Jump to content
Shiloh Discussion Group

Leaderboard


Popular Content

Showing content with the highest reputation since 06/12/2018 in all areas

  1. 4 points
    Hello everyone. This is to let you know that we're ready to go with our next Epic Trek, with historian Tim Smith. This will be our seventh consecutive year with Tim, and it promises to be another great experience. Here are the details: Price: $30 per person. Payable on the morning of the hike. Date: November 3rd, 2018. Location: Shiloh National Military Park Start Time/Place: 8:00 a.m. at Ed Shaw's, just south of the park. (Not completely set in stone just yet on Shaw's, but Mona or I will keep you posted.) If you're not sure how to get there, don't worry, we've got you covered. Focus of this year's hike: We're going to be following in the footsteps of the Confederate army's Alabama troops, and learning about their experience at Shiloh. (See professionally drawn map, below.) Overview: We'll be heading out from or near Ed Shaw's, and head off toward Spain Field with the Alabama troops of Gladden's Brigade. From there we'll reinforce John K. Jackson's Bama boys as they navigate their way through the ravines east of the Peach Orchard and help encircle the Union soldiers trapped in the Hornet's Nest. Then we'll re-up with some of Gladden's men and plunge into the Canyon of Pittsburg Landing, better known as Dill Branch Ravine. Then on to lunch near the visitors center. After lunch it's off to the west side of the park, across Canyon Jr. (Tilghman Branch), to the site of Ketchum's Alabama Battery. Then we'll begin working our way back to the south along the April 7th battle lines, and our starting point at Shaw's. Total distance for this hike looks to be roughly nine miles, with terrain ranging from easy to most definitely not easy. We should finish up between 4:00 and 6:00, based on previous hikes. As always, sturdy hiking footwear is strongly recommended. Here's that (not quite) professionally done map, outlining our basic route through the park: Check back here for updates, and feel free to ask questions either here, via Private message, or by email @pcuskey@gmail.com. Hope to see everyone in November. Perry
  2. 3 points
    Most people reference Gott's book when giving Confederate strength at Fort Donelson. Gott mostly uses the "tabular statement" compiled at the time: He then proceeds to make a few imputations for units not included above. Investigation has shown that every unit he imputed is already in this list. They are: Culbertson's Battery of 300; these were the men manning the water battery, but were detachments from units in the list. The battery was manned by Maury's (Ross') battery, Coy A of 30th TN and Coy A of 50th TN. These units are on the list, and Gott double counts them. Melton's scouts are listed in the table as having 15 men. Gott gives them 58. Major Fielding Gowan's Tennessee cavalry squadron is listed on the table as having 60. Gott estimates 170. The Kentucky cavalry coys were attached to Forrest's regiment, and are included in it (see the returns below). Gott doesn't list sources, but gives Huey's coy an incredible 112. Also, for no reason Gott added 150 surrendered to the 48th TN. Finally, there is an addition error in his artillery table. We also have the returns for the formations a mere two weeks prior to Fort Donelson: Of these formations, the majority of the 4th Division, the whole of Floyd's "division" and Clark's brigades, and the artillery and 7 regiments of Buckner's division were at Donelson. Fortunately Buckner broke down the regiments strengths in his report and it is close to 7/12ths of his January return, and can be accepted. The PFD at Donelson can be (over)estimated thus: Thus the estimate of 13,000 given by the likes of Pillow seems accurate. Note that the highest figure given by any confederate is by Preston Johnston, but he double counted Clark's and Floyd's brigades. Removing the double counts give 15,000, which is consistent with the returns.
  3. 3 points
    Thanks for this. Another little piece of Civil War Chicagoiana to add to my collection. Rumsey was late to his own funeral...but for a poignant reason.
  4. 3 points
    I located Sgt. William H. Busbey's post-war article about his being near Grant's Savannah headquarters and on Tigress during the trip to Pittsburg Landing on April 6th in the Chicago Inter-Ocean. Some obvious errors make it not completely reliable, and it may be completely unreliable, but it does make for interesting reading: "I was at Savannah in April, 1862, associated with the work of the Adams Express company . Myself and another young man employed in the same office were sleeping on the night of April 5 in a house in Savannah three or four blocks from the river. General Grant's headquarters at Savannah were in a house very close to the river. We were on higher ground than he was, and about daylight on the morning of April 6 the young man sleeping with me jumped out of bed with the exclamation, 'There's firing up at the Landing.' We could hear very distinctly the boom of cannon, and when we went to the east window we could hear, or thought we could hear, the sound of musketry. Pittsburg landing was nine miles away, but in the still morning air the roar of musketry came to us." "We dressed hurriedly, ran down to General Grant's headquarters, where we found General Webster, chief of artillery, in his night shirt on the porch listening intently to the sound of firing. We saw him run into the house, and another officer came out with him. They listened a minute, ran in again, and General Grant came out in his night dress. The three figures stood like statues while Grant listened, and then the General gave an order that put everything in a whirl. Ned Osborne of Chicago was at that time in command of Grant's headquarters guard, and under excitement he was a very active man." "In a few minutes staff officers were awake and dressed, the escort was mounted and ready to go, and the General and staff boarded at once the steamer Tigress. I remembered as I looked over the steamers at the landing tht the Tigress was the only vessel that had steam up, and comprehending that Grant would go on that vessel, my comrade and myself went down and climbed on in advance of the General and his staff. There was a ittle wait for the escort and horses of the officers, but when all were on board the steamer did not move. Inquiry developed the fact that neither the captain nor the pilot was awake or had received any notice of the journey. They were stirred up in short order, and soon the Tigress started up the river for Pittsburg Landing." "About four miles above Savannah we came to Crump's landing. General Lew Wallace, in command of the division at that point, was on the steamer Jessie K. Bell. When we came up within fifty yards of the Bell, Grant shouted to Wallace, asking if he had any news from the front. Wallace shouted back saying that a courier had just arrived with the report that Sherman had been attacked by a heavy force. Grant, with great intensity of manner, asked: 'Does the dispatch say a heavy force?' Wallace replied that it did and Grant ordered the captain of the Tigress to make all possible speed for Pittsburg Landing." "As we started General Wallace shouted in surprise: 'General Grant, have you no orders for me?' and Grant, after thinking a moment, shouted back, 'Hold yourself in readiness to march.' Then we steamed away, but in a few minutes Ross came to me and said: 'It is a general attack this time, sure.' I asked him how he knew and he said that Captain Baxter had just received orders from Grant to take a steam tug and carry orders back to General Wallace to move at once and take position on the right of the Union force engaged in battle. We arrived at Pittsburg Landing in a short time and General Grant rode away at once toward the front." [The article went on about Busbey's experiences in the battle, including hauling guns up the bluff for Webster, the boats in the river, and Mother Bickerdyke.]
  5. 3 points
    My photos from this past weekend's Epic Trek are HERE if anyone is interested. Great time of hiking, learning, and fellowship.
  6. 3 points
    The Confederate dead numbered 1728, if I am to believe my Battlefield America map [and is the number given by David W Reed (pbuhn)]. Do we really think that 700 of them fell in the assault upon the Sixth Division? (OK, I know that someone will claim that the 16th Wisconsin killed them all.)
  7. 3 points
    I know this was addressed to Tom, but I will chime in, seeing as how photographs is "my thing". I love to study period photography, portraits in particular. The issue of "photographers prop" versus the soldiers actual issued weapon in a photograph. This is a doozie that IMHO will never be answered. In many photographs it is obvious what you are seeing is a photographers prop. How do we know? Same pistol, same knife, BUT, saying it is the same long arm, that to me is impossible to determine. I would argue that you see more photographers prop weapons in Confederate images. I think, in respect to your statement, that Federal soldiers did indeed carry their own weapon to the photograph studio. Soldiers would not leave camp and leave their weapon behind. They carried it with them. It then gets into well, was the photograph made in a town at a studio, was it made by a traveling photographer who set up a studio setting in the field, or what. Sometimes we can tell the difference, other times, not so easy to decipher. There are a lot of rabbit holes still left untouched as far as research is concerned about this. There are just tons of mind boggling variables. Just take a random Confederate photograph for example. You would have to research to see if the weapon the soldier is holding is the same style weapon that was issued to the unit, at least close to the time. I have seen photographs, and actually own one, where, down to the T, the soldier is wearing his issued uniform and holding his issued musket. Samuel Rickey, 7th Iowa Infantry. I would argue that photographers, mainly in the South, did not have access to THAT many military grade weapons to use as props. Those weapons were needed in the field. At a time when the South was buying shotguns, of all things, from private individuals to arm the military, photographers would have a hard time holding on to an actual military grade weapon under such circumstances. They did have them though. As you can tell, this topic could get extremely long winded and go on for infinity. Copying something I posted earlier, this is just the confusion in ONE unit, the 15th Mississippi Infantry at the time of Shiloh. "Col. Statham's request for 900 enfields for the 15th Miss Rgt is approved days before Adj. Binford requested 8,000 .69 cartridges and 2,000 Mississippi cartridges for Shiloh. There isn't a surviving munitions request for enfield cartridges and oddly the enlisted men talk about having Belgian and Austrian weapons at Shiloh, some of the accounts written less than a week afterwards. So they are certainly not conclusive at any rate." Weapons carried at Shiloh by Federal soldiers at Shiloh would be MUCH easier to ascertain and determine with a huge deal of confidence. The Confederate Army, much harder and in some cases I would say dang near impossible without documented proof coming to light. To make a long story short, using images is a good reference, but ammunition requisitions and other documents to back it up is required. Photos are a good tool to use, but far from solid evidence if taken alone without any other supporting documentation. If a soldier is holding an 1816 converted flintlock in an image, but you know for fact based on documents that his regiment was largely carrying Enfields at Shiloh, well, you know the 1816 is either a photographers prop, or that weapon was later turned in and the soldier issued his new Enfield. Having said all this, I applaud Tom's work, it is no easy undertaking and gives us a further glimpse into the events at Shiloh. Stan
  8. 2 points
    This is a first listing of the Army of the Ohio under Don Carlos Buell, a listing of the firearms carried by these Regiments at Shiloh. Again if you have any corrections or additions or questions- please post- Grant's Army coming soon-- This is not the final count or rendering-- but I am 99% sure this is it-- Army of the Ohio—Second Division 4th Brigade 1st Ohio Infantry—740 Prussian Muskets and 200 Enfield Rifles for flank Companies 6th Indiana--- Model 1842 Rifled Muskets 5th Kentucky--- Enfield Rifles U.S. Regulars—15th, 16th, 19th --- New Springfield Rifles 5th Brigade 29th Indiana---Enfield Rifles 30th Indiana--- Enfield Rifles 34th Illinois--- Model 1842 Rifled Muskets 77th Pennsylvania--- Springfield and Enfield Rifles 6th Brigade 15th Ohio--- 730 Model 1842 Rifled Muskets 32nd Indiana--- Initially Greenwood Rifles, all Enfield Rifles by Shiloh 49th Ohio--- 700 Model 1842 Rifled Muskets and 180 Enfield Rifles Fourth Division 10th Brigade 6th Ohio--- 580 U.S. Percussion Muskets, [smoothbores], 120 Enfield Rifles 24th Ohio—840 U.S. Percussion Muskets, [smoothbores], 212 Enfield Rifles 36th Indiana--- Enfield Rifles 19th Brigade 9th Indiana--- Model 1855 Rifled Muskets 41st Ohio--- 680 Model 1842 Rifled Muskets, 200 Enfield Rifles 6th Kentucky--- Enfield Rifles 22nd Brigade 1st Kentucky--- Austrian Rifles. 54 Caliber 2nd Kentucky--- Enfield Rifles 20th Kentucky--- Model 1842 Rifled Muskets 5th Division 11th Brigade 19th Ohio--- 600 Pondir Rifles, 200 Enfield Rifles 59th Ohio--- 200 Enfield Rifles, rest in the Field? 13th Kentucky--- Model 1842 Rifled Muskets 14th Brigade 11th Kentucky--- Enfield Rifles 13th Ohio--- 800 Model 1842 Rifled Muskets, 190 Enfield Rifles 26th Kentucky--- Enfield Rifles 20th Brigade {not engaged} 13th Michigan--- Springfield Rifles- Model 1861 64th Ohio--- Springfield Rifles- Model 1861 65th Ohio--- Springfield Rifles- Model 1861 21st Brigade 15th Indiana--- Springfield Rifles 40th Indiana--- Austrian Rifles .54 Caliber 57th Indiana--- 6 Companies Prussian Musket [smoothbores], 4 Companies Enfield Rifles 24th Kentucky--- Springfield Rifles
  9. 2 points
    From the Washington Post: http://www.washingto...36b8_story.html By Tony Horwitz, It’s often said that journalists write the first rough draft of history. But rarely do reporters draft history in quite so rough a fashion as Junius Browne and Albert Richardson did in the Civil War. (PublicAffairs) - ‘Junius and Albert's Adventures in the Confederacy: A Civil War Odyssey’ by Peter Carlson The two Northern correspondents narrowly escaped death in an artillery bombardment, only to be captured by Confederates. For 593 excruciating days, they skirmished with lice in Southern prisons as the real war raged on without them. Then, after a jailbreak and a harrowing trek through enemy territory, the reporters filed the story of a lifetime: their own. Peter Carlson narrates this tale of journalistic derring-do in “Junius and Albert’s Adventures in the Confederacy.” This title, which echoes the 1989 slacker film “Bill & Ted’s Excellent Adventure,” undersells the gravity of the reporters’ experience. But it’s also appropriate, because Carlson’s book unspools like a buddy flick: Two larkish fellows embark on a trip that goes desperately wrong and often veers into farce. At the start of the Civil War, Browne and Richardson belonged to the self-styled “Bohemian Brigade,” a journalistic troupe of insouciant thrill-seekers who gallivanted along the front. Like other reporters of that era, they made no pretense to objectivity and freely expressed the staunch abolitionism of their employer, the New York Tribune. Nor did they let the facts get in the way of a good story. At one point, to avoid being scooped by a competitor, Browne and a colleague composed “long, vivid, eyewitness accounts of a battle that occurred 200 miles beyond their eyesight,” Carlson writes. Their fabrications ran at length in the Tribune, a stunt that made the writers legendary among the Bohemian Brigade. But these cavalier “knights of the quill,” as Browne called them, also risked their lives to cover combat. In May 1863, Browne and Richardson tried to sneak past rebel cannon at Vicksburg aboard a Union barge filled with hay. An incoming shell burned and killed half the soldiers on board. The survivors were fished out of the Mississippi and jailed. It was customary at the time to quickly release or swap captured journalists. But Browne and Richardson wrote for the paper most hated in the South; the Confederate in charge of prisoner exchanges called them “the worst and most obnoxious of all non-combatants.” Also, soon after their capture, the warring parties suspended prisoner exchanges. So the men were shuttled among jails, including Richmond’s notorious Castle Thunder, before ending up at North Carolina’s Salisbury Prison, a mini-Andersonville where men perished in droves from exposure, disease and shootings by guards. Carlson’s story has so many twists, right up to the last page, that I won’t spoil it by telling more. But the exquisite plot is only one of the joys of reading this book. As a veteran journalist (including 22 years at The Washington Post), Carlson captures the competitive yet collegial world of reporters in the field and their tortured relationship with distant editors. He also has an ear for quotes and an eye for detail, and shares with the Bohemian Brigade a keen sense of the ridiculous. Though the Northern reporters were hated Yanks, they were also curiosities. So Southerners flocked to visit the inmates — and to declare their willingness to “die in the last ditch” for the Cause. This line was repeated so often, Carlson writes, that it became a running gag for the reporters: “Where is this ditch? How deep is it? They’re going to need a very big ditch to hold all these Rebels who keep promising to die in it.” He also quotes the absurd reports in Southern papers, including this one on Gettysburg: “The Confederates were repulsed but cannot, at present, with justice or candor, be said to have suffered defeat.” Carlson excels as well at drawing characters, particularly the odd couple at the heart of his book. Browne, the well-schooled son of a banker, was a bookish scribe who filled his florid dispatches with Classical allusions. Richardson, a rugged farm boy, was plainspoken and ingratiated himself with all he met. Yet the two became inseparable and sustained each other through hardships and despair that neither could endure alone. “The North for us is like the grave,” Richardson wrote, after letters stopped reaching inmates, “no voice ever comes back to us from it.” If there’s a flaw in this fine book, it’s that Carlson tells his story almost too well. He’s shorn away anything that might interrupt the flow of his taut, lively narrative. This makes for a rollicking read, but at times I wanted more context and reflection — on the telegraph, for instance, a technology that transformed the news business in the mid-19th century as dramatically as the Internet has changed the media in our own time. Also, while Carlson details his deep research in the book’s endnotes, his text doesn’t address whether Browne and Richardson were reliable sources in the telling of their own story. Given the flagrant bias and outright fictions that Carlson documents in the dispatches of the Bohemian Brigade, I doubted some of the witty repartee and incredible adventures that Browne and Richardson recalled, much of it in books they wrote after returning home. But even if the two men embellished, their ordeal has resonance far beyond its drama and drollery. The reporters were forced into close, extended contact with captured Northerners and Southerners of every stripe — deserters, slaves, brutish guards, mountain guerrillas — and they experienced the behind-the-lines horror of the conflict. As a result, they witnessed, and later exposed, a theater of the war that was barely known to their colleagues at the front or to the Northern public. This remains an aspect of the Civil War that is little known to most Americans. The journalists’ experiences of both battle and captivity also speak to the enduring challenge of war reporting. Upon seeing combat for the first time, Browne wrote, “No one here seems to have any knowledge of anything, the leading officers having little more information than the privates.” As Carlson acutely notes, Browne’s one-line observation “sums up the ‘fog of war’ so well that it could be included in nearly every battle dispatch in every war ever fought.” Tony Horwitz is the author of “Confederates in the Attic” and “Midnight Rising: John Brown and the Raid That Sparked the Civil War.” Jim
  10. 2 points
    At Fort Henry the gunboat Essex took a shell through their middle boiler. The scalding steam trapped the two civilian pilots in the pilot house and killed them instantly. One pilot was found with his hand still on the wheel. The names were Marshall Ford and James McBride. At Fort Donelson, Foote’s flagship was the St. Louis. A shell penetrated the 1.5 inches of iron plate and 15 inches of oak timber sending deadly splinters along with shell fragments ricocheting throughout the pilot house. F. A. Riley, the pilot, died at the wheel. Foote was injured in his foot but was able to pry Riley’s dead fingers from the wheel and took over steering the boat. Foote thought his wound was not serious and he would be over it in a week. But it never healed and three months later he had to relinquish command of the gunboat fleet on the Mississippi. He died about a year later. The Carondelet stayed in the fight the longest at Fort Donelson. A 128-pound shell smashed into the pilot house and sent iron splinters and wood splinters into the two civilian pilots, mortally wounding one. His name was William Hinton. Later another shell hit the pilot house wounding another pilot. On board the Louisville, a pilot was wounded. The pilot house on the boats was a prime target for the enemy’s cannon. At Forts Henry and Donelson four civilian pilots were killed and at least three others wounded. Pilots were usually well-known on the rivers and served under dangerous conditions. At Forts Henry and Donelson the pilot houses on the gunboats were, indeed, a slaughter pen. This was a great question as I had never heard the term slaughter pen applied at Forts Henry and Fort Donelson. I tried a simple google search with forts Henry and Donelson and slaughter pen and the following book appeared: A History of the United States Navy, from 1775 to 1893, Volume 2 By Edgar Stanton Maclay. Page 330. Here is the link I found. It is long but when I tried to find a shorter one it was not the same book although it had the same title. https://books.google.com/books?id=UHWpn7IEuMoC&pg=PA330&lpg=PA330&dq=Slaughter+Pen+fort+donelson&source=bl&ots=gdumFKu_en&sig=ACfU3U2dvG_a0-xwGC8NzX_N401kgx69Jg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwid5Y3Y27jkAhUKM6wKHT5cDco4ChDoATAEegQIBxAB#v=onepage&q&f=false To verify what boat William Hinton was on I referred to Walke’s “The Western Flotilla at Fort Donelson, Island Number Ten, Fort Pillow and Memphis” in Battles and Leaders, Vol. 1 Hank
  11. 2 points
    Knowing that Wickliffe and Hardcastle were part of the party that crossed the desert from California with Albert Sidney Johnston it appeared that was the connection. A simple search of the other two revealed they also were part of Johnston's entourage. Brewer showed up on the SNMP facebook page. Ridley survived the war and lived till 1909 but Brewer was killed in Virginia in 1864. Hank
  12. 2 points
    Grant put in his memoirs that on January 6 he wrote Halleck and asked permission to see Halleck in St. Louis. He did not actually visit Halleck at that time. Halleck gave him another assignment. In the ORs, vol. 7 page 534 is Grant’s letter to Halleck ending with “If it meets with the approval of the Gen. Comd.g the Department I would be pleased to visit Head Quarters on business connected with this command.” However, on the same day, January 6, Halleck sent Grant an order, (ORs, vol. 7, page 533). “I wish you to make a demonstration in force on Mayfield and in the direction of Murray. Forces from Paducah and Fort Holt should meet at Mayfield and threaten Camp Beauregard and Murray, letting it be understood that Dover (i. e. Fort Donelson) is the object of your attack.” Halleck told Grant to avoid a battle as they were not ready. Nowhere in this order is Fort Henry mentioned. Grant made preparations in response to the January 6 order from Halleck. Grant ordered a column from Cairo under BG John McClernand and a column from Paducah under BG C. F. Smith to make the demonstrations. In his instructions to C. F. Smith dated January 8, 1862 (Grant Papers, vol. 4, page 11) Grant wrote that he would send Smith a gunboat and Smith should send the gunboat and a transport carrying a section of Artillery and infantry up the Tennessee River. Grant made no mention of Fort Henry but thought it would aid in the deception and help prevent rebel reinforcements moving from Columbus to Bowling Green. On January 9, 1862, three days after Halleck ordered Grant to make the demonstration, Halleck wrote McClellan informing him that he had just received McClellan’s message from the third of January the previous evening. (ORs, vol. 7, page 539) Halleck did not receive McClellan’s so-called order from January 3 until the evening of January 8. By that time Halleck had already set Grant in motion to make the demonstrations. Halleck enclosed a copy of his orders to Grant for McClellan’s information. On January 10 Halleck again wrote McClellan about McClellan’s letter of January 3. (OR. Vol. 7, page 543) This time Halleck alluded that if he followed the “order” of January 3 it would cause the loss of Missouri and did McClellan really want to do that? McClellan replied to Halleck on January 13 that Halleck had not read the letter of January 3 “with much care.” McClellan declared “There is nothing in my letter that can reasonably be construed into an order…” McClellan claimed what he wanted from Halleck was his views on how to accomplish the stated goals. (ORs, vol. 7, page 547) On January 1, 1862 the commander-in-chief, President Abraham Lincoln, telegraphed Halleck that McClellan was sick and should not be disturbed with business. Halleck was ordered by the President to work directly with Buell at once. (ORs, vol. 7, page 526) Buell received the same admonitions from the President. He wrote a message to Halleck on January 3, 1862. (ORs, vol. 7, page 526). Buell declared that the power of the Confederacy is on the line from Columbus to Bowling Green and in the center the forts on the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers. Buell wrote an attack on the flanks and center was of importance and should be done simultaneously so the Confederates could not move troops around. Buell stated that two gunboat expeditions should go the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. (hint, hint to Halleck). But Halleck did not have the troops for such expeditions and the ironclad gunboats were not ready for service. Buell pressured Halleck with; “whatever is to be done must be done in a few days.” Halleck apparently got the impression Buell was, finally, going to move against Bowling Green. He could not mount the river expeditions but he could send Grant out on the demonstrations in order to prevent rebel reinforcements being sent from Columbus to Bowling Green. In his January 6, 1862 order to Grant, Halleck told Grant that was the object of the demonstrations. (ORs, vol. 7, page 534) On January 6, 1862 Halleck sent a long synopsis to Lincoln and offered his opinion about an advance on Columbus while Buell moved on Bowling Green. It would be a repetition of the “strategic error which produced the disaster of Bull Run.” Halleck claimed such a plan would fail ninety-nine times out of hundred and was “condemned by every military authority I have [he had] ever read.” (ORs, vol. 7, page 533) On the same day that Halleck wrote Lincoln about how dumb an attack on Columbus would be Feis (William Feis, Grant's Secret Service) wants us to believe Grant wrote Halleck for a meeting to propose just such an undertaking. Feis wrote “Instead of going to St. Louis that January to propose a campaign against Forts Henry and Donelson, it is more probable that Grant hoped to convince Halleck that the time had come to eliminate Columbus.” (page 60 of Feis book) But Halleck had already pointedly stated that the true line of operations was to split the rebel defensive line in the center at the twin Forts Henry and Donelson. In late December Halleck had dinner with Sherman and Halleck’s aide, BG Cullom at the Planter’s House in St. Louis. Halleck laid a map on the table showing the rebel defensive line and asked his two guests where would be the best place to break it. They replied “in the center.” Halleck whole heartedly agreed and declared the true line of operations was to attack the rebel line on the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. If Grant went to St. Louis to champion a movement against Columbus it is no wonder Halleck would toss him out. It seems to me that requesting permission from your superior officer to do something the superior officer had already condemned and told the President of the United States it would be a strategic error would not end well. Then Feis misleads us by claiming McClellan called for a demonstration against Columbus on January 3, 1862. In addition, McClellan wanted Halleck to send expeditions up the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers to freeze troops at Fort Donelson, Fort Henry and Clarksville. If that was not enough McClellan wanted Halleck to seize Columbus if the place seemed vulnerable. Feis wrote; “Then to accomplish this mission, Halleck ordered Grant to march east of Columbus toward Mayfield and Murray…” What is not stated is that Halleck had neither the men nor the gunboats to “accomplish this mission.” Halleck ordered Grant out with the demonstrations to keep any reinforcements moving from Columbus to Bowling Green. Feis then noted Halleck ordered Grant (Feis did not give the date but it was Jan. 6) to “make a demonstration in force on Mayfield and in the direction of Murray” using forces from Cairo and Paducah. Grant is to act like he is an advance guard of a larger force and after the demonstration is deemed finished the forces should slowly retreat back to a Paducah. Nowhere in Halleck’s instructions is there a mention of Fort Henry. Then Feis wrote “Halleck cautioned against engaging the enemy and conveniently neglected to mention McClellan’s instructions to take Columbus if the opportunity arose.” Since Halleck did not receive McClellan’s letter mentioning Columbus until the night of January 8 how could he have passed along McClellan’s instructions in an order he prepared for Grant on January 6? Feis did not explain how that would be possible. Feis also does not mention McClellan writing Halleck that only a pea-brained nincompoop would have considered McClellan’s letter of January 3 as instructions. (ORs, vol. 7, page 547) As of January 6, Halleck was not considering making any movements towards rebel strongholds until he had the situation in Missouri under control. Halleck estimated that would be around mid-February. Halleck wrote McClellan on January 20, just as Grant was returning to Cairo from the demonstration, and outlined his plan for future operations. (ORs, vol. 8, page 509)It did not include a direct assault on Columbus. He thought that was impracticable and “not a proper line of operations.” Halleck declared that a more feasible plan would be expeditions up the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers towards Nashville. That would turn Columbus and cause the rebels to evacuate Bowling Green. Halleck noted he had thoroughly studied the defenses of Columbus and found them strong. Halleck wrote it would take a large siege train and a “terrible loss of life” to take Columbus. To send expeditions up the two rivers Halleck estimated it should not be attempted with no less than 60,000 men. There were only 15,000 troops available at Cairo and Paducah at that time and the gunboats were looking for crews. It has been noted that nowhere in Halleck’s order to Grant and Grant’s order to C. F. Smith is Fort Henry mentioned as a place to be threatened. The instructions from Halleck were to act as if Dover (Fort Donelson) was the target of the movement. Feis showed on page 61 of his book why one should always be skeptical of authors who are quoting short segments of reports with parts not included. Feis wants to present the idea that there was a lost opportunity to take Columbus according to McClernand’s report to Halleck of January 24. Feis wrote: “As Union troops neared Columbus during the operation, McClernand interpreted the “non-appearance” of any significant Confederate resistance to mean the enemy was “closely collected around camp fires within their entrenchments, and indisposed to take the field.” That moment, he later wrote, was perhaps the most “favorable time…for [a] successful attack and the capture of Columbus.” After observing the disappointment evinced by his men when the demonstration ended without an attempt to storm the stronghold, McClernand urged Halleck to launch an immediate attack while the enemy remained vulnerable.” (Feis book page 61) In the ORs, vol. 7, page 69 we find what McClernand wrote from which Feis cherry-picked quotations to make the claim of the “lost opportunity” to take Columbus by storm. “It was discovered that an abatis of fallen timber a half mile in width surrounded the enemy’s intrenchments. The rigor of the weather and the non-appearance of any considerable rebel force led to the belief that they were closely collected around camp fires within their intrenchments, and indisposed to take the field. It is believed that with suitable preparation on our part a favorable time was thus afforded for successful attack and the capture of Columbus.” Note Feis left out “It is believed that with suitable preparation on our part…” What McClernand noted was if the Union army had made suitable preparations they might have been able to make a successful attack on Columbus. But the army was conducting a demonstration against Columbus with no intention to attack it. Feis claimed that after McClernand stated the rebels were “indisposed to take the field” he later wrote that at that moment it was maybe the most “favorable time” to had made a successful attack. I guess technically that is true but the two referenced sentences are in the same report adjacent to each other so it was probably no more than 30 seconds. Next Feis told us that McClernand’s men were disappointed they were denied the opportunity to attack Columbus and that McClernand wanted Halleck to make an immediate attack while the rebels were vulnerable. But McClernand’s report does not say the men were disappointed they did not attack Columbus. They were disappointed that they were recalled to Cairo. I doubt the men were disappointed they were not allowed to attack through a half mile of abatis during terrible weather against intrenchments manned by an unknown number of Confederates. McClernand wrote that the advance by the Union forces was welcomed by Unionists in the area. With the withdrawal from the area McClernand was concerned of the reprisals that might be visited on the Unionists. McClernand wrote: “This consideration, with others having great weight with me, prompts me in conclusion to presume upon your indulgence so far as to urgently recommend a renewed advance of our forces, if not immediately upon Columbus, at least so far as to regain the ground we recently occupied.” McClernand went on to describe a scenario where the army could lay siege to Columbus avoiding the need to actually attempt to carry the works. The Union army did not lose an opportunity to take Columbus during the demonstrations because that was never the intent and they were not prepared to do so. Feis next lets us know that “Grant also lamented the lost opportunity. “My orders were such and the force with me also so small,” he complained, “that no attack [upon Columbus] was allowable.” This was a letter to his sister. (Grant Papers, vol. 4, page 96) Feis put [upon Columbus] into the quotation. Grant did not mention a specific location where he was not allowed to attack. The “no attack” order was placed on both McClernand and C. F. Smith. Grant’s orders to not attack applied to the whole area of the demonstrations. Halleck cobbled together as many troops as he could for the demonstration but the force was too small to attack Columbus. In Grant’s memoirs he wrote that Smith reported he thought it practicable to capture Fort Heiman. Smith sent two letters to Grant, one dated Jan. 21 and the other Jan. 22. The letters were forwarded to Halleck in St. Louis on January 23. (Grant papers, vol. 4, page 90) Neither of these letters mentioned Fort Heiman. The Confederates did not start serious work on Fort Heiman until around January 15. A citizen alerted Sidney Johnston of that fact and he telegraphed Tilghman to immediately intrench at Fort Heiman and work all night. (Johnston biography by Johnston, page 423) Fort Heiman was not finished and no cannon were in place when Smith did his demonstration. The attack plan used by Grant put no emphasis upon seizing Fort Heiman before attacking Fort Henry. Grant is not always correct in his memoirs and this could be an example of his memory not quite getting it right. It is Smith’s letter of Jan. 22 where he described his approach to Fort Henry and how easy it would be to take it with just two gunboats. It should also be noted that Smith decided to take a look at Fort Henry because he had a day to kill as the troops unloaded a steamer full of supplies 20 miles north of Fort Henry. On page 62 of his book Feis claimed that because Grant declared the mission a success before receiving a report from Smith proves that Grant was fixated on Columbus. Fort Henry and Donelson were secondary. On January 18 Grant sent a letter to McClernand starting with “The object of the expedition having been accomplished all the forces will now be withdrawn…” Grant informed Halleck the day before that he had heard from Columbus and no forces had left there for several days. That was the object of the mission – to prevent any troops from moving from Columbus to Bowling Green. On January 20 Grant wrote Halleck upon Grant’s return to Cairo the same day. Grant wrote he would prepare a report of the expedition but if Halleck would allow him to visit headquarters he would make the report in person. Grant mentioned he had not received anything official from C. F. Smith but he had information that Camp Beauregard had been destroyed (it was, by the rebels) and that the small expedition that had gone up the Tennessee River had landed two and a half miles below Fort Henry. Feis wants us to believe that since Grant requested a face-to-face meeting with Halleck before having a report from Smith that meant Grant had Columbus foremost on his mind as opposed to Forts Henry and Donelson. What Feis does not tell us is that, while Grant did not have a report from Smith, he had a report from Lt. Phelps detailing how Phelps had feigned an attack on Fort Henry on January 17 with two gunboats and a steamer with 500 infantry aboard under the orders of Smith. (ORs of the navy, page 507) The premise that Grant asked for a meeting with Halleck without any information about Smith’s foray up the Tennessee is false because Phelps made a foray up the Tennessee and he made a report on it. Feis argued that Grant was fixated on Columbus and one of his reasons stated was “the lack of attention paid to the rivers before January.” That statement would come as a surprise to Flag-Officer Foote and Lt. Phelps. Here is a list showing the number of times the Navy sent a gunboat up the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers to “pay attention” to what was going on at Forts Henry and Donelson. This list is based on reports in the Official Records of the Navy. There could have been other trips. September 8, 1861 – (ORs, vol. 4, page 404). Right after Grant occupied Paducah a Lincoln gunboat was reported to have been seen on the Tennessee River 30 miles below Fort Henry. Grant left two gunboats at Paducah. Early on gunboat captains were warned to proceed cautiously up the rivers lest they encounter rebel masked batteries. October 19, 1861 – (ORN, vol. 22, page 374) – Lt. Phelps steamed the Conestoga up the Cumberland to Eddyville where low water prevented him from going further. October 27, 1861 – (page 379) – Lt. Phelps returned to Eddyville with a steamer transporting 300 infantry to attack a rebel camp near Eddyville. C. F. Smith (page 380) also wrote a report. October 30, 1861 – (page 396) – Commander Porter took the New Era up the Cumberland River to Ingram’s Shoals where the Confederates had blocked the river with sunken barges. Ingram Shoals was approximately 30 miles below Dover. Porter was to pick up volunteers who wanted to join the US army. Porter wrote he heard about Fort Henry and that with his boat they could take it. November 6, 1861 – (page 394) Lt. Phelps managed to get his boat over Ingram Shoals and proceeded to within three miles of Fort Donelson. Phelps returned to Paducah, made his report and noted he was leaving again, immediately, to the same location to try to stop the trading going on. On page 427 of the ORN is a report by C. F. Smith of November 8, 1861 giving details of the forts on the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. Smith noted that Lt. Phelps is constantly moving his vessel up and down the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. November 17, 1861 – (page 435) – Lt. Phelps wrote a long report about his trip up the Cumberland River to as close to Fort Donelson he could get. He noted that he had done this several times already. On page 451 is a report by Foote dated December 5 noting that four gunboats have arrived and he needs men to man them. As soon as he gets them he wants to go up the Tennessee River and destroy rebel boats and a battery. December 8, 1861 – (page 457) – Lt. Phelps again steamed up the Cumberland to Fort Donelson and wrote a long report about his trip. December 10, 1861 – (page 461) – Lt. Phelps returned to Paducah and then immediately turned around and went back up the Cumberland to pick up refugees. He, again, made it close to Fort Donelson. January 6, 1862 – (Page 486) – Low water hampered operations on the rivers. Lt. Phelps wrote a long report about his close visit to Fort Henry. He added more information on Fort Donelson. He did this report on the same day Halleck wrote the order to Grant to make the demonstrations. I guess what constitutes “lack of attention” is in the eyes of the beholder. It took Halleck two days to approve Grant’s visit to St. Louis. He sent a telegram to Grant on January 22. C. F. Smith wrote letters about his undertakings on January 21 and 22. The January 21 letter spoke of the lousy road conditions. The January 22 letter is the one Smith mentioned that Fort Henry could be taken with two gunboats. Both of these letters were forwarded to Halleck on January 23. Grant made plans to leave for St. Louis the night of the January 23. Grant did not have Smith’s letters when he made the request for a visit to Halleck but he had them when he left for St. Louis. The idea that Feis put forth about Grant being a Johnny-come-lately to the idea that the true line of operations should be up the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers is contradicted by Col. John W. Emerson in a series of stories in the Jan-Apr-June issues of The Midland Monthly. The title is “Grant’s Life in the West.” Starting on pages 114-119, continued on 219-221, Emerson recounts the circumstances of how Grant, in August of 1861, identified the true line of operations for Federal advance to be the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. Grant laid out a plan and through his benefactor, Elihu Washburne, submitted it to President Lincoln. Of interest on pages 409-411 is an account of Grant’s meeting with Halleck in St. Louis. https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015011958785&view=1up&seq=6 Emerson referenced an account by John Thayer in McClure’s magazine, Vol. V, June to Nov. 1895, “Grant at Pilot Knob,” 433-437. Thayer wrote about Grant having plans about a campaign up the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers while he was at Pilot Knob in August 1861. https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015030656162&view=1up&seq=7 Luckily, I had a copy of Bruce Catton’s. Grant Moves South. Catton discusses the Emerson and Thayer articles. (pages 28-30) Catton points out some inconsistencies but does not downright reject these accounts as these are men who were there. However, there are some aspects in the accounts which are new to me and I had not heard them before so a little more digging is required. The point is that Grant, like many others, recognized the military significance of expeditions up the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. Grant also discussed attacks on Columbus from early on. Grant wrote in his memoirs that on January 6 he wanted to meet with Halleck and present a plan for expeditions up the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. The idea that he was going to convince Halleck to let him move against Columbus makes no sense. There were about 13,000 men at Columbus behind fortifications and abatis. On January 6 Halleck wrote the President and informed him that he had 15,000 men at Cairo, Fort Holt and Paducah. Leaving guards at those places meant his available force was around 10,000 which is about the number he ordered out on the demonstrations. As Halleck wrote it would be madness to try to do anything significant (like attack Columbus) with such a small number. Grant asked for a meeting with Halleck in a letter dated Jan. 20. That does not mean he was going to take off for St. Louis without having heard from C. F. Smith. He wanted to give Halleck a report of the demonstrations in person. Grant made his departure after he received Smith’s letters. Grant has the sequence wrong in his memoirs because he did ask for the meeting before reading Smith’s letter which confirmed his view. Feis’s claim that Grant was fixated on Columbus and only changed his direction later is an analysis too contrived for me. When you factor in all the mistakes Feis made in his book and other evidence not included his conclusion fails. For instance, Feis wrote on page 63 that Smith found the roads horrible and that Grant, therefore, “knew that any reinforcements sent from Columbus to aid Fort Henry would be unable to get there very fast.” But any infantry going from Columbus to Fort Henry could have taken the railroad from Columbus to Danville on the Tennessee River where Tilghman, commander at Fort Henry, could have sent a couple steamboats to pick up the troops and take them to Fort Henry. Grant and Foote formed a tag team to hound Halleck to let them move against Fort Henry. But Foote claimed that Grant originally wanted to go up the Cumberland against Fort Donelson. Early reports had Fort Donelson as weaker than Fort Henry. Foote wrote in a report (ORN, page 314) to Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy, November 13, 1862, that when four of the ironclads were ready Foote proposed to Grant to take the boats and 6,000 troops and attack Fort Henry. Foote wrote that Grant preferred to attack Fort Donelson on the Cumberland. Foote claimed he convinced Grant to attack Fort Henry if Halleck’s agreement could be obtained. No dates are given but I assume this occurred before Grant went to see Halleck in St. Louis. Grant returned to Cairo after his rebuff from Halleck the morning of Jan. 28. Perhaps it is on his return that Foote convinced Grant to get Halleck to agree to let them attack Fort Henry for it is on Jan. 28 that both Grant and Foote sent telegrams to Halleck to let them take Fort Henry. (Grant Papers, vol. 4, page 99) Grant followed through with another telegram on Jan. 29 and Halleck, finally, gave his consent on Jan. 30. Halleck’s time frame had him ordering an advance in mid-February. What convinced him to go now was not the telegrams from Foote and Grant. But those telegrams showed Halleck that those two were ready and itching to attack the rebels now. On Jan. 29 Halleck received a short telegram from McClellan (ORs, vol. 7, page 571) passing along information from a deserter that Beauregard was ordered to Kentucky to assist Johnston and that he was coming with 15 regiments. Of course, it wasn’t true but Halleck acted as if it was. He sent McClellan a telegram on January 30 (ORs, vol. 7, page 571) telling him that his telegram had been received and that Grant and Foote would be immediately ordered to attack Fort Henry so as to take possession before Beauregard showed up. As further confirmation that it was the Beauregard news that prompted Halleck to act on February 6 Halleck telegraphed McClellan and ended with the sentence “I was not ready to move, but deemed best to anticipate the arrival of Beauregard’s forces.” I have searched in vain for any reaction from Halleck to the fact he sent out the demonstrations in early January based on his belief Buell was about to move against Bowling Green and that never happened. Then Halleck ordered the advance on Fort Henry because McClellan told him Beauregard was coming west with 15 regiments and that never happened either. When Grant wrote his memoirs it was 20 years after the events. He has some details wrong but his remembrance that when he requested to meet with Halleck in January of 1862 to propose a movement up the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers because that was the true line of operations is not fiction. Sure, Grant was interested in taking Columbus but in early January there were more Confederates at Columbus behind fortifications and abatis than Grant could muster against them. Anyway, Halleck was calling the shots, not Grant, and Halleck had no intention of sending a force against Columbus. The movement against the center of Johnston’s defensive line was an obvious military objective. The idea was put forth by many people so no one is given the credit for thinking of it. Grant noted this when he wrote to his benefactor, Elihu Washburne, on March 22, 1862. From Bruce Catton’s, Grant Moves South, page 29; “Grant wrote to Washburne saying that it was idle to give credit for the move up the Tennessee to any specific general; the strategic soundness of the plan was obvious, he said—‘General Halleck no doubt thought of this route long ago, and I am shure I did.’” Hank
  13. 2 points
    Randolph. He was not a slave because Johnston had manumitted him when Johnston went to the west coast. Randolph, or Ran, went with Johnston to California as a free man and received wages for his services as cook. Johnston also wrote that Ran was a good with the mules. (Source: Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston by Colonel William Preston Johnston)
  14. 2 points
    67th Tigers Thanks for providing clarity and documentation supporting Confederate troop numbers and identity of units assigned to Fort Donelson before the surrender of 16 FEB 1862. Another source of information: Prisoner of War records. The approximately 12000 Rebel prisoners were progressively shipped north after February 16th to Camp Douglas, Illinois (about 8000 men), Camp Morton, Indiana (3000) and Camp Chase, Ohio (800). These records are accessible at Family Search via the link https://www.familysearch.org/search/collection/1916234. [Click on "Browse through 51108 images" for record access. Free account with Family Search required for access to their records -- takes two minutes.] In addition, it appears one unit was assigned to Fort Donelson, but for some reason was posted opposite the fort, on the east bank of the Cumberland River. Scott's Louisiana Regiment (of cavalry) may have been kept on the other side of the river, on the orders of General Buckner, due to a recent outbreak of measles in the regiment. The location proved fortuitous, because the regiment was not surrendered; after February 16th Scott's Louisiana made its way east, passed through Nashville, and is next reported ahead of Buell's Army of the Ohio in March, likely responsible for destroying the bridge over Duck River near Columbia. Cheers Ozzy
  15. 2 points
    The 47th Tennessee Infantry were the only reinforcements the Confederates received on the 2nd day of the Battle of Shiloh. This article is neat summation of the 47th Tennessee, the weapons they carried, and their action in the battle. Interesting short piece to read. https://emergingcivilwar.com/2016/09/08/the-47th-tennessee-infantry-at-shiloh/ Below: Col. Munson Hill of the 47th Tennessee Infantry, wearing fraternal garb.
  16. 2 points
    Of more importance to the Battle of Shiloh is the observation of General Bragg as to the condition of the Confederate Army concentrating in Corinth. Bragg was appalled at the supply situation and the discipline of the troops. He called them, "a mob" and not an Army. He was ordered to get them some training and to do his best to prepare them for Battle. Their weapons were inferior. They had plenty of cannons, but not enough trained crews to man them. A point to make for the Battle of Shiloh-- Johnston went in on a hope and a prayer that surprise and the bayonet would win the day. Braxton Bragg agreed with that after what he witnessed. Not saying the Southerners were not brave or worthy, just that they were thrown into Battle with little formal training and a lack of needed supplies-- Class A firearms one of them...
  17. 2 points
    As we know, after his defeat at Pea Ridge, Arkansas (also known as Elkhorn Tavern) Major General Earl Van Dorn of the Trans-Mississippi was requested to support the forces of General Albert Sidney Johnston in Tennessee… but there was no apparent urgency in the request. Van Dorn arrived at Memphis about 8 April 1862 and stopped at The Gayoso House. Also in Memphis was Mrs. Mary Ann Webster Loughborough, whose husband James, was a Captain on the Staff of Brigadier General Cockrell. Mary Webster of New York married James Loughborough in Kentucky a few years earlier; then the couple moved west and established themselves in St. Louis, Missouri (and subsequently gravitated towards the Rebel cause.) In early April 1862 Mrs. Loughborough wrote the following letter to a friend, revealing the presence of notable Confederates in Memphis: Gayoso House, Memphis, April, 1862. My dear J——: I am just in from dinner; and you would be amused to see the different faces—I might as well say the different appetites; for the Army of Missouri and Arkansas have been undergoing rigorous fasts of late; and the little episode of the battle of Elkhorn and the consequent privations have helped not a little the gaunt appearance of these military characters. All eat, eat rapidly; from General V—— D—— down to the smallest lieutenant, whose manner of playing the epicure over the different dishes ordered, is a study. The confidential consultations with the waiter over them, together with the knowing unconsciousness of bestowing his small change, almost convinces me that he is a brigadier-general, or a colonel, at least. You see streaming in constantly this tide of human beings, to eat, stare at the ladies, talk, and order much wine in the excitement of military anecdotes; for you must understand that a civilian is a “rara avis” amid the brilliant uniforms of the dining room. Yet, amid all this mass and huge crowd, the majority are polished gentlemen, who have evidently seen much of the world, and who are men of purpose and character. General V—— D—— and staff sit not far from me—looked at rather jealously by the Missourians, as ranking and commanding them over their favorite general. Yet, he always treats the old general with the utmost consideration and courtesy. On the other side sits General P——, with his kind, benevolent face. The poor old gentleman finds at the table his lightest reserves become his heaviest forces: nearly all his staff are about him. And, as I sit half amused at the expression of some faces, and thinking deeply of the mute, yet determined impress of character on others, two gentlemen come in—one in plain citizen’s clothing, with heavy black beard and high forehead—with stooping gait and hands behind him. I am told he is Governor J——, of Missouri. His face puzzles me—it is thoughtful and singular. By his side, with tall, lithe, slender figure, fully erect, walks General J—— T——. You will scarcely think it possible that this is the so-frequently talked of J—— T——. I thought him an ordinary man, did not you? Yet, this is anything but an ordinary man. The keen dark eye sweeps the room as he enters, taking us all in at a glance—a quick, daring, decisive, resolute face. I can make nothing more out of him. Yet, there is more of thought and intellect than you see at first. He is dressed in full uniform, with sword and sash, and has quite a military air. There are many Saint Louisians here; you see them scattered around the tables quite plentifully. General C—— is among the number. He sits at some distance, and looks quite worn and sad. You know—do you not?—that he is the father of young Churchill Clark, who was killed at Elkhorn. Have I ever told you his history? It is this: He graduated at West Point in the commencement of the war; and knowing and having a great admiration for General P——, he joined him at once: he was put in command of some artillery; and showing himself a youth of courage and ability—for he was only twenty years old—his command was increased. Throughout the constant trials and sufferings of the campaign, he showed himself equal in courage, daring, and judgment, to many older heads. He was particularly beloved by General P——. At Elkhorn, as ever, his battery sustained itself with coolness and bravery. As the general rode by, he said some cheering words to young Clark, who took off his cap and waved it, saying, “General, we will hold our own,” or words to that effect, when a ball sped from the enemy, and crashed in the young, ardent brain as he spoke. I have been told that the general was affected to tears. He knelt by his side, vainly seeking for some trace of the strong, young life, but the pulses were stilled forever; and Churchill Clark lay a stiffened corpse in the long, wet grass at Elkhorn. And so his father sits silent and alone, and all respect the grief that none can assuage. In a few days we leave. The gentlemen all go to Corinth, where a battle, in all probability, will take place before long. Fort Pillow can hardly hold out, under the daily bombardment that we hear from the gunboats; and if it falls, Memphis, on taking leave of the Confederate officers, will usher in the Federal to quarters in the Gayoso. Adieu.
  18. 2 points
    Great photo... and of benefit to learn that the significant action in the Plum Orchard has finally been recognized... 🙂
  19. 2 points
    maybe due to the addition of "Plum Orchard Rd"
  20. 2 points
    There are two pieces of communication (one constructed on April 5th, and the other generated on April 6th 1862) both of which are important in their own way to explain “how the Battle of Shiloh unfolded.” And both documents have "issues." The first item is a telegram constructed at St. Louis and sent under signature of Major General Henry Halleck on Saturday 5 April 1862. Fitting Halleck’s style of issuing concise orders, the two-line telegram begins by listing the recently promoted Major Generals by order of seniority: Buell, Pope, McClernand, C.F. Smith, Wallace. The inclusion of John Pope is significant because Major General Pope would soon join the Advance on Corinth. And the place held by John McClernand (ahead of Charles Ferguson Smith) may have come as a surprise to Major General Ulysses S. Grant… but no matter, as the late formal notice of MGen McClernand’s seniority did not provide opportunity to ‘Provide him with benefits of seniority to which he was entitled” i.e., the Shell Game played by Generals Grant, Smith, Sherman and Captain McMichael had worked perfectly; and now, at this late hour, McClernand would be notified in due course of his official seniority (likely after U.S. Grant established his HQ at Pittsburg Landing… When McClernand operating as “acting commander” had odds somewhere between Slim and None.) The second line of Halleck’s telegram reads: “You will act in concert [with General Buell] but he will exercise his separate command, unless the enemy should attack you. In that case you are authorized to take the general command.” The wording of this second line, giving Grant emergency authority over Buell in case of attack by Rebels, has significant implications. And yet, when the conduct of Day Two at Shiloh is closely examined, there is nothing more significant in regard to General Grant exercising command, than, “You take the left; and I’ll take the right” during the advance of Monday morning (coordination at its most minimal.) Which leads one to ponder: When did General Grant receive this telegram from Henry Halleck? If it was sent by telegraph from St. Louis late morning of April 5th, it likely arrived at the Fort Henry telegraph office before noon. If a steamer picked up the mail and telegraph traffic at 1 p.m., (perhaps the Minnehaha) then the 5 April telegram would arrive about midnight… plenty of time for Grant to read and understand the contents. But, at 2 p.m. on Sunday, April 6th, where was this telegram from Halleck? The cool indifference shared between Grant and Buell (with Buell simply left at the waterfront, while Grant headed away west to take care of business) does not represent “someone in possession of an important telegram, giving them extraordinary authority.” Instead, it seems to indicate General Grant has not yet received the telegram; or he has seen it… but left it behind at the Cherry Mansion. The second communication was constructed on Sunday morning by Captain A.S. Baxter, the AQM for Grant’s Army, as he rode the steamer Tigress north to relay Grant’s orders (likely relayed from Grant, through Captain John Rawlins, to Baxter.) Finding the orders complex and difficult to remember in detail, Captain Algernon Baxter scanned the floor of the Ladies’ Cabin, found a soiled bit of paper, and wrote the orders (as he best remembered them) onto that scrap (later recorded as “containing a heel mark and tobacco stain.”) Upon arrival at Crump’s Landing, Captain Baxter found Lieutenant Ross – Aide to Major General Wallace – waiting. The two rode away west and reported to MGen Wallace at, or just before 11:30 a.m. Captain Baxter presented General Wallace with the impromptu order; Wallace asked why it was not signed. Baxter explained he “created the memorandum, himself, out of fear he would “forget some detail” unless he did so.” General Wallace passed the “written order” to his Staff, and asked Baxter about the current state of affairs [Baxter left Pittsburg Landing between 10 and 10:30.] Captain Baxter replied, “We are driving them.” General Wallace was satisfied; Wallace’s staff officers were satisfied. The order was accepted, and Captain Baxter took his departure within three minutes of arrival at Stony Lonesome. Captain Frederick Kneffler, Lew Wallace’s AAG, wound up with the “written order.” He tucked it under his sword belt… and subsequently lost it. Ever since, the loss of that written order, or memorandum, has been significant because it would provide tangible proof of what Major General Wallace had been ordered to do. And, it is not difficult to envision the memorandum, jiggling loose from Captain Kneffler’s sword belt, and blowing away… to be beaten by heavy rain that night; ultimately washed into the Snake River, then Tennessee River… lost forever. But, paper was in short supply, always. Letters by soldiers were often written making use of every millimetre of space, including margins and borders. As likely as the memorandum being lost forever, it was just as likely noticed, clinging to trampled stubble, by some soldier… one of thousands following behind Kneffler on his horse. This soldier would have snatched it up, and possibly sent it as souvenir with his own letter, a few days later. My point: there is every chance that the Lew Wallace memorandum from Baxter still exists, contained in a box of Civil War letters and paraphernalia, and the owners have no idea what they have in their possession. But, with all the other material being revealed on a weekly basis, one day this piece of history might just surprise everyone, and re-emerge.
  21. 2 points
    [Part three of Corinth, interrupted] Grant’s operation, with HQ at Savannah was kept on the back burner: just active enough to keep Rebel commanders guessing, but not sufficiently robust to allow General Grant to take the reins pre-emptively. The first benefit to Grant from success further west was assignment of Benjamin Prentiss to command of the newly created Sixth Division (although Halleck tasked Brigadier General Prentiss with other duties enroute, delaying his ultimate arrival at Pittsburg Landing.) In addition, Grant was aware that Don Carlos Buell was marching south and west to effect a join at Savannah (but Grant was frustrated by the slow pace of the Army of the Ohio.) Still, these troop additions were approved by Halleck, and were part of the overall plan to initiate the Operation against Corinth, in the proper sequence… after Victory at Island No.10 (when another source of manpower (Pope), as well as ammunition and abundant supplies would be made available.) References: SDG topics “Just supposin’ begun 26 FEB 2018 and “Full Hospitals” begun 30 JAN 2018 for Prentiss tasks enroute to Savannah Tennessee. SDG topic “Grant’s six divisions” begun 1 DEC 2018 details growth of Pittsburg force. OR 8 pages 633 – 4 telegram (23 MAR 1862) in which Henry Halleck lays out his “Programme” for SecWar Stanton, which includes, “Pope’s progress is necessarily slow,” and, “I have directed General Grant to make no move until Buell’s column (now at Columbia) can form junction with him.” Also, Halleck asserts, “We must take Corinth in order to seriously injure Rebel communications.” [And Halleck proposes possible moves for T.W. Sherman (the other Sherman) and Benjamin Butler which “might take advantage of [Bragg’s Army] leaving Florida and Alabama.”] OR 8 page 631 communication of 21 MAR 1862 from MGen Halleck to F/O Foote: “Everything is progressing well on the Tennessee River towards opening your way down the Mississippi.” [Illustrates the “connected” nature of Halleck’s operations, and alludes to the “proper sequence” of those operations.] OR 8 page 643 telegram from Army AG Thomas to MGen Halleck of 25 MAR 1862: “BGen Thomas Davies has been assigned duty in Department of the Mississippi.” [In preparation for conduct of operations after success at Island No.10 Halleck has called for more trained general officers to assist, as part of Halleck’s program. General Thomas Davies will be assigned command of Second Division, following deaths of WHL Wallace… and C.F. Smith.] OR 8 page 649 telegram SecWar Stanton to MGen Halleck of 29 MAR 1862: “You will report without delay the strength and distribution of your command.” [Halleck’s response 30 March: “Buell 101,000 in KY and Tenn; Grant 75,000 in Tennessee; Pope 25000 at New Madrid; Curtis 23000 in Arkansas; Strong 9000 District of Cairo; Steele 6000 in Arkansas; Schofield 15000 District of St. Louis (including new regiments at Benton Barracks); Totten 4000 in Central Missouri; Loan 2000 in Northern Missouri; about 10000 men in Kansas, Nebraska and Colorado.”] And follows telegram of Halleck to Stanton of 28 MAR 1862 revealing “elevated level of sickness experienced by men on Tennessee River expedition” (and lays blame on brigade and regimental surgeons of volunteers.) One-in-three reported sick, and is of concern because Halleck intends to make use of Grant’s Army… soon. OR 8 page 660 communication MGen Halleck to F/O Andrew Foote of 5 APR 1862: “I shall want a gunboat at Cairo ready to go up the Tennessee River in the early part of next week.” [With the successful run of USS Carondelet past the guns of Island No.10 on April 4th, Halleck knows it is “a matter of days” before Pope crosses his army and forces the trapped Rebels to surrender (in rear of Island No.10).] OR 8 page 661 communication Halleck to MGen Samuel Curtis (Army of the Southwest) on April 5th 1862: “Price and Van Dorn will soon leave your front [and the great battle of the war is to be fought on the Tennessee River.]” OR 8 page 672 telegram Halleck to Stanton of 7 APR 1862: “Buell’s advance force has reached Grant; entire force will connect in two or three days” [sent before news arrived at St. Louis IRT Battle of Shiloh initiated early 6 APR 1862.] OR 8 page 676 communication of 8 APR 1862 from Assistant Secretary of War Thomas Scott to Henry Halleck, alluding to “sequence of events” after Surrender of Island No.10.
  22. 2 points
    and found in the area of this high ground were numerous springs...good water..army is fueled by coffee. unlike what was to be had in Corinth later...
  23. 2 points
    Then again, I don't know how much that time mattered. The Confederates were disorganized, thus part of the reason they stopped. Had they continued on the attack, being so disorganized, I venture that the disorganization would have caused even more ill coordinated attacks, and potentially, disaster for the Confederates, if that makes sense.
  24. 2 points
    Review of To Rescue My Native Land by Wm. T. Shepherd It is not often that letters and diaries compiled by artillerymen during the Civil War are encountered, and this collection is a gem: the “Civil War Letters of William T. Shepherd.” Native of Wisconsin, who enlisted in Chicago as Private in Taylor’s Battery B, 1st Illinois Light Artillery 16 July 1861, Private Shepherd (sometimes spelled Shepard) is a gifted, intelligent writer who sent letters to friends and family back in Illinois on a daily basis. Encountered in the many letters: · Camp life (and looking forward to letters, newspapers and parcels from home) · Details of duty (and October 1861 Skirmish at Fredericktown) in Missouri · Description of duty (and Christmas) at Bird’s Point, Missouri. Letter of 10 NOV 1861 describes participation in Battle of Belmont. Letter of 9 JAN 1862 reveals “everyone at Cairo, Fort Holt and Bird’s Point is under Marching Orders” (which everyone believes is for “somewhere down the Mississippi River…”) Instead, a feint is conducted to the east of Fort Columbus, which “confuses everyone”). Letter of 1 FEB 1862: under Marching Orders, again… 8 FEB 1862: describes “how easily their Fort Henry became ours.” 16 FEB: Letter begins “while besieging Fort Donelson” and describes previous four days of activity, and ends abruptly when orders arrive to “reposition the Battery.” (See 21 FEB letter.) 28 FEB: “Our Captain Taylor has just returned from a visit to Nashville…” 12 MAR: aboard steamer Silver Moon, going up the Tennessee River… 21 MAR: at Savannah, returning to steamer for move up river… 23 MAR letter written from Pitsburg Landing. “Arrived aboard John J. Roe. There are 75000 men at this place, and more arriving constantly…” 25 MAR: “Captain Taylor has been promoted, and Lieutenant Barrett is now in command of the Battery.” Letters of 8 APR and 14 APR 1862: aftermath of Battle of Shiloh. And more good news: Private William Shepherd (who was promoted to Sergeant Major by the end of the War) also kept a Diary… Cheers Ozzy To Rescue My Native Land: the Civil War Letters of William T. Shepherd (edited by Kurt H. Hakemer) Tennessee University Press 2005 (365 pages) is available at amazon.con and better libraries. [Limited access: https://books.google.com.au/books?id=a6HQRB6UimYC&pg=PA331&lpg=PA331&dq=israel+p.+rumsey+letter&source=bl&ots=JG_cwqaoUX&sig=dQa8blZoWwiMXVAQGfu3JkaSAHE&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiIg5yUx4nfAhUF448KHReGDdcQ6AEwBXoECAkQAQ#v=onepage&q=israel p. rumsey letter&f=false And for those able to visit Kenosha, Wisconsin: https://museums.kenosha.org/civilwar/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2018/05/Wisconsin-Resources-for-Website.pdf Civil War letters and diaries on file
  25. 2 points
    Mona and Stan When first investigating the history of the officer in question, I encountered newspaper claims that "he had been a classmate of Henry Halleck." But, with a birth year of 1823, to have attended West Point in Halleck's Class of 1839 would have meant entering the Military Academy in 1835... when this "cadet" would have been twelve years old. Upon further investigation, numerous claims of "graduated with the Class of 1843" were uncovered: the same USMA Class as Ulysses S. Grant. As Mona points out, the Cullum Register is deficient because it only records graduates of West Point; and the term "alumnus" was used by West Point to indicate a graduate (while other universities applied the term to include students who had merely attended.) As regards "the difficulty in Missouri" leading to the removal of this officer from command, the arresting officer was Brigadier General Stephen Hurlbut. But Hurlbut was found to be "impaired" soon afterwards, and Brigadier General John Pope arrested Hurlbut (Hurlbut was sent home to Belvidere Illinois by Major General Fremont "to await orders.") And so the situation rested until November 1861, when Fremont was removed, and Henry Halleck was installed as commander, Department of the Missouri. Cheers Ozzy
  26. 2 points
    From the Civil War Diaries Collection at Auburn University comes this Shiloh battle record, compiled by L. I. Nixon of Limestone County, Alabama. Incensed by hearing of the Confederate defeats at Fort Henry and Fort Donelson, 38-year old Liberty Independence Nixon left his wife and seven children and joined Malone's Company... and on February 24th 1862 was on his way to Corinth. After a brief stay, Malone's Company of the 1st Battalion of Alabama Volunteers returned south to vicinity of Mobile Bay to gather supplies; then a return to Corinth on the M & O R.R. took place on March 4th. Camping a few days about a mile north of Corinth, Private Nixon and his fellows rode the train north to Bethel Springs (and may have heard the exchange of gunfire between Confederate soldiers and Lew Wallace's party, tasked with tearing up the railroad -- page 18.) Returning to Corinth on March 20th, Nixon indicates "they resumed the exact same camp ground, as before." And then, Private Nixon relates the story of "Beauregard's bodyguard finding a barrel of whiskey..." which led to Malone's Company being briefly assigned as bodyguard to General Beauregard. While in close proximity to Tishomingo Hotel, Private Nixon confirms "a rush" made on the hotel (also mentioned in Braxton Bragg's Letter of 20 March 1862.) Pages 24 - 27 reflect on camp life in Corinth. Page 27 records the units making up Gladden's Brigade: 1st Louisiana Infantry, 21st Alabama Infantry, 22nd Alabama, 25th Alabama, "Robisson's" Regiment of Artillery, and Nixon's unit, the 1st Battalion Alabama Volunteers commanded by Major Chaddick. Next day (March 30th) four new companies are added to the 1st Alabama Battalion -- now known as 26th Alabama Infantry Regiment. On page 28, the orders to cook three days' rations (3 April). Same day: "We left early and took up the line of march." Pages 28 - 30 recount the march north, the rain, and wagons getting mired in the mud. Page 31 records knowledge of the Picket Skirmish of April 4th (Private Nixon observed Yankee prisoners being moved south.) Pages 32 - 34 record the final approach towards the Federal camp; and about dark on April 5th Private Nixon and his fellows are sent forward on picket duty... The entire diary is only 46 pages long (and the first four pages are water-damaged from attic storage, so almost unreadable.) Fortunately, every page is transcribed at bottom: http://content.lib.auburn.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/civil/id/23854/rec/20 Private Nixon's Shiloh Diary.
  27. 2 points
    Liberty Independence Nixon, his findagrave page and his photograph. https://www.findagrave.com/memorial/25015250/liberty-independence-nixon
  28. 2 points
    I realize it is just one regiment in a large battle, but I often wonder if A. S. Johnston knew how somewhat unorganized many of the regiments in the Army were, i.e. the 26th Alabama Infantry. The organization was not led by Maj. Chaddick, but actually by Colonel John G. Coltart of Huntsville. I have posted before the letters of Lt. Benjamin J. Gaston of the 26th Alabama. Just 3 days before the battle, Gaston was writing and stated that he did not know the "number" (regimental designation) of his unit. I have seen other historians and writers erroneously attribute the leadership of the 26th to Chaddick rather than Coltart. My his memory always shine bright, but from memory in Shiloh Bloody April, even Wiley Sword mentions Chaddick being the commander of the unit. When Gladden's men stopped in the Federal camp, well, upon renewing the attack, at that point Coltart was wounded, and Chaddick took temporary control of the unit. Coltart received a severe foot wound, but, he had it tended to behind the lines and then returned to the fight. It seems amazing to me that many men went in to that fight not knowing who their commanders were nor their regimental unit designation. It is mentioned that some units were getting ammo resupplies for six hours, aka they were disorganized. Again, I can totally see how given the facts mentioned in the first paragraph. This seems reminiscent of Bjorn's April hike, The Division That Never Was. Johnston had to have known this state of disorganization, even before the battle began, and how it would/could bring massive confusion on the field. Pictured are Colonel John G. Coltart and Lt. Col. William Davidson Chaddick, 26th Alabama Infantry. The Major of the 26th Alabama at the time of Shiloh was Andrew D. Guinn/Gwin/Gwynne (several different spellings); Gwynne was severely wounded in the arm by a shell as noted in his service records. After Shiloh, he was appointed Lt. Col. of the 38th Tennessee Infantry.
  29. 2 points
    Sat, Nov. 3 forecast for those who believe that the weatherman is capable of predicting the weather more than an hour in the future: https://www.accuweather.com/en/us/crump-tn/38327/daily-weather-forecast/2085479?day=7
  30. 2 points
    As to "The bill introduced by Senator Thurman for the relief of Col. Tom Worthington," the Columbia (TN) Herald & Mail 1878-05-03 indicated that Worthington delivered lectures as Sherman declined an inquiry. Two years later, the Chicago Tribune 1880-05-15 indicated that Worthington would get a cash payment ($962) to cover some of the period after his dismissal, but that he would get no court of inquiry from Congress. It would have been interesting if testimony had been given.
  31. 2 points
    Richard P. Derickson was a First Lieutenant in the 16th Wisconsin Infantry, Company K, at the time the Battle of Shiloh erupted. On that fateful Sunday of 6 APR 1862, he was at his duty station aboard "wharf boat" Iatan, acting in capacity of AQM for the Sixth Division (a position he had occupied since April 3rd, assigned by BGen Prentiss.) Part of Lieutenant Derickson's duties involved him creating and maintaining precise records, accounting for possession and distribution of Government stores... Kevin Getchell made use of Lieutenant Derickson's records in constructing his 2013 work, Scapegoat of Shiloh: the distortion of Lew Wallace's record by U. S. Grant. The author indicates that he "encountered the Derickson Papers at an auction, and purchased them." Exact copies of several of the documents created by LT Derickson are contained in Scapegoat of Shiloh. These records are valuable for determining activities of the embryonic Sixth Division in the days leading up to that contact in Fraley Field. Less well known: Kevin Getchell made copies of the original documents, and left those on file with Shiloh NMP https://www.jacksonsun.com/story/news/2015/04/02/shiloh-battlefield-commemorate-rd-battle-anniversary/70862666/ Jacksun Sun of 2 APR 2015.
  32. 2 points
    Pvt. James S. Matthews, Company C, 4th Illinois Cavalry (his rank at Shiloh was Private it appears). Matthews served as orderly for Gen. John A. McClernand at Shiloh. Residence Joliet IL; a 17 year-old Clerk. Enlisted on 10/7/1861 at Camp Hunter, IL as a Private. On 10/7/1861 he mustered into "C" Co. IL 4th Cavalry He was discharged for promotion on 10/31/1863 On 10/31/1863 he was commissioned into "A" Co. US CT 3rd Cavalry He was Mustered Out on 1/26/1866 Promotions: * 2nd Lieut 10/31/1863 (As of Co. A 3rd USCT Cavalry) * 1st Lieut 8/26/1865 He was described at enlistment as: 5' 7", light complexion, brown eyes, brown hair Other Information: born in New Jersey Sources used by Historical Data Systems, Inc.: - Illinois: Roster of Officers and Enlisted Men - Index to Compiled Military Service Records - Official Army Register of the Volunteer Force 1861-1865 - Illinois State Archives @ http://www.ilsos.gov/isaveterans/civilmustersrch.jsp (c) Historical Data Systems, Inc. @ www.civilwardata.com
  33. 2 points
    Interesting that the names of Grant's telegraph operator and Bodyguard/orderly are unknown for the Shiloh time period. Many General's would have more than one orderly, however, so that various messages could be carried at various times. Having said this, I imagine that if Thomas D. Holliday would not have been killed at Shiloh, that his service as Sherman's orderly would have been lost to history. His name is, probably, only remembered because he was killed while serving as Sherman's orderly.
  34. 2 points
    Men who had fought at Shiloh were later prisoners at Camp Ford, near Tyler, Texas. They played a lot of baseball.
  35. 2 points
    I offer a couple of additions. On page 152 of my signed Wiley Sword’s 2001 edition is the following concerning the confrontation between Prentiss and Peabody in the camp of the 25th Missouri; “Reining his horse in front of Peabody, who was just preparing to mount, Prentiss angrily demanded to know if he had provoked an attack by sending out a force without orders. Peabody answered that he had sent out a reconnaissance patrol after attempting to notify Prentiss of his intention. (Bold added by me) The first puzzle piece here is that Peabody states he sent out a reconnaissance patrol. Prentiss had given Peabody and Powell permission to send out reconnaissance patrols so there was “no defiance of orders” when Peabody ordered Powell to take a reconnaissance patrol to the front. However, they were not to bring on a “general engagement.” But Prentiss had heard a lot of firing; Prentiss knew that the war god Colonel David Moore had gone forward with the entire 21st Missouri to “lick them.” And when he rode into Peabody’s camp he found the long roll had been sounded in the camp of the 25th Missouri and Peabody had his regiment toeing the line in preparation of moving forward. This is why he demanded to know from Peabody if he had sent out a force without orders. The eye-catching phrase is that Peabody tried to inform Prentiss of his intention to send out a patrol but had failed to let Prentiss know due to his messenger not being able to find Prentiss. None of the other major Shiloh books mention that Peabody attempted to inform Prentiss that he was sending out Major Powell at 3 a. m. There are several varying accounts of the confrontation between Prentiss and Peabody and what was said. I was curious where Wiley Sword had gotten the account he used in his book. His reference notes referred to Shea which led to John Gilmary Shea in the bibliography to Shea’s The American Nation. Shea seems to have been a prolific author with many books about Americans and patriotism. The American Nation was a compilation of men who gave their all for Union. Included in the book are chapters on Major General William Hervey Lamm Wallace, Colonel Julius Raith and Colonel Everett Peabody. The chapter on Colonel Everett Peabody gives many details on his life and then goes into an account of the battle of Shiloh commencing on April 5, 1862. The author covers Peabody with praise and gives an account of the activities concerning Peabody sending out Powell’s patrol. Shea wrote “Few officers have fallen during the war, whose services were so valuable to the country, or whose prospects of honorable distinction were so brilliant, as those of Colonel Everett Peabody.” The amazing thing about this book as relates to the efforts to learn the truth about Shiloh is that the book, containing full praise to Peabody for saving the army at Shiloh, was published in 1862 while Prentiss was still a prisoner in the south. The story of Peabody at Shiloh was published in a book yet historians wrote about the battle of Shiloh ignorant of what Peabody had done. Except for William Swinton in his Twelve Decisive Battles of the War. I did not type up the whole chapter on Peabody, only the part on Shiloh. The book is pretty rare and I could not see that it has been digitized. I located a microfilm copy in a library near Kansas City. “On the 5th of April there seemed to be a kind of presentiment in General Grant’s army of the terrible battle impending. A visitor to the field, immediately after the battle, was assured that the desire being to avoid a collision with the enemy at that moment, the generals were instructed not to throw out pickets. The strategy reminds one of the old fable of the ostrich, who hid his head and then imagined himself safe from the hunter. That evening several soldiers and civilians were collected in Colonel Peabody’s tent, and the colonel expressed his opinion that the rebels were near in force and the army in great danger for want of pickets. Finally, he exclaimed, “I can bear this no longer. I must know whether we are in the arms of the enemy, or whether we are out of danger,” and he immediately sent an orderly to General Prentiss, asking leave to send out a scouting party. The orderly did not find General Prentiss, and Colonel P. then resolved to send it out without permission. From one to three o’clock, that night, he strolled about the camp talking with his officers and men, and at three o’clock sent out the party,--four hundred men of his own regiment,--under Major Powell, a cool and experienced officer. It is hard to overestimate the importance of this reconnaissance. Our army was encamped in a semicircle, Colonel Peabody in the centre. Beauregard had planned for three columns to attack our right, left, and centre, simultaneously at daybreak; and if he had succeeded in this, General Grant’s army would have been annihilated. His plan was frustrated by Colonel Peabody’s detachment, which, came into collision before the time, with the centre column. The rattle of musketry gave the alarm to our army, and gave the centre nearly time enough, and the flanks ample time to get under arms. Early that morning (Sunday, April 6th), Colonel Peabody sat at breakfast with Mr. B., a visitor, when the firing was heard. The colonel said to Mr. B., “Don’t disturb yourself; but I must go and see to things.” He ordered the long roll sounded, and mounting his horse rode forward to where the line was forming. Major Powell and his men soon appeared, swept on by an immense column of rebels, but skirmishing bravely as they retreated. At this instant General Prentiss rode up to Colonel Peabody and exclaimed: “Did you provoke this attack by sending out a force without orders!” “I did send out a reconnaissance, after sending you notice of my intention.” “You have brought on this attack before we were prepared; and I shall hold you responsible for it.” With our present knowledge of the battle, it seems as if General Prentiss could hardly have framed a statement more damaging to himself, or more honorable to Colonel Peabody. It sounds like a confession of perfect blindness as to the position and plans of the rebels, and an admission of want of preparation to receive an attack which the rebels had been preparing for two weeks—a confession that West Point strategists were wrong, and the colonel of volunteers, right. But Colonel Peabody knew nothing of all this. He only knew that he had taken a dangerous responsibility, and in consequence was arraigned by his superior as the cause of an impending defeat; and this thought must have made his last hour on earth one of great mental suffering. In this state of mind, it is easy to conceive with what grief and indignation he must have seen his brigade swept slowly back by the rebels, in spite of its stern resistance. The correspondent of a western paper says: “Colonel Peabody would not retreat. He seemed infatuated, and was soon left almost alone, vainly trying to rally his men. Presently he fell shot through the jaw.” The gentleman, who was breakfasting with him, saw him riding along the line urging his men with voice and gesture, to “Stand to it yet;” then saw him throw his arms up, reel, and fall from his horse, the rebels rapidly passing over the spot. On Monday evening, after the rebels were driven back, his body was found where he fell. It was pierced by five bullets: one in the head, one in the neck, one in the body, one in the thigh, and one in the hand. Thus, after “one glorious hour of crowded life,” fell a brave soldier and chivalrous gentleman. His officers buried him in a gun-box, placing at his head a board with his name, and below it the couplet: A braver man ne’er died upon the field; A warmer heart never to death did yield. His body afterwards carried to Boston, where the funeral arrangements were taken in charge of by the governor of Massachusetts. Thence to Springfield, where, in presence of an immense concourse, he was laid beside his mother, in the beautiful cemetery of that town. Few officers have fallen during the war, whose services were so valuable to the country, or whose prospects of honorable distinction were so brilliant, as those of Colonel Everett Peabody. His talents were of a high order, and were united to such practical energy, that whatever he undertook to do, was sure to be done quickly and well. Thus, when he was only twenty-two years old, Hon. James Guthrie said of him, that “he was as good a field-engineer as there was in the western country.” At twenty-three he was a chief. The same element of character gave him immediate success in the new field to which the breaking out of the great rebellion called him. He was one born to command; and his proud and chivalrous spirit, his scorn of danger, his absolute ignorance of fear, filled his men with an enthusiastic faith in him, so that he could lead them anywhere, and do any thing with them. His most striking characteristic was a high contempt for meanness or dishonesty of any kind. This trait won him respect wherever he went; but it was carried so far as to make him lack even that excusable selfishness which enables a man to take proper care of his own. His table and purse were always open, not to friends only, but even to mere acquaintances; and in money-matters he was careless to an excess,--a fault often found in large and noble natures. In the flower of his age, in the performance of a great act of service, he fell—dying as a chivalrous gentleman would wish to die, and singularly fulfilling the prediction expressed years before in a song which he composed for a military organization: And if the army of a foe invade our native land, Or rank disunion gather up its lawless, faithless band; Then the arm upon our ancient shield shall wield his blade of might, And we’ll show our worthy brethren that gentlemen can fight. The American Nation carries a copyright date of 1862. It is possible it went to print after Prentiss was released. It is one of those pieces of the puzzle as to why was the actions of Peabody not recognized by historians if there was a book published in 1862 that described what he had done. In Shiloh – The Battle That Changed the Civil War Larry Daniel has an error-prone synopsis of the opening of the battle. He based part of his opening battle remarks on a convoluted and disappointing newspaper article that was published in the Philadelphia Inquirer by a reporter of the name of Bentley. Bentley was in the camp of the 25th Missouri on the morning of April 6th and related his observations. Bentley’s description of the fight is so disorganized he convinced Larry Daniel that Prentiss actually accosted Peabody twice on the morning of April 6th. Nevertheless you can gloom some tidbits from the article and here is a link which should get you to a website that has the newspaper digitized. https://newspaperarchive.com/philadelphia-inquirer-apr-18-1862-p-2/ You are on your own to work with this site. I could not find a site that had the Philadelphia Inquirer digitized and you did not need to pay for it. Somehow I was able to print a copy of the newspaper on a single 8.5 x 11 inch sheet of paper and I use a magnifying glass to read it. One of the puzzle pieces is the relationship between Prentiss and Peabody. Recently Ozzy had a thread which discussed what day did Prentiss actually arrive at Pittsburg Landing. Prentiss stated in his 1882 speech he arrived on March 29, 1862, roughly one week before the battle. What is missing from the record is any account of an interaction between Prentiss and Peabody that supports a claim they did not get along prior to April 5th. Here is the entire letter Peabody wrote on March 31, 1862, his last letter. You have probably seen snippets of the letter but here is the entire letter. To whom it was addressed was kept secret in The American Nation but it was sent to his brother Frank. Dear -------, In camp again, with a good regiment and well equipped. We are in General Prentiss’s division (eleven regiments), and I command the leading brigade. As we are the left centre division, we expect rough work. I have a fine brigade. My own regiment at the right; the Twelfth Michigan, Sixteenth Wisconsin, and Eighteenth Missouri forming the balance. We arrived here on the 28th, and have a very pleasant camp,--the boys as lively as crickets, and every thing working smoothly, It is funny to be called general, but the boys are all delighted, and, I think, will do good service at the proper time. The enemy is supposed to be about eighteen miles from us. We have an immense army, how large I have no means of knowing; they say, however, one hundred and twenty odd regiments, and they are arriving at the rate of two or three a day. As I wrote you before leaving, I have left my contract with Judge Krum of St. Louis. In case I go under, my old assistants, Kilby and John Severance, can give you all the necessary information in regard to the property involved. Say to them all at home, that if I have good luck, I shall win my spurs. Love to all. Yours, Ev Unfortunately Colonel Everett Peabody did not have good luck but he won his spurs and was instrumental in giving the army the opportunity to save itself. He mentions General Prentiss with no hint of animosity or ill-feeling. “Every thing working smoothly” certainly does not support the mantra that Prentiss hated Peabody’s guts. Another mantra is that Peabody had a presentiment of his own death at Shiloh. But you can read in his last letter that he states “In case I go under” and then informed his brother whom to contact about some of his property. Peabody might have had a presentiment of his death in battle months earlier but he gave no such indication in his last letter home from Shiloh that he sensed he was going to be killed on the field. We had a discussion as to who ordered out Colonel Moore with five companies to go to the aid of Major Powell. I remarked I had just read an account that stated Moore was sent out by Prentiss but could not remember where. Well, I discovered it was on page 61 in the following staff ride handbook. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/educational-services/staff-rides/StaffRideHB_Shiloh.pdf Now just looking at Daniel’s book and on page 147 he states the same thing. No wonder the puzzle is so hard to complete. I added this because Bjorn stated the same thing on his hike and we were wondering where that could come from since David Moore specifically stated it was Peabody who ordered him forward. In preparing this posting I came across another occasion when Prentiss described the opening of the battle and mentioned how it was Colonel David Moore who was responsible. From Confederate Veteran, Volume 3, April, 1895 there is an article on the veteran’s reunion at Shiloh in that year. On page 104 is found the following: “He (Prentiss) reported his anxiety about the situation in front of the General (Sherman) commanding in the field, but his fears of an attack were not heeded, the General sending back word “I will guard your front.” He sent, however, Col. Moore of his division, with part of his regiment, who encountering Johnston’s army, sent a report of it back to Prentiss, adding, “If you will send the balance of my regiment to me, by thunder, I will lick them!” Here it is 1895 and Prentiss attributed the opening of the battle to Colonel David Moore. So far I have found no account where Prentiss himself displayed any knowledge of Powell’s patrol. You can find copies of the Confederate Veteran at the following link. Go to Volume 3, page 104 to find the article on the veteran reunion at Shiloh in April of 1895. http://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/webbin/serial?id=confedvet The record indicates that Major Powell took out a patrol after noticing “butternuts” observing the division’s review in Spain Field. Then, probably after Powell had returned, Moore took out his patrol and returned with his information concerning the evidence of Rebel cavalrymen. This seemed to have piqued Powell’s interest and he took out the late night patrol as detailed in the account of Private D. K. Baker where Baker related that Powell told them that they were going out to find some Rebel cavalrymen and “bring them in out of the wet.” That mission was aborted upon finding more Rebels than expected and Powell organized another patrol to go out at 3 am on April 6th. Sergeant Gordon of company A, 57th Ohio was on picket duty when Powell approached him with his patrol and told him that they were going out to “catch some rebels for breakfast.” That is a total of four patrols going out from Peabody’s camp. The idea that Powell’s 3 am patrol was sent out in violation of orders does not stand up because all of these patrols had been granted permission from Prentiss to make reconnaissance in front of Peabody’s camp. What Prentiss did not know was the timing of these patrols. Wm. J. Hahn, 1st Lt., Co. H., 25th Missouri, who was there, wrote on April 12, 1914 – “With the assistance of Colonel Everitt Peabody commanding the 1st Brigade of the 6th Division, Major Powell finally got General Prentiss’s permission to reconnoiter Sunday morning, but under no circumstances to bring on a general engagement. Major Powell explained these points to me at 10 P.M. Saturday, April 5th and directed me to visit every tent of Co. H and instruct the men to be fully dressed and be ready to march at 3 A.M. Sunday, April 6th……If ever a man deserved a monument it is our brave Major Powell…..” Hahn’s statement contains an admission that Powell had permission from Prentiss for the 3 am patrol but that “under no circumstances to bring on a general engagement.” When Prentiss rode into Peabody’s camp on the morning of April 6th he knew that Colonel David Moore had gone forward with his entire regiment and that Colonel Peabody was about to do the same with the 25th Missouri. It looked to Prentiss as if the situation had gone beyond reconnaissance patrols to approaching a general engagement and that is why he accused Peabody of bringing on an engagement and that Peabody would be held responsible. The State Historical Society of Missouri has a collection of papers of Lt. Col. Robert Van Horn of the 25th Missouri. Overall the collection is a disappointment concerning the battle of Shiloh except for a yellowed copy of a newspaper account by William A. Morton dated April 7, 1908 in the Hamiltonian newspaper from Hamilton, Missouri. William Morton was one of the four Morton brothers enrolled in the 25th Missouri. We are familiar with Charles Morton from his two accounts of the battle of Shiloh, Boy at Shiloh and Opening of the Battle of Shiloh. Brother Mark Morton served as an aide to Colonel Peabody at Shiloh. The Morton brothers were there and close to the scene. For the astute observers one might notice the date of the article being 1908 and contained in the papers of Robert Van Horn and wonder how that could be. The answer is that Robert Van Horn lived to be 92 years of age and died in 1916. I selected to include in this post the introduction in the newspaper to the article and a portion of the article concerning William Morton’s account of what they found when they returned to their demolished camp on April 7, 1862. William Morton, who was there, wondered why historians never gave credit to Peabody for what he did and that the excited Prentiss really was not aware of what actually happened. Morton also commented on the fact that Peabody took action without informing Prentiss and that was a mystery because Peabody was always respectful to fellow officers. BATTLE OF SHILOH. – W. A. MORTON – OMAHA, APRIL 7, 1908 Gen. Charles Morton Commemorates the Event Each Year A Shiloh dinner was given by Gen. Charles Morton at Omaha on April 7, this year. For many years past the General has celebrated the anniversary of the battle in a formal manner, or otherwise, and on this occasion he invited a number of the survivors of the battle to join him in commemorating the event. Five persons were present, all of whom were requested to present a written statement of personal experience in the great open field fight, giving special prominence to recollections of the opening events, as the question whether the Union army was surprised or not has never been satisfactorily settled by historians. W. A. Morton, of Little Rock, Ark., a brother of Gen. Chas. Morton, was in Hamilton last Thursday and Friday on his way home from attending the Shiloh dinner where he gave the following narrative of the battle, in which he desires to make clear the point that the First brigade of Prentiss’ division, commanded by Col. Peabody of the Missouri 25th, was not surprised. This narrative, we believe, will be read with interest by our patrons as its author was the founder of the HAMILTONIAN and he and a number of others of the same company serving in the war enlisted from this locality. Personal Experiences in the Battle of Shiloh (By W. A. Morton, late of Co. I, 25th Inft. Mo. Vols.) * * * * * * * * * * * * We marched back to camp, arriving between the hours of 1 and 2 Monday April 7th. Our camp was the very picture of the “havoc of war and the battle’s confusion.” Tents were rent by bullets and shells, and the ground was strewn with broken muskets, limbs of trees, knapsacks, etc: and the trees were splintered by cannon shot, and dead Confederates lay scattered by. A few of the tents were burnt, while those remaining all contained one or more wounded or dead Confederates. The tent which Sergeant Singleton and I had occupied contained two dead men, who were members of an Arkansas regiment. Everything of value which we left in our tents when we retreated the morning before was gone. Blankets, knapsacks and clothing, etc., and for three or four weeks we had no change of clothing. Blankets were issued soon after the battle, but we drew no clothing until early in May, when we were in the trenches near Corinth. After hastily surveying our camp the next thing in order was dinner. Some of the boys had hardtack, others had canned goods found at a demolished Sutler’s tent, and one had a chicken which he had picked up at a farm house. The meal would have been a gloomy one but for the fact that all of the boys (there were 21 of them) had a thrilling experience to relate, besides the occasion was enlivened with the thought that we had regained our camp and that the Confederates were skedaddling for Corinth. But when we entered our tents at night even the thoughts of victory could not dissipate the air of gloom. The following day our camp was thronged with visitors, who came to view our dead Colonel; there were newspaper correspondents and army officers among whom, General Garfield, who commanded a brigade of Woods Division. Buell’s army. It happened that the first person General Garfield met on entering our camp was my brother, Mark, to whom he said: “I am looking for the camp of the Missouri 25th.” Mark replied, this is the camp of the 25th. “After a few remarks concerning Col. Peabody the General inquired if there were any boys of the name of, Morton, in the regiment. Mark said, “Yes, sir, my name is Morton, and I have three brothers in the regiment.” He then conducted the General to our company and introduced Charley and myself, but John N. required no introduction as the General recognized him at sight as a former neighbor farm boy and playmate. The General praised Colonel Peabody highly for his bravery and intelligent efforts to prevent the entire army from being surprised. All the officers who visited our camp were lavish with eulogies of Col. Peabody and the officers of the first brigade, and it was current opinion that their vigilance alone saved the army from surprise. I have often wondered why historians have not given Colonel Peabody the credit which newspaper correspondents and army officers accorded him immediately after the battle, when the facts were fresh in memory. It is certain the first shot was fired by Colonel Peabody’s brigade and that if that shot had not been fired when it was, the entire army would have been unprepared for attack. Colonel Peabody was awake all the night preceding the battle, receiving information from scouts and consulting the regimental commanders in his brigade (so it was reported for days after the battle) consequently his plans for attack were made deliberately. It was the general opinion that Prentiss knew nothing of these plans and was not even aware that the enemy’s outposts were attacked until firing on the skirmish line had progressed an hour or more, for when he appeared at Colonel Peabody’s tent at 6 o’clock, and asked what that firing meant at the front, and the cause was explained, he was not only surprised but very indignant. It is said he charged Colonel Peabody with having violated orders and brought on an engagement prematurely. Lieutenant Claxton, then Commissary Sergeant, says Prentiss’ language was violent. He told Peabody he would put him under arrest, but for the reason he wanted him to bear his share of the engagement he had precipitated. Why Col. Peabody took the steps he did, without reporting to Prentiss, is a mystery. It could not have been on account of ignorance nor lack of respect to a superior officer, for he was a man of fine intelligence and was ever courteous to both inferior and superior officers, besides every inch a soldier. My brother Mark, who was Col. Peabody’s orderly, corroborates what Lieutenant Claxton says regarding the reproval Prentiss administered to Peabody for his aggressive movement. It was therefore due to Col. Peabody’s enterprise and generalship that the entire army was not surprised. To present the history of the battle in truthful and interesting form the historian should say the regimental and division commanders of the Union army were all, except Peabody’s brigade, if not surprised, caught unprepared, but displayed great ability and heroism in staying a crushing defeat. * * * * * * * * * * * * William Morton’s account of the encounter between Prentiss and Peabody comports somewhat with the account given by F. C. Nichols in a letter to the nephew of Everett Peabody dated Feb. 27, 1902. Larry Daniel in Shiloh – The Battle That Changed the Civil War attributed Nichols’ account as the most accurate because Nichols was “within hearing distance.” (page 350 in the “notes” section). Daniel quoted just a sentence of Nichols’ account but there is more quoted in Joseph Rich’s The Battle of Shiloh. Here is what is in Rich’s book. F. C. Nichols, senior Captain of the 25thMissouri at Shiloh, to F. E. Peabody, Feb. 27, 1902. “At early morn before breakfast the line of Battle was formed, with the right of Brigade resting on the right of our regimental color line. My company was on the right of Brigade. A few minutes after the line was formed, General Prentiss rode up near Colonel Peabody, who was mounted and in front of my company, about the center of the first platoon and said to him, “Colonel Peabody, I hold you responsible for bringing on this fight.” Saluting, Colonel Peabody said: ‘If I brought on the fight I am able to lead the van.’ General Prentiss ordered him to take his best regiment….the next words I heard were: 25thMissouri forward.’” In Nichols’ account and William Morton’s account we find corroboration that Prentiss, despite his anger at the moment, gave Colonel Everett Peabody the respect to lead the 25th Missouri regiment forward and gave him the opportunity to “lead the van” “to bear his share of the engagement he had precipitated.” I like that version best. Hank
  36. 2 points
    Thanks Ozzy, fascinating. Wanted to mention again in the opening sequence of the film Glory which shows Union soldiers playing Base ball. Love it. Thanks.
  37. 2 points
    Thanks for all your hard work Stan.
  38. 2 points
    Of course Ozzy’s observation is correct. I heard this somewhere else recently that Prentiss sent out David Moore to reinforce Powell and wondered where that could possibly come from. One is left to surmise how anybody could arrive at that conclusion when Moore clearly stated in his report that it was an order from Colonel Peabody that sent Moore and five companies of the 21st Missouri to Powell’s aid. But it was interesting to note that Lt. Col. Woodyard did indeed put in his report; “I have the honor to report that on the morning of the 6th of April, before sunrise, General Prentiss ordered Colonel Moore, with five companies of our regiment, to sustain the pickets of the Twelfth Michigan Infantry.” Woodyard’s comment reinforced the fact that the situation was so chaotic that Woodyard did not even know it was Peabody that sent Moore out with the first five companies and that it was done to “sustain the pickets of the Twelfth Michigan Infantry.” I kept an eye out for a confirmation of Moore’s report concerning who ordered him out with five companies to reinforce Powell. I finally found it in the following letter written in 1883 by William French, who was there. Not only was he there but he was Moore’s adjutant. His short letter contains other interesting points that blow holes in the Shiloh revisionist ship that will aid in sending that ship down to the deep where it belongs. William French’s letter was published on April 12, 1883 in the National Tribune. Copies of the National Tribune are available online. Just google National Tribune and it should show up. It is a short letter so I typed it up and here it is. One Regiment that was Not Surprised. To the Editor National Tribune: “As the manner in which the battle of Shiloh was fought is now under discussion, I would like, with your permission, to relate what I know about it. There was at least one regiment, the Twenty-first Missouri, commanded by Colonel David Moore, which was not surprised. On Saturday morning, April 5th, the day before the battle, General Prentiss, commanding the division to which we belonged, held a review, and at that time some rebel cavalry were seen in the vicinity. In the afternoon he ordered Colonel Moore to take five companies of his regiment and reconnoiter on our front. We went out about a mile and found numerous traces of the presence of rebel cavalry. The inmates of a house which we visited told us that the rebels were in large force, and that we would be attacked the following morning. Colonel Moore reported this fact to Colonel Peabody, who commanded the brigade, and also to General Prentiss, but no notice was taken of it, except that the pickets were strengthened. The next morning found us up early and ready for orders, and presently Colonel Peabody’s adjutant arrived with instructions for Colonel Moore to take out five companies. The pickets had been fired on in the meanwhile, and the Colonel met them falling back. They reported a heavy force in front of them, and the Colonel sent back to camp for the remaining five companies, and taking the pickets with him marched to the front. We had gone about a mile, and were in sight of the house where we heard the afternoon before that we were to be attacked, when the rebels fired on us. Colonel Moore was shot twice. He dismounted and told me to take care of him and keep a sharp lookout. He formed his regiment in line of battle and the boys began to deliver a very rapid fire. At this time an orderly arrived from Colonel Peabody and wished to know whether Colonel Moore could hold his position until he could re-enforce him. Colonel Moore sent back word that he would; but no re-enforcements came, however, and for about an hour we held the ground alone. The Twenty-first Missouri never did better shooting than on that Sunday morning. It was on that field that Colonel Moore was wounded for the third time. A minie ball broke his leg below the knee, and he was taken back to the camp, and afterwards placed on a gunboat on the river, If, after all the fighting we went through that Sunday morning, any of our boys were shot down near their tents, I, for one, don’t pity them. They had plenty of warning. Colonel Moore held his ground faithfully and bravely, and justice indeed has never been done him for the part he took in the battle of Shiloh.” William French Athens, Mo. Co. F, 21stMo. Wiley Sword wrote in his book on page 138; “About 7 P. M. Moore advised Prentiss that the results of his reconnaissance were negative.” That is not what Prentiss wrote in his report nor is it what William French wrote in this letter. William French wrote that they found evidence of Rebel cavalry and were told by citizens that they would be attacked in the morning. Colonel Moore reported this information to both Colonel Everett Peabody and Brigadier General Benjamin Prentiss. The Shiloh revisionists want you to believe that Moore reported nothing to the front of the camps and that Moore’s report is why General Prentiss did nothing as Peabody harangued him about Rebels to the front of his brigade. But the record clearly shows that Moore reported the presence of cavalry and the reaction by Prentiss was to send out additional pickets to strengthen the picket line and authorize additional patrols that eventually culminated in the 3 a. m. patrol by Major James E. Powell and ordered by Peabody. While Prentiss authorized reconnaissance patrols he was unaware as to the timing of those patrols. I have found nothing to indicate that Prentiss was at Peabody’s camp on the night of April 5th. Peabody, Powell and others were taking their case to Prentiss at his headquarters. As it got later on the night of April 5th Peabody continued to receive reports that heightened his alarm and increased his anxiety to know just what was in front of his brigade. But Prentiss was not there and did not have the latest information that Peabody had. It is bewildering to hear revisionists claim that Moore reported that he found nothing actionable. Moore wrote in his report; “In pursuance of the order of Brig. Gen. B. M. Prentiss, commanding Sixth Division, Army of the West Tennessee, I on Saturday proceeded to a reconnaissance on the front of the line of General Prentiss’ division and on the front of General Sherman’s division. My command consisted of three companies from the Twenty-first Missouri Regiment—companies commanded by Captains Cox, Harle, and Pearce. A thorough reconnaissance over the extent of 3 miles failed to discover the enemy. Being unsuccessful, as stated, I returned to my encampment about 7 o’clock p. m. What Moore is referring to is that he did not find any Rebels that he could shoot. Moore does not relate that he found evidence of rebel cavalry but Prentiss wrote that in his report and acted on it by strengthening the picket line. Prentiss wrote “At about 7 o’clock the same evening Colonel Moore returned, reporting some activity in the front—an evident reconnaissance by cavalry. This information received, I proceeded to strengthen the guard stationed on the Corinth road, extending the picket lines to the front a distance of a mile and a half, at the same time extending and doubling the lines of the grand guard.” It should be noted that Moore is pretty specific about the afternoon patrol he took out. He even gave us the names of the commanders of the three companies he took out on the patrol. He makes no mention of going on patrol joined by Major James E. Powell as claimed by Wiley Sword in his book. The idea of a patrol going out with both Moore and Powell just makes no sense and is not backed up by any account that I can find. It is simply one of the figments of Sword’s imagination that has found its way into the narrative and gets repeated by other historians who just repeat another historian’s work without scrutiny. But Prentiss confuses the issue with his report because he gets events out of sequence. Prentiss wrote in his second paragraph: “Saturday evening, pursuant to instructions received when I was assigned to duty with the Army of West Tennessee, the usual advance guard was posted, and in view of information received from the commandant there of, I sent forward five companies of the Twenty-fifth Missouri and five companies of the Twenty-first Missouri Infantry, under command of Col. David Moore, Twenty-first Missouri. I also, after consultation with Col. David Stuart, commanding a brigade of General Sherman’s division, sent to the left one company of the Eighteenth Wisconsin Infantry, under command of Captain Fisk. At about 7 o’clock the same evening Colonel Moore returned, reporting some activity in the front—an evident reconnaissance by cavalry. This information received, I proceeded to strengthen the guard stationed on the Corinth road, extending the picket lines to the front a distance of a mile and a half, at the same time extending and doubling the lines of the grand guard.” The way Prentiss composed these paragraphs gives the impression that Moore returned at 7 o’clock p. m. from a patrol consisting of five companies of the Twenty-first Missouri and five companies of the Twenty-fifth Missouri. But that makes no sense and does not fit the timing given by Moore in his report. Moore clearly wrote that he returned to camp at 7 p. m. after leading the three-company patrol he took out 3 miles. It makes no sense that at dusk with night approaching Prentiss would order a huge patrol of ten companies to go mashing around through the woods in the dark. My view is when Prentiss stated “I sent forward five companies of the Twenty-fifth Missouri and five companies of the Twenty-first Missouri Infantry, under command of Col. David Moore, Twenty-first Missouri” he is not describing a patrol but rather he sent Moore forward with ten companies to strengthen the picket line. Prentiss stated years later that these troops were sent forward with the order to stay through the night and try to capture some Rebels if they could. At some point on the evening of April 5th communication ceased between Prentiss at his headquarters and what was occurring in front of Peabody’s brigade. Prentiss felt he had responded to information received by sending out additional pickets. When Prentiss retired to his tent he believed that the war god David Moore was out on the picket line with ten companies of troops. However, apparently the pickets returned to camp at some point. When Powell’s patrol moved forward at 3 a. m. Prentiss was unaware of that fact. When Peabody heard pretty heavy firing and wounded men came into camp informing him that Powell could use some help Peabody sent his adjutant to Colonel Moore and told him to go to Powell’s aid with five companies. Moore did so and encountered the retreating Powell on the road east of Seay Field. Moore believed the Rebels were just a patrol and that they could be beaten back if Moore had the other five companies of the 21st Missouri. Moore sent an orderly back to camp to have the other five companies of the 21st Missouri sent to him. But the orderly did not follow the command chain. The orderly did not go to Peabody but instead went all the way to Prentiss at his headquarters. Prentiss described the arrival of the orderly in a speech in 1882; “Early in the morning, on the 6th of April, 1862, it was my duty, from what I had learned, to feel the enemy. I had been admonished on the Friday evening before that battle that an enemy of some force was in our front. Not at 3 o’clock, but on the evening of Saturday, before the sun had set, the details were made, and the order given throughout my division to advance the pickets and strengthen them with additional numbers. I did send to the front the gallant Moore, with five of his companies—three at first, and doubting their ability to meet the enemy, I sent two more on my right. On my left two companies of the 18thWisconsin were advanced one mile to the front. In the center, one company of the 61st Illinois and one of the 18th Missouri were sent forward as extra pickets, with instructions to remain until daylight and see if they could not capture some of the marauders that had been engaged in committing depredations immediately in our vicinity. Early on that Sabbath morning, before (while seated at my breakfast news came to me from the gallant Moore) I had heard the musketry fired in front, and heard the skirmishing, an orderly came galloping into camp and said: “General, the compliments of Gen. Moore. He requests me to say to you that he has met the enemy. Send his other five companies and he will lick them.” That is the language that came to me. Gen. Prentiss sent those other five companies of his regiment to him.” The work “admonish” had a different meaning back in the 1800s. The meaning was more close to “informed” as nowadays it is deemed more critical to be “admonished.” Here it is 20 years after the battle of Shiloh and Prentiss related what he believed happened. Note Prentiss remembered sending “to the front the gallant Moore” “to advance the pickets and strengthen them with additional numbers.” Prentiss had no clue as to Powell’s patrol on the morning of April 6th and the available record, including his 1882 speech shows that Prentiss had no clue as to Powell’s patrol when they placed him in his casket in February of 1901. He never mentioned Powell’s patrol and Peabody’s involvement because he never knew. Prentiss believed that Colonel David Moore was at the front with five companies and when he got a messenger from Moore wanting the rest of his regiment that just reinforced Prentiss’s belief that Moore had been involved with the start of the fighting. Back to French’s short letter and the wealth of information it contains for our consideration. 1. 1. French described how Prentiss ordered Moore to take out an afternoon patrol. French wrote five companies but Moore stated just three in his report. French reported they found numerous traces of Rebel cavalry. This contradicts the revisionist claim that Moore found nothing. 2. 2. French described how they were informed by citizens that the Rebels had a large force and that the Union camp would be attacked in the morning. French wrote that Moore passed this information on to both Prentiss and Peabody but that no serious note was taken except to strengthen the pickets. Here is a first indication that French was unaware of Powell’s patrol. It is also the only source I have seen that informs us that not only did Moore alert Prentiss but also Peabody. 3. 3. French confirmed the fact that Moore received an order from Peabody to take out five companies and move to the front. French gave the reason for this order is that the pickets had been fired upon. A second indication that French was unaware of Powell’s patrol. In addition this observation supports Moore report that it was Peabody that ordered him forward. Both Colonel David Moore and his adjutant, William French, say Peabody ordered Moore forward with five companies and they were there. 4. 4. French wrote that Moore met the pickets falling back and stopped them while sending back for the other five companies of the 21st Missouri. This is the third indication that French was unaware of Powell’s patrol and concluded that the men they encountered had been on picket duty instead of a five company patrol that Peabody had ordered to the front. French made no comment but it has been noted that the orderly Moore sent back for the other five companies went to Prentiss and not Peabody. 5. 5. French described the location of their fight as the house they had visited the day before during their reconnaissance which is at Seay Field. Seay Field is not three miles from the camp of the 21st Missouri. Based on Moore’s description that he moved in front of Sherman’s division it appears that he advanced beyond Seay Field but where Moore actually went is open to question. 6. 6. French wrote of Peabody sending an orderly to ask if Colonel Moore could hold his position until Peabody could reinforce him. I have not seen that referenced anywhere else. Finally French declaimed that “Colonel Moore held his ground faithfully and bravely, and justice indeed has never been done him for the part he took in the battle of Shiloh.” Of that French is totally correct. Rather than receiving justice for his role in the battle of Shiloh Colonel David Moore now receives ridicule and mockery at the hands of the Shiloh revisionists. He is depicted as a liar and a buffoon who could not find his way through the trees in front of Peabody’s camp without losing his way. There is no better example of how Shiloh revisionism has adversely affected the modern history of the battle of Shiloh than reading about the opening of the fight in Keven Getchell’s Scapegoat of Shiloh. What a shame that readers of that book who are not familiar with the battle of Shiloh will believe any of what Getchell wrote concerning the opening of the fight. Getchell did Moore and Prentiss a severe injustice in his book because he followed the Shiloh revisionist mantra. With that I close this posting even though I have so much more to tell. But tomorrow is another day and how it came to be that Colonel David Moore has been falsely depicted as a liar and a buffoon will be revealed in an upcoming posting. Hank
  39. 2 points
    Hi Perry. I know you are funning me because Prentiss made no statements in his official report about Peabody’s conduct in the battle and his role in alerting the army of the presence of the enemy prior to the attack. I would expound on that to clarify that there had been encounters with the Rebels prior to the morning of April 6, particularly the skirmish Buckland had that ended up facing Hardee’s infantry and even artillery at Micky’s on April 4. Prentiss was aware of a presence of enemy in the front and responded by ordering increased pickets forward on the night of April 5. But, as Prentiss admitted later, he had absolutely no idea that a full-scale attack from Johnston’s entire army was about to come down on his head. Colonel Peabody sent Major Powell out on the morning of April 6 and Powell found the entire Rebel army poised to strike the Union camps. The Colonel’s actions alerted the army to the presence of the entire Rebel army. I know you are aware of my views on Prentiss but others might not be so I take the liberty to refer to the following articles published in the Quincy Herald-Whig and on the website of the Historical Society of Quincy and Adams County. These articles were slightly edited from what I wrote without my input. They are slightly different but the gist is the same. http://www.whig.com/article/20160710/ARTICLE/307109929# https://hsqac.org/major-general-benjamin-mayberry-prentiss-quincys-slandered-hero-shiloh-hank-koopman/ On my last research visit to the Shiloh National Military Park I was reminded the degree to which the unwarranted, and unsubstantiated, vilification of Prentiss has permeated the Shiloh story. I was minding my own business at the research desk leafing through files with only one of the Shiloh volunteers in presence. I had made no references to Prentiss when out of the blue the Shiloh volunteer said to me “You know Prentiss took credit for sending out the Powell patrol.” The volunteer was surprised when I calmly replied “That is not true.” I got back “That is what all the books say.” My calm reply was “Those books are wrong.” Of all people to make the untrue statement that Prentiss took credit for sending out Powell’s patrol I am not the one. The incident reinforced my objection to the fact that I cannot even visit the park without someone trying to make me dislike Prentiss by spouting out things I know are not true. Perry, although you did not ask my view as to why Prentiss makes no mention of what Peabody did during the battle I am going to give it. Ozzy has made some recent posts that are relevant to the subject as to why is there no mention of Peabody’s actions before and during the battle in Prentiss’s report? In the forum “April 7” thread “Value of the POWs” Ozzy broached the subject of Prentiss’s official report with the following: Prentiss, Prisoners and Prognosticating Nature abhors a vacuum... and I have attempted over the past several months to determine, "Why was General Prentiss' Report of Battle of Shiloh in error, as regards the roles of Peabody and Powell ?" (Errors of omission, as in, "no credit given for the early morning reconnaissance ordered by Colonel Peabody and performed by Major Powell.") The death of Peabody was not discovered until the 25th Missouri regained their camp on April 7. Early newspaper accounts listed Peabody as wounded. Peabody’s brother made the trip from Massachusetts with the understanding that Everett Peabody had been severely wounded. When the brother arrived at Shiloh he discovered his brother had been placed in a wood crate and he took him back home to Massachusetts for burial and thus removing Colonel Peabody far away from western theater of battle. Meanwhile the last time Prentiss saw Peabody was in the camp of the 25th Missouri when they had their altercation and Prentiss told Peabody that he was responsible for bringing on the engagement. Prentiss never saw Peabody again and could not very well write about Peabody’s actions during the fight when he had no idea what Peabody had done. Prentiss included observations on Madison Miller, Jacob Tindall and Colonel C. S. Albans because they were with Prentiss during the fight and he could vouch for their actions. Prentiss was on his way to Memphis along with a couple thousand other prisoners by the time Peabody was confirmed killed. The only way Prentiss could learn of Peabody’s death is if someone told him but all the prisoners were sent off the battlefield on the night of April 6. During his imprisonment Prentiss might have read some smuggled newspapers but otherwise what Prentiss was hearing was how he and his men had surrendered first thing. Prentiss was finally released from prison and arrived in Washington DC on October 17, 1862. He spent a busy day visiting Lincoln and relating how the prisoners had been mistreated and it was going to take a big effort to bring the south to heel. That night Prentiss was serenaded and gave a speech and immediately left for Quincy, Illinois with a group of five or six other officers. He was given a 30-day leave. He passed through Chicago where he was serenaded again and he gave a speech along with several of the other officers. Prentiss then traveled home to Quincy, Illinois. The trip was a whirlwind of activity. By this time it was over six months after Shiloh and the war had moved on. During this journey the only way Prentiss would have known of the death of Peabody is if someone told him. There is no reasonable expectation that someone would have told Prentiss what Peabody had done during the battle so he could include it in his report. Prentiss did not return to an existing division where he could get information about the battle from a staff. He returned alone to Quincy. The usual sequence for an official report by a senior commander was that he would wait to receive the reports of his underlings to aid in the preparation of his report. Prentiss had no such advantage. He had never read or had in his possession the reports of the members of his division. Prentiss was writing blind using just his memory and understanding of what had happened. Prentiss had not a clue as to what had transpired concerning Peabody ordering out Powell’s patrol. This is evident in his report when he attributed the start of the fighting to the combative Colonel David Moore. One missing puzzle piece for me was to confirm that there were no officers of the 25th Missouri among the officer prisoners captured along with Prentiss. Ozzy posted the link he found to a list of officers captured at Shiloh. The list has no officer from the 25th Missouri who might have been able to tell Prentiss what transpired in their camp concerning the actions of Peabody and Powell. The date of November 17, 1862 shows that Prentiss procrastinated the writing of his report. Prentiss felt no need to get his story out as quickly as possible. He waited until the last day of his leave to finally write it. The report was not Prentiss’s top priority as other events were taking place in Quincy at that time. The papers are full of the Emancipation Proclamation issued by Lincoln after the September battle at Antietam. Prentiss was busy as he was invited to give speeches relating to the very important mid-term elections. In November Prentiss married a 24-year old woman to be his second wife. That surely cut into the time he had to write a report about Shiloh. It is surmised by some that the reason Prentiss did not mention more about Peabody and his death on the battlefield is that he hated Peabody. If that is the criteria than Peabody must have been the most hated man in the brigade. Of the five official reports submitted by regimental officers of Peabody’s brigade only one lists the death of Peabody. (Col. Francis Quinn of the 12th Michigan). Lt. Col. Robert Van Horn of the 25th Missouri must have really hated Peabody because he did not mention the death of Peabody in his report. The big difference between those officers and Prentiss is that they knew Peabody had been killed but Prentiss did not. General Grant was so impressed with Peabody (and Julius Raith) that he did not mention him in his report either. But we did learn all about Sherman’s boo-boo to his hand from Grant. Prentiss did not note the deaths of Colonel Tindall of the 23rd Missouri and Colonel Albans of the 18th Wisconsin in his report but he did mention their outstanding service which he witnessed. I guess Prentiss hated them too. My view is that had Prentiss known of the deaths of Tindal and Albans he would have mentioned their sacrifice in his hastily written report. If Prentiss did not know of the deaths of Tindal and Albans it is logical to conclude he did not know of the death of Peabody either when he wrote his report. But why is there no mention of the part played in the opening of the fight by Major Powell? Because Prentiss did not know the fight was initiated by Powell’s patrol. Prentiss believed that the fight was initiated with the troops under the command of Colonel David Moore. Then that brought up the question as to when did Prentiss finally learn that the fight was initiated by Major Powell’s patrol? I set to work on this myself (just a retired engineer doing the type of Shiloh research that Shiloh revisionist historians just won’t do) and through luck and lots of hours in archives I found out that every time I found a report, letter, speech and a newspaper account where Prentiss described the opening of the fight he always attributed it to Colonel David Moore. I have found nothing in which Prentiss gave any indication he knew of Powell’s patrol. Therefore, my view is that the answer to when Brigadier General Benjamin Mayberry Prentiss learned of the early morning patrol by Major James E. Powell is – NEVER. Benjamin Mayberry Prentiss went to his grave never knowing of Major Powell’s patrol and how the battle of Shiloh truly started. The idea that Benjamin Prentiss deliberately dissed Colonel Peabody by not acknowledging Peabody’s role in sending out Major Powell’s patrol that ended up alerting the army and gave it time to defend itself fails to scrutiny. Prentiss can hardly be expected to have credited Peabody with doing something of which Prentiss was unaware. The good General is doing just fine. He sleeps well and I appreciate the opportunity to explain why. There is a lot more to be told. Hank
  40. 2 points
    " water from the tennessee river" Jeez, the lest ya could do was give em water from Rhea Springs.
  41. 2 points
    I would say that would be ON park property. "at" their camp, to me that indicates just beyond the perimeter of their camp and further beyond. And it sounds like to me more than one trench, by the way it is phrased.
  42. 2 points
    That is exactly it! Thanks Ozzy. Skelton, I remembered it was a distinct last name. I did not know other Henry's were used at Corinth. I could have sworn I saw it in print in a book, but, it could very well have been this article that I stumbled upon. I may be wrong, but I think most people think, "oh, Henry Rifle, they were blasting away like they do in Western movies". I have even seen Civil War reenactors carrying Henry rifles and they were just blasting away when shooting. I don't think this is historically accurate. I think the soldiers lucky enough to have these weapons, especially early in the war, would have been firing "somewhat fast", but still taking deliberate aim. Ammunition was not just laying around for this weapon. I can't see someone, especially Confederate, burning through ammunition when ammunition resupply would be a colossal issue. At Corinth, for Skelton, I think actually it would have been more than a colossal issue. If he ran out of ammo, there was probably NO resupply, and he would be left carrying a heavy paperweight if he did run out of ammo. I found the picture of Fisher mentioned in the article, holding his Henry rifle. Fisher, and the 10th Kentucky Partisan Rangers Cavalry, however, did not fight at Corinth. Their fighting was done in Kentucky for the most part. Still, incredibly rare and historically important image. I would imagine the most technologically advanced rifle on the field at Shiloh would be the Sharps rifle or carbine. But, I imagine Birge's Western Sharpshooters, along with other marksmen and sharpshooters, were carrying some finely crafted rifles as well, such as the Dimick rifle.
  43. 2 points
    Notes on Firearms used by the different Confederate Regiments and Brigades at the Battle of Shiloh April 6-7th 1862. Note* The results posted here is a work in progress to be updated when new research is found. The results are not final. This is a simple compilation of what has been discovered. The footnotes are not included here, but will be part of a final paper or report to be given to the Shiloh NPS. For the record, sources used were RG 109 Regimental Papers NA., The Wyckoff analysis done by the Shiloh NPS on firearms, Frederick Todd’s book on American Military Equipage, Official Records of the Civil War, and several other State and written sources from Civil War Study Groups, letters, papers, photographic evidence of original Confederate soldiers posing with their issued firearms, Regimental Histories, Confederate Veteran Magazine and memoirs. 1st Corp Major General Leonidas Polk Clark’s Division Russell’s Brigade 11th Louisiana- evidence to the use of cap and ball .69 caliber smoothbores 12th Tennessee-evidence to the use of cap and ball and flintlock .69 caliber smoothbore muskets 13th Tennessee-evidence to the use of flintlock .69 caliber smoothbores, “we had old flintlocks, muzzle loaders with buck and ball.” 22nd Tennessee- initially flintlock .69 caliber smoothbores, early British smoothbores .70 caliber—possible issue of Enfield Rifles, before or picked up during the Battle. Total—for the Brigade 2,650 smoothbores and a possible 800 with Enfield Rifles—research continues. Stewart’s Brigade 13th Arkansas- evidence to use of cap and ball .69 caliber smoothbores 4th Tennessee-evidence to use of cap and ball .69 caliber smoothbores and an assortment of “old guns.” 5th Tennessee [35th Tennessee]-evidence to the use of cap and ball .69 caliber smoothbores, some Companies with civilian Rifles, Mississippi Rifles or 1855 Rifles, research continues- 33rd Tennessee- initially “shotguns, civilian hunting rifles”-issued flintlock .69 caliber smoothbores prior to Battle. Total—for the Brigade 1,706 smoothbores, maybe 100 rifles, research continues. Cheatham’s Division Johnson’s Brigade Blythe’s Infantry Mississippi, 7 Hall’s Rifles returned after the Battle— Co A. Sharp’s Rifles, Co B. shotguns, Co I. Civilian Rifles .32 caliber, and he rest old flintlock and cap and ball .69 caliber muskets. 2nd Tennessee Infantry, J. Knox Walker—UNKNOWN 15TH Tennessee Infantry, initially 744 men with flintlocks .69 caliber—mixed flintlock and cap and ball .69 caliber muskets during the Battle of Shiloh. 154th Tennessee Senior Infantry, Co. L armed with Maynard Rifles, the rest unknown. 2, 052 men in the Brigade—we know of 500 with smoothbores and 50-100 with Maynard Rifles .32 or .50 caliber. Stephen’s Brigade 7th Kentucky Infantry, evidence to being armed with new Enfield Rifles prior to Battle. 1st Tennessee Infantry Battalion, some Companies with 1855 rifles, and the rest .69 caliber smoothbores 6th Tennessee Infantry, flintlock .69 caliber smoothbores and some cap and ball .69 caliber smoothbores. 9th Tennessee Infantry, flintlock .69 caliber smoothbores 1,620 men in the Brigade, estimated 600 with rifles, Enfield’s and Maynard’s, the rest 1020 with smoothbore muskets. 2nd Corp Major General Braxton Bragg Ruggle’s Division Gibson’s Brigade 1st Arkansas Infantry, Fagan’s, Co. B with smoothbores 4th Louisiana, photo evidence to cap and ball .69 caliber smoothbores 13th Louisiana Infantry, evidence to the issue of 700 muskets, smoothbores, type unknown. 19th Louisiana Infantry, photo evidence to cap and ball .69 caliber smoothbores. 2,560 men with most smoothbores. Anderson’s Brigade 1st Florida Infantry, “upon the Regimental formation…the Franklin Rifles received 1855 rifled muskets, [drilled initially with flintlock muskets], Confederate Government issued Model 1842 .69 caliber muskets, Pensacola Guards armed with a mixture of muskets.” 9th Texas Infantry, evidence to .69 caliber smoothbore muskets, some with shotguns. 17th Louisiana Infantry, evidence to some carrying .54 rebored civilian rifles, the rest UNKNOWN 20th Louisiana Infantry, UNKNOWN Confederate Guards Response Battalion, 1,000 .58 caliber rounds issued- some had 1855 rifles, the rest UNKNOWN 1,633 men, 50-100 1855 rifled muskets, possible civilian rifles bored to .54 caliber, low numbers issued, estimated 426 with smoothbores, the rest UNKNOWN Pond’s Brigade 16th Louisiana Infantry, photo evidence some Companies with Mississippi Rifles, and .69 caliber cap and ball muskets. 18th Louisiana Infantry, flank companies armed with rifles and the rest smoothbore muskets. 38th Tennessee Infantry, “I have armed Looney’s with Shotguns, Country Rifles, and old muskets [flintlocks?].” Crescent Infantry, “5 Companies with 1819 Hall’s rifles .52 caliber, 2 Companies with smoothbore muskets, and 1 with shotguns.” Orleans Guards Infantry Battalion, flank Companies with 1855 rifles and the rest Model 1842 .69 caliber cap and ball muskets. 2,644 men, 150-250 with Mississippi rifles, [250 with Hall’s Rifles .52 caliber], 100 with shotguns, and the rest approximately 2,044 with smoothbores. Wither’s Division Gladden’s Brigade 1st Louisiana Regulars, flank Companies .58 caliber 1855 rifled muskets, the balance .69 caliber smoothbore muskets 21st Alabama Infantry, UNKNOWN 22nd Alabama Infantry, armed with private purchase Enfield two band rifles and sword bayonets. 25th Alabama Infantry, issues of caps 2,000 and photo evidence to cap and ball .69 caliber muskets, and some shotguns. 26th Alabama Infantry, photo evidence to some Companies, flank, Mississippi Rifles and the balance .69 caliber cap and ball muskets smoothbores. 2,156 men, maybe 500-600 with rifles, and the rest approximately 1600 with .69 caliber smoothbore muskets. Chalmer’s Brigade 5th Mississippi, issue evidence, 9,000 musket ball cartridges and 1,000 musket caps, and photo evidence smoothbore musket—Armed with .69 caliber cap and ball smoothbore muskets. 7th Mississippi Infantry, Co. F armed with Hall’s Rifles .52 calibler. 9th Mississippi Infantry, Co. D armed with Mississippi Rifles .54 caliber, other sources list Enfield Rifles issued prior to Shiloh. 10th Mississippi Infantry, evidence to all Rifles, Mississippi’s and 1855 Rifled muskets. 52nd Tennessee Infantry [plus segments of the 51st Tennessee], armed with shotguns and the 51st men, armed with Hall’s .52 caliber rifled muskets. 2,236 men estimated 1,000 Rifles, 400 shotguns, and 700-800 smoothbore muskets and UNKNOWN’s. Jackson’s Brigade 2nd Texas Infantry, evidence to smoothbore muskets [more research forthcoming] 17th Alabama Infantry, UNKNOWN 18th Alabama, photo evidence to cap and ball conversion .69 caliber smoothbore muskets and Mississippi Rifles. 19th Alabama, photo evidence to Mississippi Rifles and conversion .69 caliber smoothbore muskets. 2,127 men, unknown number of Mississippi Rifles .54 caliber, maybe 200 to 300 and 1,500 smoothbore muskets. The 17th Alabama is an UNKNOWN. 3rd Corp Major General William J. Hardee Hindman’s Brigade 2nd Arkansas Infantry, initially issued smoothbores and Flintlock Hall’s Rifles .52 caliber. Issued new Enfield Rifles in November of 1861. 3rd Confederate Infantry, [18th Arkansas Infantry], armed with Enfield Rifles. 6th Arkansas Infantry, went into Battle with Model 1819 Hall’s flintlock rifled muskets, .52 caliber. 7th Arkansas Infantry, went into Battle with Model 1819 Hall’s flintlock rifled muskets, .52 caliber. 2,290 men, all armed with Rifles, Hall’s and Enfields, but the Hall’s “flint and steel muskets put the men at a great disadvantage.” Cleburne’s Brigade 2nd Tennessee Provisional Bate’s, mixed civilian rifles and flintlocks initially. 6th Mississippi Infantry, two flank companies Enfield Rifled muskets, and the rest “mixed” 15th Arkansas Infantry, poor arms, but picked up new Enfield Rifles from Peabody’s camps. 23rd Tennessee Infantry, Flintlock .69 caliber smoothbore muskets. 24th Tennessee Infantry, some 1841 Model Mississippi Rifles and the balance flintlock .69 caliber smoothbores. 2,537 men, maybe 500 rifles, and approximately 1,258 smoothbore muskets. Wood’s Brigade 3rd Mississippi Infantry Battalion, UNKNOWN 8th Arkansas Infantry, Conflicting evidence, one source says Enfield Rifles and the original ordnance records show 24,000 Flintlock cartridges issued post Shiloh, April-May, 1862. 9th Arkansas Infantry Battalion, Model 1819 Hall’s Rifled muskets and a mix of civilian guns. 16th Alabama Infantry, cap and ball .69 caliber smoothbore muskets. 27th Tennessee Infantry, issued new Enfield Rifles in December of 1861. 44th Tennessee Infantry, UNKNOWN 55th Tennessee Infantry, only two Companies armed with flintlock .69 caliber smoothbore muskets. 1,996 men, 3rd Mississippi Battalion and 44th Tennessee UNKNOWN- 490 rifles known and 580 smoothbores. Reserve Corp Brigadier General John C. Breckenridge Trabue’s Brigade 3rd Kentucky Infantry, evidence to mix cap and ball .69 caliber smoothbores and flintlock .69 caliber smoothbores. 4th Alabama Infantry, evidence to Enfield Rifles and smoothbores 5th Kentucky Infantry, “Ragamuffins’ armed with long-rifles [civilian].” 6th Kentucky Infantry, went into the Battle armed with smoothbores, traded them for Enfield Rifles on the 6th. 31st Alabama Infantry, evidence to part Enfield Rifles and smoothbore muskets. Crew’s Infantry Battalion, “poorly armed.” 2,678 men. Second Brigade Brig. Gen. JOHN S. BOWEN (wounded) Col. JOHN D. MARTIN 9th Arkansas, mix of Hall’s Rifles, cap and ball .69 caliber muskets and civilian rifles and shotguns. Col. Isaac L. Dunlop 10th Arkansas, Model 1819 Hall’s flintlock Rifles .52 caliber Col. Thomas H. Merrick 2d Confederate Infantry [25th Mississippi Infantry], UNKNOWN Col. John d. Martin Maj. Thomas H. Mangum 1st Missouri Infantry, evidence to Enfield Rifles Third Brigade Col. WINFIELD S. STATHAM, 15th Mississippi 15th Mississippi Infantry, Co. G Maynard Rifles and Mississippi Rifles, the rest flintlock .69 caliber smoothbores. 22d Mississippi Infantry, evidence to all Enfield Rifles. 19th Tennessee Infantry, initially flintlock .69 caliber smoothbore muskets, days before Shiloh, cap and ball .69 caliber smoothbore muskets and 97 Mississippi Rifles .54 caliber. Col. David H. Cummings 20th Tennessee Infantry, initially with flintlock .69 caliber smoothbore muskets, in March of 1862, all new Enfield Rifles and accoutrements. Col. Joel A. Battle (captured) 28th Tennessee Infantry, “615 flintlock smoothbore muskets for 915 men October of 1861.” Possibility of Enfield Rifles for the balance. 45th Tennessee, Mix of cap and ball .69 caliber smoothbore muskets, some Enfield Rifles and Mississippi Rifles. Notes on Firearms used by the different Confederate Regiments and Brigades at the Battle of Shiloh April 6-7th 1862. Note* The results posted here is a work in progress to be updated when new research is found. The results are not final. This is a simple compilation of what has been discovered. The footnotes are not included here, but will be part of a final paper or report to be given to the Shiloh NPS. For the record, sources used were RG 109 Regimental Papers NA., The Wyckoff analysis done by the Shiloh NPS on firearms, Frederick Todd’s book on American Military Equipage, Official Records of the Civil War, and several other State and written sources from Civil War Study Groups, letters, papers, photographic evidence of original Confederate soldiers posing with their issued firearms, Regimental Histories, Confederate Veteran Magazine and memoirs. 1st Corp Major General Leonidas Polk Clark’s Division Russell’s Brigade 11th Louisiana- evidence to the use of cap and ball .69 caliber smoothbores 12th Tennessee-evidence to the use of cap and ball and flintlock .69 caliber smoothbore muskets 13th Tennessee-evidence to the use of flintlock .69 caliber smoothbores, “we had old flintlocks, muzzle loaders with buck and ball.” 22nd Tennessee- initially flintlock .69 caliber smoothbores, early British smoothbores .70 caliber—possible issue of Enfield Rifles, before or picked up during the Battle. Total—for the Brigade 2,650 smoothbores and a possible 800 with Enfield Rifles—research continues. Stewart’s Brigade 13th Arkansas- evidence to use of cap and ball .69 caliber smoothbores 4th Tennessee-evidence to use of cap and ball .69 caliber smoothbores and an assortment of “old guns.” 5th Tennessee [35th Tennessee]-evidence to the use of cap and ball .69 caliber smoothbores, some Companies with civilian Rifles, Mississippi Rifles or 1855 Rifles, research continues- 33rd Tennessee- initially “shotguns, civilian hunting rifles”-issued flintlock .69 caliber smoothbores prior to Battle. Total—for the Brigade 1,706 smoothbores, maybe 100 rifles, research continues. Cheatham’s Division Johnson’s Brigade Blythe’s Infantry Mississippi, 7 Hall’s Rifles returned after the Battle— Co A. Sharp’s Rifles, Co B. shotguns, Co I. Civilian Rifles .32 caliber, and he rest old flintlock and cap and ball .69 caliber muskets. 2nd Tennessee Infantry, J. Knox Walker—UNKNOWN 15TH Tennessee Infantry, initially 744 men with flintlocks .69 caliber—mixed flintlock and cap and ball .69 caliber muskets during the Battle of Shiloh. 154th Tennessee Senior Infantry, Co. L armed with Maynard Rifles, the rest unknown. 2, 052 men in the Brigade—we know of 500 with smoothbores and 50-100 with Maynard Rifles .32 or .50 caliber. Stephen’s Brigade 7th Kentucky Infantry, evidence to being armed with new Enfield Rifles prior to Battle. 1st Tennessee Infantry Battalion, some Companies with 1855 rifles, and the rest .69 caliber smoothbores 6th Tennessee Infantry, flintlock .69 caliber smoothbores and some cap and ball .69 caliber smoothbores. 9th Tennessee Infantry, flintlock .69 caliber smoothbores 1,620 men in the Brigade, estimated 600 with rifles, Enfield’s and Maynard’s, the rest 1020 with smoothbore muskets. 2nd Corp Major General Braxton Bragg Ruggle’s Division Gibson’s Brigade 1st Arkansas Infantry, Fagan’s, Co. B with smoothbores 4th Louisiana, photo evidence to cap and ball .69 caliber smoothbores 13th Louisiana Infantry, evidence to the issue of 700 muskets, smoothbores, type unknown. 19th Louisiana Infantry, photo evidence to cap and ball .69 caliber smoothbores. 2,560 men with most smoothbores. Anderson’s Brigade 1st Florida Infantry, “upon the Regimental formation…the Franklin Rifles received 1855 rifled muskets, [drilled initially with flintlock muskets], Confederate Government issued Model 1842 .69 caliber muskets, Pensacola Guards armed with a mixture of muskets.” 9th Texas Infantry, evidence to .69 caliber smoothbore muskets, some with shotguns. 17th Louisiana Infantry, evidence to some carrying .54 rebored civilian rifles, the rest UNKNOWN 20th Louisiana Infantry, UNKNOWN Confederate Guards Response Battalion, 1,000 .58 caliber rounds issued- some had 1855 rifles, the rest UNKNOWN 1,633 men, 50-100 1855 rifled muskets, possible civilian rifles bored to .54 caliber, low numbers issued, estimated 426 with smoothbores, the rest UNKNOWN Pond’s Brigade 16th Louisiana Infantry, photo evidence some Companies with Mississippi Rifles, and .69 caliber cap and ball muskets. 18th Louisiana Infantry, flank companies armed with rifles and the rest smoothbore muskets. 38th Tennessee Infantry, “I have armed Looney’s with Shotguns, Country Rifles, and old muskets [flintlocks?].” Crescent Infantry, “5 Companies with 1819 Hall’s rifles .52 caliber, 2 Companies with smoothbore muskets, and 1 with shotguns.” Orleans Guards Infantry Battalion, flank Companies with 1855 rifles and the rest Model 1842 .69 caliber cap and ball muskets. 2,644 men, 150-250 with Mississippi rifles, [250 with Hall’s Rifles .52 caliber], 100 with shotguns, and the rest approximately 2,044 with smoothbores. Wither’s Division Gladden’s Brigade 1st Louisiana Regulars, flank Companies .58 caliber 1855 rifled muskets, the balance .69 caliber smoothbore muskets 21st Alabama Infantry, UNKNOWN 22nd Alabama Infantry, armed with private purchase Enfield two band rifles and sword bayonets. 25th Alabama Infantry, issues of caps 2,000 and photo evidence to cap and ball .69 caliber muskets, and some shotguns. 26th Alabama Infantry, photo evidence to some Companies, flank, Mississippi Rifles and the balance .69 caliber cap and ball muskets smoothbores. 2,156 men, maybe 500-600 with rifles, and the rest approximately 1600 with .69 caliber smoothbore muskets. Chalmer’s Brigade 5th Mississippi, issue evidence, 9,000 musket ball cartridges and 1,000 musket caps, and photo evidence smoothbore musket—Armed with .69 caliber cap and ball smoothbore muskets. 7th Mississippi Infantry, Co. F armed with Hall’s Rifles .52 calibler. 9th Mississippi Infantry, Co. D armed with Mississippi Rifles .54 caliber, other sources list Enfield Rifles issued prior to Shiloh. 10th Mississippi Infantry, evidence to all Rifles, Mississippi’s and 1855 Rifled muskets. 52nd Tennessee Infantry [plus segments of the 51st Tennessee], armed with shotguns and the 51st men, armed with Hall’s .52 caliber rifled muskets. 2,236 men estimated 1,000 Rifles, 400 shotguns, and 700-800 smoothbore muskets and UNKNOWN’s. Jackson’s Brigade 2nd Texas Infantry, evidence to smoothbore muskets [more research forthcoming] 17th Alabama Infantry, UNKNOWN 18th Alabama, photo evidence to cap and ball conversion .69 caliber smoothbore muskets and Mississippi Rifles. 19th Alabama, photo evidence to Mississippi Rifles and conversion .69 caliber smoothbore muskets. 2,127 men, unknown number of Mississippi Rifles .54 caliber, maybe 200 to 300 and 1,500 smoothbore muskets. The 17th Alabama is an UNKNOWN. 3rd Corp Major General William J. Hardee Hindman’s Brigade 2nd Arkansas Infantry, initially issued smoothbores and Flintlock Hall’s Rifles .52 caliber. Issued new Enfield Rifles in November of 1861. 3rd Confederate Infantry, [18th Arkansas Infantry], armed with Enfield Rifles. 6th Arkansas Infantry, went into Battle with Model 1819 Hall’s flintlock rifled muskets, .52 caliber. 7th Arkansas Infantry, went into Battle with Model 1819 Hall’s flintlock rifled muskets, .52 caliber. 2,290 men, all armed with Rifles, Hall’s and Enfields, but the Hall’s “flint and steel muskets put the men at a great disadvantage.” Cleburne’s Brigade 2nd Tennessee Provisional Bate’s, mixed civilian rifles and flintlocks initially. 6th Mississippi Infantry, two flank companies Enfield Rifled muskets, and the rest “mixed” 15th Arkansas Infantry, poor arms, but picked up new Enfield Rifles from Peabody’s camps. 23rd Tennessee Infantry, Flintlock .69 caliber smoothbore muskets. 24th Tennessee Infantry, some 1841 Model Mississippi Rifles and the balance flintlock .69 caliber smoothbores. 2,537 men, maybe 500 rifles, and approximately 1,258 smoothbore muskets. Wood’s Brigade 3rd Mississippi Infantry Battalion, UNKNOWN 8th Arkansas Infantry, Conflicting evidence, one source says Enfield Rifles and the original ordnance records show 24,000 Flintlock cartridges issued post Shiloh, April-May, 1862. 9th Arkansas Infantry Battalion, Model 1819 Hall’s Rifled muskets and a mix of civilian guns. 16th Alabama Infantry, cap and ball .69 caliber smoothbore muskets. 27th Tennessee Infantry, issued new Enfield Rifles in December of 1861. 44th Tennessee Infantry, UNKNOWN 55th Tennessee Infantry, only two Companies armed with flintlock .69 caliber smoothbore muskets. 1,996 men, 3rd Mississippi Battalion and 44th Tennessee UNKNOWN- 490 rifles known and 580 smoothbores. Reserve Corp Brigadier General John C. Breckenridge Trabue’s Brigade 3rd Kentucky Infantry, evidence to mix cap and ball .69 caliber smoothbores and flintlock .69 caliber smoothbores. 4th Alabama Infantry, evidence to Enfield Rifles and smoothbores 5th Kentucky Infantry, “Ragamuffins’ armed with long-rifles [civilian].” 6th Kentucky Infantry, went into the Battle armed with smoothbores, traded them for Enfield Rifles on the 6th. 31st Alabama Infantry, evidence to part Enfield Rifles and smoothbore muskets. Crew’s Infantry Battalion, “poorly armed.” 2,678 men. Second Brigade Brig. Gen. JOHN S. BOWEN (wounded) Col. JOHN D. MARTIN 9th Arkansas, mix of Hall’s Rifles, cap and ball .69 caliber muskets and civilian rifles and shotguns. Col. Isaac L. Dunlop 10th Arkansas, Model 1819 Hall’s flintlock Rifles .52 caliber Col. Thomas H. Merrick 2d Confederate Infantry [25th Mississippi Infantry], UNKNOWN Col. John d. Martin Maj. Thomas H. Mangum 1st Missouri Infantry, evidence to Enfield Rifles Third Brigade Col. WINFIELD S. STATHAM, 15th Mississippi 15th Mississippi Infantry, Co. G Maynard Rifles and Mississippi Rifles, the rest flintlock .69 caliber smoothbores. 22d Mississippi Infantry, evidence to all Enfield Rifles. 19th Tennessee Infantry, initially flintlock .69 caliber smoothbore muskets, days before Shiloh, cap and ball .69 caliber smoothbore muskets and 97 Mississippi Rifles .54 caliber. Col. David H. Cummings 20th Tennessee Infantry, initially with flintlock .69 caliber smoothbore muskets, in March of 1862, all new Enfield Rifles and accoutrements. Col. Joel A. Battle (captured) 28th Tennessee Infantry, “615 flintlock smoothbore muskets for 915 men October of 1861.” Possibility of Enfield Rifles for the balance. 45th Tennessee, Mix of cap and ball .69 caliber smoothbore muskets, some Enfield Rifles and Mississippi Rifles.
  44. 2 points
    I just spent the day at the Gettysburg battlefield which is about 3-1/2 hours from my domicile. I was amazed how poorly interpreted the battlefield is. A brigade will have one War Department tablet which summarizes its actions over the three days of the battle and possibly also what it did on July 4. The regimental monuments placed sort of where they should be. The interpretation from the tablets and monuments at Gettysburg is extremely lacking, especially when contrasted with the Shiloh battlefield. Major Reed did a good job with his placements of the War Department tablets and his control of the placement of the monuments. I am under the impression that the Gettysburg battlefield, at least in its beginning, was somewhat of a spontaneous creation, lacking the firm guidance of a Reed or Boynton (Chickamauga), and it shows. This trip to Gettysburg was my first in twenty years. Now I realize why I visit it every twenty years while visiting the Shiloh National Military Park, which is about a twelve-hour drive, at least once a year.
  45. 2 points
    25th Alabama Infantry account by Cpt. William P. Howell, Company I, 25th Alabama Infantry. He is referring to Pvt. Burton Jackson Waddell, Company I, 25th Alabama Infantry. I know this is just one account, but, pretty neat. I will here relate a little incident of a man in my company. In the summer of ’61 when the company was being raised at Oak Level one B.J. Waddell who had just returned from Texas joined our company and had a fine rifle gun which he had secured in the west and insisted that he must carry it to shoot yankees and in our first engagement which I have already described, having shot his rifle a few rounds and while on his knees trying to reload, a yankee bullet struck him in the heel, which disabled him in the balance of the war and while he is still living and resides near Anniston, Alabama. I don’t think he has ever recovered from that gun shot.
  46. 2 points
  47. 2 points
    Cpl. Henry Bowen Foster, Company C, Birge's Western Sharpshooters, was killed at Shiloh. He was one of only 2 men in Birge's to be killed.
  48. 2 points
    "Battle at Pittsburg Landing" letterhead, available in 1862. At the below link, "Milgram Civil War" has accumulated over one hundred patriotic covers and letterheads, including battle scenes (and a different sketch of Pittsburg Landing, with steamers and gunboats in the background) and noteworthy persons (including Abraham Lincoln, Ellsworth, Flag-officer Foote, U.S. Grant, Halleck, McClellan & Halleck, Jefferson Davis... The pdf takes about five minutes to load, but is worth the wait: http://www.rfrajola.com/MilgramCW/MilgramCW.pdf Civil War patriotic Letter designs And not wanting to neglect the Confederate contribution to patriotic Letter and envelope designs: http://www.trishkaufmann.com/confederate-patriotics.php
  49. 2 points
    Civil War Guns, published 1962 by William B. Edwards, is a well-researched, comprehensive catalogue of almost all of the various rifles, muskets, rifle-muskets and carbines in use during the Civil War. The information contained (and page number): 1- 6 and 218 Sharps carbine and rifle 144 - 154 Spencer carbine and rifle (with 7-round tube magazine) 22 - 37 Springfield models 1841, 1855 and 1861 242 - 250 Enfield Model 1853 89 and 256 Austrian (Lorenz) 29, 67 & 122 Vincennes Not restricted to particular weapons, the following topics are also covered: 28, 65 & 132 - 143 Fremont's role in 1861 acquiring weapons in Europe (and problems with the Hall carbine) 8 The Zouave Movement 9 Minie ball development 13 - 15 The rifled barrel and its importance 16 Maynard Tape primer system 18 Huger's Tests of 1853/4 (to determine best type of rifled barrels and optimum size of projectile) 42 photo of Tool Kit (necessary for maintenance of rifle-musket) Containing hundreds of photographs and written by a man involved in manufacture of firearms, this is a valuable resource. http://archive.org/details/Civil_War_Guns
  50. 2 points
    Ozzy, looks like nobody is around to answer your question. I think people must be taking a summertime hiatus from SDG. I would say Grant, Forrest, and Cleburne. For each of them, it was the beginning stage of putting them on the path of how they are remembered today. I would say each earned his stardom after Shiloh, and Shiloh put the ball in motion.
×
×
  • Create New...