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  2. Stan An account by Benjamin Franklin Sawyer, who was then Captain of Company I, says that Lt Col Herron was mortally wounded and died the next day. Sawyer was later Lt Col of the 24th Alabama. <Omitted; unrelated to Lt Col Herron's death.> [The Newberry Herald. (Newberry, SC) , March 11, 1874, page 1.] The brother of Capt B F Sawyer, left on the field mortally wounded, was Theodore Nathan Sawyer. Image from FindAGrave https://www.findagrave.com/memorial/158618549/theodore-nathan-sawyer
  3. National treasure and esteemed Civil War historian Ed Bearss passed away on 16 September 2020. He was 97. The Marine Corps veteran was known for involvement in furthering knowledge of Fort Donelson and the Vicksburg Campaign, but Ed Bearss wrote accurate, detailed papers on wide-ranging aspects of the Civil War (most recently an excellent paper describing the Battle of Santa Rosa Island near Pensacola Florida was uncovered.) And the involvement of Ed Bearss in raising of USS Cairo, now on permanent display at Vicksburg, is not to be forgotten. The family requests that those interested in commemorating Ed's legacy make a contribution to The American Battlefield Trust: http://Www.battlefields.org/remembering-Ed-Bearss.
  4. 1776 Project Several years ago mention was made of the approaching 250th Commemorations of the Founding of America as an independent nation. Today, President Trump signed the 2020 Constitution Day Proclamation establishing the 1776 Project, commencing the program of 250th Anniversary recognition: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pt8NLUWAYU4 The White House post of 17 SEP 2020. The Civil War was a Constitutional crisis; and the Battle of Shiloh was one important episode in the resolution of that crisis.
  5. Great find on L. D. Sandidge (there are any number of undiscovered gems yet to be revealed in the Southern Historical Society Papers.) What makes Sandidge's report compelling: he was one of a very few men who rode from the extreme left to the extreme right during the Battle of Shiloh; acquiring a better feel for the events of 6 and 7 April 1862 than Beauregard, or even Albert Sidney Johnston. On the Federal side, only Grant and one or two of his staff officers accomplished a similar feat. There's nothing like “being there” to gain an appreciation for the lay of the land.
  6. I stumbled upon this unsubmitted report by L.D. Sandidge, who served on Daniel Ruggles' staff. Particularly valuable for his discussion of the attack on William Tecumseh Sherman's camp on the morning of April 6. Link will be at the bottom. On the evening prior to the battle, I encamped Ruggles' division of three brigades and four batteries of artillery and a battalion of cavalry extending Bragg's line to the left, and instead of placing the left brigade en potence with the alignment, I found that Hardee's line did not rest on Owl creek. I extended the left brigade on continuous line, its extreme left resting on Owl creek and fronting the Federal encamped advance, menacing our unprotected left flank. I finished marking the line, as directed from division headquarters, and the entire division was on the ground, before dark. The four batteries held in columns, section front, in rear of the brigade intervals; the regiments held in columns at half distance, division front — this ployment being the prescribed order; the entire line about six hundred paces in rear of Hardee's line and overlapping it, as stated, by one brigade (Ruggles'), and Withers' division on its right, forming Bragg's line, Bragg being in second line of battle; Polk's corps, composed of Breckinridge's and B. R. Johnson's brigades, in reserve to rear — B. R. Johnson's brigade leading. Such was the position, as indicated by map inclosed, on night of 4th April preceding the battle. About dark I returned from extreme left to Corinth road, rejoined you there, and we slept by slight camp-fire in the interval between Gibson's and Anderson's (Patton) brigades. In the conversation [174] held with you then, I asked, as you were one of the council of war, what were the leading objective points to be considered, what the plan of action, &c. You stated that after some discussion and difference of opinion in the council, General Sidney Johnston intended trying to drive the Federal left back on its centre and right, thus doubling his army against Owl creek, away from the river and gunboats. I added that was contrary to the usual plan, which was to drive the Federal forces against the broad, deep river in their rear. You replied you had stated in the council your impression “they would not swing that way” --i. e., against Owl creek-but would stubbornly fight with their gunboats at their back. My opinion then and now is, that General Sidney Johnston lost his life in a vain effort to force the Federal retreat — an army of forty-five thousand, with his one-third less — in a direction arbitrarily selected. Here I notice the point that Gibson was ignorant of the movements “above indicated placing the army in position” --a singular statement contrasted with the fact that I slept in the same apartment with him at his headquarters at Mickey's the preceding night; that the brigade and staff moved at daylight next morning in conjunction with your other troops, and in the utmost good order took position indicated, his left resting on Corinth road. From this time, say 8 P. M., every brigade and battery was ready for instant action. At daylight Sunday morning the battle began — Chalmers' skirmishers on the extreme right, in accordance with what I understood to be the plan of battle, opening fire. Instantly we were in the saddle, and you gave the first and last command I recollect your giving as a command, often repeated, and always responded to by your division: “Forward” We rode rapidly down the division line, more than a mile long, through a densely wooded, hilly country, relieved here and there only by small cultivated fields, to see that the forward movement was continuous. Before we had ridden the length of two brigades — the line moving forward all the while — after a hurried consultation with the staff, you had a gun moved in advance and threw a few shells into the heights beyond, where some of the Federals were seen moving towards Hardee's flank, to develop their design, Hardee inquiring at once into the cause of the firing. You and remaining staff continued your forward progress, while I kept down the line. By the time I returned to the right — I had ridden rapidly too — I saw the following state of affairs: Hardee withdrawn from our front, for he had in his advance gained ground [175] to the right so rapidly, supporting the main attack on the Federal extreme left, that very early in the morning, instead of being in second line, our division was in first line confronting Federal right-centre, not two hundred yards distant, holding elevated ground with artillery and dense masses of infantry. In my brief absence — it was not then 8 A. M.--Patton Anderson, your second brigade, had twice furiously assaulted his position, and though checked each time, had successfully reformed his brigade line amidst the smoke of the battle, and you and he were preparing to made another effort to storm the heights beyond the narrow creek separating us from the Federals. I told you you could not carry the position without more force, and inquired for your first brigade (Gibson's). You stated you had, at General Bragg's request, detached Gibson, who was following up Hardee's and Withers' advance, and were all heavily engaged on our right. I then tried to bring you forward a battalion of cavalry (Brewer's) to make a diversion obliquely from the right, proffering to lead the cavalry in person, while you were making an artillery combination to support a renewed attack. But before engaging, the cavalry made such a wide detour to the right under cover of Hardee, they were useless to us. You further directed me to ride to the rear, and if I could get no support from the reserves (Polk), I was authorized to move one of the left brigades temporarily from left to right to support Anderson's renewed attack in front. In the meantime, the left of our line was still moving forward. On going to the rear a few hundred yards, I met the head of a Tennessee regiment marching by the flank — the first regiment of B. R. Johnson's brigade, Polk's command. I saw General B. R. Johnson, told him the situation in front, and begged him to move forward to our right and assist our front attack by an oblique demonstration, which he promptly executed, being severely wounded himself at the first onset. His brigade here fired the first gun — say 10 A. M.--that was fired by Polk's command. As soon as the head of the columns of the troops above mentioned appeared on our right, you, superintending the artillery firing (Washington artillery, &c.), again ordered “Forward I” and the indomitable Anderson a third time moved through the fire, sword in hand, and his attack, combined with the movement and attack of B. R. Johnson, finally drove the Federals--Anderson sweeping over the ground, capturing their artillery, &c. Our left brigade swung round, following up the attack, driving the Federals [176] back towards the river — we, in truth, being more successful than the main attack made from our right. In a word, the Federals declined to drive from the river at all, as you predicted in the council. The Federals, though driven from our front, moved rearward very slowly, contesting every inch. After we got them started, I again rode down the left of our line, directing our left brigade forward. The Federal right about this time began to swing rearward much faster than his right-centre, and it was evident they were falling back to concentrate on and strengthen the Federal centre and left, so heavily assaulted all the morning by the main effort to cut them off from the river. On my return to the extreme right of our division line, about noon, I found you had continued to drive the Federal right-centre to a certain point in an old field, where they were making a determined stand. I noticed here a long gap between our line and where I supposed Withers' left ought to be, and called your attention. We then thought it dangerous to leave it open, as a failure on our right and a furious effort on the part of the Federals in our front, if we failed to check, would imperil our rear. You directed me to fill up the interval with any detached infantry I could find, and at once bring forward all the artillery I could get to move, and have them open fire at once on the Federals in front, to prevent their making any movement endangering our position, and keep them moving in retreat. It was here that we finally, in a few hours, got between fifty and sixty field guns in position, and under this heavy fire you succeeded in moving again the Federals in our front, who had held their position so long and obstinately that when they started they found troops of Hardee and Withers on their left and rear, and our left brigade and the head of Polk's reserves on their right and rear, intercepting their march. A portion of Polk's column following the onward march of our left, both swinging to the right as they [moved forward, found themselves simultaneously on the rear and right of the Federal position. Here being assaulted in front by you with infantry and artillery, as stated, and hemmed in, 2,500 with Prentiss surrendered. It was at the point above mentioned, when we were getting this artillery together, I first heard of General Sidney Johnston's death on our right. The Federals by this time were concentrating along the river front all their remaining artillery and every infantry organization that could hold together, and were fighting for existence. The advance and attack continued--General Bragg issuing orders to [177] bring everything forward, and in less than an hour after Prentiss laid down his arms we rode over the ground his brigade stood in our advance. But now Leu Wallace was on our flank with 10,000 fresh troops from Pittsburg Landing. Nelson, leading Buel's army, 25,000 strong, was crossing the river in our front, and we were beginning to feel his fire. But an half hour of sun remained. It was impossible — though more than one assault was made to drive the defeated Federals into the river — to do anything more without reorganizing our troops, which was done during the night; but on the morrow the new army had to be fought on the same field. How that was done let history tell. I am certain I saw General Beauregard leading Mouton's regiment of our brigade in person, when you and Mouton, with the entire line, attacked the enemy's centre, and again two more of the brigades (Anderson's and Pond's) prolonged on the line of Cheatham at Shiloh church, again and again advanced by successive alignments, you and staff carrying the battle flags, repelling every attack of the fresh army of Monday (see Basil Duke's Forrest's Cavalry — foot note on Shiloh), till the Confederate army, moving in regular order, retired leisurely by the passage of lines from the field towards Corinth. Breckinridge and his Kentuckians will remember when their brigade was left on the field, interposed to secure retreat, a staff officer came through the rain and mire with General Ruggles' compliments and message that not one Louisianian would move a pace in retreat at the peril of a life in the brigade — the entire division to reinforce him — and his answer, “Sandidge, go tell you Louisianians God bless them! If they hear not our guns at dawn of the morning, send back a flag that we may have honorable burial, for we are enough to die!” https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A2001.05.0121%3Achapter%3D4.34
  7. Edmund H. Cummins of the Maryland Line, Virginia State Forces from May 1861, subsequently incorporated in the PACS as Engineer officer, was assigned to General PGT Beauregard after Bull Run (CSA Staff Officers page 39.) In Roman's biography of General Beauregard (page 158) it is claimed that “First Lieutenant Cummins was to be given command of the Rocket Company” [the rockets appear to have been intended as a signal device.] When the Rocket Company was disallowed by Richmond, now-Captain Cummins continued on as member of Beauregard's staff [Signals Officer.] An interesting Letter dated 20 OCT 1861 from General Beauregard to President Davis concerns the General's desire for a Rocket Company; and questions SecWar Judah Benjamin's authority to disallow Beauregard's request. Unfortunately, this Letter was sent during the Beauregard vs. Davis dispute regarding “credit for success at Bull Run; blame for lack of pursuit to Washington” and did not elicit a favorable response from President Davis. When General Beauregard departed Virginia for Kentucky, meeting General Albert Sidney Johnston at Bowling Green early February 1862 [see Letter of 30 JAN 1862, Roman pages 492 - 493] he brought Captain Edmund Cummins along. Initially, it was intended for PGT Beauregard to replace MGen Polk as commander of Fort Columbus; then it was decided (by General A.S. Johnston) that Polk would remain in command of Fort Columbus, under command of General Beauregard. And Beauregard's assignment was formalized as responsibility for “The Department of the Mississippi” [usually indicated as Army of the Mississippi] between Johnston's Department No.2 and MGen Van Dorn's Trans-Mississippi. Island No.10 and New Madrid fell under Beauregard's purview; so when Fort Columbus was evacuated, key staff of Beauregard (Trudeau and Captain Cummins) were initially sent to Island No.10 to assist with developing the strong defence there. But, both James de Berty Trudeau and Edmund Cummins were withdrawn from Island No.10 before that position collapsed. And both officers were present at Battle of Shiloh [see General Beauregard's Shiloh Battle Report page 6: “Captain Cummins, signal officer, was also actively employed as a staff officer both days.”] Still investigating what were the duties performed by Captain Cummins and his team at Shiloh...
  8. Confederate Signals Although technically assigned to General Beauregard, it appears Captain E. H. Cummins may have acted as Signals Officer for the Army of the Mississippi at Shiloh. What were his duties? What tools and other resources (manpower) did he use? This is in early stages of investigation. But a book recently uncovered, Military Memoirs of a Confederate (1907) identifies the man at the top of the Confederate Signals Department early in the war: Captain (later Brigadier General) Edward Porter Alexander. [E. P. Alexander was an associate of Major A. J. Myer before the war, and assisted with development of U.S. military signals.] With a little effort, the tasks performed by Rebel Signals Operators at Shiloh and Corinth may be revealed. https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/000454546 Military Memoirs of a Confederate by BGen Edward P. Alexander (1907). [On pages 15 - 16 Alexander outlines the tasks and difficulties of laying out Signal Stations preparatory to Battle of (First) Manassas.] N.B. Of general interest: Edward P. Alexander was offered command of the Confederate Signal Corps, but declined, preferring to remain in the field. The position was subsequently awarded to William Norris, who held the rank of Major for the bulk of the war; and who established the Confederate Secret Service as a component of the Signal Corps, with direct links to Secretary of State Judah Benjamin and a network of agents operating as far north as Montreal Canada. The Confederate Secret Service with its Maryland Line [secure communications] and links to Mosby and other action agents is still not fully understood... but more information is revealed every day.
  9. What if... Farragut was supposed to take possession of Vicksburg, like he did at Natchez; Farragut miss-read his orders/ did not get clarification for “what to do after taking control of the Prime Objective of New Orleans” Farragut did not realize the bluffs at Vicksburg were so high; Farragut, not realizing the height of Vicksburg's bluffs, sent the weapon that could have engaged the top of those bluffs – David Dixon Porter's mortar schooners – away out of the Mississippi to “await further orders at Ship Island” (and Porter employed those mortars against Forts Gaines and Morgan, and mostly expended all the remaining, hard-to-replace 126-pound explosive shells) Farragut left his infantry force (commanded by MGen Benjamin Butler) behind in New Orleans/ Algiers instead of bringing him north, up the Mississippi River (as suggested in Butler's orders) Farragut, by not chasing the Rebels away from Vicksburg; and by not landing 14000 men under Butler at Vicksburg, missed an opportunity (mentioned in Butler's orders) to take not only Vicksburg, but launch Butler east towards Jackson Mississippi, where Butler's force was supposed to act as “anvil” to Halleck's “hammer” and Beauregard's Rebels “the piece being worked” ...and with every likelihood, end Rebellion in the West; The linch-pin that brought the whole program (above) unstuck was President Lincoln removing McClellan from his role as “General in Chief of the Army” in March 1862 and assuming that role himself (with assist from Edwin Stanton); and no one realized that Farragut and Butler had not received clarification of their orders (originally issued by McClellan.) Wouldn't that be a tragic tale for the Union... if true?
  10. The computer I am presently using is slightly more than a year old, purchased after my previous, four year old computer froze up on me (and took everything not backed up on memory stick.) Reviewing my notes, in April, May, June 2018 I was seeking information on Braxton Bragg; and was particularly curious why the General never got around to writing Memoirs... and discovered those works were in the pipeline (to be assisted/ ghost written by E. T. Sykes.) And somewhere during the course of investigation, that brief report by Captain Sykes relating to the Battle of Shiloh popped up... But it was one of those files I had not backed up, and lost on the hard drive with the old computer. And the only details I can recall: the article was written about 1873; it seems to have been submitted to General Bragg; there were two or three such reports written by E. T. Sykes about other battles he participated in (but because they were not Shiloh, I did not copy those.) Sorry I cannot be of more help... Ozzy
  11. I revisit this topic to remind everyone that Patton Anderson (who Braxton Bragg stated "was his best friend") was the original subject (of a Quiz topic in June 2018.) But, there is more to reveal... Because, the Patton Anderson - Braxton Bragg connection was discovered while searching for "potential ghost writers approached to assist with construction of Braxton Bragg's Memoirs." So, without further ado, those three men: Kinloch Falconer (approached in about 1870) William Thomas Walthall (approached after 1870, but went on to assist Jefferson Davis with Rise & Fall of the Confederacy) Edward Turner Sykes (approached by Bragg after Kinloch Falconer, it appears E.T. Sykes, Adjutant for the 10th Mississippi at Shiloh and briefly on the Staff of Patton Anderson, was the man selected to "assist" with Bragg's Memoirs. Volumes of documents were provided to Major Sykes... but for some reason, nothing except a few "sketches" ever eventuated, one of which was posted a day or two ago on SDG as "The 10th Mississippi Story"). Always more to the story... Ozzy [See next post...]
  12. I am currently piecing April 7 together and it is quite a difficult battle to figure out, particularly on the Confederate side with the units being jumbled together and accounts differing so much.
  13. Ozzy

    Seat of War Map

    Copy of photograph taken from site of house used by BGen McClernand as HQ building (which was destroyed after Battle of Fort Donelson.) Image found in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War (p.400) published by The Century Company (1887).
  14. Well Done on finding this information; and Thanks for providing a link to the Diary. The view of the conflict (the entire War) from a Southern perspective is enlightening. And it further verifies the Truth that, “We claim we know everything about Shiloh” ...at our peril. [On review of the Diary, there are interesting idiosyncrasies: the description of “Ellsworth vs. Jackson” at Alexandria May 1861; the labelling of Action of 18 July 1861 as Battle of Bull Run (a common mistake during the first few days following the engagement, which was later termed “Battle of Blackburn's Ford”); the adjustment of arrival times in Kentucky in SEP 1861 making it appear as if the Federals took Paducah before the Rebels took Hickman and Columbus; ignoring the result of Grant vs. Floyd/Pillow/Buckner at Fort Donelson on 16 FEB 1862...] And another reference (ongoing research) to Daniel Beltzhoover: https://www.emmitsburg.net/archive_list/articles/history/civil_war/belzhoover.htm
  15. For those who doubted it, in my research I have found proof of the Watson Battery at Shiloh, from Clarke's Diary of the War of Separation, which includes Alexander Walker's Shiloh report for the New Orleans Delta. He has the Watson Battery in the bombardment of Pittsburg Landing late on April 6. "The artillery were all hurried forward to complete the work. Thirty-six of our best guns were now brought into position on a ridge at a distance of three-fourths of a mile from the enemy's main body. There was the Watson heavy battery, of Breckinridge's Division, among the first to take its place, under the fearless and skilful Beltzhoover, who had already performed several brilliant feats in aid of Cheatham's movement. In this battery the liberal and patriotic gentleman after, whom it was named, who had been instrumental in putting it into the field with his own means, worked at the guns as an artillerist." Link: https://docsouth.unc.edu/imls/clarke/clarke.html
  16. 8 SEP 1861 Action at Fort Columbus As is known, BGen U.S. Grant took possession of Paducah on 6 SEP 1861 (and as Hank likes to say, “the War went downhill for the Confederacy from there” ...or words to that effect.) Less well known, the Rebel force that invaded Kentucky from the South, taking Hickman and the heights at Columbus, still were potential threat to Grant's small force at Paducah. What to do? Before dawn on 8 SEP 1861 BGen Grant directed Commander Stembel (Gunboat Lexington) to support an expedition under command of Colonel G. Waagner to Rebel-occupied Columbus and determine the enemy strength. The gunboat Conestoga (Lieutenant-Commanding Phelps) joined enroute from Cairo and the two gunboats closed the Rebel position and drew fire from artillery mounted on the bluff. Then CDR Stembel threw several shells into Lucas Bend... and as if by magic, two Rebel gunboats appeared. The Federal gunboats withdrew, chased briefly by one of the Rebel boats; Lexington and Conestoga were back at Cairo before noon. By this action and observation, the force at what became Fort Columbus was estimated as 2000 men and six pieces of artillery... not enough to threaten Paducah. The two Illinois infantry regiments and Willard's Battery (in total, about 2000 men) were deemed sufficient, for the moment. But just to be sure, Isaac Pugh's 41st Illinois Infantry was sent to Paducah on September 8th. Reference: OR (Navy) vol.22 pages 326 – 329.
  17. One of the few remaining Staff officers remaining to be identified held the position of Scout. On review of “The Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston” by his son, Wm. Preston Johnston (1880) on page 554 that man is identified as Major B. B. Waddell. In addition, in a 3 APR 1862 communication from MGen Bragg, Chief of Staff to MGen Hardee (see below), reference is made to the same man: “Captain Waddell, of General Beauregard's staff, with two guides will report to you.” Not specifically assigned to General Johnston, Major Waddell appears to have become “Chief Scout for the Army of the Mississippi.” http://shilohdiscussiongroup.com/topic/42-correspondence-confederate-april-3-1862/?tab=comments#comment-177 mention of Waddell. Entry at NPS: https://www.nps.gov/civilwar/search-soldiers-detail.htm?soldierId=973F6ADC-DC7A-DF11-BF36-B8AC6F5D926A Entry page 170 https://archive.org/stream/cu31924030921096#page/170/mode/2up of "Confederate Staff Officers" has Captain B. B. Waddell indicated as "VADC to General Beauregard 6 APR 1862."
  18. Maybe Grant sustained Mason to help out a fellow from Ohio? Just a thought as he might have smarted at the accusations against the state. At any rate, it is very much human nature to blame a whole group, even if the 1st, 4th, and 20th Tennessee did not conform to the stereotype about Tennessee troops at Shiloh.
  19. Thanks, I read over Haydon's article, and offered some important tactical and staff details. Thanks for pointing me to it.
  20. As for shirkers at Shiloh, the two States besmirched: Tennessee and Ohio. Tennessee was pointedly mentioned in a Letter from Mrs. Bragg to General Bragg (and in a subsequent letter, he agreed with her observation.) Tennessee also suffered from “that regiment” that even Breckinridge and Isham Harris could not control... leading to General Johnston trying his hand... leading to the General's death. On the Federal side, Ohio was the one that had to overcome the bad reputation: EVERYONE knew about the 53rd Ohio and their Colonel, who told them to, “Run and save yourselves.” And in front of Brigadier General Hurlbut, Myer's 13th Ohio Light Artillery deserted its six guns immediately after a lucky hit from Rebel Artillery (thought to be Robertson's) exploded their ammunition chest. And there was the 71st Ohio (Rodney Mason), which was supposed to be with Stuart on the far left... but no one could recall seeing them. And of course, Buell's Army of the Ohio received bad press outside of Ohio for arriving at Savannah DAYS later than he should have... [This caused unexpected enmity, because many soldiers from Ohio claimed it was IOWA soldiers who were at the waterfront in their thousands; and that IOWA regiments had been captured at sunrise in Prentiss' Camp.] It is wrong to paint “everyone from there” with the same brush, but it is human nature. [In the case of “Prentiss was captured early in the day,” it took him many months to retrieve his reputation – and the reputations of soldiers captured with him – after the incorrect reports in newspapers circulated... everywhere. And he and 2000 others were stuck in POW camps until OCT/ NOV 1862, without ability to address those charges.] [Also interesting to note: both William T. Sherman and Ulysses S. Grant were originally from Ohio; yet both avoided the "Ohio Tar Brush" that appeared at Shiloh.]
  21. Joseph Rich was obviously biased against Lew Wallace: a man whose Division had been promised to the 12th Iowa all day, yet failed to deliver. [Although not delivered to POW Camp, Joseph Rich was captured with many other wounded men -- perhaps as many as 300 -- yet left behind, mostly in the Camp of the 3rd Iowa, because it was too much trouble to remove wounded prisoners that could not walk from the battlefield. Two other captured wounded known to have been left behind: David W. Reed (Father of Shiloh NMP) and BGen WHL Wallace.] Lew Wallace's Division had been promised to most of the other Shiloh defenders, as well. [Apparently, LtCol James B. McPherson knew where Lew Wallace was going to be installed... but he arrived too late, and remained on the far right of the Union line, where the Third Division started Day Two.]
  22. Major Dudley Haydon reached Richmond end of April/ early May 1862. He carried with him 1) a Letter from Brigadier General William Preston to Johnston's son dated 18 APR 1862, 2) his Diary (from at least January, perhaps back to OCT 1861 when he joined General Johnston's Staff at Bowling Green) 3) eye-witness accounts of General Johnston's death from the other members of Staff, 4) knowledge of Staff meetings and Councils of War in the days leading up to Shiloh, 5) knowledge of General Johnston that he could share with Wm. P. Johnston (who had not seen his Father since SEP 1861). Either with the help of reporters, or on his own, Major Haydon's “Rough Notes of the Battle of Shiloh” appeared in 3 May 1862 edition of Richmond Daily Dispatch, Front Page, center column. General Beauregard's courier-delivered report was not printed by Richmond Daily Dispatch until 10 May (and was on page 2, running three columns in length.) [Shortly after placing Colonel W. P. Johnston "on his Staff," President Davis also gave the Colonel his own room in the Executive Mansion. Therefore, I believe anything Dudley Hayden shared with W. P. Johnston was shared with President Davis.] As for that June 1862 meeting between Colonel W. P. Johnston and General Beauregard in Mobile (after the General's removal from command, replaced by Bragg) ...THAT would have been one uncomfortable discussion.
  23. I read it today and thought "everything that is old is new." Outside of his harsh treatment of Lew Wallace, this very much reads like Tim Smith's argument. That adds to my contention that a lot of current scholarship, far from being unbiased, is a more detailed version of the Just Cause narrative of the Civil War. Before anyone chops off my head, Smith's work on Shiloh is first rate and I refer back to it all the time in my work. I also like Sword, Cunningham, and Daniel, and all three of them for different reasons. Hell, even Groom works as an introduction to the battle. Shiloh has been better served by historians and authors than most other battles of the war.
  24. Interesting... Do we know what Haydon delivered? In my Beauregard research I think Preston Johnston, at least in 1862, did not totally have it in for Beauregard. His report to Davis could have been harsher.
  25. For another take on Johnston's death, this comes from his courier: Broome, John P. “How Gen. A.S. Johnson Died.” Confederate Veteran, vol. 16 (December 1908), p. 629. I am not certain I believe it, but its better than William Stevenson's account, which does not line up and seems like an attempt to be there for a big moment. I posted it here as I consider couriers to be part of the staff, even if not formally so. I had an ancestor who was a courier for Loring, even though he was illiterate.
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