly there is some evidence that the 13th Ohio Battery suffered from an unfair account from Hurlbut as other reports I mention in the two blog posts allude to. I do not know enough of Hurlbut to surmise if he warrants a pass or fail grade.
  8. I'm sorry. I've been away from the group for a while and just now saw your question. If you look at this map on my ShilohDiary website (https://shilohdiary.files.wordpress.com/2009/09/easternrockhillmap.pdf), the cave would have been directly behind (north of) the location noted as "The Duncans' House." I have not explored the location thoroughly enough to determine if the cave still exists, but C.D. Rickman told me that he remembered seeing it while playing on that property as a child in the 1950s. It was C.D.'s childhood memories of the hill, cave and creek that led us to look at this property and ultimately to confirm it to our satisfaction as the most likely location for the Duncans' house in 1862. Sadly, C.D. passed away a couple of years ago, or he could give you a lot more information about the area.
  9. Ozzy

    Ex Post Facto

    Having heard it asserted that "Prentiss was not a very good officer" and that "the ill considered actions of General Prentiss in not joining one of the backward movements led to his capture," the following article from Missouri Daily Republican of 16 July 1861 page 2 col. 5 is presented in rebuttal: The men-in-ranks were aware of the seniority games being played in Illinois and Missouri, even before the first encounter between General Benjamin Prentiss and "General" Grant on 17 August 1861.
  10. Ozzy

    New and Improved

    The following video from middle of 2019 is an exemplary sample of tours now conducted at Shiloh NMP making use of corrected terminology. The “Dense Thicket” with its briars, brambles and thorns is finally given pride of place along “This Line” (the temporary name for the poorly identified Sunken Road, which was never really sunken, “just washed out in a few places” with deep wagon ruts, not really useable by infantrymen.) CONGRATULATIONS to everyone who assisted in making these changes come about. As we say in Australia, “I am gobsmacked.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VzvStI2fneY A Shiloh Battle Walk posted by Paul Vivrett 10 SEP 2020
  11. Had a read of the above link a few days ago and have been considering how to respond: 1) A comparison could be made between the after battle treatment given to Myer’s 13th Ohio and Behr’s 6th Indiana (Morton Battery) and why the disparity in treatment occurred. 2) An examination of the Ohio regiments and leaders accused of poor performance (71st Ohio, 13th Ohio Battery, 53rd Ohio, Colonel Thomas Worthington) could be conducted to determine validity of the charges, and who was to blame. 3) An assessment of General Hurlbut’s performance on Sunday 6 April 1862 could be conducted to determine if that leader succeeded or failed (and if he failed, decide if the interaction with Myer’s 13th Ohio Battery was the cause of that failure.) Along which course would you like to proceed?
  12. After my first post about the 13th Ohio Battery, I came across a few more sources and hence have done a follow up post: More on the Unlucky 13th at Shiloh!
  13. Rbn3

    Henry Stark

    The 52nd suffered a "crisis of command" it seems because of a series of events. Sweeney was promoted, Wilcox was gone to Chicago (still not sure what the "business" was that caused Halleck to order him there, but maybe a court martial?) Stark more or less disappeared early. No field grade officer remained to write a report. "Charles D. Tewksbury draft memoir transcription, Fifty-Second Illinois Folder: 3, for his wounding “in the early part of the engagement by a falling limb” story. Philander to Editor, April 9, 1862, for account of “wound from a shell early in the day;” Historical Memoranda, 5, details “Stark commanding until 3:30 PM” when “Bowen assumed command in obedience to [Sweeny’s] orders,” and leaves it at that." Stark Major Henry Theiste A CHANCE TO LEAVE MY CARCASS ON THE FIELD OF BATTLE 52 Illinois at Shiloh.pdf
  14. Thank you for sharing that letter. It is true that the good battery commander might have been stretching to fit a narrative, but it also helps to confirm for me that the 13th was more likely placed in a bad spot.
  15. Sean Chick

    Henry Stark

    Also, where exactly does the story of Stark being hit by a tree limb come from? The Barto letter should be in the Abraham Lincoln Library (they have a ton of stuff). Where though does "Philander to Editor, April 5, 1862, James Compton Biographical Folder" come from? Both should go a long way towards explaing what went wrong on in the 52nd Illinois, and why they fled when Cleburne's shot up brigade attacked in their vicinity.
  16. One matter complicating this is Robertson. He was a good battery commander, but also strict, mean, and committed war crimes later in the conflict. Was he being unusually magnanimous to the 13th Ohio Battery (they were after all fellow artillerymen), bragging, or did he want to take Hurlbut down a peg? check out the attached letter from SNMP. Also included are accounts from the 52nd Tennessee and 10th Mississippi. They are not directly related, its just how the file was sent to me. Robertson Mosier Learned letters - Robertson Battery, 52nd TN, 10th MS.tif
  17. Once you wrote the Yates part about Prentiss, it all came back to me. He played a pretty important role in 1861 in Illinois, so it is understandable he was annoyed about having Grant over him. For McClellan, the Blair family is likely the best overall answer. I almost put Lincoln for McClernand. It is true, but with two cavaets. First they were not friends and came from opposing parties. McClernand campaigned against Lincoln in 1860 and 1864. They even faced off in court a few times. But they had a decent working relationship, and did work a court case together. It is notable that after Vicksburg Lincoln abandoned McClernand. Lincoln was his patron, but not in an unreserved way such as you see with Davis' support for Johnston.
  18. Ozzy

    Question of Patronage

    Well done Sean Chick! If I can expand on your correct answers: Benjamin Prentiss “had benefit of a politician; not a very good one.” At start of the National Emergency, Illinois Governor Richard Yates appears to have supported Prentiss (sent him to Cairo to command the situation there.) After the death of Senator Stephen Douglas in June 1861, Orville H. Browning was parachuted into the empty Senate seat… and assumed “support” of fellow Quincy resident, Benjamin Prentiss. McClernand was the “Leading Congressman from Illinois” and provided his own patronage; and managed to finagle patronage from President Lincoln (of the opposite political party.) McClernand kept Lincoln appraised of “the real story” regarding operations out West through frequent letters (much in the same way Ulysses Doubleday kept President-elect Lincoln appraised of the situation at Fort Sumter in 1860/61.) These out-of-official channel letters acted as counterpoint to Official Army reports. John A. Logan appears to have benefited from patronage of John McClernand early on; and subsequently received “support” of President Lincoln (because Lincoln needed southern Illinois Democrats to remain loyal to the Union.) Over time, the self-actualized John Logan became his own patron. John Fremont. As first Republican candidate for President (1856) Fremont established a connection with Lincoln after the November 1860 election. Non-West Point army officer and self-made millionaire (actual net worth disputed; but a wealthy man) with strong political connections in Missouri (married into the Democrat Benton Family) Fremont was sent by President Lincoln to Europe as Special Emissary, with mission “to buy up all the serviceable small arms and light artillery pieces available.” These weapons helped arm the North… and Fremont’s purchase took them out of the market for possible sale to the South. For his support, Fremont was anointed Major General and put in command of Department of the West, based at St. Louis.
  19. I am with you, Sean. A poorly suited position, taken under fire immediately, a direct hit on a caisson within moments of moving into position...all these seem to add up to a bad situation more than one of cowardice. Most likely Robertson exaggerated, as most were prone to do, but when you take his comments in context of other comments of the 13th, Hurlbut excepted, then the picture seems again to be one of circumstances.
  20. Sean Chick

    Henry Stark

    Thanks for posting these Newton letters. The experience of the 52nd Illinois on April 6 needs to be better understood. I think their retreat late in the afternoon is a key reason the Union lines collapsed when it did. The lack of discussion of the regiment in the battle's after action reports (at least among those published) is curious.
  21. Benjamin Prentiss: Good one. He was a politician but not a major one. John McClernand: John McClernand Henry Wager Halleck: He seems to have owed his position to the support of Winfield Scott. Halleck, while a master of army politics, was not quite so good at getting patrons among the politicians. George B. McClellan: Montgomery Blair Lew Wallace: I think Oliver Morton, although from a different party, took a shine to Wallace. Stephen Hurlbut: Abraham Lincoln, who thought Hurlbut was one of the finest public speakers in the country. John A. Logan: John A. Logan John Fremont: The various radicals in Congress. Albert Sidney Johnston: Jefferson Davis Braxton Bragg: Thomas Bragg, Thomas Overton Moore PGT Beauregard: Jacques Villere, John Slidell, Pierre Soule, although I have not been able to figure out if Soule held it against Beauregard for marrying into the Slidell family. Soule and Beauregard were pretty tight in 1852.
  22. I have always seen what happened to them as a perfect storm. They were poorly placed by Hurlbut, poorly trained, and poorly led. One thing I recently ran into was the Captain Felix Robertson's thoughts on the matter. He felt their withdrawal was due to both his accurate cannon fire and a lack of infantry support. Robertson did not think that Hurlbut's first position on the south end of Sarah Bell Field was ever occupied, but rather Hurlbut said the division was positioned there after the battle to cover what happened to the 13th Ohio Battery. It would be a scandal sending a green battery far ahead of the infantry. After sifting through reports and recollections, I think Robertson exaggerated, but there is some truth to the idea that the 13th Ohio Battery was not properly supported. I think Hurlbut's first line was only half formed, and mostly on the eastern end of the field. Once the battery routed and Adams' brigade approached, Hurlbut wisely fell back.
  23. Thanks, Ozzy, for the elaboration! It was Hurlbut's staff officer that insisted on the deployment location of the battery, so not certain if Hurlbut had input to that decision filtered through his staff officer or not. I have come across a few more articles for a Part II.
  24. Rbn3

    Henry Stark

    https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5406/jillistathistsoc.107.3-4.0296 Both Newton and Wilcox were at the protracted 1863 Court Martial of Col. Silas Baldwin of the 57th Illinois. Newton was a witness for the prosecution and Col John S Wilcox was a member of the Court, which convicted Baldwin. A Newton letter confirms that Wilcox went to Chicago on orders from Halleck just prior to the battle at Pittsburg Landing. Newton sent a letter home with Wilcox, apparently. Wilcox had testified at the proceeding involving fraud over a rations contract that involved the 52nd's Col Wilson and his QM Charles Wells.. After letters lauding Wilson from Illinois politicians were received by the Federal Judge (Drummond) Wilson's indictment by a Federal Grand Jury was quashed in 1863. Wilcox was not convinced that Wilson was innocent and began an unsuccessful petition to get Judge Wilson taken off the Illinois Bench. Wilson was also involved is some shenanigans over the purchase of horses. Wilson was the father of Edmund Beecher Wilson, author of The Cell and a ground breaking biologist and geneticist. BTW, John Wilcox's (14 years) older brother Silvanus had been Halleck's room mate at West Point but resigned over ill health. Silvanus returned to Elgin where he had been Wilson's law partner (briefly). Silvanus ran into Halleck at the Planter's Hotel in St. Louis in late 1861. Halleck reportedly exclaimed: "Wilcox I thought you were dead." Did Wilcox miss the fun at Shiloh because of all this? No wonder no one bothered to pile up some logs or entrench, they were too busy with internecine warfare to bother about the Rebs. ps: I posted some of this a while back in this thread. Rations_fraud_Wilson_Wells_Wilcox 26 Nov 1861 Chicago Tribune part 1 of 2 Entire page from LOC.pdf Wilson Wells Trial in Federal Court motion to quash indictment.pdf Wilcox_petition_to_remove_Wilson_from_the_Bench (1).pdf Isaac_Wilson_C_B__Wells_Case_nolle_prosequi_by_District_Attorney.pdf
  25. Had to read through the attachment to “The Western Theatre in the Civil War (The Unlucky 13th at Shiloh)” a couple of times to glean the full story. But, if true, it is damning: Captain Myers reported with his battery to Savannah “about the 20th of March” and was told by the Commanding General [on 20 March 1862 this would be Major General Grant] to “take your company on shore at Pittsburg Landing, and go up on the bank and search out ground for [your] camp wherever [you] please, and wait for further orders.” These orders did not come until early April, when it appears Burrow’s 14th Ohio Battery was transferred from Hurlbut to McClernand, and Myer’s 13th Ohio Battery was assigned to BGen Hurlbut. (Hurlbut indicates the 13th Ohio Battery reported to him for duty on Friday 4 April.) [A similar re-assignment resulted in Munch’s Minnesota Battery and Hickenlooper’s 5th Ohio Battery reporting to BGen Prentiss at about the same time…] As regards the performance of the 13th Ohio Battery on the morning of 6 April 1862 there appears to be a combination of bad luck; poorly considered decision as regards battery placement; and inexperience of the officers and men of the 13th Battery. The lack of familiarity with BGen Hurlbut did not help matters. The hit accomplished by Confederate Artillery (believed to be Robertson’s Alabama) which exploded the ammunition chest likely killed and disabled horses and panicked the men. Such a lucky strike, with resultant thunderous roar and shrapnel, would likely have panicked any green unit: the men of the 13th Ohio Battery were unfortunate that THEIR unit was the one so affected. But, the attempt to “pin the blame” on Stephen Hurlbut was misguided: BGen Hurlbut did not direct Myer’s Ohio Battery to Pittsburg Landing without adequate instructions; and BGen Hurlbut was not responsible for the explosion of the ammunition chest. An excellent, thought-provoking article...
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