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  1. 6 points
    Sometimes from the depths of anguish and despair emerges something beautiful and inspiring. Such is the case with a Christmas song that started out as a poem, written in the middle of a seemingly endless war by a man who was no stranger to either anguish or despair. I'll let the video below tell the rest of the story. It's very much worth a listen. However life may find you as we near the end of 2017, I wish you better days ahead, and a truly wonderful 2018. Merry Christmas, folks. Perry
  2. 5 points
    Thanks for the links Tim. I believe I've found my favorite way to take in these hikes. Google maps, a Trailhead map and Tony's excellent videos. Life is good!
  3. 4 points
    Hello everyone. This is to let you know that we're ready to go with our next Epic Trek, with historian Tim Smith. This will be our seventh consecutive year with Tim, and it promises to be another great experience. Here are the details: Price: $30 per person. Payable on the morning of the hike. Date: November 3rd, 2018. Location: Shiloh National Military Park Start Time/Place: 8:00 a.m. at Ed Shaw's, just south of the park. (Not completely set in stone just yet on Shaw's, but Mona or I will keep you posted.) If you're not sure how to get there, don't worry, we've got you covered. Focus of this year's hike: We're going to be following in the footsteps of the Confederate army's Alabama troops, and learning about their experience at Shiloh. (See professionally drawn map, below.) Overview: We'll be heading out from or near Ed Shaw's, and head off toward Spain Field with the Alabama troops of Gladden's Brigade. From there we'll reinforce John K. Jackson's Bama boys as they navigate their way through the ravines east of the Peach Orchard and help encircle the Union soldiers trapped in the Hornet's Nest. Then we'll re-up with some of Gladden's men and plunge into the Canyon of Pittsburg Landing, better known as Dill Branch Ravine. Then on to lunch near the visitors center. After lunch it's off to the west side of the park, across Canyon Jr. (Tilghman Branch), to the site of Ketchum's Alabama Battery. Then we'll begin working our way back to the south along the April 7th battle lines, and our starting point at Shaw's. Total distance for this hike looks to be roughly nine miles, with terrain ranging from easy to most definitely not easy. We should finish up between 4:00 and 6:00, based on previous hikes. As always, sturdy hiking footwear is strongly recommended. Here's that (not quite) professionally done map, outlining our basic route through the park: Check back here for updates, and feel free to ask questions either here, via Private message, or by email @pcuskey@gmail.com. Hope to see everyone in November. Perry
  4. 4 points
    Captain Henry Binmore It is said that a good leader surrounds himself with good people. And, as has been discussed, Benjamin Prentiss had a number of good people in his employ, following on his election as Brigadier General (by the troops he was to command), on May 8th 1861, in charge of the Illinois Brigade, with HQ at Cairo. And those individuals selected by Prentiss contributed to the success of their General; and in return saw their own careers go from strength to strength. One such individual, not yet discussed, is Henry Binmore. A native of London born in 1833, Henry migrated to Montreal Canada at age 16 and became a journalist, self-taught in the skill of shorthand notation. After moving to the United States, the young man worked as reporter for newspapers in Illinois and Missouri, and got caught up in the phenomena that was Stephen A. Douglas: a rising star on the National stage, whose debates in 1858 with chief contender for a Senate seat from Illinois -- Abraham Lincoln -- also propelled that man into the National spotlight. Reporter Binmore published articles from those debates, all conducted in Illinois, in the Chicago Times and the Missouri Daily Republican... and probably led to Binmore gaining the notice of Senator Douglas (who won the election). Henry Binmore was employed as Secretary to Stephen A. Douglas, and remained with that man until his untimely death in June 1861. Private Secretary Binmore was suddenly in need of employment; and Brigadier General Prentiss was in need of a competent record-keeper/administrator. Given the rank of Captain, Henry Binmore became Prentiss's Assistant Adjutant General, and followed General Prentiss from Illinois to Northern Missouri. And when Benjamin Prentiss was assigned to duty with Grant's Army in Tennessee in March 1862, prospective assignment as Commander of the new Sixth Division, it may have been Captain Binmore who went ahead and reported at Savannah (while General Prentiss was busy with tasks assigned by Henry Halleck, and completed at Cairo, Mound City and Fort Henry.) It may very well have been Henry Binmore to whom Colonel Madison Miller reported on or about March 31st 1862, and received camp assignment for the 18th Missouri Infantry. (Next day, Miller records meeting General Prentiss, in person, and being assigned as Commander of 2nd Brigade, of the Sixth Division.) As AAG for the Sixth Division, Captain Binmore applied skills learned and practiced in Missouri to write and disseminate orders, and keep the books for General Prentiss. It is unknown how successful was Captain Binmore on April 6th, suffering the same surprise as the rest of the Sixth Division; and forced to flee north before 9 a.m., where it appears he remained close to General Prentiss in the Hornet's Nest (likely keeping an account of the Day's happenings -- and probably employed to deliver orders to units, close by, especially while Prentiss' designated courier -- Edwin Moore -- was away delivering one of the many messages to General Grant.) Before 4:30 p.m., about the same time Benjamin Prentiss ordered north the artillery batteries belonging to Hickenlooper and Munch (Pfaender), the General also ordered Captain Binmore to the Landing... and so, General Prentiss was without Staff when he was taken prisoner before 5:30 (Surgeon Everett having been killed earlier in the day.) A Staff officer without a General to serve, Henry Binmore applied to Stephen Hurlbut, and found employment as volunteer Aide de camp. In December 1862, when Major General Hurlbut was put in Command of the new 16th Army Corps, with HQ at Memphis, Binmore was promoted to Major, and then Lieutenant Colonel, and became Hurlbut's AAG. At the conclusion of the War, Henry Binmore returned to Chicago and found employment as a Law Reporter (while studying law.) Passing the Illinois Bar before 1890, he continued to work in the legal profession, and the writing of law-related documents and papers, until his death in 1907. Just a bit more to the story of the Sixth Division... Ozzy References: http://archive.org/stream/lincolndouglas2184linc#page/n121/mode/2up/search/photograph Henry Binmore bio pages 80 - 81. OR 8, OR 10, OR 24 (various pages) Shiloh Report of General B. M. Prentiss http://archive.org/stream/cu31924022842433#page/n0/mode/2up/search/Binmore Henry Binmore's legal papers A Politician Turned General: the Civil War Career of Stephen A. Hurlbut by Jeffrey Norman Lash (2003) Kent State Press, page 110. http://newspapers.library.in.gov/cgi-bin/indiana?a=d&d=PT19071107.1.8 Plymouth Tribune 7 NOV 1907 page 8 col.4 "Reporter dies" SDG post March 2018 "The 18th Missouri Infantry" [Colonel Madison Miller] [Sketch by Robert Marshall Root] Lincoln - Douglas Debate of 18 SEP 1858 at Charleston Illinois before a crowd of 15000 people. Prominent on the Speaker's Platform are Abraham Lincoln, Stephen A. Douglas, and scribbling away below Lincoln's left arm, Henry Binmore. [From Scenic and Historic Illinois (1928) by Charles E. Brown.]
  5. 4 points
    All, Well, as many of you know, I have worked a long time to develop the best image collection related to the Battle of Shiloh, and also, Corinth, Fort Donelson, and Iuka. Never have thought to ask before, but if anyone has any images, or knows of any images, related to these battles, especially Shiloh. Let me know, I would love to add them to the appropriate album. I would speculate that the Shiloh Confederate and Federal albums is the largest online collection of images related to the Battle of Shiloh available, well, anywhere. Hope everyone enjoys them! Stan
  6. 4 points
    Jim - here are a few screenshots from my gps app showing where we hiked, with some added tags (I hope I got them right - if not someone will let us know). I included the elevations around Tilghman Branch since Tim asked about it.
  7. 4 points
    I have my reservation in Savannah and plan to be there as scheduled. Since the research I have done over the years involves Prentiss, Peabody, Powell, the opening of the fight and the Sunken Road and Hornets’ Nest I invite anybody from this group and any others who have an interest to meet me at 9 AM on Sunday, Nov. 12, at the Prentiss headquarters monument where I will share information on Prentiss. Then I plan to visit Peabody’s monument to have a discussion of what happened in the opening of the fight. After that we will make a trip to the Hornets’ Nest to discuss the action there and along the Sunken Road. Other details like the amount of walking and time frame will be worked out once we get started. I have no fixed time for ending but figure on continuing as long as there is an interest to do so. I was going to offer to do this after the morning Trabue hike but since those plans have changed I adjusted to start Sunday morning. Hank
  8. 3 points
    I located Sgt. William H. Busbey's post-war article about his being near Grant's Savannah headquarters and on Tigress during the trip to Pittsburg Landing on April 6th in the Chicago Inter-Ocean. Some obvious errors make it not completely reliable, and it may be completely unreliable, but it does make for interesting reading: "I was at Savannah in April, 1862, associated with the work of the Adams Express company . Myself and another young man employed in the same office were sleeping on the night of April 5 in a house in Savannah three or four blocks from the river. General Grant's headquarters at Savannah were in a house very close to the river. We were on higher ground than he was, and about daylight on the morning of April 6 the young man sleeping with me jumped out of bed with the exclamation, 'There's firing up at the Landing.' We could hear very distinctly the boom of cannon, and when we went to the east window we could hear, or thought we could hear, the sound of musketry. Pittsburg landing was nine miles away, but in the still morning air the roar of musketry came to us." "We dressed hurriedly, ran down to General Grant's headquarters, where we found General Webster, chief of artillery, in his night shirt on the porch listening intently to the sound of firing. We saw him run into the house, and another officer came out with him. They listened a minute, ran in again, and General Grant came out in his night dress. The three figures stood like statues while Grant listened, and then the General gave an order that put everything in a whirl. Ned Osborne of Chicago was at that time in command of Grant's headquarters guard, and under excitement he was a very active man." "In a few minutes staff officers were awake and dressed, the escort was mounted and ready to go, and the General and staff boarded at once the steamer Tigress. I remembered as I looked over the steamers at the landing tht the Tigress was the only vessel that had steam up, and comprehending that Grant would go on that vessel, my comrade and myself went down and climbed on in advance of the General and his staff. There was a ittle wait for the escort and horses of the officers, but when all were on board the steamer did not move. Inquiry developed the fact that neither the captain nor the pilot was awake or had received any notice of the journey. They were stirred up in short order, and soon the Tigress started up the river for Pittsburg Landing." "About four miles above Savannah we came to Crump's landing. General Lew Wallace, in command of the division at that point, was on the steamer Jessie K. Bell. When we came up within fifty yards of the Bell, Grant shouted to Wallace, asking if he had any news from the front. Wallace shouted back saying that a courier had just arrived with the report that Sherman had been attacked by a heavy force. Grant, with great intensity of manner, asked: 'Does the dispatch say a heavy force?' Wallace replied that it did and Grant ordered the captain of the Tigress to make all possible speed for Pittsburg Landing." "As we started General Wallace shouted in surprise: 'General Grant, have you no orders for me?' and Grant, after thinking a moment, shouted back, 'Hold yourself in readiness to march.' Then we steamed away, but in a few minutes Ross came to me and said: 'It is a general attack this time, sure.' I asked him how he knew and he said that Captain Baxter had just received orders from Grant to take a steam tug and carry orders back to General Wallace to move at once and take position on the right of the Union force engaged in battle. We arrived at Pittsburg Landing in a short time and General Grant rode away at once toward the front." [The article went on about Busbey's experiences in the battle, including hauling guns up the bluff for Webster, the boats in the river, and Mother Bickerdyke.]
  9. 3 points
    It's not often you find an eyewitness account of "that march" conducted by Lew Wallace on Sunday, April 6th... Johann Stuber migrated with his parents and siblings from Switzerland in 1854, and settled in Cincinnati. In October 1861, the 23 year old, trained as a typesetter, joined the 58th Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Company A, and was soon promoted to Corporal. First seeing action at Fort Donelson, the 58th Ohio remained with Lew Wallace's Third Division; and when that division was sent to Crump's Landing in March 1862, the 2nd Brigade (Colonel John Thayer) comprising the 58th OVI, 68th OVI, 23rd Indiana and 1st Nebraska, established its brigade camp in vicinity of Stony Lonesome, midway between Adamsville and Crump's Landing. Corporal Stuber's report for April 6th 1862: "In the morning we heard from the vicinity of Pittsburg Landing a heavy cannonade, which soon developed into an unbroken roar, which persisted as the morning wore on. From the Landing (where our provisions were kept), there came a "rabbit-footed messenger," who had arrived by boat. He loudly reported that he was a member of the 57th Ohio, and that upon being aroused from his sleep by the noise of battle, raced for the Landing and took a boat to Crump's, to deliver the news: but not for us to hurry to help, but to flee for our lives downriver. Knowing that our Army had 50,000 troops at Pittsburg, confirmed by Captain Markgraff during his recent visit, we refused to believe this refugee's report. "About midday, we received the orders preparatory to marching: ammunition was distributed, and we packed necessities and rations for ten days. After about an hour, we began to march south with our heavy knapsacks (instead of taking the boats, as we believed we would). It was dreadfully hot, and the soldiers of the regiments ahead of us threw away their blankets and excess clothing during the march, so that a carpet of clothing lined both sides of the road. We had hiked about seven miles, and were about one mile from our destination, when a report came that we were going the wrong way. We were turned around, and told to take another road -- which caused us to go double the distance in order to arrive where we were wanted. "It was during twilight that my regiment reached a dark woods, at the edge of a swamp, and were told to wait. And while we waited, we were not allowed to do anything -- no pipes or cigars -- because we were told the Rebels could be on the other side of the swamp, only 500 yards away. Finally, we passed through that swamp and reaching the other side, were told we had arrived. We continued marching, and the gunboats were firing, supposedly in the direction of the Rebels. We had gone about a mile when we entered a Union camp, totally abandoned by its owners, but with the tents filled with wounded, who all seemed to be moaning and crying from their wounds. We continued past this camp, and entered a dark woods, where we halted and attempted to rest beneath the boughs of the trees. But the gunboats continued firing; and it started to rain... a thunderstorm, no less. As bad as it was for us, we could not help feeling pity for the wounded, caught in the open with no shelter. We could hear them, away out there, somewhere, in the darkness, calling for help, and for water. And we could not help them. The pickets were not far from us; and the enemy's pickets were not far from our pickets. During the night, firing occurred between the lines of pickets, so heavy at times it seemed the Battle had resumed..." [Above record translated and edited; entry from "The Diary of Johann Stuber" for 6 April 1862.] Ozzy Reference: http://archive.org/stream/meintagebuchuber00stub#page/22/mode/2up
  10. 3 points
    My photos from this past weekend's Epic Trek are HERE if anyone is interested. Great time of hiking, learning, and fellowship.
  11. 3 points
  12. 3 points
    The Confederate dead numbered 1728, if I am to believe my Battlefield America map [and is the number given by David W Reed (pbuhn)]. Do we really think that 700 of them fell in the assault upon the Sixth Division? (OK, I know that someone will claim that the 16th Wisconsin killed them all.)
  13. 3 points
    I know this was addressed to Tom, but I will chime in, seeing as how photographs is "my thing". I love to study period photography, portraits in particular. The issue of "photographers prop" versus the soldiers actual issued weapon in a photograph. This is a doozie that IMHO will never be answered. In many photographs it is obvious what you are seeing is a photographers prop. How do we know? Same pistol, same knife, BUT, saying it is the same long arm, that to me is impossible to determine. I would argue that you see more photographers prop weapons in Confederate images. I think, in respect to your statement, that Federal soldiers did indeed carry their own weapon to the photograph studio. Soldiers would not leave camp and leave their weapon behind. They carried it with them. It then gets into well, was the photograph made in a town at a studio, was it made by a traveling photographer who set up a studio setting in the field, or what. Sometimes we can tell the difference, other times, not so easy to decipher. There are a lot of rabbit holes still left untouched as far as research is concerned about this. There are just tons of mind boggling variables. Just take a random Confederate photograph for example. You would have to research to see if the weapon the soldier is holding is the same style weapon that was issued to the unit, at least close to the time. I have seen photographs, and actually own one, where, down to the T, the soldier is wearing his issued uniform and holding his issued musket. Samuel Rickey, 7th Iowa Infantry. I would argue that photographers, mainly in the South, did not have access to THAT many military grade weapons to use as props. Those weapons were needed in the field. At a time when the South was buying shotguns, of all things, from private individuals to arm the military, photographers would have a hard time holding on to an actual military grade weapon under such circumstances. They did have them though. As you can tell, this topic could get extremely long winded and go on for infinity. Copying something I posted earlier, this is just the confusion in ONE unit, the 15th Mississippi Infantry at the time of Shiloh. "Col. Statham's request for 900 enfields for the 15th Miss Rgt is approved days before Adj. Binford requested 8,000 .69 cartridges and 2,000 Mississippi cartridges for Shiloh. There isn't a surviving munitions request for enfield cartridges and oddly the enlisted men talk about having Belgian and Austrian weapons at Shiloh, some of the accounts written less than a week afterwards. So they are certainly not conclusive at any rate." Weapons carried at Shiloh by Federal soldiers at Shiloh would be MUCH easier to ascertain and determine with a huge deal of confidence. The Confederate Army, much harder and in some cases I would say dang near impossible without documented proof coming to light. To make a long story short, using images is a good reference, but ammunition requisitions and other documents to back it up is required. Photos are a good tool to use, but far from solid evidence if taken alone without any other supporting documentation. If a soldier is holding an 1816 converted flintlock in an image, but you know for fact based on documents that his regiment was largely carrying Enfields at Shiloh, well, you know the 1816 is either a photographers prop, or that weapon was later turned in and the soldier issued his new Enfield. Having said all this, I applaud Tom's work, it is no easy undertaking and gives us a further glimpse into the events at Shiloh. Stan
  14. 3 points
    Thanks Tom. Yes, I have worked hard on the images for the Shiloh Discussion Group page, hoping this place can be a kind of repository for them. I am sure I have amassed the largest online collection of Federal and Confederate soldiers killed, wounded, missing, POW, etc., at the Battle of Shiloh. It seems like for some regiments both North and South at Shiloh we can paint a thorough picture of what they looked like and what they were wearing, but with other units, not so much. I will help out where I can, and good luck in your endeavors. Find attached an article describing, literally down to the maker, of the J. Curry Rifles, Company I, who were Alabamians that were serving in Blythe's Mississippi Battalion. If you save the image to your computer, you can open it up and zoom in to read it. Stan
  15. 3 points
    Well, haven't seen anyone post anything yet, so I figured I would give a very generic after action report of the anniversary events this year. I myself arrived on Thursday, but I didn't partake of the 12 mile hike first tour. Others may want to chime in on that. Thursday evening the park staff got together and decided to cancel the big living history. They were set to have 12 cannons, probably well over 100 infantry, plus cavalry. It was decided that with the forecast calling for heavy rain having tons of vehicles moving in Duncan field would turn the field into a torn up muddy mess. The decision to cancel was the correct one. Everyone gathered in the visitor center before 5 on Friday morning. The debate was made whether or not to cancel the hike and instead have a talk either inside the visitor center or at the picnic area pavilion. Bjorn, being the stalwart that he is, said he was going on his hike regardless. So, the event was on. We gathered at the Peabody monument and made our way to Fraley field, with Bjorn giving an excellent tour and description of the dawn patrol and the ensuing fighting. It was raining, but not heavily at this time. The dawn patrol hike completed, many of us next took part in Bjorn's tour of the morning action by Prentiss, Peabody, and Miller. We moved from tablet to tablet, with superb commentary of the fighting in each sector, even by the 16th Wisconsin Infantry (love ya Jim). We first toured and discussed Peabody's brigade, then moved to Miller's sector. I should insert that we had very respectable size crowds even though the weather was nasty. Finishing the Prentiss line talk at the Prentiss headquarters camp marker, Bjorn announced that he was going to do something he had never done before, and invited others to join in. From the Prentiss marker, we followed Prentiss' men and their line of retreat from their camps to their position in the Hornet's Nest. Bjorn stated that in the past the Prentiss line talk ended there and voila picked up in the Hornet's Nest, so actually making the trek from the camps to the Hornet's nest sorta filled the gap in the story. It was a very informative tour and talk, with everyone learning something new. We had one gentleman working on Gladden's brigade, the 26th/50th Alabama Infantry in particular, so we spent time unraveling facts about Gladden's brigade after it was chewed up in Spain field. We continued on, spent some time in Briar creek, talking about the terrain in that sector, and ended at the Hornet's Nest. A number of us enjoyed a fine meal for lunch in Savannah at the Dae Break Cafe (where the old Whirly Bird was once located in Savannah, behind the A&W/Long John Silver's eatery), Dae Break is a great place to eat btw. Making it back, the next tour was the Confederate left attacks by Pond, along with Wharton's Cavalry. We also stopped in Glover field where Bjorn described the fighting between Brewer's Alabama Cavalry battalion and Birge's Western Sharpshooters. We made our way down through Tilghman branch ravine. With the rain, the trek through the ravine following the Louisiana boys was slippery and muddy to say the least. The rain was at times very intense, while at other times just a heavy drizzle, all throughout the day. Many people were thoroughly soaked to say the least, but most everyone stuck it out through the entire tour. After cresting the ravine and discussing the fighting of Pond's brigade, we moved to Cavalry field and discussed Wharton's charge and repulse. That evening, many of us enjoyed good food, good company, and good discussions at Hagy's Catfish Hotel. It was a long day, and I think I speak for everyone in saying that everyone was bone tired by the end of the day, the rain adding to that tired feeling. I tell you, walking around in heavy rain can take it out of you! The following morning, Saturday, many took part in the hike on Lew Wallace. This writer skipped out on that, and hung out with the small contingent of reenactors that were on hand across from the visitor center. Saturday afternoon brought about another great Bjorn hike discussing the fighting at the crossroads, in Review field, Woolf field, and the action of the 38th Tennessee Infantry near Shiloh Church, all on 7 April 1862. I myself learned a great deal. We discussed more brigades and regiments than I can write about. The temperature on Saturday was cold to say the least. We had heavy spitting snow for much of the hike. Tony decided to head for home that evening, but we were joined by Mike Talplacido for Saturday, but Mike went in search of pictures on Sunday morning. Once again on Saturday evening, many of us went out to eat at Top of the River. Sunday morning we met up at the visitor center for the Fallen Timbers car caravan tour. It was still chilly, but the sun was out. We first stopped at Ed Shaw's for discussion. We then proceeded to the Johnston bivouac site of 5 April 1862. We then proceeded on to Fallen Timbers, where Bjorn colorfully described the fighting there. We proceeded on to Pebble Hill where we ended the tour. Many of us proceeded back to the visitor center, where most of us parted ways. I did not take part in the evening tour of the Hamburg road discussion on Sunday. There were other tours going on, naturally, and others may want to chime in on those tours. Like most fun events, it flew by too quickly. The Friends of Shiloh table was set up inside the visitor center as it was just too cold to have it set up outside. For those on the hikes, we withstood heavy rain, followed by nasty cold weather and snow, but in the end I think everyone had a great time. Ideas for future tours were also discussed, but I will leave that a surprise in case they come to fruition so others can have something to look forward to. I was glad to see everyone, and we wished others could be there. Shiloh, we all love that place, glad we got to spend time together there. Looking forward to the next time! Stan
  16. 3 points
    It was great meeting the two of you on Thursday! I had an absolute blast and am so glad i was able to spend the day with others who enjoy learning about the battle as much as me. Hopefully I can make another one soon!
  17. 3 points
    Aaron Loder Mastin, nineteen years old from Mercer County enlisted in D.P. Brown's Company F of the 41st Illinois Infantry (Colonel Pugh) in August 1861... and immediately commenced this diary. Of interest, because it appears Private Mastin was well educated; and in February 1862, with his regiment based in Union-occupied Paducah Kentucky, Aaron Mastin was detailed as Nurse and sent to help establish/ contribute to the operation of the Female Seminary Hospital (renamed as St. John's Hospital, and officially " 7th Division Hospital" at intersection of Chestnut and Court Streets.) Prior to establishment of St. John's, the Paducah Marine Hospital near the waterfront on Hospital Street appears to have been taken over as Federal barracks (incorporated into Fort Anderson) and a variety of churches and the Court House were pressed into service as ad hoc hospitals. Army Nurse Mastin details the efforts of Dr. Kirch to initiate the Hospital; and the handover to Dr. S.A. Williams (and Surgeon T.N. Wilmans) of the 200-plus bed facility, while reporting "what was heard" from Fort Donelson, and the arrival of wounded from that conflict. In the April 5th entry, Nurse Mastin (now Ward Master at St. John's Hospital) records "the burial of deceased hospital patients in trenches." And on April 8th reports "hearing of the success at Island No.10 and the first news of General Grant's battle near Corinth." The Diary of Aaron Mastin is important for its record of hospital service in Paducah (where many of the sick and wounded from the Army of the Tennessee were taken by steamer in March and April 1862.) Ozzy References: http://www.jacksonpurchasehistory.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Mastin-Diary.pdf http://www.pa-roots.com/pacw/hospitals/hospitallist.htm List of Civil War Hospitals (included to illustrate that many hospitals did not get recorded, such as Paducah's St. John's and Cairo's St. John's Hospital.) http://www.findagrave.com/memorial/26655293 Aaron L. Mastin record at find-a-grave.
  18. 3 points
    its taken me a while but...heres the answer...Mcclerndand was station at Savannah in arch 1862...he sent Col Leonard F Ross of the 3rd Brigade of McClerndand's 1st Division.down that way for the purpose of cjlearing that section of the county of marauders and destroy rebel supplies.march 18th-20th 1862.The expedition left on the 18th with 3 reg of infantry,7 comp of calvary and 2 12# howitzers .they encamped that evening at plantations of me gould and a mr carter. the morning of the 19th they traveled on muddy roads to the town of pin-hook.there they confiscated a flour mill that was providing flour for the rebel troops..then they returned to in to Savannah on the 20th. 'in the previous post your link to the origin of pin-hook is very interesting...it read that it referred to to do with race horses...well not too far from this pinhook/lutts area is florence alabama..and back in the early 1800's it was a mecca for thoroughbred breding and racing.there is a road in florence named jackson rd--after andrew jackson who traveled down that road often from nashville for racehorse business. i will have to looking to this more but i dont recall any thoroughbred farms in SW hardin county..but...??the pinhook area was pretty much a farming community.kinda still is. p.s. i have to give stay allen credit ..he is my source of research on the expedition part of this answer. the horse part i know from jackson research.
  19. 3 points
    Major Joseph Kirkland wrote a Civil War novel published in 1891 in Chicago: The Captain of Company K. The first link below gives the background of the author and of the novel. The second link is to a copy of the book. Kirkwood actually served with the 12th Illinois with McClellen and left the service when McClellen was relieved. The 12th ended up in Tennesee at Shiloh and then with Sherman. Kirkwood's description of Shiloh is decent historical fiction as he remained a friend of many participants. The book is worth a glance just for Hugh Capper's pen and ink drawings. Kirkwood writes in the voice of a central Illinois farmer. The book belongs in the collection of "Shiloh in literature" - perhaps not on the same top shelf with the works of Bierce, Houston and others. http://civilwar.lib.niu.edu/islandora/object/niu-civil%3A14280 https://archive.org/stream/captainofcompany00kirk#page/n13/mode/2up/search/Pittsburg
  20. 3 points
    Crump's Landing (before 1904. Looks like the "strong gate to keep out Yankees" finally disappeared...) From Indiana at Shiloh: report of the Commission; compiled by John W. Coons.
  21. 3 points
    Lovely poem/song, Perry. I've always liked H W Longfellow's work. Here's wishing you and all the members of the Shiloh Discussion Group, peace in your heart this Christmas and good health in 2018. THE MANASSAS BELLE
  22. 3 points
    I needed a break from my continuing and relentless efforts to crush the Shiloh revisionism malarkey of the last forty years or so and decided to see if I could answer this quiz. 1. The man of many talents, Lew Wallace, sat on the Military Tribunal that tried Booth’s accomplices in 1865. 2. Ulysses S. Grant was fortunate his wife did not like Lincoln’s wife and she had no desire to accompany the Lincolns to Ford’s Theatre on the night of April 14, 1865. Lincoln’s so called security detail failed him miserably but Grant also traveled with a security detail and had he went with Lincoln that night history would be different. 3. My trusted copy of The Bold Cavaliers revealed the name of this officer and the same picture. The man is Thomas Henry Hines and the picture was credited to the Filson Club in Louisville, Kentucky. 4. Hines studied law in Toronto with none other than the former vice-president of the United States, John C. Breckinridge. (Source – Wikipedia) 5. The staff officer was an aide to P.G.T. Beauregard at Shiloh. His name is Jacob Thompson and he served in the cabinet of President Buchanan along with the notoriously inept Rebel General John B. Floyd. (I just searched on Google with the clues given and found his name) 6. Vincent Price would have made a superb Dr. Luke Blackburn as the story was told of his attempts to introduce Yellow Fever to Northern cities. Interesting to find that despite the attempt at biological warfare Blackburn was elected governor of Kentucky in the 1870s. Anyway, searching Google I eventually found a page of a book which was the biography of John C. Breckinridge and in it was described Dr. Blackburn attending to Breckinridge. They were both Kentuckians so it made sense. It is a little tricky to have John C. Breckinridge the answer to two disparate questions but the search for these answers was, as always, beneficial and informative in learning additional facts about the battle of Shiloh. Merry Christmas and Happy New Year to all. Hank
  23. 3 points
    Billy Thought I would have a go at finding that picture... and was amazed at my lack of success. First, I tried Wikipedia (and found the bio of Charles Carroll Marsh to be incomplete.) Then I tried Google Images: and although there are CDVs of other members of the Marsh family on offer, there are none featuring C. Carroll Marsh. http://www.findagrave.com Next attempted "find-a-grave" and searched Cook County and Chicago for burial site. With no result, expanded the search to all of Illinois; and although found "C. Carroll Marsh, died 1908" and "Charles C. Marsh, died 1907" neither of these are Colonel C. Carroll Marsh, formerly of 20th Illinois Infantry. http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov The Library of Congress online newspaper collection at Chronicling America offers (free) access to back-issues of newspapers, that may be searched by State of publication for the information desired. Just under the heading, "Humanties: Chronicling America" is "Search pages." By entering Illinois and 1862 and 1863 and Carroll Marsh into the four boxes below "Search pages," and pressing "GO" I received the following hits: http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/search/pages/results/?state=Illinois&date1=1862&date2=1863&proxtext=Carroll+Marsh&x=14&y=16&dateFilterType=yearRange&rows=20&searchType=basic [The entry for April 19th 1862 contains a "Listing of killed and wounded officers from Battle of Shiloh" that records Colonel C. Carroll Marsh among the "wounded," (without revealing the nature of his wound.)] But the most revealing detail of the Chronicling America search of Illinois newspapers -- out to 1917 -- lies in the fact nothing comes back "as a hit" on Colonel C. Carroll Marsh after 1864. http://www.familysearch.org/search Next went over to the (free) family heritage site -- Family Search -- and entered "Charles Carroll" and "Marsh" born New York 1827 to 1831; resident of Chicago Illinois 1858 to 1871: United States records -- Search -- and the following results were returned: an 1860 Chicago census (with Charles C. Marsh -- misspelled Marshe -- and wife Harriet, with three children) and a number of Alameda California voting registration documents, the last being dated 1896. http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov Returned to Chronicling America, and searched the California newspapers: in Search pages, entered California and 1891 and 1917 and Carroll Marsh into the four boxes, and pressed, "GO" ...and this came back. The San Francisco Call for Tuesday, October 4th 1904 page 14, column 3 "Died" and column 4 "Marsh, Charles C., Colonel 20th Illinois Volunteer Infantry, beloved husband of Harriet Cooley Marsh and father of Mrs. C.J. Mattison of Oswego New York [two other adult children also listed], passed away October 2nd 1904 in East Oakland [funeral details and "private burial" indicated.] http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn85066387/1904-10-04/ed-1/seq-14/#date1=1888&index=6&rows=20&words=Carroll+Marsh&searchType=basic&sequence=0&state=California&date2=1917&proxtext=Carroll+Marsh&y=15&x=15&dateFilterType=yearRange&page=1 The above information recorded to illustrate how this search may be attempted. Once it was determined that Colonel C. C. Marsh resigned in 1863 and settled in California (in or near Alameda), and died in California in 1904, the ability to uncover a "family photograph" presents, either at find-a-grave, some California library, his California workplace, or in possession of family members (possibly not published on the Internet, but likely in existence.) Happy Hunting! Ozzy N.B. Of course, now that "Harriet" is known to be his wife, with residence in California, and death date October 1904, a more thorough Family Search investigation may be attempted (and perhaps "place of business" or "political offices held" will return as a "hit" and allow search of those sites for photos... Update: although unable to find Colonel Marsh's grave (as yet) here is Harriet Cooley Marsh at find-a-grave. http://www.findagrave.com/memorial/180219283/herriett-marsh
  24. 3 points
    Ozzy noticed that Tony has uploaded his videos of the Epic Hike: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5LeGGxEr_-8 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5fSVhn6WQRk https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tYdCEoP0DMI&t=1307s
  25. 2 points
    [Part three of Corinth, interrupted] Grant’s operation, with HQ at Savannah was kept on the back burner: just active enough to keep Rebel commanders guessing, but not sufficiently robust to allow General Grant to take the reins pre-emptively. The first benefit to Grant from success further west was assignment of Benjamin Prentiss to command of the newly created Sixth Division (although Halleck tasked Brigadier General Prentiss with other duties enroute, delaying his ultimate arrival at Pittsburg Landing.) In addition, Grant was aware that Don Carlos Buell was marching south and west to effect a join at Savannah (but Grant was frustrated by the slow pace of the Army of the Ohio.) Still, these troop additions were approved by Halleck, and were part of the overall plan to initiate the Operation against Corinth, in the proper sequence… after Victory at Island No.10 (when another source of manpower (Pope), as well as ammunition and abundant supplies would be made available.) References: SDG topics “Just supposin’ begun 26 FEB 2018 and “Full Hospitals” begun 30 JAN 2018 for Prentiss tasks enroute to Savannah Tennessee. SDG topic “Grant’s six divisions” begun 1 DEC 2018 details growth of Pittsburg force. OR 8 pages 633 – 4 telegram (23 MAR 1862) in which Henry Halleck lays out his “Programme” for SecWar Stanton, which includes, “Pope’s progress is necessarily slow,” and, “I have directed General Grant to make no move until Buell’s column (now at Columbia) can form junction with him.” Also, Halleck asserts, “We must take Corinth in order to seriously injure Rebel communications.” [And Halleck proposes possible moves for T.W. Sherman (the other Sherman) and Benjamin Butler which “might take advantage of [Bragg’s Army] leaving Florida and Alabama.”] OR 8 page 631 communication of 21 MAR 1862 from MGen Halleck to F/O Foote: “Everything is progressing well on the Tennessee River towards opening your way down the Mississippi.” [Illustrates the “connected” nature of Halleck’s operations, and alludes to the “proper sequence” of those operations.] OR 8 page 643 telegram from Army AG Thomas to MGen Halleck of 25 MAR 1862: “BGen Thomas Davies has been assigned duty in Department of the Mississippi.” [In preparation for conduct of operations after success at Island No.10 Halleck has called for more trained general officers to assist, as part of Halleck’s program. General Thomas Davies will be assigned command of Second Division, following deaths of WHL Wallace… and C.F. Smith.] OR 8 page 649 telegram SecWar Stanton to MGen Halleck of 29 MAR 1862: “You will report without delay the strength and distribution of your command.” [Halleck’s response 30 March: “Buell 101,000 in KY and Tenn; Grant 75,000 in Tennessee; Pope 25000 at New Madrid; Curtis 23000 in Arkansas; Strong 9000 District of Cairo; Steele 6000 in Arkansas; Schofield 15000 District of St. Louis (including new regiments at Benton Barracks); Totten 4000 in Central Missouri; Loan 2000 in Northern Missouri; about 10000 men in Kansas, Nebraska and Colorado.”] And follows telegram of Halleck to Stanton of 28 MAR 1862 revealing “elevated level of sickness experienced by men on Tennessee River expedition” (and lays blame on brigade and regimental surgeons of volunteers.) One-in-three reported sick, and is of concern because Halleck intends to make use of Grant’s Army… soon. OR 8 page 660 communication MGen Halleck to F/O Andrew Foote of 5 APR 1862: “I shall want a gunboat at Cairo ready to go up the Tennessee River in the early part of next week.” [With the successful run of USS Carondelet past the guns of Island No.10 on April 4th, Halleck knows it is “a matter of days” before Pope crosses his army and forces the trapped Rebels to surrender (in rear of Island No.10).] OR 8 page 661 communication Halleck to MGen Samuel Curtis (Army of the Southwest) on April 5th 1862: “Price and Van Dorn will soon leave your front [and the great battle of the war is to be fought on the Tennessee River.]” OR 8 page 672 telegram Halleck to Stanton of 7 APR 1862: “Buell’s advance force has reached Grant; entire force will connect in two or three days” [sent before news arrived at St. Louis IRT Battle of Shiloh initiated early 6 APR 1862.] OR 8 page 676 communication of 8 APR 1862 from Assistant Secretary of War Thomas Scott to Henry Halleck, alluding to “sequence of events” after Surrender of Island No.10.
  26. 2 points
    Liberty Independence Nixon, his findagrave page and his photograph. https://www.findagrave.com/memorial/25015250/liberty-independence-nixon
  27. 2 points
    I realize it is just one regiment in a large battle, but I often wonder if A. S. Johnston knew how somewhat unorganized many of the regiments in the Army were, i.e. the 26th Alabama Infantry. The organization was not led by Maj. Chaddick, but actually by Colonel John G. Coltart of Huntsville. I have posted before the letters of Lt. Benjamin J. Gaston of the 26th Alabama. Just 3 days before the battle, Gaston was writing and stated that he did not know the "number" (regimental designation) of his unit. I have seen other historians and writers erroneously attribute the leadership of the 26th to Chaddick rather than Coltart. My his memory always shine bright, but from memory in Shiloh Bloody April, even Wiley Sword mentions Chaddick being the commander of the unit. When Gladden's men stopped in the Federal camp, well, upon renewing the attack, at that point Coltart was wounded, and Chaddick took temporary control of the unit. Coltart received a severe foot wound, but, he had it tended to behind the lines and then returned to the fight. It seems amazing to me that many men went in to that fight not knowing who their commanders were nor their regimental unit designation. It is mentioned that some units were getting ammo resupplies for six hours, aka they were disorganized. Again, I can totally see how given the facts mentioned in the first paragraph. This seems reminiscent of Bjorn's April hike, The Division That Never Was. Johnston had to have known this state of disorganization, even before the battle began, and how it would/could bring massive confusion on the field. Pictured are Colonel John G. Coltart and Lt. Col. William Davidson Chaddick, 26th Alabama Infantry. The Major of the 26th Alabama at the time of Shiloh was Andrew D. Guinn/Gwin/Gwynne (several different spellings); Gwynne was severely wounded in the arm by a shell as noted in his service records. After Shiloh, he was appointed Lt. Col. of the 38th Tennessee Infantry.
  28. 2 points
    Richard P. Derickson was a First Lieutenant in the 16th Wisconsin Infantry, Company K, at the time the Battle of Shiloh erupted. On that fateful Sunday of 6 APR 1862, he was at his duty station aboard "wharf boat" Iatan, acting in capacity of AQM for the Sixth Division (a position he had occupied since April 3rd, assigned by BGen Prentiss.) Part of Lieutenant Derickson's duties involved him creating and maintaining precise records, accounting for possession and distribution of Government stores... Kevin Getchell made use of Lieutenant Derickson's records in constructing his 2013 work, Scapegoat of Shiloh: the distortion of Lew Wallace's record by U. S. Grant. The author indicates that he "encountered the Derickson Papers at an auction, and purchased them." Exact copies of several of the documents created by LT Derickson are contained in Scapegoat of Shiloh. These records are valuable for determining activities of the embryonic Sixth Division in the days leading up to that contact in Fraley Field. Less well known: Kevin Getchell made copies of the original documents, and left those on file with Shiloh NMP https://www.jacksonsun.com/story/news/2015/04/02/shiloh-battlefield-commemorate-rd-battle-anniversary/70862666/ Jacksun Sun of 2 APR 2015.
  29. 2 points
    I offer a couple of additions. On page 152 of my signed Wiley Sword’s 2001 edition is the following concerning the confrontation between Prentiss and Peabody in the camp of the 25th Missouri; “Reining his horse in front of Peabody, who was just preparing to mount, Prentiss angrily demanded to know if he had provoked an attack by sending out a force without orders. Peabody answered that he had sent out a reconnaissance patrol after attempting to notify Prentiss of his intention. (Bold added by me) The first puzzle piece here is that Peabody states he sent out a reconnaissance patrol. Prentiss had given Peabody and Powell permission to send out reconnaissance patrols so there was “no defiance of orders” when Peabody ordered Powell to take a reconnaissance patrol to the front. However, they were not to bring on a “general engagement.” But Prentiss had heard a lot of firing; Prentiss knew that the war god Colonel David Moore had gone forward with the entire 21st Missouri to “lick them.” And when he rode into Peabody’s camp he found the long roll had been sounded in the camp of the 25th Missouri and Peabody had his regiment toeing the line in preparation of moving forward. This is why he demanded to know from Peabody if he had sent out a force without orders. The eye-catching phrase is that Peabody tried to inform Prentiss of his intention to send out a patrol but had failed to let Prentiss know due to his messenger not being able to find Prentiss. None of the other major Shiloh books mention that Peabody attempted to inform Prentiss that he was sending out Major Powell at 3 a. m. There are several varying accounts of the confrontation between Prentiss and Peabody and what was said. I was curious where Wiley Sword had gotten the account he used in his book. His reference notes referred to Shea which led to John Gilmary Shea in the bibliography to Shea’s The American Nation. Shea seems to have been a prolific author with many books about Americans and patriotism. The American Nation was a compilation of men who gave their all for Union. Included in the book are chapters on Major General William Hervey Lamm Wallace, Colonel Julius Raith and Colonel Everett Peabody. The chapter on Colonel Everett Peabody gives many details on his life and then goes into an account of the battle of Shiloh commencing on April 5, 1862. The author covers Peabody with praise and gives an account of the activities concerning Peabody sending out Powell’s patrol. Shea wrote “Few officers have fallen during the war, whose services were so valuable to the country, or whose prospects of honorable distinction were so brilliant, as those of Colonel Everett Peabody.” The amazing thing about this book as relates to the efforts to learn the truth about Shiloh is that the book, containing full praise to Peabody for saving the army at Shiloh, was published in 1862 while Prentiss was still a prisoner in the south. The story of Peabody at Shiloh was published in a book yet historians wrote about the battle of Shiloh ignorant of what Peabody had done. Except for William Swinton in his Twelve Decisive Battles of the War. I did not type up the whole chapter on Peabody, only the part on Shiloh. The book is pretty rare and I could not see that it has been digitized. I located a microfilm copy in a library near Kansas City. “On the 5th of April there seemed to be a kind of presentiment in General Grant’s army of the terrible battle impending. A visitor to the field, immediately after the battle, was assured that the desire being to avoid a collision with the enemy at that moment, the generals were instructed not to throw out pickets. The strategy reminds one of the old fable of the ostrich, who hid his head and then imagined himself safe from the hunter. That evening several soldiers and civilians were collected in Colonel Peabody’s tent, and the colonel expressed his opinion that the rebels were near in force and the army in great danger for want of pickets. Finally, he exclaimed, “I can bear this no longer. I must know whether we are in the arms of the enemy, or whether we are out of danger,” and he immediately sent an orderly to General Prentiss, asking leave to send out a scouting party. The orderly did not find General Prentiss, and Colonel P. then resolved to send it out without permission. From one to three o’clock, that night, he strolled about the camp talking with his officers and men, and at three o’clock sent out the party,--four hundred men of his own regiment,--under Major Powell, a cool and experienced officer. It is hard to overestimate the importance of this reconnaissance. Our army was encamped in a semicircle, Colonel Peabody in the centre. Beauregard had planned for three columns to attack our right, left, and centre, simultaneously at daybreak; and if he had succeeded in this, General Grant’s army would have been annihilated. His plan was frustrated by Colonel Peabody’s detachment, which, came into collision before the time, with the centre column. The rattle of musketry gave the alarm to our army, and gave the centre nearly time enough, and the flanks ample time to get under arms. Early that morning (Sunday, April 6th), Colonel Peabody sat at breakfast with Mr. B., a visitor, when the firing was heard. The colonel said to Mr. B., “Don’t disturb yourself; but I must go and see to things.” He ordered the long roll sounded, and mounting his horse rode forward to where the line was forming. Major Powell and his men soon appeared, swept on by an immense column of rebels, but skirmishing bravely as they retreated. At this instant General Prentiss rode up to Colonel Peabody and exclaimed: “Did you provoke this attack by sending out a force without orders!” “I did send out a reconnaissance, after sending you notice of my intention.” “You have brought on this attack before we were prepared; and I shall hold you responsible for it.” With our present knowledge of the battle, it seems as if General Prentiss could hardly have framed a statement more damaging to himself, or more honorable to Colonel Peabody. It sounds like a confession of perfect blindness as to the position and plans of the rebels, and an admission of want of preparation to receive an attack which the rebels had been preparing for two weeks—a confession that West Point strategists were wrong, and the colonel of volunteers, right. But Colonel Peabody knew nothing of all this. He only knew that he had taken a dangerous responsibility, and in consequence was arraigned by his superior as the cause of an impending defeat; and this thought must have made his last hour on earth one of great mental suffering. In this state of mind, it is easy to conceive with what grief and indignation he must have seen his brigade swept slowly back by the rebels, in spite of its stern resistance. The correspondent of a western paper says: “Colonel Peabody would not retreat. He seemed infatuated, and was soon left almost alone, vainly trying to rally his men. Presently he fell shot through the jaw.” The gentleman, who was breakfasting with him, saw him riding along the line urging his men with voice and gesture, to “Stand to it yet;” then saw him throw his arms up, reel, and fall from his horse, the rebels rapidly passing over the spot. On Monday evening, after the rebels were driven back, his body was found where he fell. It was pierced by five bullets: one in the head, one in the neck, one in the body, one in the thigh, and one in the hand. Thus, after “one glorious hour of crowded life,” fell a brave soldier and chivalrous gentleman. His officers buried him in a gun-box, placing at his head a board with his name, and below it the couplet: A braver man ne’er died upon the field; A warmer heart never to death did yield. His body afterwards carried to Boston, where the funeral arrangements were taken in charge of by the governor of Massachusetts. Thence to Springfield, where, in presence of an immense concourse, he was laid beside his mother, in the beautiful cemetery of that town. Few officers have fallen during the war, whose services were so valuable to the country, or whose prospects of honorable distinction were so brilliant, as those of Colonel Everett Peabody. His talents were of a high order, and were united to such practical energy, that whatever he undertook to do, was sure to be done quickly and well. Thus, when he was only twenty-two years old, Hon. James Guthrie said of him, that “he was as good a field-engineer as there was in the western country.” At twenty-three he was a chief. The same element of character gave him immediate success in the new field to which the breaking out of the great rebellion called him. He was one born to command; and his proud and chivalrous spirit, his scorn of danger, his absolute ignorance of fear, filled his men with an enthusiastic faith in him, so that he could lead them anywhere, and do any thing with them. His most striking characteristic was a high contempt for meanness or dishonesty of any kind. This trait won him respect wherever he went; but it was carried so far as to make him lack even that excusable selfishness which enables a man to take proper care of his own. His table and purse were always open, not to friends only, but even to mere acquaintances; and in money-matters he was careless to an excess,--a fault often found in large and noble natures. In the flower of his age, in the performance of a great act of service, he fell—dying as a chivalrous gentleman would wish to die, and singularly fulfilling the prediction expressed years before in a song which he composed for a military organization: And if the army of a foe invade our native land, Or rank disunion gather up its lawless, faithless band; Then the arm upon our ancient shield shall wield his blade of might, And we’ll show our worthy brethren that gentlemen can fight. The American Nation carries a copyright date of 1862. It is possible it went to print after Prentiss was released. It is one of those pieces of the puzzle as to why was the actions of Peabody not recognized by historians if there was a book published in 1862 that described what he had done. In Shiloh – The Battle That Changed the Civil War Larry Daniel has an error-prone synopsis of the opening of the battle. He based part of his opening battle remarks on a convoluted and disappointing newspaper article that was published in the Philadelphia Inquirer by a reporter of the name of Bentley. Bentley was in the camp of the 25th Missouri on the morning of April 6th and related his observations. Bentley’s description of the fight is so disorganized he convinced Larry Daniel that Prentiss actually accosted Peabody twice on the morning of April 6th. Nevertheless you can gloom some tidbits from the article and here is a link which should get you to a website that has the newspaper digitized. https://newspaperarchive.com/philadelphia-inquirer-apr-18-1862-p-2/ You are on your own to work with this site. I could not find a site that had the Philadelphia Inquirer digitized and you did not need to pay for it. Somehow I was able to print a copy of the newspaper on a single 8.5 x 11 inch sheet of paper and I use a magnifying glass to read it. One of the puzzle pieces is the relationship between Prentiss and Peabody. Recently Ozzy had a thread which discussed what day did Prentiss actually arrive at Pittsburg Landing. Prentiss stated in his 1882 speech he arrived on March 29, 1862, roughly one week before the battle. What is missing from the record is any account of an interaction between Prentiss and Peabody that supports a claim they did not get along prior to April 5th. Here is the entire letter Peabody wrote on March 31, 1862, his last letter. You have probably seen snippets of the letter but here is the entire letter. To whom it was addressed was kept secret in The American Nation but it was sent to his brother Frank. Dear -------, In camp again, with a good regiment and well equipped. We are in General Prentiss’s division (eleven regiments), and I command the leading brigade. As we are the left centre division, we expect rough work. I have a fine brigade. My own regiment at the right; the Twelfth Michigan, Sixteenth Wisconsin, and Eighteenth Missouri forming the balance. We arrived here on the 28th, and have a very pleasant camp,--the boys as lively as crickets, and every thing working smoothly, It is funny to be called general, but the boys are all delighted, and, I think, will do good service at the proper time. The enemy is supposed to be about eighteen miles from us. We have an immense army, how large I have no means of knowing; they say, however, one hundred and twenty odd regiments, and they are arriving at the rate of two or three a day. As I wrote you before leaving, I have left my contract with Judge Krum of St. Louis. In case I go under, my old assistants, Kilby and John Severance, can give you all the necessary information in regard to the property involved. Say to them all at home, that if I have good luck, I shall win my spurs. Love to all. Yours, Ev Unfortunately Colonel Everett Peabody did not have good luck but he won his spurs and was instrumental in giving the army the opportunity to save itself. He mentions General Prentiss with no hint of animosity or ill-feeling. “Every thing working smoothly” certainly does not support the mantra that Prentiss hated Peabody’s guts. Another mantra is that Peabody had a presentiment of his own death at Shiloh. But you can read in his last letter that he states “In case I go under” and then informed his brother whom to contact about some of his property. Peabody might have had a presentiment of his death in battle months earlier but he gave no such indication in his last letter home from Shiloh that he sensed he was going to be killed on the field. We had a discussion as to who ordered out Colonel Moore with five companies to go to the aid of Major Powell. I remarked I had just read an account that stated Moore was sent out by Prentiss but could not remember where. Well, I discovered it was on page 61 in the following staff ride handbook. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/educational-services/staff-rides/StaffRideHB_Shiloh.pdf Now just looking at Daniel’s book and on page 147 he states the same thing. No wonder the puzzle is so hard to complete. I added this because Bjorn stated the same thing on his hike and we were wondering where that could come from since David Moore specifically stated it was Peabody who ordered him forward. In preparing this posting I came across another occasion when Prentiss described the opening of the battle and mentioned how it was Colonel David Moore who was responsible. From Confederate Veteran, Volume 3, April, 1895 there is an article on the veteran’s reunion at Shiloh in that year. On page 104 is found the following: “He (Prentiss) reported his anxiety about the situation in front of the General (Sherman) commanding in the field, but his fears of an attack were not heeded, the General sending back word “I will guard your front.” He sent, however, Col. Moore of his division, with part of his regiment, who encountering Johnston’s army, sent a report of it back to Prentiss, adding, “If you will send the balance of my regiment to me, by thunder, I will lick them!” Here it is 1895 and Prentiss attributed the opening of the battle to Colonel David Moore. So far I have found no account where Prentiss himself displayed any knowledge of Powell’s patrol. You can find copies of the Confederate Veteran at the following link. Go to Volume 3, page 104 to find the article on the veteran reunion at Shiloh in April of 1895. http://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/webbin/serial?id=confedvet The record indicates that Major Powell took out a patrol after noticing “butternuts” observing the division’s review in Spain Field. Then, probably after Powell had returned, Moore took out his patrol and returned with his information concerning the evidence of Rebel cavalrymen. This seemed to have piqued Powell’s interest and he took out the late night patrol as detailed in the account of Private D. K. Baker where Baker related that Powell told them that they were going out to find some Rebel cavalrymen and “bring them in out of the wet.” That mission was aborted upon finding more Rebels than expected and Powell organized another patrol to go out at 3 am on April 6th. Sergeant Gordon of company A, 57th Ohio was on picket duty when Powell approached him with his patrol and told him that they were going out to “catch some rebels for breakfast.” That is a total of four patrols going out from Peabody’s camp. The idea that Powell’s 3 am patrol was sent out in violation of orders does not stand up because all of these patrols had been granted permission from Prentiss to make reconnaissance in front of Peabody’s camp. What Prentiss did not know was the timing of these patrols. Wm. J. Hahn, 1st Lt., Co. H., 25th Missouri, who was there, wrote on April 12, 1914 – “With the assistance of Colonel Everitt Peabody commanding the 1st Brigade of the 6th Division, Major Powell finally got General Prentiss’s permission to reconnoiter Sunday morning, but under no circumstances to bring on a general engagement. Major Powell explained these points to me at 10 P.M. Saturday, April 5th and directed me to visit every tent of Co. H and instruct the men to be fully dressed and be ready to march at 3 A.M. Sunday, April 6th……If ever a man deserved a monument it is our brave Major Powell…..” Hahn’s statement contains an admission that Powell had permission from Prentiss for the 3 am patrol but that “under no circumstances to bring on a general engagement.” When Prentiss rode into Peabody’s camp on the morning of April 6th he knew that Colonel David Moore had gone forward with his entire regiment and that Colonel Peabody was about to do the same with the 25th Missouri. It looked to Prentiss as if the situation had gone beyond reconnaissance patrols to approaching a general engagement and that is why he accused Peabody of bringing on an engagement and that Peabody would be held responsible. The State Historical Society of Missouri has a collection of papers of Lt. Col. Robert Van Horn of the 25th Missouri. Overall the collection is a disappointment concerning the battle of Shiloh except for a yellowed copy of a newspaper account by William A. Morton dated April 7, 1908 in the Hamiltonian newspaper from Hamilton, Missouri. William Morton was one of the four Morton brothers enrolled in the 25th Missouri. We are familiar with Charles Morton from his two accounts of the battle of Shiloh, Boy at Shiloh and Opening of the Battle of Shiloh. Brother Mark Morton served as an aide to Colonel Peabody at Shiloh. The Morton brothers were there and close to the scene. For the astute observers one might notice the date of the article being 1908 and contained in the papers of Robert Van Horn and wonder how that could be. The answer is that Robert Van Horn lived to be 92 years of age and died in 1916. I selected to include in this post the introduction in the newspaper to the article and a portion of the article concerning William Morton’s account of what they found when they returned to their demolished camp on April 7, 1862. William Morton, who was there, wondered why historians never gave credit to Peabody for what he did and that the excited Prentiss really was not aware of what actually happened. Morton also commented on the fact that Peabody took action without informing Prentiss and that was a mystery because Peabody was always respectful to fellow officers. BATTLE OF SHILOH. – W. A. MORTON – OMAHA, APRIL 7, 1908 Gen. Charles Morton Commemorates the Event Each Year A Shiloh dinner was given by Gen. Charles Morton at Omaha on April 7, this year. For many years past the General has celebrated the anniversary of the battle in a formal manner, or otherwise, and on this occasion he invited a number of the survivors of the battle to join him in commemorating the event. Five persons were present, all of whom were requested to present a written statement of personal experience in the great open field fight, giving special prominence to recollections of the opening events, as the question whether the Union army was surprised or not has never been satisfactorily settled by historians. W. A. Morton, of Little Rock, Ark., a brother of Gen. Chas. Morton, was in Hamilton last Thursday and Friday on his way home from attending the Shiloh dinner where he gave the following narrative of the battle, in which he desires to make clear the point that the First brigade of Prentiss’ division, commanded by Col. Peabody of the Missouri 25th, was not surprised. This narrative, we believe, will be read with interest by our patrons as its author was the founder of the HAMILTONIAN and he and a number of others of the same company serving in the war enlisted from this locality. Personal Experiences in the Battle of Shiloh (By W. A. Morton, late of Co. I, 25th Inft. Mo. Vols.) * * * * * * * * * * * * We marched back to camp, arriving between the hours of 1 and 2 Monday April 7th. Our camp was the very picture of the “havoc of war and the battle’s confusion.” Tents were rent by bullets and shells, and the ground was strewn with broken muskets, limbs of trees, knapsacks, etc: and the trees were splintered by cannon shot, and dead Confederates lay scattered by. A few of the tents were burnt, while those remaining all contained one or more wounded or dead Confederates. The tent which Sergeant Singleton and I had occupied contained two dead men, who were members of an Arkansas regiment. Everything of value which we left in our tents when we retreated the morning before was gone. Blankets, knapsacks and clothing, etc., and for three or four weeks we had no change of clothing. Blankets were issued soon after the battle, but we drew no clothing until early in May, when we were in the trenches near Corinth. After hastily surveying our camp the next thing in order was dinner. Some of the boys had hardtack, others had canned goods found at a demolished Sutler’s tent, and one had a chicken which he had picked up at a farm house. The meal would have been a gloomy one but for the fact that all of the boys (there were 21 of them) had a thrilling experience to relate, besides the occasion was enlivened with the thought that we had regained our camp and that the Confederates were skedaddling for Corinth. But when we entered our tents at night even the thoughts of victory could not dissipate the air of gloom. The following day our camp was thronged with visitors, who came to view our dead Colonel; there were newspaper correspondents and army officers among whom, General Garfield, who commanded a brigade of Woods Division. Buell’s army. It happened that the first person General Garfield met on entering our camp was my brother, Mark, to whom he said: “I am looking for the camp of the Missouri 25th.” Mark replied, this is the camp of the 25th. “After a few remarks concerning Col. Peabody the General inquired if there were any boys of the name of, Morton, in the regiment. Mark said, “Yes, sir, my name is Morton, and I have three brothers in the regiment.” He then conducted the General to our company and introduced Charley and myself, but John N. required no introduction as the General recognized him at sight as a former neighbor farm boy and playmate. The General praised Colonel Peabody highly for his bravery and intelligent efforts to prevent the entire army from being surprised. All the officers who visited our camp were lavish with eulogies of Col. Peabody and the officers of the first brigade, and it was current opinion that their vigilance alone saved the army from surprise. I have often wondered why historians have not given Colonel Peabody the credit which newspaper correspondents and army officers accorded him immediately after the battle, when the facts were fresh in memory. It is certain the first shot was fired by Colonel Peabody’s brigade and that if that shot had not been fired when it was, the entire army would have been unprepared for attack. Colonel Peabody was awake all the night preceding the battle, receiving information from scouts and consulting the regimental commanders in his brigade (so it was reported for days after the battle) consequently his plans for attack were made deliberately. It was the general opinion that Prentiss knew nothing of these plans and was not even aware that the enemy’s outposts were attacked until firing on the skirmish line had progressed an hour or more, for when he appeared at Colonel Peabody’s tent at 6 o’clock, and asked what that firing meant at the front, and the cause was explained, he was not only surprised but very indignant. It is said he charged Colonel Peabody with having violated orders and brought on an engagement prematurely. Lieutenant Claxton, then Commissary Sergeant, says Prentiss’ language was violent. He told Peabody he would put him under arrest, but for the reason he wanted him to bear his share of the engagement he had precipitated. Why Col. Peabody took the steps he did, without reporting to Prentiss, is a mystery. It could not have been on account of ignorance nor lack of respect to a superior officer, for he was a man of fine intelligence and was ever courteous to both inferior and superior officers, besides every inch a soldier. My brother Mark, who was Col. Peabody’s orderly, corroborates what Lieutenant Claxton says regarding the reproval Prentiss administered to Peabody for his aggressive movement. It was therefore due to Col. Peabody’s enterprise and generalship that the entire army was not surprised. To present the history of the battle in truthful and interesting form the historian should say the regimental and division commanders of the Union army were all, except Peabody’s brigade, if not surprised, caught unprepared, but displayed great ability and heroism in staying a crushing defeat. * * * * * * * * * * * * William Morton’s account of the encounter between Prentiss and Peabody comports somewhat with the account given by F. C. Nichols in a letter to the nephew of Everett Peabody dated Feb. 27, 1902. Larry Daniel in Shiloh – The Battle That Changed the Civil War attributed Nichols’ account as the most accurate because Nichols was “within hearing distance.” (page 350 in the “notes” section). Daniel quoted just a sentence of Nichols’ account but there is more quoted in Joseph Rich’s The Battle of Shiloh. Here is what is in Rich’s book. F. C. Nichols, senior Captain of the 25thMissouri at Shiloh, to F. E. Peabody, Feb. 27, 1902. “At early morn before breakfast the line of Battle was formed, with the right of Brigade resting on the right of our regimental color line. My company was on the right of Brigade. A few minutes after the line was formed, General Prentiss rode up near Colonel Peabody, who was mounted and in front of my company, about the center of the first platoon and said to him, “Colonel Peabody, I hold you responsible for bringing on this fight.” Saluting, Colonel Peabody said: ‘If I brought on the fight I am able to lead the van.’ General Prentiss ordered him to take his best regiment….the next words I heard were: 25thMissouri forward.’” In Nichols’ account and William Morton’s account we find corroboration that Prentiss, despite his anger at the moment, gave Colonel Everett Peabody the respect to lead the 25th Missouri regiment forward and gave him the opportunity to “lead the van” “to bear his share of the engagement he had precipitated.” I like that version best. Hank
  30. 2 points
    Thanks for all your hard work Stan.
  31. 2 points
    Of course Ozzy’s observation is correct. I heard this somewhere else recently that Prentiss sent out David Moore to reinforce Powell and wondered where that could possibly come from. One is left to surmise how anybody could arrive at that conclusion when Moore clearly stated in his report that it was an order from Colonel Peabody that sent Moore and five companies of the 21st Missouri to Powell’s aid. But it was interesting to note that Lt. Col. Woodyard did indeed put in his report; “I have the honor to report that on the morning of the 6th of April, before sunrise, General Prentiss ordered Colonel Moore, with five companies of our regiment, to sustain the pickets of the Twelfth Michigan Infantry.” Woodyard’s comment reinforced the fact that the situation was so chaotic that Woodyard did not even know it was Peabody that sent Moore out with the first five companies and that it was done to “sustain the pickets of the Twelfth Michigan Infantry.” I kept an eye out for a confirmation of Moore’s report concerning who ordered him out with five companies to reinforce Powell. I finally found it in the following letter written in 1883 by William French, who was there. Not only was he there but he was Moore’s adjutant. His short letter contains other interesting points that blow holes in the Shiloh revisionist ship that will aid in sending that ship down to the deep where it belongs. William French’s letter was published on April 12, 1883 in the National Tribune. Copies of the National Tribune are available online. Just google National Tribune and it should show up. It is a short letter so I typed it up and here it is. One Regiment that was Not Surprised. To the Editor National Tribune: “As the manner in which the battle of Shiloh was fought is now under discussion, I would like, with your permission, to relate what I know about it. There was at least one regiment, the Twenty-first Missouri, commanded by Colonel David Moore, which was not surprised. On Saturday morning, April 5th, the day before the battle, General Prentiss, commanding the division to which we belonged, held a review, and at that time some rebel cavalry were seen in the vicinity. In the afternoon he ordered Colonel Moore to take five companies of his regiment and reconnoiter on our front. We went out about a mile and found numerous traces of the presence of rebel cavalry. The inmates of a house which we visited told us that the rebels were in large force, and that we would be attacked the following morning. Colonel Moore reported this fact to Colonel Peabody, who commanded the brigade, and also to General Prentiss, but no notice was taken of it, except that the pickets were strengthened. The next morning found us up early and ready for orders, and presently Colonel Peabody’s adjutant arrived with instructions for Colonel Moore to take out five companies. The pickets had been fired on in the meanwhile, and the Colonel met them falling back. They reported a heavy force in front of them, and the Colonel sent back to camp for the remaining five companies, and taking the pickets with him marched to the front. We had gone about a mile, and were in sight of the house where we heard the afternoon before that we were to be attacked, when the rebels fired on us. Colonel Moore was shot twice. He dismounted and told me to take care of him and keep a sharp lookout. He formed his regiment in line of battle and the boys began to deliver a very rapid fire. At this time an orderly arrived from Colonel Peabody and wished to know whether Colonel Moore could hold his position until he could re-enforce him. Colonel Moore sent back word that he would; but no re-enforcements came, however, and for about an hour we held the ground alone. The Twenty-first Missouri never did better shooting than on that Sunday morning. It was on that field that Colonel Moore was wounded for the third time. A minie ball broke his leg below the knee, and he was taken back to the camp, and afterwards placed on a gunboat on the river, If, after all the fighting we went through that Sunday morning, any of our boys were shot down near their tents, I, for one, don’t pity them. They had plenty of warning. Colonel Moore held his ground faithfully and bravely, and justice indeed has never been done him for the part he took in the battle of Shiloh.” William French Athens, Mo. Co. F, 21stMo. Wiley Sword wrote in his book on page 138; “About 7 P. M. Moore advised Prentiss that the results of his reconnaissance were negative.” That is not what Prentiss wrote in his report nor is it what William French wrote in this letter. William French wrote that they found evidence of Rebel cavalry and were told by citizens that they would be attacked in the morning. Colonel Moore reported this information to both Colonel Everett Peabody and Brigadier General Benjamin Prentiss. The Shiloh revisionists want you to believe that Moore reported nothing to the front of the camps and that Moore’s report is why General Prentiss did nothing as Peabody harangued him about Rebels to the front of his brigade. But the record clearly shows that Moore reported the presence of cavalry and the reaction by Prentiss was to send out additional pickets to strengthen the picket line and authorize additional patrols that eventually culminated in the 3 a. m. patrol by Major James E. Powell and ordered by Peabody. While Prentiss authorized reconnaissance patrols he was unaware as to the timing of those patrols. I have found nothing to indicate that Prentiss was at Peabody’s camp on the night of April 5th. Peabody, Powell and others were taking their case to Prentiss at his headquarters. As it got later on the night of April 5th Peabody continued to receive reports that heightened his alarm and increased his anxiety to know just what was in front of his brigade. But Prentiss was not there and did not have the latest information that Peabody had. It is bewildering to hear revisionists claim that Moore reported that he found nothing actionable. Moore wrote in his report; “In pursuance of the order of Brig. Gen. B. M. Prentiss, commanding Sixth Division, Army of the West Tennessee, I on Saturday proceeded to a reconnaissance on the front of the line of General Prentiss’ division and on the front of General Sherman’s division. My command consisted of three companies from the Twenty-first Missouri Regiment—companies commanded by Captains Cox, Harle, and Pearce. A thorough reconnaissance over the extent of 3 miles failed to discover the enemy. Being unsuccessful, as stated, I returned to my encampment about 7 o’clock p. m. What Moore is referring to is that he did not find any Rebels that he could shoot. Moore does not relate that he found evidence of rebel cavalry but Prentiss wrote that in his report and acted on it by strengthening the picket line. Prentiss wrote “At about 7 o’clock the same evening Colonel Moore returned, reporting some activity in the front—an evident reconnaissance by cavalry. This information received, I proceeded to strengthen the guard stationed on the Corinth road, extending the picket lines to the front a distance of a mile and a half, at the same time extending and doubling the lines of the grand guard.” It should be noted that Moore is pretty specific about the afternoon patrol he took out. He even gave us the names of the commanders of the three companies he took out on the patrol. He makes no mention of going on patrol joined by Major James E. Powell as claimed by Wiley Sword in his book. The idea of a patrol going out with both Moore and Powell just makes no sense and is not backed up by any account that I can find. It is simply one of the figments of Sword’s imagination that has found its way into the narrative and gets repeated by other historians who just repeat another historian’s work without scrutiny. But Prentiss confuses the issue with his report because he gets events out of sequence. Prentiss wrote in his second paragraph: “Saturday evening, pursuant to instructions received when I was assigned to duty with the Army of West Tennessee, the usual advance guard was posted, and in view of information received from the commandant there of, I sent forward five companies of the Twenty-fifth Missouri and five companies of the Twenty-first Missouri Infantry, under command of Col. David Moore, Twenty-first Missouri. I also, after consultation with Col. David Stuart, commanding a brigade of General Sherman’s division, sent to the left one company of the Eighteenth Wisconsin Infantry, under command of Captain Fisk. At about 7 o’clock the same evening Colonel Moore returned, reporting some activity in the front—an evident reconnaissance by cavalry. This information received, I proceeded to strengthen the guard stationed on the Corinth road, extending the picket lines to the front a distance of a mile and a half, at the same time extending and doubling the lines of the grand guard.” The way Prentiss composed these paragraphs gives the impression that Moore returned at 7 o’clock p. m. from a patrol consisting of five companies of the Twenty-first Missouri and five companies of the Twenty-fifth Missouri. But that makes no sense and does not fit the timing given by Moore in his report. Moore clearly wrote that he returned to camp at 7 p. m. after leading the three-company patrol he took out 3 miles. It makes no sense that at dusk with night approaching Prentiss would order a huge patrol of ten companies to go mashing around through the woods in the dark. My view is when Prentiss stated “I sent forward five companies of the Twenty-fifth Missouri and five companies of the Twenty-first Missouri Infantry, under command of Col. David Moore, Twenty-first Missouri” he is not describing a patrol but rather he sent Moore forward with ten companies to strengthen the picket line. Prentiss stated years later that these troops were sent forward with the order to stay through the night and try to capture some Rebels if they could. At some point on the evening of April 5th communication ceased between Prentiss at his headquarters and what was occurring in front of Peabody’s brigade. Prentiss felt he had responded to information received by sending out additional pickets. When Prentiss retired to his tent he believed that the war god David Moore was out on the picket line with ten companies of troops. However, apparently the pickets returned to camp at some point. When Powell’s patrol moved forward at 3 a. m. Prentiss was unaware of that fact. When Peabody heard pretty heavy firing and wounded men came into camp informing him that Powell could use some help Peabody sent his adjutant to Colonel Moore and told him to go to Powell’s aid with five companies. Moore did so and encountered the retreating Powell on the road east of Seay Field. Moore believed the Rebels were just a patrol and that they could be beaten back if Moore had the other five companies of the 21st Missouri. Moore sent an orderly back to camp to have the other five companies of the 21st Missouri sent to him. But the orderly did not follow the command chain. The orderly did not go to Peabody but instead went all the way to Prentiss at his headquarters. Prentiss described the arrival of the orderly in a speech in 1882; “Early in the morning, on the 6th of April, 1862, it was my duty, from what I had learned, to feel the enemy. I had been admonished on the Friday evening before that battle that an enemy of some force was in our front. Not at 3 o’clock, but on the evening of Saturday, before the sun had set, the details were made, and the order given throughout my division to advance the pickets and strengthen them with additional numbers. I did send to the front the gallant Moore, with five of his companies—three at first, and doubting their ability to meet the enemy, I sent two more on my right. On my left two companies of the 18thWisconsin were advanced one mile to the front. In the center, one company of the 61st Illinois and one of the 18th Missouri were sent forward as extra pickets, with instructions to remain until daylight and see if they could not capture some of the marauders that had been engaged in committing depredations immediately in our vicinity. Early on that Sabbath morning, before (while seated at my breakfast news came to me from the gallant Moore) I had heard the musketry fired in front, and heard the skirmishing, an orderly came galloping into camp and said: “General, the compliments of Gen. Moore. He requests me to say to you that he has met the enemy. Send his other five companies and he will lick them.” That is the language that came to me. Gen. Prentiss sent those other five companies of his regiment to him.” The work “admonish” had a different meaning back in the 1800s. The meaning was more close to “informed” as nowadays it is deemed more critical to be “admonished.” Here it is 20 years after the battle of Shiloh and Prentiss related what he believed happened. Note Prentiss remembered sending “to the front the gallant Moore” “to advance the pickets and strengthen them with additional numbers.” Prentiss had no clue as to Powell’s patrol on the morning of April 6th and the available record, including his 1882 speech shows that Prentiss had no clue as to Powell’s patrol when they placed him in his casket in February of 1901. He never mentioned Powell’s patrol and Peabody’s involvement because he never knew. Prentiss believed that Colonel David Moore was at the front with five companies and when he got a messenger from Moore wanting the rest of his regiment that just reinforced Prentiss’s belief that Moore had been involved with the start of the fighting. Back to French’s short letter and the wealth of information it contains for our consideration. 1. 1. French described how Prentiss ordered Moore to take out an afternoon patrol. French wrote five companies but Moore stated just three in his report. French reported they found numerous traces of Rebel cavalry. This contradicts the revisionist claim that Moore found nothing. 2. 2. French described how they were informed by citizens that the Rebels had a large force and that the Union camp would be attacked in the morning. French wrote that Moore passed this information on to both Prentiss and Peabody but that no serious note was taken except to strengthen the pickets. Here is a first indication that French was unaware of Powell’s patrol. It is also the only source I have seen that informs us that not only did Moore alert Prentiss but also Peabody. 3. 3. French confirmed the fact that Moore received an order from Peabody to take out five companies and move to the front. French gave the reason for this order is that the pickets had been fired upon. A second indication that French was unaware of Powell’s patrol. In addition this observation supports Moore report that it was Peabody that ordered him forward. Both Colonel David Moore and his adjutant, William French, say Peabody ordered Moore forward with five companies and they were there. 4. 4. French wrote that Moore met the pickets falling back and stopped them while sending back for the other five companies of the 21st Missouri. This is the third indication that French was unaware of Powell’s patrol and concluded that the men they encountered had been on picket duty instead of a five company patrol that Peabody had ordered to the front. French made no comment but it has been noted that the orderly Moore sent back for the other five companies went to Prentiss and not Peabody. 5. 5. French described the location of their fight as the house they had visited the day before during their reconnaissance which is at Seay Field. Seay Field is not three miles from the camp of the 21st Missouri. Based on Moore’s description that he moved in front of Sherman’s division it appears that he advanced beyond Seay Field but where Moore actually went is open to question. 6. 6. French wrote of Peabody sending an orderly to ask if Colonel Moore could hold his position until Peabody could reinforce him. I have not seen that referenced anywhere else. Finally French declaimed that “Colonel Moore held his ground faithfully and bravely, and justice indeed has never been done him for the part he took in the battle of Shiloh.” Of that French is totally correct. Rather than receiving justice for his role in the battle of Shiloh Colonel David Moore now receives ridicule and mockery at the hands of the Shiloh revisionists. He is depicted as a liar and a buffoon who could not find his way through the trees in front of Peabody’s camp without losing his way. There is no better example of how Shiloh revisionism has adversely affected the modern history of the battle of Shiloh than reading about the opening of the fight in Keven Getchell’s Scapegoat of Shiloh. What a shame that readers of that book who are not familiar with the battle of Shiloh will believe any of what Getchell wrote concerning the opening of the fight. Getchell did Moore and Prentiss a severe injustice in his book because he followed the Shiloh revisionist mantra. With that I close this posting even though I have so much more to tell. But tomorrow is another day and how it came to be that Colonel David Moore has been falsely depicted as a liar and a buffoon will be revealed in an upcoming posting. Hank
  32. 2 points
    Naturally anything having to do with Alabamians will be a great experience
  33. 2 points
    That is exactly it! Thanks Ozzy. Skelton, I remembered it was a distinct last name. I did not know other Henry's were used at Corinth. I could have sworn I saw it in print in a book, but, it could very well have been this article that I stumbled upon. I may be wrong, but I think most people think, "oh, Henry Rifle, they were blasting away like they do in Western movies". I have even seen Civil War reenactors carrying Henry rifles and they were just blasting away when shooting. I don't think this is historically accurate. I think the soldiers lucky enough to have these weapons, especially early in the war, would have been firing "somewhat fast", but still taking deliberate aim. Ammunition was not just laying around for this weapon. I can't see someone, especially Confederate, burning through ammunition when ammunition resupply would be a colossal issue. At Corinth, for Skelton, I think actually it would have been more than a colossal issue. If he ran out of ammo, there was probably NO resupply, and he would be left carrying a heavy paperweight if he did run out of ammo. I found the picture of Fisher mentioned in the article, holding his Henry rifle. Fisher, and the 10th Kentucky Partisan Rangers Cavalry, however, did not fight at Corinth. Their fighting was done in Kentucky for the most part. Still, incredibly rare and historically important image. I would imagine the most technologically advanced rifle on the field at Shiloh would be the Sharps rifle or carbine. But, I imagine Birge's Western Sharpshooters, along with other marksmen and sharpshooters, were carrying some finely crafted rifles as well, such as the Dimick rifle.
  34. 2 points
    I just spent the day at the Gettysburg battlefield which is about 3-1/2 hours from my domicile. I was amazed how poorly interpreted the battlefield is. A brigade will have one War Department tablet which summarizes its actions over the three days of the battle and possibly also what it did on July 4. The regimental monuments placed sort of where they should be. The interpretation from the tablets and monuments at Gettysburg is extremely lacking, especially when contrasted with the Shiloh battlefield. Major Reed did a good job with his placements of the War Department tablets and his control of the placement of the monuments. I am under the impression that the Gettysburg battlefield, at least in its beginning, was somewhat of a spontaneous creation, lacking the firm guidance of a Reed or Boynton (Chickamauga), and it shows. This trip to Gettysburg was my first in twenty years. Now I realize why I visit it every twenty years while visiting the Shiloh National Military Park, which is about a twelve-hour drive, at least once a year.
  35. 2 points
  36. 2 points
    Ozzy, looks like nobody is around to answer your question. I think people must be taking a summertime hiatus from SDG. I would say Grant, Forrest, and Cleburne. For each of them, it was the beginning stage of putting them on the path of how they are remembered today. I would say each earned his stardom after Shiloh, and Shiloh put the ball in motion.
  37. 2 points
    Awesome image! Where did you find that one! Of course the 14th by Shiloh were in blue jackets-- But a great image. Don did Shiloh, if I remember, because people at that time were asking for something Western. He had a hard time finding how Johnston was dressed at Shiloh-- after much research he came with this rendition. The Arkansas troops, their uniforms are based on research done by myself and Jerry Coats of Gettysburg. Jerry dug out the ordnance and clothing records in the National Archives. Using some photos and flag research we put it all together for this painting. Jerry said his Western stuff just did not sell as well as his Eastern Battlefield paintings and prints. Remember when it was all Gettysburg and Antietam 25 years ago!!! Not so much today, but that was the way it was back then. I will fill in the gaps. I did do the research for 10 Western figures for Don.-- Tom
  38. 2 points
    Bragg's words some ironically contradictory. He believes that he has done great work in and around Mobile/Pensacola preparing the area for defense and they can't spare him there, yet he could not repeat those same results out west and indeed he believes the west is lost. But, if he was going to go, he was going to take what he considered the "cream of the crop", the 9th Miss, 1st Louisiana, etc., etc. with him. You have to wonder if he likewise didn't want to leave for this scenario: If he left and Federals managed to take command of Pensacola and Mobile, that it would reflect badly on Bragg and his ability to organize effective long term defenses. In the letter from Benjamin to Bragg, I noticed something that was still around later in the war. Fremont is called incompetent. Later in the war, during Streight's Raid through Alabama, even locals considered that Federal force "incompetent". It is interesting how throughout the war Southerner's viewed Federal troops as inept.
  39. 2 points
    Grant's Greatest Strength From study of U.S. Grant's military history in the West during the Civil War, what becomes apparent is the General's aggression, drive and determination to take the fight to the enemy. Belmont -- initially flagged as a "demonstration in vicinity of Fort Columbus" -- was converted by Grant into a highly successful raid. Fort Henry was such an obvious target that newspaper reporters, all during the month of January, were conjecturing when that Confederate fort would be attacked. And Fort Donelson was merely the logical next step, after the capture of Fort Henry. Following the capture of Fort Donelson, the logical next step was "occupation of Nashville" (a major source of supply for the Rebel Army.) But, General Grant saw unedifying vacillation on the part of his Federal counterparts (Buell and Halleck, in particular), and took measures into his own hands to press for Nashville's occupation. First, Grant suggested to Major General Halleck that Nashville be taken. Then, finding no obvious plan in work, Grant suggested he could take Nashville. Finally, Grant determined that Nashville's occupation was needlessly being delayed; and took measures to "fix that problem" U.S. Grant told Halleck that he was going to Nashville (and added the proviso, "Unless you specifically prohibit my going.") He looked for an opportunity... and found it: the arrival of Nelson's Division, sent to assist in capture of Fort Donelson (and now, technically, Nelson's Division was a part of Grant's Army) Nelson's Division, in convoy aboard seven transports steaming up the Cumberland River, was deemed by Grant as superfluous; and labelled by Grant as "no longer needed." Therefore, General Grant thought it best to "return to sender" Nelson's force, by re-directing the flotilla a little further up the Cumberland, with new destination: Nashville. When Brigadier General William Nelson stepped ashore on February 25th he was the first Union general officer to enter the former Confederate capital of Tennessee. He technically belonged to Grant, who was in process of "returning him to the Army of the Ohio." (Which is why there is confusion to this day IRT who occupied Nashville?) To sum up, General Grant's greatest strength was his ability to "see opportunity, and exploit opportunity." (Drive, determination, aggression, persistence... were merely character traits used as tools by Grant to develop opportunity.) My take on U.S. Grant Ozzy Reference: Badeau's Military History of U.S. Grant (1867) pages 56 -61.
  40. 2 points
    The adjutants' report for the 58th Illinois regt. states that the regiment was armed "with the most worthless arms " at Fort Donelson that had been cast aside by other troops. (flintlocks) . When disembarking at Pittsburg landing they "exchanged arms" so assuming that they had never fired their newer rifles at Shiloh until engaged.
  41. 2 points
    Caption: A magnificent image of an unidentified Federal regiment drawn up for the camera near Stevenson. Hard-bitten Westerners like these would take the war to the enemy wherever they found him. (BEHRINGER-CRAWFORD MUSEUM, COVINGTON, KENTUCKY)
  42. 2 points
    All, I know this is a Shiloh board, but, a little "after action report". Mona was in my neck of the woods here at Stones River and I was able to give her a tour of the battlefield. A little insert here, if anyone is ever in the area and wants a tour, let me know and I will be glad to show you around. I guess this is also a, "Shiloh is lucky" moment. I was not happy to report to Mona, well, telling her, "don't get too excited, this ain't Shiloh". Tragically, in the 1890's there was a desire to create a National Military Park at Stones River almost as large as Shiloh. The move would have created a park of roughly 3,100 acres. Today, I think we roughly have 700 acres. Size wise, what the park has today is roughly, for a Shiloh comparison, Grant's last line, extending out to Cloud Field and over to the main battlefield entrance today. Similar to Shiloh, we had to drive through the battlefield to get to the area where the battle started. Stones River battlefield, is, well, it is gone. I lived in Murfreesboro 17 years ago, and since that time this battlefield has been paved over. When I say paved over, Stones Rivers' versions of the Peach Orchard, Rea Field, Fraley Field, Duncan Field, Jones Field, the Hornet's Nest, where most of the major fighting took place, is no more. I-24 goes through the heart of that area now. Cleburne's men attacked where Interstate 24 now exists. To the east of 24, it is now Walmart, an expanding hospital, hotels, places to eat, you get the picture. Even the last few open areas/fields are being developed at this very moment. The spot where General Sill was killed is now a bank, and across the street roughly 10 acres are being bulldozed for new construction. So many tons of dirt have been moved, that what the area originally looked like, versus now, well, there is no comparison. Small hills area bulldozed flat, so the terrain is just totally different. The area known as the Slaughter Pen, well, the park has half of it, on the other side of the road, a hospital expansion, and a soon to be 4 lane road. In the map attached, where it says Roberts(Bradley), marked by the X, I was lucky enough to make several evening/nighttime trips last fall (with permission), and found the bullets and canister you see. The mound of dirt I am standing by, I found a Williams Cleaner bullet in the pile, I just eyeballed it laying there. The pile itself was literally 2 stories high. Dropped bullets, fired bullets, artillery shell fragments, percussion caps, you name it, lots of stuff came from that area. People were finding tons of bullets just laying on top of the ground once the bulldozer went through. At Shiloh, we know almost exactly where specific regiments went through. At Stones River, because of the destruction, you can only form vague generalities. There is a Blue/Gray magazine with an in depth article, and tons of maps, about Stones River. But, because of people metal detecting, and relics found including a Mississippi button, the maps in the magazine appear to be incorrect. Not off by a lot, but off by up to 300 meters or more in some spots. Heavy traffic in the area makes stopping to get out and look difficult as Mona can testify to for sure. Sadly, I think we are just a generation or two away from a time when nobody will have much of an idea of where actions took place. Somewhat like, "well, so and so troops passed through this area at this intersection by the gas station, or, it could have been down 3 blocks by the McDonald's, we just don't know." I was able to show her some areas off the park where we know exactly how troops moved. And, naturally, you can see with good confidence where troops moved within the park. Other areas, with no places to pull over, you have to "tell the story" as you drive by, but again those are mainly off park property. I was able to show her 2 houses, still standing, that were used as field hospitals. But, we had a good time for sure. I tell you, we are lucky to have Shiloh so intact! Stan
  43. 2 points
    As result of the campaign against Fort Donelson, the Union suffered 507 killed and 1976 wounded; and the Confederates lost 327 killed and reported 1127 wounded. And because the United States Forces were victorious, Federal forces were responsible for burying (or removing for burial) over 800 dead; and providing care for more than 3000 wounded. Many wounded Confederate soldiers were sent to Union hospitals in Louisville (which got General U.S. Grant off-side with Don Carlos Buell, who complained to Henry Halleck about wounded soldiers being deposited in his Military District without permission.) The remainder, Union and Rebel, mostly went to hospitals in Paducah, Mound City, St. Louis, and elsewhere. But, by the end of February 1862, many Union soldiers were still unaccounted for -- by their families back home. And the mostly full hospitals along the Ohio River and Mississippi Rivers were not emptying. (And there was concern that the 700-bed Hospital at Mound City was kept full due to incompetence of the Director, Doctor Franklin.) The people of Illinois expressed their dissatisfaction in newspapers; and in letters to their Representatives in Springfield. In response, at the end of February, Governor Yates of Illinois sent a Commission of Doctors to Cairo on a fact-finding mission [see Chicago Daily Tribune of 25 FEB 1862, page 1.] Doctors Curtis, Johns and Williams, and Major Starring, visited the most concerning facilities. As a result, the hospitals at Mound City and Paducah were found to be full because of the large numbers of recently admitted sick men (who added their numbers to the slowly departing Fort Donelson wounded.) Dr. Franklin at Mound City was determined to be doing his best: he had even sent 100 men home on furlough to complete their recoveries. And, at Fort Donelson, the Commissioners compiled more complete records of the dead; and discovered over 200 wounded men still in vicinity (many of these wounded Union soldiers had been captured by the Rebels during the Campaign, and placed in Nashville hospitals for care. And remained behind when the Confederates evacuated. ) About 100 of the worst cases were sent to St. Louis for hospitalization; 115 others were sent home on furlough. Governor Yates published his March 7th report in the 14 MAR 1862 edition of the Chicago Daily Tribune. A few days later, General Lew Wallace sent over 200 desperately sick men away from Crump's Landing aboard the steamer, Telegraph, for treatment that could not be acquired at Savannah, Tennessee... and unwittingly initiated friction between himself and General Grant (and infuriated the prickly Henry Halleck, who hated malingerers, and believed "his Furlough System" was being abused.) And, although this topic has been covered pretty thoroughly, it turns out... there is more to the story. Ozzy References: http://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84031490/1862-03-14/ed-1/seq-3/#date1=1862&sort=date&rows=20&words=FRANKLIN+Franklin&searchType=basic&sequence=0&index=16&state=Illinois&date2=1862&proxtext=Franklin&y=0&x=0&dateFilterType=yearRange&page=10 Chicago Daily Tribune for 14 MAR 1862 and 25 FEB 1862. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Fort_Donelson Fort Donelson casualty figures.
  44. 2 points
    According to The History of the Orphan Brigade Edward Porter Thompson, Price C. Newman of Louisville was elected 2nd lieutenant in November, 1861, and was elected captain at the reorganization of May 15, 1862. He participated in all of the major engagements of the Orphan Brigade and died in Louisville on July 30, 1894. (page 802) https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.b4519380;view=1up;seq=1213
  45. 2 points
    Stan, another reason the Rebs probably didn't collect weapons on the night of the 6th was that they believed they had pretty much won the battle and only needed to clean up in the morning. If they thought they controlled the battlefield, they might have felt they had plenty of time to pick up any arms laying around.
  46. 2 points
    Thanks for putting this series together. The general feeling now is that the wounded were very badly handled at Shiloh (and many, many were) yet there were also experienced surgeons who worked tirelessly to do the best they could. Doctors of that era were strong anatomists and some, with that knowledge plus experience coupled with dexterity, did save lives with tourniquets and amputations. If only Pasteur and Lister had come a decade or so earlier. A.S. Johnson almost certainly could have been saved with a simple tourniquet if he had not sent his surgeon away to treat others. Surgeon General William A. Hammond made a valiant attempt to enforce the ancient edict of "first do no harm" by removing calomel and tartar emetic from the Army formulary (May 6, 1863). But that was a year after Shiloh. The resulting "Calomel War" was part of the reason for Hammond's short tenure. Dr. Letterman's ambulance groups were a huge innovation.
  47. 2 points
    Ran across the below Smithsonian Magazine article, dated 28 June 2016, by accident, while searching for orders sent by Henry Halleck. The report caught me by surprise, as I assumed all the Civil War telegrams still in existence (North and South) had been de-coded, already. Just goes to show: there is a lot of material still out there, some of which may turn one theory or another on its head... Ozzy http://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/you-can-help-decode-thousands-top-secret-civil-war-telegrams-180959561/ 16.000 Telegrams yet to be De-Coded
  48. 2 points
    Not Hardin County, or McNairy County... but Madison County, a bit to the northwest. Robert Cartmell was a married, 33-year-old farmer working a property just outside Jackson, Tennessee when war broke out in April 1861. Since 1859 he maintained a diary (and faithfully recorded daily entries through April 1862.) Because Jackson was HQ for the Mobile & Ohio Railroad; and because the telegraph ran to Jackson, farmer Cartmell had access to timely news reports (often within hours or a day of the event) and Robert Cartmell would walk into town nearly every day to get the latest news, and then record that news (and his analysis) in his diary. Some of the more noteworthy entries: page 37 1859 Robert visited Corinth and recorded his impression of that soon-to-be famous railroad junction; (94) 14 Apr 61 The contest at Fort Sumter confirmed; (107) 8 Jun 61 Robert cast his ballot for Tennessee to secede; (149) 24 Jan 62 The defeat of Crittenden and Zollicoffer in Eastern Kentucky reported; (151) 8 Feb 62 "Went to town this evening and learned Fort Henry has fallen" (151) 10 Feb "Beauregard has arrived at Bowing Green (and gunboats have gone up the Tennessee River to Florence) (152) 16 Feb "Walked into town and learned Fort Donelson had fallen" (154) 24 Feb "The Governor wants the people of Madison County to volunteer (and he has gone to Memphis)" (154) Robert Cartmell joined a "militia company of married men" (Ford's Company at Jackson) (155) 3 Mar "A continuous stream of soldiers arriving at Jackson [from evacuation of Fort Columbus]" (155) "General Beauregard is here (and may make Jackson his HQ)" (155 - 162) Reports steamers carrying Federal troops up the Tennessee River; reports the arrival of Confederate soldiers in vicinity, until on April 5th he estimates 100,000 Rebels and 150,000 Federal troops are poised for a contest (all the while recording the daily weather; time spent at drill with Ford's Company; and work done on his farm...) A "diary with a difference," this record kept by Robert Cartmell is available online courtesy Tennessee Virtual Archive at: http://teva.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p15138coll39/id/268/rec/302 Robert Cartmell diary (mostly recorded at Jackson Tennessee). Cheers Ozzy
  49. 2 points
    I show the 2nd manual as being written by Thos Worthington http://trove.nla.gov.au/work/11640670?selectedversion=NBD27608790
  50. 2 points
    Maps from several different battles. Thought some might enjoy this. https://unwritten-record.blogs.archives.gov/2017/10/17/rg-109-confederate-maps-series-now-digitized-and-available-online/
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