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  2. Ozzy

    Shiloh primary sources

    Mona There are three primary "storage sites" on the Internet for old books, all of which allow free access, and all of which are actively expanding their collections: archive.org HathiTrust.org Project gutenberg 1) When searching for a reference, go to your favourite Search site (Google, Yahoo, etc) 2) Enter the title as complete as possible -- example: Health histories of generals -- [ Enter ] 3) If nothing comes back as "hit," or if similar titles come back, try Health histories of generals archive Health histories of generals hathi Health histories of generals gutenberg 4) If the reference you are after still does not appear, try adding the author: Health histories of generals by Jack Welsh 5) If still nothing, perhaps the title is not correct. Try: The health histories of generals The health histories of Union generals The health histories of Civil War generals The health histories of Union generals by Dr. Jack Welsh The health histories of Union generals by Dr. Jack Welsh archive The health histories of Confederate generals by Dr. Jack Welsh hathi [Keep trying different combinations of possible title, and review what hits come back...] 6) One of the "hits" informs me there is "The Medical Histories of Union Generals" by Jack Welsh and it is available at books.google.com.au (This is another free access site, but sometimes only limited searches are available. A similar free access site -- but requiring a password -- is jstor). 7) If still no luck, try getting the correct title (and author) from Library of Congress. Repeat the above search. [Sometimes misspellings, or words omitted from title derail the search. Make sure your spellings are correct, and all words in title are included.] 8 If a well-known author's work is being sought, return to your favourite search engine and try: onlinebooks Welsh, Jack in the above example, nothing comes back from onlinebooks at University of Pennsylvania. But, a "hit" comes back from wikipedia for Jack Welch that includes most of his published works at bottom of page. 9) If you have tried all of the above, and still have no luck it could be privately held (family library) it could be privately held (university library, or university library special collections) [Some of the above are still accessible, and some are not. For example, I have been searching for William Tecumseh Sherman's Civil War diaries, and believe they are either in private hands, or held at U.S. Military Academy at West Point. Regardless, I am convinced that they are not available online. Some searches just do not pan out.] Happy Hunting Ozzy
  3. Today
  4. mona

    Shiloh primary sources

    hi there are several titles in this list i am interested in reading..do you know how to go about finding a copy..remember..im not that good on the computer..thanks! mona
  5. rwaller

    New photo album layout

    Thanks for all your hard work Stan.
  6. Stan Hutson

    New photo album layout

    Nothing can be done to change it or view it in the old style I reckon. Sigh.
  7. Ozzy

    Shiloh primary sources

    Missing from the above collection, but containing hundreds of Shiloh veteran recollections: The National Tribune. Published in Washington, D.C. from 1877 until 1917 (much of that time edited by John McElroy) the National Tribune was a "Veteran's Newspaper" dedicated to advocating for pensions and benefits for Northern War Veterans and their widows and children. Possibly the two most important Shiloh articles are the following: http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn82016187/1883-02-01/ed-1/seq-1/#date1=1883&index=0&rows=20&words=Hovey+HOVEY&searchType=basic&sequence=0&state=District+of+Columbia&date2=1883&proxtext=Hovey&y=0&x=0&dateFilterType=yearRange&page=1 National Tribune of 1 FEB 1883 page one, col.1 "Pittsburg Landing" http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn82016187/1884-03-13/ed-1/seq-1/ National Tribune of 13 March 1884 page one, col.5 "Battle of Shiloh" [The first of fourteen elements in a series describing the gathering of Federal Forces at Pittsburg Landing and the resulting Battle of Shiloh. Believed to have been created by a journalist with last name of "Cunningham," this series appears to have been a response to the interest generated by an exchange between Generals Hovey and Veatch, regarding "the Surprise" at Shiloh. [The front page beginning of each element continues onto page 8, and sometimes pages 2 and 8.] [Of course, there is much more to be discovered in the National Tribune. Placing "last name" of Powell or Peabody or etc in Search Feature results in interesting hits. As does Pittsburg and Shiloh and surprise...] [Single-word searches work best.] Thank-you to Library of Congress (Chronicling America online newspaper access) for making these references available. Ozzy
  8. Ozzy

    Shiloh primary sources

    The following link leads to 21 pages of titles/ authors of primary sources (created through about 1920) relating to Battle of Shiloh: http://www.civilwardigital.com/Shiloh-_Guide_to_Collection.pdf Guide to Shiloh primary sources Cheers Ozzy
  9. Yesterday
  10. Ozzy

    Alvin Hovey, 24th Indiana

    Surprised ? The extraordinary exchange of arguments involving Generals Veatch and Hovey took place during 1883 and focused on a single topic: Surprise. Every aspect of “Were we surprised at Pittsburg Landing ?” gained an airing, and along the way, scores of Shiloh veterans added their own responses, both For and Against the idea of Surprise. Of particular interest, some aspects of “the surprise” that were examined: · The initiation of first contact, attributed to General Prentiss; · Just-in-time disruption of Rebel intention to launch surprise attack; · Lack of preparation of physical defences at Pittsburg Landing (abatis and trenches) · Claimed lack of proper pickets and cavalry patrols; · The presence of General Grant at Savannah, nine miles away from his Army at Pittsburg Landing, recognized as “not the action of a commander who seriously believes his Army is under threat of attack by the enemy” · The presence of “acoustic shadow,” believed due to easterly wind and dampness of the air, which prevented many from hearing the exchange of musketry (and hence were surprised when the Rebels appeared in their front) · The roar of cannon (beginning about 7 a.m.) which alerted General Grant at Savannah and sent that officer up the Tennessee River (departed about 8 a.m.) · The sending away of messengers by General Prentiss, alerting Smith and Hurlbut to the presence of the enemy in force, and requesting support; the messengers prevented Hurlbut and Wallace and Stuart, and their commands, from being surprised. The initial post that resulted in Veatch vs. Hovey appeared on the front page of the 1 FEB 1883 edition of the National Tribune. The 15 FEB edition, page 1, Col.3, contained the first veteran response (with a cryptic reply at bottom of Column 3 from the Editor.) General Veatch had his article published 15 March, and General Hovey added his on 5 April 1883. The fallout: during the course of the discussion, serious efforts were made to determine, “Who really was responsible for thwarting the Confederate surprise that Sunday morning?” References: http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn82016187/1883-02-01/ed-1/seq-1/#date1=1883&index=0&rows=20&words=Hovey+HOVEY&searchType=basic&sequence=0&state=District+of+Columbia&date2=1883&proxtext=Hovey&y=0&x=0&dateFilterType=yearRange&page=1 National Tribune of 1 FEB 1883. http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn82016187/1884-03-13/ed-1/seq-1/ National Tribune of 15 FEB 1883.
  11. CSuniforms

    New photo album layout

    Me neither--- Hard to find specific Regiments--
  12. Last week
  13. and the staging of vehicles sounds good to me.
  14. Transylvania

    Epic Trek with Tim 2018: Sweet Home Alabama Edition

    I plan to attend. Since I don't want to spend essentially twenty-four hours round trip on the road for a one-day hike, I will lead a Not-So-Epic hike on Sunday, November 4, following the route of Trabue's Kentucky Brigade (with hint of Alabama in keeping with the theme of the Epic Hike) on the First Day, conditions permitting. Let's meet at Tour Stop 13 (Water Oaks Pond). We'll head over to Tablet 448 and then find our way to the junction of the Hamburg - Savannah and Corinth-Pittsburg Roads, where Trabue's Brigade closed the encirclement of the Hornet's Nest. Depending on our energy, we can then head over to the Indian Mounds where the Brigade came under fire of the gunboats on the evening of April 6 or head back to Tour Stop 13. We will be bushwacking in the upper reaches of Tilghman Branch. If we head back to Tour Stop 13, the distance is about two to three miles. Going to the Indian Mounds would add another couple of miles (or almost so). Alternatively, we could stage vehicles there and shuttle survivors of the hike back to Water Oaks Pond. No reservations are necessary, although I would like an indication of interest when we assemble for the Epic Hike.
  15. mona

    Baseball, anyone?

    thanks for this info...knew he had played base ball but not to this extent..
  16. Ozzy

    Baseball, anyone?

    Upon reading the posts at SDG, it is evident that Confederate Cavalry officer, Basil Duke, is a favourite of many. A veteran of the Battle of Shiloh, who afterwards became involved with the progress of Shiloh Memorial Park (which eventually became Shiloh NMP), and who was often invited as Speaker at Dedication events... But, unknown to most, is that prior to the Civil War, Basil Duke was a base ball player. Born in Kentucky in 1838, Basil Duke took his Law degree earned at Transylvania College west and settled in St. Louis, where he joined his cousin's law firm and became involved in militia activities and base ball. A member of the Cyclones in time for the 1860 season, he played against other St. Louis clubs named Morning Stars, Unions, Tigers, Excelsiors, Independents and Empires, on fields around the city, recorded as Lafayette Park, Laclede Ground, Commercial Ground, Gamble Lawn Ground, and "the field immediately west of the Fair Grounds." In 1861, Basil Duke missed the March opening of the Season (away with "other activities") and as far as is known, never played for the Cyclones again. During 1861, the young man returned to Kentucky and signed on with another cousin: John Hunt Morgan. Base ball (spelled as two words) continued in St. Louis during the War (but often involved the club's "second nine," with their First Nine being otherwise engaged.) References: http://www.matrixgames.com/forums/printable.asp?m=1836953 Basil Duke and the St. Louis Cyclones http://thisgameofgames.com/home/category/basil-duke/ Jeffery Kittel's excellent Civil War baseball site (with focus on St. Louis) http://digital.shsmo.org/cdm/compoundobject/collection/dmr/id/17105/rec/5 Missouri Daily Republican of 5 June 1863 with box score for Game played at the Commercial Ground between the Baltics and the Independents (won by Baltics 33 - 14) recorded page 3 Col. 5 (bottom). http://digital.shsmo.org/cdm/compoundobject/collection/dmr/id/11906/rec/19 Missouri Daily Republican of 9 July 1860 page 2, Col.10 announcing Game to be played that afternoon at 4 p.m. between the Cyclones and Morning Stars.
  17. Stan Hutson

    New photo album layout

    Not sure if anyone has noticed, but the way in which photos and albums are stored/displayed has changed. I do not like the new layout. I guess there is no way to default to the old style though.
  18. Ozzy

    6th Division, 1st contact

    Peabody started the Battle of Shiloh “Peabody started the battle with the patrol he sent out” says WI16thJim, as summarized by Hank. And it is likely that in 2018 no one (with an interest in History of Shiloh) disputes this. But, the devil is in the details… and nine months after the Battle of Shiloh, no one was sure how the battle began: many of the key participants were dead (Colonel Peabody, Major Powell.) The opportunity for survivors to get together and hash out a story did not present itself due some being sent away wounded (Colonel Moore) and some spending months in captivity (Brigadier General Prentiss and Colonel Madison Miller.) Much like “The Blind Man and the Elephant,” everyone held a piece of the puzzle, but it was only upon combining those unique pieces that the picture was revealed. In 1903 (two years after the death of Benjamin Prentiss) Andrew Hickenlooper reported: “The bugle’s cheery notes aroused the camp at the dawn of day [reveille was sounded at 6 o’clock.] Breakfast was over and all was ready for an early morning drill, when the faint reports of distant picket shots were heard…” [Sketches of War History p.412.] [And included to not only illustrate the “acoustic cloud” reported by many Federal commanders (which many believed was due a strong easterly breeze blowing from the Tennessee River, and which muffled the sound of musket fire less than two miles away), but also Hickenlooper’s claim “he heard an exchange of picket fire.” ] In his report published 1891, advocate for Shiloh Memorial Park, former member of 41st Illinois E.T. Lee, recalled, “At 3 o’clock on Sunday morning Colonel Moore with five companies of his regiment again went to the front, and at break of day he drove the advance pickets of the enemy in and engaged their advance line” [SDG “Shiloh Memorial Park,” post of 29 June 2018.] This statement is derived (and repeated almost verbatim) from General Benjamin Prentiss’s November 1862 Shiloh Report.] Then, there is O. P. Newberry’s information, released broadly before his death in 1874. As a Lieutenant in Company I of 25th Missouri, Oliver Newberry was one of the few witnesses to the encounter between Benjamin Prentiss and Everett Peabody, at or after 6 a.m. on Sunday morning; and may have been present at the meeting that resulted in Major Powell being sent forward in the darkness of pre-dawn Sunday morning. Letters sent to family members after the battle hint at “more awareness of what took place,” than was available to senior commanders. Unfortunately, with Peabody and Powell dead, who supports (or negates) Newberry’s claims? Still, what claims existed (end of 1862) were these: · Pickets, correctly placed by General Prentiss, started the Battle of Shiloh; · Colonel Moore, responding to picket firing, started the Battle; · Colonel Peabody, without authority, sent Powell to start the Battle of Shiloh. Beginning with the claim, “the picket line, correctly placed and strengthened by General Prentiss initiated contact that led to Battle of Shiloh,” this version of events had majority support in 1862 and is recorded in Prentiss’s November 1862 report; and in the April 1862 report of Colonel David Moore (in which it is apparent that Colonel Peabody mentioned “contact with the enemy, experienced by pickets” as justification for sending Moore and five companies forward.) “Colonel Moore responded to picket firing and started the Battle of Shiloh,” is how General Prentiss documented the events of Sunday Morning, April 6th 1862. Trying to make sense of how the whole affair started, Prentiss knew that he sent forward “the remainder of the 21st Missouri” at Colonel Moore’s request, upon waking up Sunday morning. And he may have had opportunity to query Colonel Moore, briefly, as that seriously wounded officer was removed from the front, on his way to Pittsburg Landing for treatment. (If so, Colonel Moore would have mentioned that he was “responding to the firing of the pickets.”) In any event, Colonel Moore, by virtue of his response, is accorded claim for “initiating Battle of Shiloh” in Prentiss’s official report. The claim that Major Powell, under orders of Colonel Peabody, is responsible for initiating the Battle of Shiloh is more problematic, and was not “shouted from the rooftops” at the time because of those inherent problems: obvious disregard (disrespect) of a senior commander; working outside the Chain of Command; usurping authority… Which is probably why details leaked out gradually over time (without possibility of putting the whole story together until all the facts were revealed much, much later.) Timeline Of Events affecting Sixth Division Sunday morning 6 APR 1862 [prior to 6 APR] BGen Prentiss strengthens his picket line. [after midnight] Following consultation with like-minded subordinates, Colonel Peabody sends away Major Powell with mission, “to capture Rebel cavalryman and return him to camp of 1st Brigade, Sixth Division for interrogation.” [after midnight] Major Powell detaches a small group from the picket force and leads them away towards a house, believed to be a base of Rebel cavalry [report of Private Baker 25th Missouri.] Finding the number of Rebel troops in vicinity too strong for his small force, Major Powell retraces his steps; and back at camp, bolsters his force with three companies each belonging to 25th Missouri and 12th Michigan. 3 a.m. (est) Major Powell leads his bolstered force, intent on the Capture Mission, away towards the suspected Cavalry outpost. Before arriving (and in vicinity of Fraley Field) Powell’s reconnaissance draws fire from “a Confederate vedette.” [Sergeant Ed. A. Gordon of Co.A 57th OVI on picket duty recalls Major Powell and "three companies of the 25th Missouri" passing his picket post "at about 3 a.m., long before daylight." Sergeant Gordon records in National Tribune of 26 APR 1883 p.2 Col.6 that "Major Powell informed us that he was going to catch some Rebels for breakfast." ] 5:15 (or 4:55) Recorded time of above contact: Rebels vs. Major Powell. 5:30 (est) Upon hearing engagement taking place, Colonel Peabody alerts Colonel Moore and tells him, “Contact with our pickets has occurred.” Moore is sent away by Peabody with five companies of his 21st Missouri to investigate “the picket firing.” As he heads in the direction of the sound of gunfire, Colonel Moore encounters the 25th Missouri (Major Powell) returning to camp. Moore turns Powell around, and also takes control of elements of the 16th Wisconsin, Company A (Captain Saxe) and continues forward. 6 a.m. Reveille in Camp of Sixth Division. 6 a.m. A messenger sent from Colonel Moore reports to BGen Prentiss and reports “contact with the pickets.” Further, Colonel Moore requests the remainder of his 21st Missouri (which Prentiss sends away to bolster Colonel Moore.) The sound of gunfire away in the distance becomes more distinct (although most soldiers north of the Sixth Division do not hear the sound of musketry due to “acoustic shadow.”) Just after 6 a.m. The Long Roll is sounded (either by orders of Prentiss or Peabody.) And Prentiss confronts Peabody. 6:30 (est) The lines of infantry and two batteries of artillery move forward. 7 a.m. Hickenlooper begins firing. Munch begins firing. 7 a.m. Prentiss sends messengers to Smith (2nd DIV) and Hurlbut (4th DIV) explaining developments and “requesting reinforcements.” 7:11 General Grant (at Savannah) hears the booming of artillery. [Corrections and additions most welcome, as long as references provided – Ozzy.]
  19. As I was updating a Quiz Question at the time Hank posted the above, I've had first chance to read -- and mostly agree -- with his information. Two bits of information that have been revealed of late also shed light on "the purpose of Powell's patrol" (and it was not "finding the enemy." ) Private Baker's published remarks in 1883 indicate that "Major Powell went forward to a house suspected of harboring Confederate cavalry with the intention of capturing a Rebel cavalryman and bringing him back within Union lines, in order to interrogate him and determine what were the Confederate intentions." (A close read of Colonel Quinn's Shiloh report also alludes to this Capture Attempt [OR 10 page 280.] ) Private Baker goes on to claim that Major Powell, finding the enemy in too great of force for his small body of stalwarts, returned to the camp of the 25th Missouri, gathered together a bigger force, and attempted the same exercise again... but drew fire from the Rebels along the way [see "PVT Baker, 25th Missouri" in SDG.] The second "bit of information" comes from closer reading of "Who sent Colonel Moore on the morning of April 6th ?" Because, if as so many claim that, "Colonel Peabody knew the Rebel Army was out there, about to launch a surprise attack" ...then why does he send only half of David Moore's force to engage the whole Confederate Army? Why not sound the Long Roll, get everyone up and moving (including General Prentiss)? [From my own reading, this "keeping of Prentiss in the dark" while Colonel Peabody 1) sent forward Powell, 2) sent forward half of Moore, and 3) allowed General Prentiss to awake to the sound of music (without revealing -- himself, personally -- what was going on) is what enraged the just-awakened Benjamin Prentiss. By the time Prentiss awoke, Peabody had been "in charge" for an hour, and had not 1) beat the Long Roll, 2) sent word to other Division commanders (2nd and 4th Division) what was taking place, and 3) had not moved forward sufficient force or artillery to deal with "the whole Rebel Army." These three actions (with the possible exception of beating of the Long Roll, which occurred at 6 a.m.) were accomplished by General Prentiss a short time after "being roused from slumber." If Colonel Peabody had gone to General Prentiss (after sending away Colonel Moore and his five companies) and explained what took place (and waited for Benjamin Prentiss to get over his initial anger), Colonel Peabody would likely have been forgiven, the fight would have proceeded, and Prentiss's Shiloh report would have been written differently. [But, it does not appear that Colonel Peabody even revealed to Colonel Moore the true reason why he was being sent forward (as Moore reported it was "due to the picket guard being attacked and driven in" -- which could only have been told him by Colonel Peabody.] The "rest of the story" is not always pleasant... Ozzy
  20. Ozzy

    Mississippi Department

    The reason this question is important... Many sources indicate that "Halleck departed the Western Theatre in July 1862 without restoring U. S. Grant to overall command," while others claim that "Halleck departed for the Eastern Theatre, and left Grant in charge at Corinth." And it is known that Major General Grant was allowed to "relocate his Headquarters to Memphis" in June, before Halleck departed. If Grant was forced to report to a successor of Halleck at St. Louis (or Corinth), that would impact on how U.S. Grant conducted himself. And if Grant had no one to report to, except an immediate "supervisor" 1200 miles away, that would also influence how General Grant performed and developed. Ozzy
  21. Of course Ozzy’s observation is correct. I heard this somewhere else recently that Prentiss sent out David Moore to reinforce Powell and wondered where that could possibly come from. One is left to surmise how anybody could arrive at that conclusion when Moore clearly stated in his report that it was an order from Colonel Peabody that sent Moore and five companies of the 21st Missouri to Powell’s aid. But it was interesting to note that Lt. Col. Woodyard did indeed put in his report; “I have the honor to report that on the morning of the 6th of April, before sunrise, General Prentiss ordered Colonel Moore, with five companies of our regiment, to sustain the pickets of the Twelfth Michigan Infantry.” Woodyard’s comment reinforced the fact that the situation was so chaotic that Woodyard did not even know it was Peabody that sent Moore out with the first five companies and that it was done to “sustain the pickets of the Twelfth Michigan Infantry.” I kept an eye out for a confirmation of Moore’s report concerning who ordered him out with five companies to reinforce Powell. I finally found it in the following letter written in 1883 by William French, who was there. Not only was he there but he was Moore’s adjutant. His short letter contains other interesting points that blow holes in the Shiloh revisionist ship that will aid in sending that ship down to the deep where it belongs. William French’s letter was published on April 12, 1883 in the National Tribune. Copies of the National Tribune are available online. Just google National Tribune and it should show up. It is a short letter so I typed it up and here it is. One Regiment that was Not Surprised. To the Editor National Tribune: “As the manner in which the battle of Shiloh was fought is now under discussion, I would like, with your permission, to relate what I know about it. There was at least one regiment, the Twenty-first Missouri, commanded by Colonel David Moore, which was not surprised. On Saturday morning, April 5th, the day before the battle, General Prentiss, commanding the division to which we belonged, held a review, and at that time some rebel cavalry were seen in the vicinity. In the afternoon he ordered Colonel Moore to take five companies of his regiment and reconnoiter on our front. We went out about a mile and found numerous traces of the presence of rebel cavalry. The inmates of a house which we visited told us that the rebels were in large force, and that we would be attacked the following morning. Colonel Moore reported this fact to Colonel Peabody, who commanded the brigade, and also to General Prentiss, but no notice was taken of it, except that the pickets were strengthened. The next morning found us up early and ready for orders, and presently Colonel Peabody’s adjutant arrived with instructions for Colonel Moore to take out five companies. The pickets had been fired on in the meanwhile, and the Colonel met them falling back. They reported a heavy force in front of them, and the Colonel sent back to camp for the remaining five companies, and taking the pickets with him marched to the front. We had gone about a mile, and were in sight of the house where we heard the afternoon before that we were to be attacked, when the rebels fired on us. Colonel Moore was shot twice. He dismounted and told me to take care of him and keep a sharp lookout. He formed his regiment in line of battle and the boys began to deliver a very rapid fire. At this time an orderly arrived from Colonel Peabody and wished to know whether Colonel Moore could hold his position until he could re-enforce him. Colonel Moore sent back word that he would; but no re-enforcements came, however, and for about an hour we held the ground alone. The Twenty-first Missouri never did better shooting than on that Sunday morning. It was on that field that Colonel Moore was wounded for the third time. A minie ball broke his leg below the knee, and he was taken back to the camp, and afterwards placed on a gunboat on the river, If, after all the fighting we went through that Sunday morning, any of our boys were shot down near their tents, I, for one, don’t pity them. They had plenty of warning. Colonel Moore held his ground faithfully and bravely, and justice indeed has never been done him for the part he took in the battle of Shiloh.” William French Athens, Mo. Co. F, 21stMo. Wiley Sword wrote in his book on page 138; “About 7 P. M. Moore advised Prentiss that the results of his reconnaissance were negative.” That is not what Prentiss wrote in his report nor is it what William French wrote in this letter. William French wrote that they found evidence of Rebel cavalry and were told by citizens that they would be attacked in the morning. Colonel Moore reported this information to both Colonel Everett Peabody and Brigadier General Benjamin Prentiss. The Shiloh revisionists want you to believe that Moore reported nothing to the front of the camps and that Moore’s report is why General Prentiss did nothing as Peabody harangued him about Rebels to the front of his brigade. But the record clearly shows that Moore reported the presence of cavalry and the reaction by Prentiss was to send out additional pickets to strengthen the picket line and authorize additional patrols that eventually culminated in the 3 a. m. patrol by Major James E. Powell and ordered by Peabody. While Prentiss authorized reconnaissance patrols he was unaware as to the timing of those patrols. I have found nothing to indicate that Prentiss was at Peabody’s camp on the night of April 5th. Peabody, Powell and others were taking their case to Prentiss at his headquarters. As it got later on the night of April 5th Peabody continued to receive reports that heightened his alarm and increased his anxiety to know just what was in front of his brigade. But Prentiss was not there and did not have the latest information that Peabody had. It is bewildering to hear revisionists claim that Moore reported that he found nothing actionable. Moore wrote in his report; “In pursuance of the order of Brig. Gen. B. M. Prentiss, commanding Sixth Division, Army of the West Tennessee, I on Saturday proceeded to a reconnaissance on the front of the line of General Prentiss’ division and on the front of General Sherman’s division. My command consisted of three companies from the Twenty-first Missouri Regiment—companies commanded by Captains Cox, Harle, and Pearce. A thorough reconnaissance over the extent of 3 miles failed to discover the enemy. Being unsuccessful, as stated, I returned to my encampment about 7 o’clock p. m. What Moore is referring to is that he did not find any Rebels that he could shoot. Moore does not relate that he found evidence of rebel cavalry but Prentiss wrote that in his report and acted on it by strengthening the picket line. Prentiss wrote “At about 7 o’clock the same evening Colonel Moore returned, reporting some activity in the front—an evident reconnaissance by cavalry. This information received, I proceeded to strengthen the guard stationed on the Corinth road, extending the picket lines to the front a distance of a mile and a half, at the same time extending and doubling the lines of the grand guard.” It should be noted that Moore is pretty specific about the afternoon patrol he took out. He even gave us the names of the commanders of the three companies he took out on the patrol. He makes no mention of going on patrol joined by Major James E. Powell as claimed by Wiley Sword in his book. The idea of a patrol going out with both Moore and Powell just makes no sense and is not backed up by any account that I can find. It is simply one of the figments of Sword’s imagination that has found its way into the narrative and gets repeated by other historians who just repeat another historian’s work without scrutiny. But Prentiss confuses the issue with his report because he gets events out of sequence. Prentiss wrote in his second paragraph: “Saturday evening, pursuant to instructions received when I was assigned to duty with the Army of West Tennessee, the usual advance guard was posted, and in view of information received from the commandant there of, I sent forward five companies of the Twenty-fifth Missouri and five companies of the Twenty-first Missouri Infantry, under command of Col. David Moore, Twenty-first Missouri. I also, after consultation with Col. David Stuart, commanding a brigade of General Sherman’s division, sent to the left one company of the Eighteenth Wisconsin Infantry, under command of Captain Fisk. At about 7 o’clock the same evening Colonel Moore returned, reporting some activity in the front—an evident reconnaissance by cavalry. This information received, I proceeded to strengthen the guard stationed on the Corinth road, extending the picket lines to the front a distance of a mile and a half, at the same time extending and doubling the lines of the grand guard.” The way Prentiss composed these paragraphs gives the impression that Moore returned at 7 o’clock p. m. from a patrol consisting of five companies of the Twenty-first Missouri and five companies of the Twenty-fifth Missouri. But that makes no sense and does not fit the timing given by Moore in his report. Moore clearly wrote that he returned to camp at 7 p. m. after leading the three-company patrol he took out 3 miles. It makes no sense that at dusk with night approaching Prentiss would order a huge patrol of ten companies to go mashing around through the woods in the dark. My view is when Prentiss stated “I sent forward five companies of the Twenty-fifth Missouri and five companies of the Twenty-first Missouri Infantry, under command of Col. David Moore, Twenty-first Missouri” he is not describing a patrol but rather he sent Moore forward with ten companies to strengthen the picket line. Prentiss stated years later that these troops were sent forward with the order to stay through the night and try to capture some Rebels if they could. At some point on the evening of April 5th communication ceased between Prentiss at his headquarters and what was occurring in front of Peabody’s brigade. Prentiss felt he had responded to information received by sending out additional pickets. When Prentiss retired to his tent he believed that the war god David Moore was out on the picket line with ten companies of troops. However, apparently the pickets returned to camp at some point. When Powell’s patrol moved forward at 3 a. m. Prentiss was unaware of that fact. When Peabody heard pretty heavy firing and wounded men came into camp informing him that Powell could use some help Peabody sent his adjutant to Colonel Moore and told him to go to Powell’s aid with five companies. Moore did so and encountered the retreating Powell on the road east of Seay Field. Moore believed the Rebels were just a patrol and that they could be beaten back if Moore had the other five companies of the 21st Missouri. Moore sent an orderly back to camp to have the other five companies of the 21st Missouri sent to him. But the orderly did not follow the command chain. The orderly did not go to Peabody but instead went all the way to Prentiss at his headquarters. Prentiss described the arrival of the orderly in a speech in 1882; “Early in the morning, on the 6th of April, 1862, it was my duty, from what I had learned, to feel the enemy. I had been admonished on the Friday evening before that battle that an enemy of some force was in our front. Not at 3 o’clock, but on the evening of Saturday, before the sun had set, the details were made, and the order given throughout my division to advance the pickets and strengthen them with additional numbers. I did send to the front the gallant Moore, with five of his companies—three at first, and doubting their ability to meet the enemy, I sent two more on my right. On my left two companies of the 18thWisconsin were advanced one mile to the front. In the center, one company of the 61st Illinois and one of the 18th Missouri were sent forward as extra pickets, with instructions to remain until daylight and see if they could not capture some of the marauders that had been engaged in committing depredations immediately in our vicinity. Early on that Sabbath morning, before (while seated at my breakfast news came to me from the gallant Moore) I had heard the musketry fired in front, and heard the skirmishing, an orderly came galloping into camp and said: “General, the compliments of Gen. Moore. He requests me to say to you that he has met the enemy. Send his other five companies and he will lick them.” That is the language that came to me. Gen. Prentiss sent those other five companies of his regiment to him.” The work “admonish” had a different meaning back in the 1800s. The meaning was more close to “informed” as nowadays it is deemed more critical to be “admonished.” Here it is 20 years after the battle of Shiloh and Prentiss related what he believed happened. Note Prentiss remembered sending “to the front the gallant Moore” “to advance the pickets and strengthen them with additional numbers.” Prentiss had no clue as to Powell’s patrol on the morning of April 6th and the available record, including his 1882 speech shows that Prentiss had no clue as to Powell’s patrol when they placed him in his casket in February of 1901. He never mentioned Powell’s patrol and Peabody’s involvement because he never knew. Prentiss believed that Colonel David Moore was at the front with five companies and when he got a messenger from Moore wanting the rest of his regiment that just reinforced Prentiss’s belief that Moore had been involved with the start of the fighting. Back to French’s short letter and the wealth of information it contains for our consideration. 1. 1. French described how Prentiss ordered Moore to take out an afternoon patrol. French wrote five companies but Moore stated just three in his report. French reported they found numerous traces of Rebel cavalry. This contradicts the revisionist claim that Moore found nothing. 2. 2. French described how they were informed by citizens that the Rebels had a large force and that the Union camp would be attacked in the morning. French wrote that Moore passed this information on to both Prentiss and Peabody but that no serious note was taken except to strengthen the pickets. Here is a first indication that French was unaware of Powell’s patrol. It is also the only source I have seen that informs us that not only did Moore alert Prentiss but also Peabody. 3. 3. French confirmed the fact that Moore received an order from Peabody to take out five companies and move to the front. French gave the reason for this order is that the pickets had been fired upon. A second indication that French was unaware of Powell’s patrol. In addition this observation supports Moore report that it was Peabody that ordered him forward. Both Colonel David Moore and his adjutant, William French, say Peabody ordered Moore forward with five companies and they were there. 4. 4. French wrote that Moore met the pickets falling back and stopped them while sending back for the other five companies of the 21st Missouri. This is the third indication that French was unaware of Powell’s patrol and concluded that the men they encountered had been on picket duty instead of a five company patrol that Peabody had ordered to the front. French made no comment but it has been noted that the orderly Moore sent back for the other five companies went to Prentiss and not Peabody. 5. 5. French described the location of their fight as the house they had visited the day before during their reconnaissance which is at Seay Field. Seay Field is not three miles from the camp of the 21st Missouri. Based on Moore’s description that he moved in front of Sherman’s division it appears that he advanced beyond Seay Field but where Moore actually went is open to question. 6. 6. French wrote of Peabody sending an orderly to ask if Colonel Moore could hold his position until Peabody could reinforce him. I have not seen that referenced anywhere else. Finally French declaimed that “Colonel Moore held his ground faithfully and bravely, and justice indeed has never been done him for the part he took in the battle of Shiloh.” Of that French is totally correct. Rather than receiving justice for his role in the battle of Shiloh Colonel David Moore now receives ridicule and mockery at the hands of the Shiloh revisionists. He is depicted as a liar and a buffoon who could not find his way through the trees in front of Peabody’s camp without losing his way. There is no better example of how Shiloh revisionism has adversely affected the modern history of the battle of Shiloh than reading about the opening of the fight in Keven Getchell’s Scapegoat of Shiloh. What a shame that readers of that book who are not familiar with the battle of Shiloh will believe any of what Getchell wrote concerning the opening of the fight. Getchell did Moore and Prentiss a severe injustice in his book because he followed the Shiloh revisionist mantra. With that I close this posting even though I have so much more to tell. But tomorrow is another day and how it came to be that Colonel David Moore has been falsely depicted as a liar and a buffoon will be revealed in an upcoming posting. Hank
  22. Earlier
  23. Ozzy

    PVT Baker 25th Missouri

    The Reason for Powell’s Patrol Returning to the original subject of this post (Private Baker’s newspaper article) let’s play a game of “What if…?” Included on these pages of the Shiloh Discussion Group there are two competing claims: 1) the pickets sent forward by Sherman and Prentiss on the evening of Saturday 5 April 1862 were correctly placed; and 2) the patrol performed by Major James Powell, 25th Missouri (and ordered forward by Colonel Everett Peabody, commanding 1st Brigade of Prentiss’s Sixth Division) was responsible for sounding the alarm, thus saving Grant’s Army at Pittsburg Landing. In the account of Private Baker, he provides details of Powell’s Patrol not available elsewhere. And this leads to an interesting conclusion in regard to “the purpose of Powell’s Patrol.” [Before reading further, consider: “What do you believe was the reason Colonel Peabody sent forward that early Sunday morning patrol of Major Powell ?” (Over the years, some have suggested, “because of his experience at Lexington Missouri, Peabody was not going to let himself be surprised again,” while others claim that, “Colonel Peabody had a premonition, and in response sent forward that patrol to alert the sleeping Federals to their imminent danger,” while yet others insist that, “Everett Peabody was a fatalist, who in spite of knowing that Sounding the Alarm would likely result in his own death, took action to Sound that Alarm, anyway.”) ] Now, read Daniel Baker’s report and see what Private Baker claims that Major Powell was directed by Colonel Peabody to accomplish (and how many excursions forward were made by Major Powell in pursuit of this goal.) Consider this: the only members of Grant’s Army who truly knew what was going on with this early Sunday morning “adventure” featuring David Powell were David Powell, Everett Peabody, a handful of officers who met with Peabody and agreed with the decision to send Powell, and the members of the 25th Missouri and 12th Michigan who actually took part… and Private Baker. Of these, many did not survive to see sunset on April 6th 1862. All we have is hearsay. Leaving Private Baker for a moment, read the November 1862 report of the Battle of Shiloh submitted by Brigadier General Prentiss. It is safe to assume that Benjamin Prentiss “woke up to the sound of gunfire on Sunday morning.” The General was asleep, having sent out a patrol the previous evening, conducted by his trusted subordinate, Colonel David Moore, which discovered, “nothing of substance.” In his report, General Prentiss states, “At 3 o’clock on the morning of Sunday, April 6, Colonel David Moore, 21st Missouri, with five companies of his infantry regiment, proceeded to the front, and at break of day the advance pickets were driven in, whereupon Colonel Moore pushed forward and engaged the enemy’s advance…” [ Underline is mine – Ozzy – for emphasis to show that Prentiss does not say, “I sent Moore forward,” or “Colonel Peabody sent Moore forward,” because in November 1862, Benjamin Prentiss did not fully know how the Battle of Shiloh started; but he did know that when he woke up, “someone” was out somewhere to the front, with increasing sound of gunfire. Compare this to how Prentiss claims, in the same report that, “I sent forward [David Moore’s patrol, and Captain Fisk’s company in front of Stuart] on Saturday.” Leaves no doubt that Prentiss takes credit for ordering the Saturday reconnaissance, and does not take credit for Moore being in the front Sunday.] And then Colonel Moore sent back for “the rest of his 21st Missouri to be sent forward.” A messenger “arrived at my tent headquarters, calling for the balance of the 21st Missouri, which was promptly sent forward.” [From this messenger, Prentiss discovers that it is “Colonel Moore and several companies of his 21st Missouri that is out in front” …but how did he get there? ] There are several reports of, “General Prentiss hooted at Colonel Peabody.” So, this likely occurred… but why? Could it be that General Prentiss heard a “camp rumour” that Peabody had “done something to bring on the Prohibited General Engagement” (possibly responsible for sending David Moore to the front ?) Peabody was killed soon afterwards, and Moore was carried away wounded, to the rear, so there was no one (and no opportunity) to provide direct evidence of “how things got started” until much later. But, as far as Benjamin Prentiss could determine (as reported in November 1862) Colonel Moore responded to “something taking place to his front” and this movement forward occurred at 3 a.m. and “the general engagement, proceeding beyond exchange of picket-fire, commenced at break of day.” What if… in the course of waking up on Sunday morning, General Prentiss received word from a messenger that indicated Colonel Moore was responsible for the eruption of gunfire to the front. And then, in process of sending the remainder of the 21st Missouri forward (followed soon afterwards by Prentiss sending forward Hickenlooper’s Ohio Battery and Munch’s Minnesota Battery) the General “was informed” that Colonel Peabody had 1) acted on his own initiative; 2) brought on the prohibited General Engagement (prohibited by Major General Grant) and 3) the Colonel failed to alert General Prentiss as to “what was going on, and how it transpired ?” Does not Prentiss have a right to “hoot at Colonel Peabody ?” And, as more details are revealed: Moore and Powell were part of the patrol on Saturday; Powell went out early Sunday morning with the 25th Missouri and 12th Michigan… but even before that, Major Powell went forward with some of the pickets to see if he could capture a Rebel cavalryman, to find out what was developing to the front… [Where does the story end ? How much is fact, and how much is result of overactive imagination ? Prentiss, when constructing his Shiloh Report, stuck to only the truth he could prove in November 1862.] What was the result? Colonel Moore gets the credit (from Prentiss) for sounding the alarm that kept the Union Army from being surprised at Shiloh. [Prentiss does not “take credit,” because Moore was already in place when Prentiss woke up.] Colonel Peabody (who apparently operated outside his authority) is accorded neither credit nor censure; and General Prentiss had every right to make mention of Colonel Peabody’s “operation outside his authority,” but due to lack of absolute evidence – or compassion for the dead man’s memory – chose to include details in his November report, as stated. [Peabody would have had recourse on Saturday after Moore returned, through Chain of Command, to inform Prentiss that he “intended to visit Major General Grant with his concerns” and Prentiss could not have legally prevented that visit. Of course, the problem was: Grant was not at Pittsburg, but nine miles downriver at Savannah; so Peabody’s time-sensitive concerns had to be dealt with immediately, or not at all.] (Peabody’s role will be determined by historians in the fullness of time, as will Powell’s role.) If Private Baker is to be believed, we still do not have the full story…
  24. Who Sent Colonel Moore I have been following this discussion with interest; and in process of viewing the above video, “The Division that Never Was,” by Tony Willoughby, and featuring the excellent introduction of Prentiss’s Sixth Division by the well-prepared Bjorn Skaptason, beginning at the 36:45 mark, a jarring error jumps from the video, when Mr. Skaptason indicates, “how Colonel David Moore and his handful of 21st Missouri companies came to find themselves in front of the Sixth Division on Sunday morning,” stating that, “As Major Powell fell back, he encountered five companies of the 21st Missouri under Colonel David Moore… When the skirmish started in Fraley Field, General Prentiss decided he needed to send some reinforcements… so General Prentiss sent Colonel Moore with five companies of the 21st Missouri.” The problem with this statement, is Benjamin Prentiss was likely still asleep when Colonel Moore marched those five companies forward; and it could very well be the subsequent increased firing or arrival of a messenger from Colonel Moore (requesting the remainder of his 21st Missouri be sent forward) is what awoke General Prentiss from his slumber. How do we know this? In the very first line of the fourth paragraph, as Benjamin Prentiss details in his Shiloh report his initial actions of Sunday morning, April 6th, he states, “At 3 o’clock on the morning of Sunday, April 6, Colonel David Moore, 21st Missouri, with five companies of his infantry regiment, proceeded to the front…” [Note that Prentiss does not take credit for sending Colonel Moore, because at 3 o’clock (even before Major Powell made initial contact) it is safe to assume that Benjamin Prentiss was asleep.] Prentiss’s first action in regard to Moore that morning is recorded, “At this stage a messenger was sent to my headquarters, calling for the balance of the 21st Missouri, which was promptly sent forward.” [This sending of reinforcements to Colonel Moore is the first action indicated as being taken by General Prentiss upon waking up – his first decision, with resulting action, which can be attributed to Benjamin Prentiss that morning.] So, who sent Colonel Moore forward ? Remember that David Moore was wounded Sunday morning, was removed from the field, and subsequently escaped the capture(s) that occurred during the day (and which resulted in much of the 21st Missouri – that had not been killed or wounded – being sent away south as prisoners.) So, Colonel Moore was available to submit his Shiloh Report (but with General Prentiss being unavailable), the report was sent to Prentiss’s Assistant Adjutant General, Henry Binmore, on 11 April 1862. In that report, David Moore states, “On Sunday morning, at about 6 o’clock, being notified that the picket guard of the First Brigade had been attacked and driven in, by order of Colonel Everett Peabody, commanding the First Brigade, I advanced with five companies of my command…” [pp.9 - 10 report to be found in The 21st Missouri Regiment Infantry Veteran Volunteers (1899) by N.D. Starr & T.W. Holman http://archive.org/stream/21stmissouriregi00holm#page/n3/mode/2up .]
  25. Ozzy

    James Veatch, 25th Indiana

    The Great Debate In 1883 following on the release to the public of the first dozen volumes of the Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, two Generals from Indiana engaged in an astonishing debate -- beginning at Farragut G.A.R. Post of Evansville, where both presented their views in January -- and which continued on the pages of the Newspaper of Union Civil War Veterans, the National Tribune. Major General Alvin Hovey defended his view that the Union Army under General Grant was surprised at Shiloh; while Major General James Veatch presented his rebuttal over the course of four columns on Page One of the 15 March 1883 issue: http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn82016187/1883-03-15/ed-1/seq-1/ You are invited to have a read, compare the statements of Generals Veatch and Hovey, and if you feel so inclined, post your comments. Cheers Ozzy N.B. Alvin Hovey's Shiloh article is here: http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn82016187/1883-04-05/ed-1/seq-1/ and more information regarding this Veteran of Battle of Shiloh can be found at SDG post "Alvin Hovey, 24th Indiana" of 30 AUG 2018.
  26. Ozzy

    James Veatch, 25th Indiana

    Mona and Transylvania Thanks for reminding us that Tony Willoughby created these valuable video records, the two above relating the story of James Veatch on Day One ( operating near the center of the battlefield) and Day Two (involved with Grant's Charge in the afternoon.) Bjorn Skaptason does an admirable job presenting the Story of Veatch (detached from Hurlbut;s Fourth Division to support Federal forces further west.) And, as Mr. Skaptason admits: "As political generals go, Veatch did pretty good" [minute mark 5:30 of first video.] All the best Ozzy
  27. mona

    James Veatch, 25th Indiana

    thanks for posting this!!! i could not atend d/t a memorial service i was part of at the church..
  28. well...we will be closer to the river when we stop for lunch..
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