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  1. 3 points
    I located Sgt. William H. Busbey's post-war article about his being near Grant's Savannah headquarters and on Tigress during the trip to Pittsburg Landing on April 6th in the Chicago Inter-Ocean. Some obvious errors make it not completely reliable, and it may be completely unreliable, but it does make for interesting reading: "I was at Savannah in April, 1862, associated with the work of the Adams Express company . Myself and another young man employed in the same office were sleeping on the night of April 5 in a house in Savannah three or four blocks from the river. General Grant's headquarters at Savannah were in a house very close to the river. We were on higher ground than he was, and about daylight on the morning of April 6 the young man sleeping with me jumped out of bed with the exclamation, 'There's firing up at the Landing.' We could hear very distinctly the boom of cannon, and when we went to the east window we could hear, or thought we could hear, the sound of musketry. Pittsburg landing was nine miles away, but in the still morning air the roar of musketry came to us." "We dressed hurriedly, ran down to General Grant's headquarters, where we found General Webster, chief of artillery, in his night shirt on the porch listening intently to the sound of firing. We saw him run into the house, and another officer came out with him. They listened a minute, ran in again, and General Grant came out in his night dress. The three figures stood like statues while Grant listened, and then the General gave an order that put everything in a whirl. Ned Osborne of Chicago was at that time in command of Grant's headquarters guard, and under excitement he was a very active man." "In a few minutes staff officers were awake and dressed, the escort was mounted and ready to go, and the General and staff boarded at once the steamer Tigress. I remembered as I looked over the steamers at the landing tht the Tigress was the only vessel that had steam up, and comprehending that Grant would go on that vessel, my comrade and myself went down and climbed on in advance of the General and his staff. There was a ittle wait for the escort and horses of the officers, but when all were on board the steamer did not move. Inquiry developed the fact that neither the captain nor the pilot was awake or had received any notice of the journey. They were stirred up in short order, and soon the Tigress started up the river for Pittsburg Landing." "About four miles above Savannah we came to Crump's landing. General Lew Wallace, in command of the division at that point, was on the steamer Jessie K. Bell. When we came up within fifty yards of the Bell, Grant shouted to Wallace, asking if he had any news from the front. Wallace shouted back saying that a courier had just arrived with the report that Sherman had been attacked by a heavy force. Grant, with great intensity of manner, asked: 'Does the dispatch say a heavy force?' Wallace replied that it did and Grant ordered the captain of the Tigress to make all possible speed for Pittsburg Landing." "As we started General Wallace shouted in surprise: 'General Grant, have you no orders for me?' and Grant, after thinking a moment, shouted back, 'Hold yourself in readiness to march.' Then we steamed away, but in a few minutes Ross came to me and said: 'It is a general attack this time, sure.' I asked him how he knew and he said that Captain Baxter had just received orders from Grant to take a steam tug and carry orders back to General Wallace to move at once and take position on the right of the Union force engaged in battle. We arrived at Pittsburg Landing in a short time and General Grant rode away at once toward the front." [The article went on about Busbey's experiences in the battle, including hauling guns up the bluff for Webster, the boats in the river, and Mother Bickerdyke.]
  2. 3 points
    My photos from this past weekend's Epic Trek are HERE if anyone is interested. Great time of hiking, learning, and fellowship.
  3. 2 points
    As we know, after his defeat at Pea Ridge, Arkansas (also known as Elkhorn Tavern) Major General Earl Van Dorn of the Trans-Mississippi was requested to support the forces of General Albert Sidney Johnston in Tennessee… but there was no apparent urgency in the request. Van Dorn arrived at Memphis about 8 April 1862 and stopped at The Gayoso House. Also in Memphis was Mrs. Mary Ann Webster Loughborough, whose husband James, was a Captain on the Staff of Brigadier General Cockrell. Mary Webster of New York married James Loughborough in Kentucky a few years earlier; then the couple moved west and established themselves in St. Louis, Missouri (and subsequently gravitated towards the Rebel cause.) In early April 1862 Mrs. Loughborough wrote the following letter to a friend, revealing the presence of notable Confederates in Memphis: Gayoso House, Memphis, April, 1862. My dear J——: I am just in from dinner; and you would be amused to see the different faces—I might as well say the different appetites; for the Army of Missouri and Arkansas have been undergoing rigorous fasts of late; and the little episode of the battle of Elkhorn and the consequent privations have helped not a little the gaunt appearance of these military characters. All eat, eat rapidly; from General V—— D—— down to the smallest lieutenant, whose manner of playing the epicure over the different dishes ordered, is a study. The confidential consultations with the waiter over them, together with the knowing unconsciousness of bestowing his small change, almost convinces me that he is a brigadier-general, or a colonel, at least. You see streaming in constantly this tide of human beings, to eat, stare at the ladies, talk, and order much wine in the excitement of military anecdotes; for you must understand that a civilian is a “rara avis” amid the brilliant uniforms of the dining room. Yet, amid all this mass and huge crowd, the majority are polished gentlemen, who have evidently seen much of the world, and who are men of purpose and character. General V—— D—— and staff sit not far from me—looked at rather jealously by the Missourians, as ranking and commanding them over their favorite general. Yet, he always treats the old general with the utmost consideration and courtesy. On the other side sits General P——, with his kind, benevolent face. The poor old gentleman finds at the table his lightest reserves become his heaviest forces: nearly all his staff are about him. And, as I sit half amused at the expression of some faces, and thinking deeply of the mute, yet determined impress of character on others, two gentlemen come in—one in plain citizen’s clothing, with heavy black beard and high forehead—with stooping gait and hands behind him. I am told he is Governor J——, of Missouri. His face puzzles me—it is thoughtful and singular. By his side, with tall, lithe, slender figure, fully erect, walks General J—— T——. You will scarcely think it possible that this is the so-frequently talked of J—— T——. I thought him an ordinary man, did not you? Yet, this is anything but an ordinary man. The keen dark eye sweeps the room as he enters, taking us all in at a glance—a quick, daring, decisive, resolute face. I can make nothing more out of him. Yet, there is more of thought and intellect than you see at first. He is dressed in full uniform, with sword and sash, and has quite a military air. There are many Saint Louisians here; you see them scattered around the tables quite plentifully. General C—— is among the number. He sits at some distance, and looks quite worn and sad. You know—do you not?—that he is the father of young Churchill Clark, who was killed at Elkhorn. Have I ever told you his history? It is this: He graduated at West Point in the commencement of the war; and knowing and having a great admiration for General P——, he joined him at once: he was put in command of some artillery; and showing himself a youth of courage and ability—for he was only twenty years old—his command was increased. Throughout the constant trials and sufferings of the campaign, he showed himself equal in courage, daring, and judgment, to many older heads. He was particularly beloved by General P——. At Elkhorn, as ever, his battery sustained itself with coolness and bravery. As the general rode by, he said some cheering words to young Clark, who took off his cap and waved it, saying, “General, we will hold our own,” or words to that effect, when a ball sped from the enemy, and crashed in the young, ardent brain as he spoke. I have been told that the general was affected to tears. He knelt by his side, vainly seeking for some trace of the strong, young life, but the pulses were stilled forever; and Churchill Clark lay a stiffened corpse in the long, wet grass at Elkhorn. And so his father sits silent and alone, and all respect the grief that none can assuage. In a few days we leave. The gentlemen all go to Corinth, where a battle, in all probability, will take place before long. Fort Pillow can hardly hold out, under the daily bombardment that we hear from the gunboats; and if it falls, Memphis, on taking leave of the Confederate officers, will usher in the Federal to quarters in the Gayoso. Adieu.
  4. 2 points
  5. 2 points
    Thanks for this. Another little piece of Civil War Chicagoiana to add to my collection. Rumsey was late to his own funeral...but for a poignant reason.
  6. 2 points
    Great photo... and of benefit to learn that the significant action in the Plum Orchard has finally been recognized... 🙂
  7. 2 points
    maybe due to the addition of "Plum Orchard Rd"
  8. 2 points
    There are two pieces of communication (one constructed on April 5th, and the other generated on April 6th 1862) both of which are important in their own way to explain “how the Battle of Shiloh unfolded.” And both documents have "issues." The first item is a telegram constructed at St. Louis and sent under signature of Major General Henry Halleck on Saturday 5 April 1862. Fitting Halleck’s style of issuing concise orders, the two-line telegram begins by listing the recently promoted Major Generals by order of seniority: Buell, Pope, McClernand, C.F. Smith, Wallace. The inclusion of John Pope is significant because Major General Pope would soon join the Advance on Corinth. And the place held by John McClernand (ahead of Charles Ferguson Smith) may have come as a surprise to Major General Ulysses S. Grant… but no matter, as the late formal notice of MGen McClernand’s seniority did not provide opportunity to ‘Provide him with benefits of seniority to which he was entitled” i.e., the Shell Game played by Generals Grant, Smith, Sherman and Captain McMichael had worked perfectly; and now, at this late hour, McClernand would be notified in due course of his official seniority (likely after U.S. Grant established his HQ at Pittsburg Landing… When McClernand operating as “acting commander” had odds somewhere between Slim and None.) The second line of Halleck’s telegram reads: “You will act in concert [with General Buell] but he will exercise his separate command, unless the enemy should attack you. In that case you are authorized to take the general command.” The wording of this second line, giving Grant emergency authority over Buell in case of attack by Rebels, has significant implications. And yet, when the conduct of Day Two at Shiloh is closely examined, there is nothing more significant in regard to General Grant exercising command, than, “You take the left; and I’ll take the right” during the advance of Monday morning (coordination at its most minimal.) Which leads one to ponder: When did General Grant receive this telegram from Henry Halleck? If it was sent by telegraph from St. Louis late morning of April 5th, it likely arrived at the Fort Henry telegraph office before noon. If a steamer picked up the mail and telegraph traffic at 1 p.m., (perhaps the Minnehaha) then the 5 April telegram would arrive about midnight… plenty of time for Grant to read and understand the contents. But, at 2 p.m. on Sunday, April 6th, where was this telegram from Halleck? The cool indifference shared between Grant and Buell (with Buell simply left at the waterfront, while Grant headed away west to take care of business) does not represent “someone in possession of an important telegram, giving them extraordinary authority.” Instead, it seems to indicate General Grant has not yet received the telegram; or he has seen it… but left it behind at the Cherry Mansion. The second communication was constructed on Sunday morning by Captain A.S. Baxter, the AQM for Grant’s Army, as he rode the steamer Tigress north to relay Grant’s orders (likely relayed from Grant, through Captain John Rawlins, to Baxter.) Finding the orders complex and difficult to remember in detail, Captain Algernon Baxter scanned the floor of the Ladies’ Cabin, found a soiled bit of paper, and wrote the orders (as he best remembered them) onto that scrap (later recorded as “containing a heel mark and tobacco stain.”) Upon arrival at Crump’s Landing, Captain Baxter found Lieutenant Ross – Aide to Major General Wallace – waiting. The two rode away west and reported to MGen Wallace at, or just before 11:30 a.m. Captain Baxter presented General Wallace with the impromptu order; Wallace asked why it was not signed. Baxter explained he “created the memorandum, himself, out of fear he would “forget some detail” unless he did so.” General Wallace passed the “written order” to his Staff, and asked Baxter about the current state of affairs [Baxter left Pittsburg Landing between 10 and 10:30.] Captain Baxter replied, “We are driving them.” General Wallace was satisfied; Wallace’s staff officers were satisfied. The order was accepted, and Captain Baxter took his departure within three minutes of arrival at Stony Lonesome. Captain Frederick Kneffler, Lew Wallace’s AAG, wound up with the “written order.” He tucked it under his sword belt… and subsequently lost it. Ever since, the loss of that written order, or memorandum, has been significant because it would provide tangible proof of what Major General Wallace had been ordered to do. And, it is not difficult to envision the memorandum, jiggling loose from Captain Kneffler’s sword belt, and blowing away… to be beaten by heavy rain that night; ultimately washed into the Snake River, then Tennessee River… lost forever. But, paper was in short supply, always. Letters by soldiers were often written making use of every millimetre of space, including margins and borders. As likely as the memorandum being lost forever, it was just as likely noticed, clinging to trampled stubble, by some soldier… one of thousands following behind Kneffler on his horse. This soldier would have snatched it up, and possibly sent it as souvenir with his own letter, a few days later. My point: there is every chance that the Lew Wallace memorandum from Baxter still exists, contained in a box of Civil War letters and paraphernalia, and the owners have no idea what they have in their possession. But, with all the other material being revealed on a weekly basis, one day this piece of history might just surprise everyone, and re-emerge.
  9. 2 points
    [Part three of Corinth, interrupted] Grant’s operation, with HQ at Savannah was kept on the back burner: just active enough to keep Rebel commanders guessing, but not sufficiently robust to allow General Grant to take the reins pre-emptively. The first benefit to Grant from success further west was assignment of Benjamin Prentiss to command of the newly created Sixth Division (although Halleck tasked Brigadier General Prentiss with other duties enroute, delaying his ultimate arrival at Pittsburg Landing.) In addition, Grant was aware that Don Carlos Buell was marching south and west to effect a join at Savannah (but Grant was frustrated by the slow pace of the Army of the Ohio.) Still, these troop additions were approved by Halleck, and were part of the overall plan to initiate the Operation against Corinth, in the proper sequence… after Victory at Island No.10 (when another source of manpower (Pope), as well as ammunition and abundant supplies would be made available.) References: SDG topics “Just supposin’ begun 26 FEB 2018 and “Full Hospitals” begun 30 JAN 2018 for Prentiss tasks enroute to Savannah Tennessee. SDG topic “Grant’s six divisions” begun 1 DEC 2018 details growth of Pittsburg force. OR 8 pages 633 – 4 telegram (23 MAR 1862) in which Henry Halleck lays out his “Programme” for SecWar Stanton, which includes, “Pope’s progress is necessarily slow,” and, “I have directed General Grant to make no move until Buell’s column (now at Columbia) can form junction with him.” Also, Halleck asserts, “We must take Corinth in order to seriously injure Rebel communications.” [And Halleck proposes possible moves for T.W. Sherman (the other Sherman) and Benjamin Butler which “might take advantage of [Bragg’s Army] leaving Florida and Alabama.”] OR 8 page 631 communication of 21 MAR 1862 from MGen Halleck to F/O Foote: “Everything is progressing well on the Tennessee River towards opening your way down the Mississippi.” [Illustrates the “connected” nature of Halleck’s operations, and alludes to the “proper sequence” of those operations.] OR 8 page 643 telegram from Army AG Thomas to MGen Halleck of 25 MAR 1862: “BGen Thomas Davies has been assigned duty in Department of the Mississippi.” [In preparation for conduct of operations after success at Island No.10 Halleck has called for more trained general officers to assist, as part of Halleck’s program. General Thomas Davies will be assigned command of Second Division, following deaths of WHL Wallace… and C.F. Smith.] OR 8 page 649 telegram SecWar Stanton to MGen Halleck of 29 MAR 1862: “You will report without delay the strength and distribution of your command.” [Halleck’s response 30 March: “Buell 101,000 in KY and Tenn; Grant 75,000 in Tennessee; Pope 25000 at New Madrid; Curtis 23000 in Arkansas; Strong 9000 District of Cairo; Steele 6000 in Arkansas; Schofield 15000 District of St. Louis (including new regiments at Benton Barracks); Totten 4000 in Central Missouri; Loan 2000 in Northern Missouri; about 10000 men in Kansas, Nebraska and Colorado.”] And follows telegram of Halleck to Stanton of 28 MAR 1862 revealing “elevated level of sickness experienced by men on Tennessee River expedition” (and lays blame on brigade and regimental surgeons of volunteers.) One-in-three reported sick, and is of concern because Halleck intends to make use of Grant’s Army… soon. OR 8 page 660 communication MGen Halleck to F/O Andrew Foote of 5 APR 1862: “I shall want a gunboat at Cairo ready to go up the Tennessee River in the early part of next week.” [With the successful run of USS Carondelet past the guns of Island No.10 on April 4th, Halleck knows it is “a matter of days” before Pope crosses his army and forces the trapped Rebels to surrender (in rear of Island No.10).] OR 8 page 661 communication Halleck to MGen Samuel Curtis (Army of the Southwest) on April 5th 1862: “Price and Van Dorn will soon leave your front [and the great battle of the war is to be fought on the Tennessee River.]” OR 8 page 672 telegram Halleck to Stanton of 7 APR 1862: “Buell’s advance force has reached Grant; entire force will connect in two or three days” [sent before news arrived at St. Louis IRT Battle of Shiloh initiated early 6 APR 1862.] OR 8 page 676 communication of 8 APR 1862 from Assistant Secretary of War Thomas Scott to Henry Halleck, alluding to “sequence of events” after Surrender of Island No.10.
  10. 2 points
    and found in the area of this high ground were numerous springs...good water..army is fueled by coffee. unlike what was to be had in Corinth later...
  11. 2 points
    Then again, I don't know how much that time mattered. The Confederates were disorganized, thus part of the reason they stopped. Had they continued on the attack, being so disorganized, I venture that the disorganization would have caused even more ill coordinated attacks, and potentially, disaster for the Confederates, if that makes sense.
  12. 2 points
    Review of To Rescue My Native Land by Wm. T. Shepherd It is not often that letters and diaries compiled by artillerymen during the Civil War are encountered, and this collection is a gem: the “Civil War Letters of William T. Shepherd.” Native of Wisconsin, who enlisted in Chicago as Private in Taylor’s Battery B, 1st Illinois Light Artillery 16 July 1861, Private Shepherd (sometimes spelled Shepard) is a gifted, intelligent writer who sent letters to friends and family back in Illinois on a daily basis. Encountered in the many letters: · Camp life (and looking forward to letters, newspapers and parcels from home) · Details of duty (and October 1861 Skirmish at Fredericktown) in Missouri · Description of duty (and Christmas) at Bird’s Point, Missouri. Letter of 10 NOV 1861 describes participation in Battle of Belmont. Letter of 9 JAN 1862 reveals “everyone at Cairo, Fort Holt and Bird’s Point is under Marching Orders” (which everyone believes is for “somewhere down the Mississippi River…”) Instead, a feint is conducted to the east of Fort Columbus, which “confuses everyone”). Letter of 1 FEB 1862: under Marching Orders, again… 8 FEB 1862: describes “how easily their Fort Henry became ours.” 16 FEB: Letter begins “while besieging Fort Donelson” and describes previous four days of activity, and ends abruptly when orders arrive to “reposition the Battery.” (See 21 FEB letter.) 28 FEB: “Our Captain Taylor has just returned from a visit to Nashville…” 12 MAR: aboard steamer Silver Moon, going up the Tennessee River… 21 MAR: at Savannah, returning to steamer for move up river… 23 MAR letter written from Pitsburg Landing. “Arrived aboard John J. Roe. There are 75000 men at this place, and more arriving constantly…” 25 MAR: “Captain Taylor has been promoted, and Lieutenant Barrett is now in command of the Battery.” Letters of 8 APR and 14 APR 1862: aftermath of Battle of Shiloh. And more good news: Private William Shepherd (who was promoted to Sergeant Major by the end of the War) also kept a Diary… Cheers Ozzy To Rescue My Native Land: the Civil War Letters of William T. Shepherd (edited by Kurt H. Hakemer) Tennessee University Press 2005 (365 pages) is available at amazon.con and better libraries. [Limited access: https://books.google.com.au/books?id=a6HQRB6UimYC&pg=PA331&lpg=PA331&dq=israel+p.+rumsey+letter&source=bl&ots=JG_cwqaoUX&sig=dQa8blZoWwiMXVAQGfu3JkaSAHE&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiIg5yUx4nfAhUF448KHReGDdcQ6AEwBXoECAkQAQ#v=onepage&q=israel p. rumsey letter&f=false And for those able to visit Kenosha, Wisconsin: https://museums.kenosha.org/civilwar/wp-content/uploads/sites/4/2018/05/Wisconsin-Resources-for-Website.pdf Civil War letters and diaries on file
  13. 2 points
    Mona and Stan When first investigating the history of the officer in question, I encountered newspaper claims that "he had been a classmate of Henry Halleck." But, with a birth year of 1823, to have attended West Point in Halleck's Class of 1839 would have meant entering the Military Academy in 1835... when this "cadet" would have been twelve years old. Upon further investigation, numerous claims of "graduated with the Class of 1843" were uncovered: the same USMA Class as Ulysses S. Grant. As Mona points out, the Cullum Register is deficient because it only records graduates of West Point; and the term "alumnus" was used by West Point to indicate a graduate (while other universities applied the term to include students who had merely attended.) As regards "the difficulty in Missouri" leading to the removal of this officer from command, the arresting officer was Brigadier General Stephen Hurlbut. But Hurlbut was found to be "impaired" soon afterwards, and Brigadier General John Pope arrested Hurlbut (Hurlbut was sent home to Belvidere Illinois by Major General Fremont "to await orders.") And so the situation rested until November 1861, when Fremont was removed, and Henry Halleck was installed as commander, Department of the Missouri. Cheers Ozzy
  14. 2 points
    From the Civil War Diaries Collection at Auburn University comes this Shiloh battle record, compiled by L. I. Nixon of Limestone County, Alabama. Incensed by hearing of the Confederate defeats at Fort Henry and Fort Donelson, 38-year old Liberty Independence Nixon left his wife and seven children and joined Malone's Company... and on February 24th 1862 was on his way to Corinth. After a brief stay, Malone's Company of the 1st Battalion of Alabama Volunteers returned south to vicinity of Mobile Bay to gather supplies; then a return to Corinth on the M & O R.R. took place on March 4th. Camping a few days about a mile north of Corinth, Private Nixon and his fellows rode the train north to Bethel Springs (and may have heard the exchange of gunfire between Confederate soldiers and Lew Wallace's party, tasked with tearing up the railroad -- page 18.) Returning to Corinth on March 20th, Nixon indicates "they resumed the exact same camp ground, as before." And then, Private Nixon relates the story of "Beauregard's bodyguard finding a barrel of whiskey..." which led to Malone's Company being briefly assigned as bodyguard to General Beauregard. While in close proximity to Tishomingo Hotel, Private Nixon confirms "a rush" made on the hotel (also mentioned in Braxton Bragg's Letter of 20 March 1862.) Pages 24 - 27 reflect on camp life in Corinth. Page 27 records the units making up Gladden's Brigade: 1st Louisiana Infantry, 21st Alabama Infantry, 22nd Alabama, 25th Alabama, "Robisson's" Regiment of Artillery, and Nixon's unit, the 1st Battalion Alabama Volunteers commanded by Major Chaddick. Next day (March 30th) four new companies are added to the 1st Alabama Battalion -- now known as 26th Alabama Infantry Regiment. On page 28, the orders to cook three days' rations (3 April). Same day: "We left early and took up the line of march." Pages 28 - 30 recount the march north, the rain, and wagons getting mired in the mud. Page 31 records knowledge of the Picket Skirmish of April 4th (Private Nixon observed Yankee prisoners being moved south.) Pages 32 - 34 record the final approach towards the Federal camp; and about dark on April 5th Private Nixon and his fellows are sent forward on picket duty... The entire diary is only 46 pages long (and the first four pages are water-damaged from attic storage, so almost unreadable.) Fortunately, every page is transcribed at bottom: http://content.lib.auburn.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/civil/id/23854/rec/20 Private Nixon's Shiloh Diary.
  15. 2 points
    Liberty Independence Nixon, his findagrave page and his photograph. https://www.findagrave.com/memorial/25015250/liberty-independence-nixon
  16. 2 points
    I realize it is just one regiment in a large battle, but I often wonder if A. S. Johnston knew how somewhat unorganized many of the regiments in the Army were, i.e. the 26th Alabama Infantry. The organization was not led by Maj. Chaddick, but actually by Colonel John G. Coltart of Huntsville. I have posted before the letters of Lt. Benjamin J. Gaston of the 26th Alabama. Just 3 days before the battle, Gaston was writing and stated that he did not know the "number" (regimental designation) of his unit. I have seen other historians and writers erroneously attribute the leadership of the 26th to Chaddick rather than Coltart. My his memory always shine bright, but from memory in Shiloh Bloody April, even Wiley Sword mentions Chaddick being the commander of the unit. When Gladden's men stopped in the Federal camp, well, upon renewing the attack, at that point Coltart was wounded, and Chaddick took temporary control of the unit. Coltart received a severe foot wound, but, he had it tended to behind the lines and then returned to the fight. It seems amazing to me that many men went in to that fight not knowing who their commanders were nor their regimental unit designation. It is mentioned that some units were getting ammo resupplies for six hours, aka they were disorganized. Again, I can totally see how given the facts mentioned in the first paragraph. This seems reminiscent of Bjorn's April hike, The Division That Never Was. Johnston had to have known this state of disorganization, even before the battle began, and how it would/could bring massive confusion on the field. Pictured are Colonel John G. Coltart and Lt. Col. William Davidson Chaddick, 26th Alabama Infantry. The Major of the 26th Alabama at the time of Shiloh was Andrew D. Guinn/Gwin/Gwynne (several different spellings); Gwynne was severely wounded in the arm by a shell as noted in his service records. After Shiloh, he was appointed Lt. Col. of the 38th Tennessee Infantry.
  17. 2 points
    http://www.historynet.com/a-frolic-up-the-tennessee.htm#prettyPhoto Image of Lt. Seth Ledyard Phelps, US Navy. He commanded the Tyler, Lexington, and Conestoga on their naval raid after the fall of Fort Donelson. Neat article on naval activity setting the stage for the Battle of Shiloh.
  18. 2 points
    Sat, Nov. 3 forecast for those who believe that the weatherman is capable of predicting the weather more than an hour in the future: https://www.accuweather.com/en/us/crump-tn/38327/daily-weather-forecast/2085479?day=7
  19. 2 points
  20. 2 points
    The 47th Tennessee Infantry were the only reinforcements the Confederates received on the 2nd day of the Battle of Shiloh. This article is neat summation of the 47th Tennessee, the weapons they carried, and their action in the battle. Interesting short piece to read. https://emergingcivilwar.com/2016/09/08/the-47th-tennessee-infantry-at-shiloh/ Below: Col. Munson Hill of the 47th Tennessee Infantry, wearing fraternal garb.
  21. 2 points
    As to "The bill introduced by Senator Thurman for the relief of Col. Tom Worthington," the Columbia (TN) Herald & Mail 1878-05-03 indicated that Worthington delivered lectures as Sherman declined an inquiry. Two years later, the Chicago Tribune 1880-05-15 indicated that Worthington would get a cash payment ($962) to cover some of the period after his dismissal, but that he would get no court of inquiry from Congress. It would have been interesting if testimony had been given.
  22. 2 points
    Richard P. Derickson was a First Lieutenant in the 16th Wisconsin Infantry, Company K, at the time the Battle of Shiloh erupted. On that fateful Sunday of 6 APR 1862, he was at his duty station aboard "wharf boat" Iatan, acting in capacity of AQM for the Sixth Division (a position he had occupied since April 3rd, assigned by BGen Prentiss.) Part of Lieutenant Derickson's duties involved him creating and maintaining precise records, accounting for possession and distribution of Government stores... Kevin Getchell made use of Lieutenant Derickson's records in constructing his 2013 work, Scapegoat of Shiloh: the distortion of Lew Wallace's record by U. S. Grant. The author indicates that he "encountered the Derickson Papers at an auction, and purchased them." Exact copies of several of the documents created by LT Derickson are contained in Scapegoat of Shiloh. These records are valuable for determining activities of the embryonic Sixth Division in the days leading up to that contact in Fraley Field. Less well known: Kevin Getchell made copies of the original documents, and left those on file with Shiloh NMP https://www.jacksonsun.com/story/news/2015/04/02/shiloh-battlefield-commemorate-rd-battle-anniversary/70862666/ Jacksun Sun of 2 APR 2015.
  23. 2 points
    Pvt. James S. Matthews, Company C, 4th Illinois Cavalry (his rank at Shiloh was Private it appears). Matthews served as orderly for Gen. John A. McClernand at Shiloh. Residence Joliet IL; a 17 year-old Clerk. Enlisted on 10/7/1861 at Camp Hunter, IL as a Private. On 10/7/1861 he mustered into "C" Co. IL 4th Cavalry He was discharged for promotion on 10/31/1863 On 10/31/1863 he was commissioned into "A" Co. US CT 3rd Cavalry He was Mustered Out on 1/26/1866 Promotions: * 2nd Lieut 10/31/1863 (As of Co. A 3rd USCT Cavalry) * 1st Lieut 8/26/1865 He was described at enlistment as: 5' 7", light complexion, brown eyes, brown hair Other Information: born in New Jersey Sources used by Historical Data Systems, Inc.: - Illinois: Roster of Officers and Enlisted Men - Index to Compiled Military Service Records - Official Army Register of the Volunteer Force 1861-1865 - Illinois State Archives @ http://www.ilsos.gov/isaveterans/civilmustersrch.jsp (c) Historical Data Systems, Inc. @ www.civilwardata.com
  24. 2 points
    Interesting that the names of Grant's telegraph operator and Bodyguard/orderly are unknown for the Shiloh time period. Many General's would have more than one orderly, however, so that various messages could be carried at various times. Having said this, I imagine that if Thomas D. Holliday would not have been killed at Shiloh, that his service as Sherman's orderly would have been lost to history. His name is, probably, only remembered because he was killed while serving as Sherman's orderly.
  25. 2 points
    Men who had fought at Shiloh were later prisoners at Camp Ford, near Tyler, Texas. They played a lot of baseball.
  26. 2 points
    I offer a couple of additions. On page 152 of my signed Wiley Sword’s 2001 edition is the following concerning the confrontation between Prentiss and Peabody in the camp of the 25th Missouri; “Reining his horse in front of Peabody, who was just preparing to mount, Prentiss angrily demanded to know if he had provoked an attack by sending out a force without orders. Peabody answered that he had sent out a reconnaissance patrol after attempting to notify Prentiss of his intention. (Bold added by me) The first puzzle piece here is that Peabody states he sent out a reconnaissance patrol. Prentiss had given Peabody and Powell permission to send out reconnaissance patrols so there was “no defiance of orders” when Peabody ordered Powell to take a reconnaissance patrol to the front. However, they were not to bring on a “general engagement.” But Prentiss had heard a lot of firing; Prentiss knew that the war god Colonel David Moore had gone forward with the entire 21st Missouri to “lick them.” And when he rode into Peabody’s camp he found the long roll had been sounded in the camp of the 25th Missouri and Peabody had his regiment toeing the line in preparation of moving forward. This is why he demanded to know from Peabody if he had sent out a force without orders. The eye-catching phrase is that Peabody tried to inform Prentiss of his intention to send out a patrol but had failed to let Prentiss know due to his messenger not being able to find Prentiss. None of the other major Shiloh books mention that Peabody attempted to inform Prentiss that he was sending out Major Powell at 3 a. m. There are several varying accounts of the confrontation between Prentiss and Peabody and what was said. I was curious where Wiley Sword had gotten the account he used in his book. His reference notes referred to Shea which led to John Gilmary Shea in the bibliography to Shea’s The American Nation. Shea seems to have been a prolific author with many books about Americans and patriotism. The American Nation was a compilation of men who gave their all for Union. Included in the book are chapters on Major General William Hervey Lamm Wallace, Colonel Julius Raith and Colonel Everett Peabody. The chapter on Colonel Everett Peabody gives many details on his life and then goes into an account of the battle of Shiloh commencing on April 5, 1862. The author covers Peabody with praise and gives an account of the activities concerning Peabody sending out Powell’s patrol. Shea wrote “Few officers have fallen during the war, whose services were so valuable to the country, or whose prospects of honorable distinction were so brilliant, as those of Colonel Everett Peabody.” The amazing thing about this book as relates to the efforts to learn the truth about Shiloh is that the book, containing full praise to Peabody for saving the army at Shiloh, was published in 1862 while Prentiss was still a prisoner in the south. The story of Peabody at Shiloh was published in a book yet historians wrote about the battle of Shiloh ignorant of what Peabody had done. Except for William Swinton in his Twelve Decisive Battles of the War. I did not type up the whole chapter on Peabody, only the part on Shiloh. The book is pretty rare and I could not see that it has been digitized. I located a microfilm copy in a library near Kansas City. “On the 5th of April there seemed to be a kind of presentiment in General Grant’s army of the terrible battle impending. A visitor to the field, immediately after the battle, was assured that the desire being to avoid a collision with the enemy at that moment, the generals were instructed not to throw out pickets. The strategy reminds one of the old fable of the ostrich, who hid his head and then imagined himself safe from the hunter. That evening several soldiers and civilians were collected in Colonel Peabody’s tent, and the colonel expressed his opinion that the rebels were near in force and the army in great danger for want of pickets. Finally, he exclaimed, “I can bear this no longer. I must know whether we are in the arms of the enemy, or whether we are out of danger,” and he immediately sent an orderly to General Prentiss, asking leave to send out a scouting party. The orderly did not find General Prentiss, and Colonel P. then resolved to send it out without permission. From one to three o’clock, that night, he strolled about the camp talking with his officers and men, and at three o’clock sent out the party,--four hundred men of his own regiment,--under Major Powell, a cool and experienced officer. It is hard to overestimate the importance of this reconnaissance. Our army was encamped in a semicircle, Colonel Peabody in the centre. Beauregard had planned for three columns to attack our right, left, and centre, simultaneously at daybreak; and if he had succeeded in this, General Grant’s army would have been annihilated. His plan was frustrated by Colonel Peabody’s detachment, which, came into collision before the time, with the centre column. The rattle of musketry gave the alarm to our army, and gave the centre nearly time enough, and the flanks ample time to get under arms. Early that morning (Sunday, April 6th), Colonel Peabody sat at breakfast with Mr. B., a visitor, when the firing was heard. The colonel said to Mr. B., “Don’t disturb yourself; but I must go and see to things.” He ordered the long roll sounded, and mounting his horse rode forward to where the line was forming. Major Powell and his men soon appeared, swept on by an immense column of rebels, but skirmishing bravely as they retreated. At this instant General Prentiss rode up to Colonel Peabody and exclaimed: “Did you provoke this attack by sending out a force without orders!” “I did send out a reconnaissance, after sending you notice of my intention.” “You have brought on this attack before we were prepared; and I shall hold you responsible for it.” With our present knowledge of the battle, it seems as if General Prentiss could hardly have framed a statement more damaging to himself, or more honorable to Colonel Peabody. It sounds like a confession of perfect blindness as to the position and plans of the rebels, and an admission of want of preparation to receive an attack which the rebels had been preparing for two weeks—a confession that West Point strategists were wrong, and the colonel of volunteers, right. But Colonel Peabody knew nothing of all this. He only knew that he had taken a dangerous responsibility, and in consequence was arraigned by his superior as the cause of an impending defeat; and this thought must have made his last hour on earth one of great mental suffering. In this state of mind, it is easy to conceive with what grief and indignation he must have seen his brigade swept slowly back by the rebels, in spite of its stern resistance. The correspondent of a western paper says: “Colonel Peabody would not retreat. He seemed infatuated, and was soon left almost alone, vainly trying to rally his men. Presently he fell shot through the jaw.” The gentleman, who was breakfasting with him, saw him riding along the line urging his men with voice and gesture, to “Stand to it yet;” then saw him throw his arms up, reel, and fall from his horse, the rebels rapidly passing over the spot. On Monday evening, after the rebels were driven back, his body was found where he fell. It was pierced by five bullets: one in the head, one in the neck, one in the body, one in the thigh, and one in the hand. Thus, after “one glorious hour of crowded life,” fell a brave soldier and chivalrous gentleman. His officers buried him in a gun-box, placing at his head a board with his name, and below it the couplet: A braver man ne’er died upon the field; A warmer heart never to death did yield. His body afterwards carried to Boston, where the funeral arrangements were taken in charge of by the governor of Massachusetts. Thence to Springfield, where, in presence of an immense concourse, he was laid beside his mother, in the beautiful cemetery of that town. Few officers have fallen during the war, whose services were so valuable to the country, or whose prospects of honorable distinction were so brilliant, as those of Colonel Everett Peabody. His talents were of a high order, and were united to such practical energy, that whatever he undertook to do, was sure to be done quickly and well. Thus, when he was only twenty-two years old, Hon. James Guthrie said of him, that “he was as good a field-engineer as there was in the western country.” At twenty-three he was a chief. The same element of character gave him immediate success in the new field to which the breaking out of the great rebellion called him. He was one born to command; and his proud and chivalrous spirit, his scorn of danger, his absolute ignorance of fear, filled his men with an enthusiastic faith in him, so that he could lead them anywhere, and do any thing with them. His most striking characteristic was a high contempt for meanness or dishonesty of any kind. This trait won him respect wherever he went; but it was carried so far as to make him lack even that excusable selfishness which enables a man to take proper care of his own. His table and purse were always open, not to friends only, but even to mere acquaintances; and in money-matters he was careless to an excess,--a fault often found in large and noble natures. In the flower of his age, in the performance of a great act of service, he fell—dying as a chivalrous gentleman would wish to die, and singularly fulfilling the prediction expressed years before in a song which he composed for a military organization: And if the army of a foe invade our native land, Or rank disunion gather up its lawless, faithless band; Then the arm upon our ancient shield shall wield his blade of might, And we’ll show our worthy brethren that gentlemen can fight. The American Nation carries a copyright date of 1862. It is possible it went to print after Prentiss was released. It is one of those pieces of the puzzle as to why was the actions of Peabody not recognized by historians if there was a book published in 1862 that described what he had done. In Shiloh – The Battle That Changed the Civil War Larry Daniel has an error-prone synopsis of the opening of the battle. He based part of his opening battle remarks on a convoluted and disappointing newspaper article that was published in the Philadelphia Inquirer by a reporter of the name of Bentley. Bentley was in the camp of the 25th Missouri on the morning of April 6th and related his observations. Bentley’s description of the fight is so disorganized he convinced Larry Daniel that Prentiss actually accosted Peabody twice on the morning of April 6th. Nevertheless you can gloom some tidbits from the article and here is a link which should get you to a website that has the newspaper digitized. https://newspaperarchive.com/philadelphia-inquirer-apr-18-1862-p-2/ You are on your own to work with this site. I could not find a site that had the Philadelphia Inquirer digitized and you did not need to pay for it. Somehow I was able to print a copy of the newspaper on a single 8.5 x 11 inch sheet of paper and I use a magnifying glass to read it. One of the puzzle pieces is the relationship between Prentiss and Peabody. Recently Ozzy had a thread which discussed what day did Prentiss actually arrive at Pittsburg Landing. Prentiss stated in his 1882 speech he arrived on March 29, 1862, roughly one week before the battle. What is missing from the record is any account of an interaction between Prentiss and Peabody that supports a claim they did not get along prior to April 5th. Here is the entire letter Peabody wrote on March 31, 1862, his last letter. You have probably seen snippets of the letter but here is the entire letter. To whom it was addressed was kept secret in The American Nation but it was sent to his brother Frank. Dear -------, In camp again, with a good regiment and well equipped. We are in General Prentiss’s division (eleven regiments), and I command the leading brigade. As we are the left centre division, we expect rough work. I have a fine brigade. My own regiment at the right; the Twelfth Michigan, Sixteenth Wisconsin, and Eighteenth Missouri forming the balance. We arrived here on the 28th, and have a very pleasant camp,--the boys as lively as crickets, and every thing working smoothly, It is funny to be called general, but the boys are all delighted, and, I think, will do good service at the proper time. The enemy is supposed to be about eighteen miles from us. We have an immense army, how large I have no means of knowing; they say, however, one hundred and twenty odd regiments, and they are arriving at the rate of two or three a day. As I wrote you before leaving, I have left my contract with Judge Krum of St. Louis. In case I go under, my old assistants, Kilby and John Severance, can give you all the necessary information in regard to the property involved. Say to them all at home, that if I have good luck, I shall win my spurs. Love to all. Yours, Ev Unfortunately Colonel Everett Peabody did not have good luck but he won his spurs and was instrumental in giving the army the opportunity to save itself. He mentions General Prentiss with no hint of animosity or ill-feeling. “Every thing working smoothly” certainly does not support the mantra that Prentiss hated Peabody’s guts. Another mantra is that Peabody had a presentiment of his own death at Shiloh. But you can read in his last letter that he states “In case I go under” and then informed his brother whom to contact about some of his property. Peabody might have had a presentiment of his death in battle months earlier but he gave no such indication in his last letter home from Shiloh that he sensed he was going to be killed on the field. We had a discussion as to who ordered out Colonel Moore with five companies to go to the aid of Major Powell. I remarked I had just read an account that stated Moore was sent out by Prentiss but could not remember where. Well, I discovered it was on page 61 in the following staff ride handbook. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/educational-services/staff-rides/StaffRideHB_Shiloh.pdf Now just looking at Daniel’s book and on page 147 he states the same thing. No wonder the puzzle is so hard to complete. I added this because Bjorn stated the same thing on his hike and we were wondering where that could come from since David Moore specifically stated it was Peabody who ordered him forward. In preparing this posting I came across another occasion when Prentiss described the opening of the battle and mentioned how it was Colonel David Moore who was responsible. From Confederate Veteran, Volume 3, April, 1895 there is an article on the veteran’s reunion at Shiloh in that year. On page 104 is found the following: “He (Prentiss) reported his anxiety about the situation in front of the General (Sherman) commanding in the field, but his fears of an attack were not heeded, the General sending back word “I will guard your front.” He sent, however, Col. Moore of his division, with part of his regiment, who encountering Johnston’s army, sent a report of it back to Prentiss, adding, “If you will send the balance of my regiment to me, by thunder, I will lick them!” Here it is 1895 and Prentiss attributed the opening of the battle to Colonel David Moore. So far I have found no account where Prentiss himself displayed any knowledge of Powell’s patrol. You can find copies of the Confederate Veteran at the following link. Go to Volume 3, page 104 to find the article on the veteran reunion at Shiloh in April of 1895. http://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/webbin/serial?id=confedvet The record indicates that Major Powell took out a patrol after noticing “butternuts” observing the division’s review in Spain Field. Then, probably after Powell had returned, Moore took out his patrol and returned with his information concerning the evidence of Rebel cavalrymen. This seemed to have piqued Powell’s interest and he took out the late night patrol as detailed in the account of Private D. K. Baker where Baker related that Powell told them that they were going out to find some Rebel cavalrymen and “bring them in out of the wet.” That mission was aborted upon finding more Rebels than expected and Powell organized another patrol to go out at 3 am on April 6th. Sergeant Gordon of company A, 57th Ohio was on picket duty when Powell approached him with his patrol and told him that they were going out to “catch some rebels for breakfast.” That is a total of four patrols going out from Peabody’s camp. The idea that Powell’s 3 am patrol was sent out in violation of orders does not stand up because all of these patrols had been granted permission from Prentiss to make reconnaissance in front of Peabody’s camp. What Prentiss did not know was the timing of these patrols. Wm. J. Hahn, 1st Lt., Co. H., 25th Missouri, who was there, wrote on April 12, 1914 – “With the assistance of Colonel Everitt Peabody commanding the 1st Brigade of the 6th Division, Major Powell finally got General Prentiss’s permission to reconnoiter Sunday morning, but under no circumstances to bring on a general engagement. Major Powell explained these points to me at 10 P.M. Saturday, April 5th and directed me to visit every tent of Co. H and instruct the men to be fully dressed and be ready to march at 3 A.M. Sunday, April 6th……If ever a man deserved a monument it is our brave Major Powell…..” Hahn’s statement contains an admission that Powell had permission from Prentiss for the 3 am patrol but that “under no circumstances to bring on a general engagement.” When Prentiss rode into Peabody’s camp on the morning of April 6th he knew that Colonel David Moore had gone forward with his entire regiment and that Colonel Peabody was about to do the same with the 25th Missouri. It looked to Prentiss as if the situation had gone beyond reconnaissance patrols to approaching a general engagement and that is why he accused Peabody of bringing on an engagement and that Peabody would be held responsible. The State Historical Society of Missouri has a collection of papers of Lt. Col. Robert Van Horn of the 25th Missouri. Overall the collection is a disappointment concerning the battle of Shiloh except for a yellowed copy of a newspaper account by William A. Morton dated April 7, 1908 in the Hamiltonian newspaper from Hamilton, Missouri. William Morton was one of the four Morton brothers enrolled in the 25th Missouri. We are familiar with Charles Morton from his two accounts of the battle of Shiloh, Boy at Shiloh and Opening of the Battle of Shiloh. Brother Mark Morton served as an aide to Colonel Peabody at Shiloh. The Morton brothers were there and close to the scene. For the astute observers one might notice the date of the article being 1908 and contained in the papers of Robert Van Horn and wonder how that could be. The answer is that Robert Van Horn lived to be 92 years of age and died in 1916. I selected to include in this post the introduction in the newspaper to the article and a portion of the article concerning William Morton’s account of what they found when they returned to their demolished camp on April 7, 1862. William Morton, who was there, wondered why historians never gave credit to Peabody for what he did and that the excited Prentiss really was not aware of what actually happened. Morton also commented on the fact that Peabody took action without informing Prentiss and that was a mystery because Peabody was always respectful to fellow officers. BATTLE OF SHILOH. – W. A. MORTON – OMAHA, APRIL 7, 1908 Gen. Charles Morton Commemorates the Event Each Year A Shiloh dinner was given by Gen. Charles Morton at Omaha on April 7, this year. For many years past the General has celebrated the anniversary of the battle in a formal manner, or otherwise, and on this occasion he invited a number of the survivors of the battle to join him in commemorating the event. Five persons were present, all of whom were requested to present a written statement of personal experience in the great open field fight, giving special prominence to recollections of the opening events, as the question whether the Union army was surprised or not has never been satisfactorily settled by historians. W. A. Morton, of Little Rock, Ark., a brother of Gen. Chas. Morton, was in Hamilton last Thursday and Friday on his way home from attending the Shiloh dinner where he gave the following narrative of the battle, in which he desires to make clear the point that the First brigade of Prentiss’ division, commanded by Col. Peabody of the Missouri 25th, was not surprised. This narrative, we believe, will be read with interest by our patrons as its author was the founder of the HAMILTONIAN and he and a number of others of the same company serving in the war enlisted from this locality. Personal Experiences in the Battle of Shiloh (By W. A. Morton, late of Co. I, 25th Inft. Mo. Vols.) * * * * * * * * * * * * We marched back to camp, arriving between the hours of 1 and 2 Monday April 7th. Our camp was the very picture of the “havoc of war and the battle’s confusion.” Tents were rent by bullets and shells, and the ground was strewn with broken muskets, limbs of trees, knapsacks, etc: and the trees were splintered by cannon shot, and dead Confederates lay scattered by. A few of the tents were burnt, while those remaining all contained one or more wounded or dead Confederates. The tent which Sergeant Singleton and I had occupied contained two dead men, who were members of an Arkansas regiment. Everything of value which we left in our tents when we retreated the morning before was gone. Blankets, knapsacks and clothing, etc., and for three or four weeks we had no change of clothing. Blankets were issued soon after the battle, but we drew no clothing until early in May, when we were in the trenches near Corinth. After hastily surveying our camp the next thing in order was dinner. Some of the boys had hardtack, others had canned goods found at a demolished Sutler’s tent, and one had a chicken which he had picked up at a farm house. The meal would have been a gloomy one but for the fact that all of the boys (there were 21 of them) had a thrilling experience to relate, besides the occasion was enlivened with the thought that we had regained our camp and that the Confederates were skedaddling for Corinth. But when we entered our tents at night even the thoughts of victory could not dissipate the air of gloom. The following day our camp was thronged with visitors, who came to view our dead Colonel; there were newspaper correspondents and army officers among whom, General Garfield, who commanded a brigade of Woods Division. Buell’s army. It happened that the first person General Garfield met on entering our camp was my brother, Mark, to whom he said: “I am looking for the camp of the Missouri 25th.” Mark replied, this is the camp of the 25th. “After a few remarks concerning Col. Peabody the General inquired if there were any boys of the name of, Morton, in the regiment. Mark said, “Yes, sir, my name is Morton, and I have three brothers in the regiment.” He then conducted the General to our company and introduced Charley and myself, but John N. required no introduction as the General recognized him at sight as a former neighbor farm boy and playmate. The General praised Colonel Peabody highly for his bravery and intelligent efforts to prevent the entire army from being surprised. All the officers who visited our camp were lavish with eulogies of Col. Peabody and the officers of the first brigade, and it was current opinion that their vigilance alone saved the army from surprise. I have often wondered why historians have not given Colonel Peabody the credit which newspaper correspondents and army officers accorded him immediately after the battle, when the facts were fresh in memory. It is certain the first shot was fired by Colonel Peabody’s brigade and that if that shot had not been fired when it was, the entire army would have been unprepared for attack. Colonel Peabody was awake all the night preceding the battle, receiving information from scouts and consulting the regimental commanders in his brigade (so it was reported for days after the battle) consequently his plans for attack were made deliberately. It was the general opinion that Prentiss knew nothing of these plans and was not even aware that the enemy’s outposts were attacked until firing on the skirmish line had progressed an hour or more, for when he appeared at Colonel Peabody’s tent at 6 o’clock, and asked what that firing meant at the front, and the cause was explained, he was not only surprised but very indignant. It is said he charged Colonel Peabody with having violated orders and brought on an engagement prematurely. Lieutenant Claxton, then Commissary Sergeant, says Prentiss’ language was violent. He told Peabody he would put him under arrest, but for the reason he wanted him to bear his share of the engagement he had precipitated. Why Col. Peabody took the steps he did, without reporting to Prentiss, is a mystery. It could not have been on account of ignorance nor lack of respect to a superior officer, for he was a man of fine intelligence and was ever courteous to both inferior and superior officers, besides every inch a soldier. My brother Mark, who was Col. Peabody’s orderly, corroborates what Lieutenant Claxton says regarding the reproval Prentiss administered to Peabody for his aggressive movement. It was therefore due to Col. Peabody’s enterprise and generalship that the entire army was not surprised. To present the history of the battle in truthful and interesting form the historian should say the regimental and division commanders of the Union army were all, except Peabody’s brigade, if not surprised, caught unprepared, but displayed great ability and heroism in staying a crushing defeat. * * * * * * * * * * * * William Morton’s account of the encounter between Prentiss and Peabody comports somewhat with the account given by F. C. Nichols in a letter to the nephew of Everett Peabody dated Feb. 27, 1902. Larry Daniel in Shiloh – The Battle That Changed the Civil War attributed Nichols’ account as the most accurate because Nichols was “within hearing distance.” (page 350 in the “notes” section). Daniel quoted just a sentence of Nichols’ account but there is more quoted in Joseph Rich’s The Battle of Shiloh. Here is what is in Rich’s book. F. C. Nichols, senior Captain of the 25thMissouri at Shiloh, to F. E. Peabody, Feb. 27, 1902. “At early morn before breakfast the line of Battle was formed, with the right of Brigade resting on the right of our regimental color line. My company was on the right of Brigade. A few minutes after the line was formed, General Prentiss rode up near Colonel Peabody, who was mounted and in front of my company, about the center of the first platoon and said to him, “Colonel Peabody, I hold you responsible for bringing on this fight.” Saluting, Colonel Peabody said: ‘If I brought on the fight I am able to lead the van.’ General Prentiss ordered him to take his best regiment….the next words I heard were: 25thMissouri forward.’” In Nichols’ account and William Morton’s account we find corroboration that Prentiss, despite his anger at the moment, gave Colonel Everett Peabody the respect to lead the 25th Missouri regiment forward and gave him the opportunity to “lead the van” “to bear his share of the engagement he had precipitated.” I like that version best. Hank
  27. 2 points
    Thanks Ozzy, fascinating. Wanted to mention again in the opening sequence of the film Glory which shows Union soldiers playing Base ball. Love it. Thanks.
  28. 2 points
    Thanks for all your hard work Stan.
  29. 2 points
    Of course Ozzy’s observation is correct. I heard this somewhere else recently that Prentiss sent out David Moore to reinforce Powell and wondered where that could possibly come from. One is left to surmise how anybody could arrive at that conclusion when Moore clearly stated in his report that it was an order from Colonel Peabody that sent Moore and five companies of the 21st Missouri to Powell’s aid. But it was interesting to note that Lt. Col. Woodyard did indeed put in his report; “I have the honor to report that on the morning of the 6th of April, before sunrise, General Prentiss ordered Colonel Moore, with five companies of our regiment, to sustain the pickets of the Twelfth Michigan Infantry.” Woodyard’s comment reinforced the fact that the situation was so chaotic that Woodyard did not even know it was Peabody that sent Moore out with the first five companies and that it was done to “sustain the pickets of the Twelfth Michigan Infantry.” I kept an eye out for a confirmation of Moore’s report concerning who ordered him out with five companies to reinforce Powell. I finally found it in the following letter written in 1883 by William French, who was there. Not only was he there but he was Moore’s adjutant. His short letter contains other interesting points that blow holes in the Shiloh revisionist ship that will aid in sending that ship down to the deep where it belongs. William French’s letter was published on April 12, 1883 in the National Tribune. Copies of the National Tribune are available online. Just google National Tribune and it should show up. It is a short letter so I typed it up and here it is. One Regiment that was Not Surprised. To the Editor National Tribune: “As the manner in which the battle of Shiloh was fought is now under discussion, I would like, with your permission, to relate what I know about it. There was at least one regiment, the Twenty-first Missouri, commanded by Colonel David Moore, which was not surprised. On Saturday morning, April 5th, the day before the battle, General Prentiss, commanding the division to which we belonged, held a review, and at that time some rebel cavalry were seen in the vicinity. In the afternoon he ordered Colonel Moore to take five companies of his regiment and reconnoiter on our front. We went out about a mile and found numerous traces of the presence of rebel cavalry. The inmates of a house which we visited told us that the rebels were in large force, and that we would be attacked the following morning. Colonel Moore reported this fact to Colonel Peabody, who commanded the brigade, and also to General Prentiss, but no notice was taken of it, except that the pickets were strengthened. The next morning found us up early and ready for orders, and presently Colonel Peabody’s adjutant arrived with instructions for Colonel Moore to take out five companies. The pickets had been fired on in the meanwhile, and the Colonel met them falling back. They reported a heavy force in front of them, and the Colonel sent back to camp for the remaining five companies, and taking the pickets with him marched to the front. We had gone about a mile, and were in sight of the house where we heard the afternoon before that we were to be attacked, when the rebels fired on us. Colonel Moore was shot twice. He dismounted and told me to take care of him and keep a sharp lookout. He formed his regiment in line of battle and the boys began to deliver a very rapid fire. At this time an orderly arrived from Colonel Peabody and wished to know whether Colonel Moore could hold his position until he could re-enforce him. Colonel Moore sent back word that he would; but no re-enforcements came, however, and for about an hour we held the ground alone. The Twenty-first Missouri never did better shooting than on that Sunday morning. It was on that field that Colonel Moore was wounded for the third time. A minie ball broke his leg below the knee, and he was taken back to the camp, and afterwards placed on a gunboat on the river, If, after all the fighting we went through that Sunday morning, any of our boys were shot down near their tents, I, for one, don’t pity them. They had plenty of warning. Colonel Moore held his ground faithfully and bravely, and justice indeed has never been done him for the part he took in the battle of Shiloh.” William French Athens, Mo. Co. F, 21stMo. Wiley Sword wrote in his book on page 138; “About 7 P. M. Moore advised Prentiss that the results of his reconnaissance were negative.” That is not what Prentiss wrote in his report nor is it what William French wrote in this letter. William French wrote that they found evidence of Rebel cavalry and were told by citizens that they would be attacked in the morning. Colonel Moore reported this information to both Colonel Everett Peabody and Brigadier General Benjamin Prentiss. The Shiloh revisionists want you to believe that Moore reported nothing to the front of the camps and that Moore’s report is why General Prentiss did nothing as Peabody harangued him about Rebels to the front of his brigade. But the record clearly shows that Moore reported the presence of cavalry and the reaction by Prentiss was to send out additional pickets to strengthen the picket line and authorize additional patrols that eventually culminated in the 3 a. m. patrol by Major James E. Powell and ordered by Peabody. While Prentiss authorized reconnaissance patrols he was unaware as to the timing of those patrols. I have found nothing to indicate that Prentiss was at Peabody’s camp on the night of April 5th. Peabody, Powell and others were taking their case to Prentiss at his headquarters. As it got later on the night of April 5th Peabody continued to receive reports that heightened his alarm and increased his anxiety to know just what was in front of his brigade. But Prentiss was not there and did not have the latest information that Peabody had. It is bewildering to hear revisionists claim that Moore reported that he found nothing actionable. Moore wrote in his report; “In pursuance of the order of Brig. Gen. B. M. Prentiss, commanding Sixth Division, Army of the West Tennessee, I on Saturday proceeded to a reconnaissance on the front of the line of General Prentiss’ division and on the front of General Sherman’s division. My command consisted of three companies from the Twenty-first Missouri Regiment—companies commanded by Captains Cox, Harle, and Pearce. A thorough reconnaissance over the extent of 3 miles failed to discover the enemy. Being unsuccessful, as stated, I returned to my encampment about 7 o’clock p. m. What Moore is referring to is that he did not find any Rebels that he could shoot. Moore does not relate that he found evidence of rebel cavalry but Prentiss wrote that in his report and acted on it by strengthening the picket line. Prentiss wrote “At about 7 o’clock the same evening Colonel Moore returned, reporting some activity in the front—an evident reconnaissance by cavalry. This information received, I proceeded to strengthen the guard stationed on the Corinth road, extending the picket lines to the front a distance of a mile and a half, at the same time extending and doubling the lines of the grand guard.” It should be noted that Moore is pretty specific about the afternoon patrol he took out. He even gave us the names of the commanders of the three companies he took out on the patrol. He makes no mention of going on patrol joined by Major James E. Powell as claimed by Wiley Sword in his book. The idea of a patrol going out with both Moore and Powell just makes no sense and is not backed up by any account that I can find. It is simply one of the figments of Sword’s imagination that has found its way into the narrative and gets repeated by other historians who just repeat another historian’s work without scrutiny. But Prentiss confuses the issue with his report because he gets events out of sequence. Prentiss wrote in his second paragraph: “Saturday evening, pursuant to instructions received when I was assigned to duty with the Army of West Tennessee, the usual advance guard was posted, and in view of information received from the commandant there of, I sent forward five companies of the Twenty-fifth Missouri and five companies of the Twenty-first Missouri Infantry, under command of Col. David Moore, Twenty-first Missouri. I also, after consultation with Col. David Stuart, commanding a brigade of General Sherman’s division, sent to the left one company of the Eighteenth Wisconsin Infantry, under command of Captain Fisk. At about 7 o’clock the same evening Colonel Moore returned, reporting some activity in the front—an evident reconnaissance by cavalry. This information received, I proceeded to strengthen the guard stationed on the Corinth road, extending the picket lines to the front a distance of a mile and a half, at the same time extending and doubling the lines of the grand guard.” The way Prentiss composed these paragraphs gives the impression that Moore returned at 7 o’clock p. m. from a patrol consisting of five companies of the Twenty-first Missouri and five companies of the Twenty-fifth Missouri. But that makes no sense and does not fit the timing given by Moore in his report. Moore clearly wrote that he returned to camp at 7 p. m. after leading the three-company patrol he took out 3 miles. It makes no sense that at dusk with night approaching Prentiss would order a huge patrol of ten companies to go mashing around through the woods in the dark. My view is when Prentiss stated “I sent forward five companies of the Twenty-fifth Missouri and five companies of the Twenty-first Missouri Infantry, under command of Col. David Moore, Twenty-first Missouri” he is not describing a patrol but rather he sent Moore forward with ten companies to strengthen the picket line. Prentiss stated years later that these troops were sent forward with the order to stay through the night and try to capture some Rebels if they could. At some point on the evening of April 5th communication ceased between Prentiss at his headquarters and what was occurring in front of Peabody’s brigade. Prentiss felt he had responded to information received by sending out additional pickets. When Prentiss retired to his tent he believed that the war god David Moore was out on the picket line with ten companies of troops. However, apparently the pickets returned to camp at some point. When Powell’s patrol moved forward at 3 a. m. Prentiss was unaware of that fact. When Peabody heard pretty heavy firing and wounded men came into camp informing him that Powell could use some help Peabody sent his adjutant to Colonel Moore and told him to go to Powell’s aid with five companies. Moore did so and encountered the retreating Powell on the road east of Seay Field. Moore believed the Rebels were just a patrol and that they could be beaten back if Moore had the other five companies of the 21st Missouri. Moore sent an orderly back to camp to have the other five companies of the 21st Missouri sent to him. But the orderly did not follow the command chain. The orderly did not go to Peabody but instead went all the way to Prentiss at his headquarters. Prentiss described the arrival of the orderly in a speech in 1882; “Early in the morning, on the 6th of April, 1862, it was my duty, from what I had learned, to feel the enemy. I had been admonished on the Friday evening before that battle that an enemy of some force was in our front. Not at 3 o’clock, but on the evening of Saturday, before the sun had set, the details were made, and the order given throughout my division to advance the pickets and strengthen them with additional numbers. I did send to the front the gallant Moore, with five of his companies—three at first, and doubting their ability to meet the enemy, I sent two more on my right. On my left two companies of the 18thWisconsin were advanced one mile to the front. In the center, one company of the 61st Illinois and one of the 18th Missouri were sent forward as extra pickets, with instructions to remain until daylight and see if they could not capture some of the marauders that had been engaged in committing depredations immediately in our vicinity. Early on that Sabbath morning, before (while seated at my breakfast news came to me from the gallant Moore) I had heard the musketry fired in front, and heard the skirmishing, an orderly came galloping into camp and said: “General, the compliments of Gen. Moore. He requests me to say to you that he has met the enemy. Send his other five companies and he will lick them.” That is the language that came to me. Gen. Prentiss sent those other five companies of his regiment to him.” The work “admonish” had a different meaning back in the 1800s. The meaning was more close to “informed” as nowadays it is deemed more critical to be “admonished.” Here it is 20 years after the battle of Shiloh and Prentiss related what he believed happened. Note Prentiss remembered sending “to the front the gallant Moore” “to advance the pickets and strengthen them with additional numbers.” Prentiss had no clue as to Powell’s patrol on the morning of April 6th and the available record, including his 1882 speech shows that Prentiss had no clue as to Powell’s patrol when they placed him in his casket in February of 1901. He never mentioned Powell’s patrol and Peabody’s involvement because he never knew. Prentiss believed that Colonel David Moore was at the front with five companies and when he got a messenger from Moore wanting the rest of his regiment that just reinforced Prentiss’s belief that Moore had been involved with the start of the fighting. Back to French’s short letter and the wealth of information it contains for our consideration. 1. 1. French described how Prentiss ordered Moore to take out an afternoon patrol. French wrote five companies but Moore stated just three in his report. French reported they found numerous traces of Rebel cavalry. This contradicts the revisionist claim that Moore found nothing. 2. 2. French described how they were informed by citizens that the Rebels had a large force and that the Union camp would be attacked in the morning. French wrote that Moore passed this information on to both Prentiss and Peabody but that no serious note was taken except to strengthen the pickets. Here is a first indication that French was unaware of Powell’s patrol. It is also the only source I have seen that informs us that not only did Moore alert Prentiss but also Peabody. 3. 3. French confirmed the fact that Moore received an order from Peabody to take out five companies and move to the front. French gave the reason for this order is that the pickets had been fired upon. A second indication that French was unaware of Powell’s patrol. In addition this observation supports Moore report that it was Peabody that ordered him forward. Both Colonel David Moore and his adjutant, William French, say Peabody ordered Moore forward with five companies and they were there. 4. 4. French wrote that Moore met the pickets falling back and stopped them while sending back for the other five companies of the 21st Missouri. This is the third indication that French was unaware of Powell’s patrol and concluded that the men they encountered had been on picket duty instead of a five company patrol that Peabody had ordered to the front. French made no comment but it has been noted that the orderly Moore sent back for the other five companies went to Prentiss and not Peabody. 5. 5. French described the location of their fight as the house they had visited the day before during their reconnaissance which is at Seay Field. Seay Field is not three miles from the camp of the 21st Missouri. Based on Moore’s description that he moved in front of Sherman’s division it appears that he advanced beyond Seay Field but where Moore actually went is open to question. 6. 6. French wrote of Peabody sending an orderly to ask if Colonel Moore could hold his position until Peabody could reinforce him. I have not seen that referenced anywhere else. Finally French declaimed that “Colonel Moore held his ground faithfully and bravely, and justice indeed has never been done him for the part he took in the battle of Shiloh.” Of that French is totally correct. Rather than receiving justice for his role in the battle of Shiloh Colonel David Moore now receives ridicule and mockery at the hands of the Shiloh revisionists. He is depicted as a liar and a buffoon who could not find his way through the trees in front of Peabody’s camp without losing his way. There is no better example of how Shiloh revisionism has adversely affected the modern history of the battle of Shiloh than reading about the opening of the fight in Keven Getchell’s Scapegoat of Shiloh. What a shame that readers of that book who are not familiar with the battle of Shiloh will believe any of what Getchell wrote concerning the opening of the fight. Getchell did Moore and Prentiss a severe injustice in his book because he followed the Shiloh revisionist mantra. With that I close this posting even though I have so much more to tell. But tomorrow is another day and how it came to be that Colonel David Moore has been falsely depicted as a liar and a buffoon will be revealed in an upcoming posting. Hank
  30. 2 points
    well...we will be closer to the river when we stop for lunch..
  31. 1 point
    Okay folks, we have our subjects set for our Epic Trek with historian Tim Smith on November 2nd. This year we're returning to our original format of examining two different subjects rather than just one, and I hope you agree that they're good choices. More details will be posted soon, but here's an overview for now: Our morning hike will focus on Union General Benjamin Prentiss and his controversial role in the battle and its aftermath. Did Prentiss save Grant's army, as we often hear, or is there more to the story? And was he responsible for alerting the Union army to the danger that morning, or was he, like Sherman and Grant, taken by surprise when the attack hit? We'll delve into these issues, and visit several sites around the battlefield associated with Prentiss, including his defensive position in the legendary Hornets Nest. (We may also have a chance to recreate a late 19th Century photograph that included the General.) After a break for lunch, our afternoon hike will be a subject suggested by SDG member Jim Franklin - we'll follow the Confederate approach to Grants Last Line, examining the challenges they faced and discussing the controversy that erupted after the battle over this aborted attack. Did Beauregard make the right call here, or should the Confederates have continued the attack? See the terrain in person and decide for yourself. A big thank you to Jim for the excellent idea! Again, more details will be posted soon. I'm already looking forward to the hikes, and seeing some familiar faces and hopefully some new ones as well. As always, feel free to post any questions you might have. Perry
  32. 1 point
    We all wound up getting a tick or two, but the Deep Woods Off pretty much took care of most and we only had to flick a couple away.
  33. 1 point
    Yes Ozzy..I have not read this prior...You always come up with great reads..but I do have to correct this article a little...Morgan's favorite mount was a black mare..Black Bess. Thank you for the birthday present!! Mona
  34. 1 point
    Hello, I am a long time amateur CW historian but have a newfound interest in Shiloh due to my ancestral link. As a result of some active family genealogy I discovered I have ancestors who fought on both sides of the battle. My 3rd great grandfather CC Harris was a 1SGT with the 12th Tennessee, Russell's Brigade, Clark's Division, Polk's Corps. And his future daughter's uncle-in-law, David H Marshall, was there on the Union side with the 13th Kentucky Infantry, Boyle's Brigade, 5th Division, Army of the Ohio. As a result of this my interest in Shiloh has been reinvigorated. I'll be following this board closely. Any information on these units or direction to primary source material will be most welcome. The image attached is GGG Gpa CC Harris. If anyone can provide info on this uniform I'd be thankful. Thanks for the hospitality, -Brian
  35. 1 point
    in case some have not seen the Shiloh NPS site..yet...on Anniversary Sat..the have planned period baseball games..field yet to be determined.There is a organization in Tennessee that has several teams that play ball as was done back in the 1800's. This should be interesting! Just hope we have baseball weather this year.
  36. 1 point
    At the beginning of the 19th Century, Napoleon was seen as "the greatest military leader of recent times," and French was naturally the language to be learned in order to facilitate the study of Napoleon and his strategy and tactics. In the process, French terms for military ranks, units, movements, weaponry, etc were reaffirmed as "the correct terms" for universal understanding (and new French terms were incorporated into American military terminology.) The following link: a publication provided to American soldiers deployed to Europe in 1917 (with attention being directed to French Military Terms on pages 7 - 16.) https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=uc1.$b260555;view=1up;seq=5 French for the Army and Navy (1917). [And for a brief discussion of how French military tactics influenced the course of instruction at West Point: https://www.historynet.com/french-lessons-west-point.htm French Lessons at West Point, initially taught by Francis De Masson from 1803 - 1812 and making certain that military terms such as bastion, glacis and abatis were incorporated, and followed later by empennage, fuselage, nacelle, and aileron (when the airplane entered service.]
  37. 1 point
    I wanted to let you know that this evening 1-7-19 @8:30 CST on Mississippi Public Broadcast TV will air an 1983 interview with Mr Foote. Also I heard an interview on radio while driving--Could not write man's name down...but the topic was on mississippi authors in early 1900's. The tale goes that Shelby Foote got into a bit of trouble in school and was suspended a week .His parents sent him to this gentleman's fine home and he then sat him down in his library and told him his punishment was to stay there and read the entire week. ..I didnt know where else to place this topic.
  38. 1 point
    #7---False..yes Grant did suffer with terrible migranes but alcohol was never used. He opted for mustard plasters and treatment like this.The migrane attacks did render him down and out which may have fulled the talk of drinking to point of passing out..but it was the migranes that laid him out.Also ,he contracted malaria in 1852 while in Isthmus of Panama and this condition also puts one to bed and even after"recovery" flare ups do return.So either medical condition or both arising at the same time would really prostrate him to sick bed.
  39. 1 point
    The above is a great starting point... and for those wishing to use Julia Grant's role as confidant to General Grant to better advantage, the Letters written by Grant to his wife are to be found scattered through the 30 - plus volumes of The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant. In order to quickly find the letters distributed throughout each 400 page volume: select a volume at https://cdm16631.contentdm.oclc.org/digital/collection/USG_volume/id/17030/rec/4 place "Julia" in the Search Box, and hit [enter] every reference to Julia returns, presented as a list. [ The General always addressed his wife as "Julia," and signed off as "Ulys." ] U.S. Grant included details in letters to his wife (such as being without a watch at Shiloh) not to be found elsewhere.
  40. 1 point
    As far as can be determined, Julian Larke's was the first complete biography of U.S. Grant available to the public (published 1864.) The other early biographies: Henry Coppee 1864 brief 3-page article that appeared in United States Service Magazine, June edition Henry Coppee 1866 complete biography, Grant and His Campaigns Adam Badeau 1867 Military History of Ulysses S. Grant U. S. Grant 1885 Personal Memoirs of Ulysses S. Grant Links: Coppee article in SDG topic "Personalities" -- "U. S. Grant" Coppee https://archive.org/details/granthiscampaign01lccopp/page/n5 Badeau https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/000465085 U.S. Grant https://www.gutenberg.org/files/4367/4367-h/4367-h.htm
  41. 1 point
    yes the last clue helped. id this individual.
  42. 1 point
    Mona The other interesting inclusion is the list of defenses possessed by Corinth -- rifle pits, redoubts, abattis -- none of which were determined to be necessary for defence of Pittsburg Landing (and even actively discouraged, at least by General Sherman.) Ozzy
  43. 1 point
    Joe Would it not seem odd, that an officer would gain significant promotion... and not tell anyone? Keep that promotion to himself; not release a "Special Orders" informing the men in his command; but instead, save that news for a specific instance... when it would have ultimate impact: to impress another officer (who until very recently was the ranking Brigadier General of the two.) How would that other officer, formerly superior (even at West Point) now find "the tables turned," confronted by the recipient of "such GREAT NEWS." I have yet to find Brigadier General Buell's direct response (although subsequent reactions to that "great news, shared," abound.) Personality conflict, writ large... Ozzy N.B. In terms of Chess (check.) And in terms of Poker (dominate.)
  44. 1 point
    Scott's Cavalry regiment was the 1st Louisiana Cavalry and from what I found on the net, it shows they were operating under Forrest at Shiloh. Very odd that they are not independently listed in the OR's, that I can see. Did a little research and found the obituary, plus another online source, showing one Martin Costley, 1st Louisiana Cavalry, Company L, wounded at Shiloh. So, they were there it seems. The original article you posted is very odd and hard to follow. Very generic "history" of the battle, almost written as if the writer was not there, just rehashing the Shiloh battle story. If they were with Forrest, it leads one to wonder if they followed Forrest away from guarding bridges and joined in the attack near the Sarah Bell cotton field?
  45. 1 point
    I think that Lauman got a raw deal regarding Second Jackson. He had been ordered the day before IIRC to keep abreast of the division on his left. He, and many of his supporters, claim that he was following orders when the unfortunate incident occurred. Ord, Sherman, and Grant had him immediately releieved and given no chance to obtain justice through a court of inquiry. Their hurry to get Lauman out and keep this quiet indicates that Lauman was more of a scapegoat than a guilty party.
  46. 1 point
    Larry DeBarry @ Shiloh Tours and Museum gives great tours and his museum is a must see. Larry's a pretty cool relic too! https://shilohtours.com/
  47. 1 point
    Grant sallies forth… Why send Bennett? The answer to the question, “Where did General Grant go, upon arrival at Pittsburg Landing?’ can be determined by solving the Bennett Problem. Who was Frank Bennett? In April 1862, he was 1st Lieutenant with the 2nd Illinois Cavalry, Company A. And on the morning of April 6th, he was lined up with the rest of his company, just east of Shiloh Church, when Major General Grant approached and began a communication (more of a chat) with Captain John Hotaling (in command of Company A.) At conclusion of the chat, General Grant put Captain Hotaling on his Staff for the day, charged with “placing and best using Birge’s Western Sharpshooters.” To Frank Bennett, General Grant stated the following: “You will take your Company A and go with as much dispatch as possible to Crump’s Landing. Present my compliments to General Lew Wallace, and tell him to come immediately, you being the escort” [Fletcher page 50.] [Upon Frank Bennett meeting Lew Wallace, just before noon; and failing to persuade General Wallace to follow him back to Pittsburg Landing via the River Road, Lieutenant Bennett detached himself from General Wallace and returned directly to his starting point, where he was met by General Grant and Captain William Rowley at 1:20 p.m. (approx.) If it is assumed that Bennett took a bit longer to find Lew Wallace, than to return from meeting Lew Wallace, then the latest time (by Sherman’s watch) that Bennett could have started on his mission as messenger was 10:30 (but more likely, a few minutes earlier.)] In OR 10 page 184, Captain John Rawlins AAG reports, “First you met with General WHL Wallace… After talking to General Wallace, you then directed me to return to the river and send Captain Baxter [with orders for Major General Lew Wallace.] Grant met WHL Wallace at or near the top of the bluff, overlooking Pittsburg Landing. It does not make sense for this man to be waiting anywhere else (after sending away steamer John Warner, and awaiting Grant’s arrival.) If it is assumed that Tigress arrived at Pittsburg Landing at 9:30, and Grant met briefly with WHL Wallace at 9:40 it is likely that General Grant rode away west and met with “the acting commander of Camp Shiloh,” BGen William Tecumseh Sherman, at or just before 10 a.m. [In Sherman’s Memoirs, he indicates on page 272 that “General Grant and his Staff visited me about 10 a.m.” …a time that was seared into Sherman’s brain, due to the fact “everything was under control, prior to 10 a.m.” and “everything tumbled out of control – for a while, anyway – just after 10 a.m.,” with the loss of Waterhouse’s Battery. ] Badeau, page 79, also claims Grant met with Sherman at 10 a.m. At this 10 a.m. meeting, Grant may have learned from Sherman that “he was defending the Owl Creek Bridge, because he expected Lew Wallace to march across it when joining the Army.” Sherman would have known that the Bridge had been recently strengthened (to accommodate cavalry and artillery) and likely was aware that the Shunpike had been completed. [ Jacob Bieler and Louis Kern both of Behr’s Morton Artillery, indicated afterwards that they heard Sherman’s AAG Hammond direct Captain Behr to protect the Owl Creek Bridge, “because Lew Wallace is expected to come down the road and make use of the bridge.” ] In Sherman’s Shiloh report OR 10 page 248, he admits to, “Captain Behr was on the extreme right, guarding the bridge on the Purdy Road over Owl Creek.” But later, in one of Sherman’s many classic examples of “double-speak,” on page 250, he reports, “General McClernand and I, upon consultation, selected a new line of defense, with its right covering the bridge by which General Wallace had to approach.” This seamless conflating of one bridge with another (without mentioning the name of the second bridge, or its location over Snake Creek), allows the reader to draw an incorrect conclusion: the bridge over Snake Creek was always the destination of Lew Wallace; he “had to approach” the battlefield via that bridge… which Grant believed, but which was not true. [ I believe Sherman deliberately shaded his Shiloh Report, in successful effort to hide his own knowledge of the likely intended use of Owl Creek Bridge, in order to protect Grant from unwanted criticism.] If Sherman did not reveal the existence of the Shunpike (and its likely use by Lew Wallace), then the members of the 2nd Illinois Cavalry most certainly did make mention of their own use of the Shunpike to General Grant. Either way, the Poker player Grant maintained his composure, simply directed Lieutenant Bennett to “go north and bring Lew Wallace back to here,” and figured he’d fixed the problem… and must have been extremely surprised, at about 1:20 p.m., to find Frank Bennett, and no Lew Wallace in tow. Points to consider… · General Grant most definitely sent away Cavalry Officer Frank Bennett (with verbal orders for Lew Wallace, including the stipulation that, “Lieutenant Bennett act as escort, to guide Wallace and his Division to the battlefield.” ) If Bennett had been sent first, there would be no reason to send Baxter, or anyone else, via the Tennessee River. · WHL Wallace was the first General officer met upon Grant’s arrival, and that meeting took place in near proximity to the bluff, overlooking Pittsburg Landing. Colonel Tuttle had led the 2nd Division into position along the Sunken Road; and LtCol McPherson was away, placing Cavender’s Missouri Artillery in the most advantageous positions, in support of the Second Division. · “Something” likely happened to cause a delay to the departure of Tigress, carrying a messenger to Crump’s Landing: Rawlins may have intended to take the orders himself, but got caught up in other things (like establishing the HQ at the Landing); or, Rawlins wanted to send someone more knowledgeable, but no one else was available; or, Baxter was the only man available, and he required more instruction IRT the orders with which he was entrusted (and perhaps time was spent acquiring a horse for Baxter, to ride away from Crump’s Landing… not knowing a horse would be waiting for him, upon arrival at Crump’s Landing? ) · The whole after-battle reporting, especially as regards Lew Wallace, Grant’s late arrival at Pittsburg Landing, and the sending of multiple messengers for reenforcements… smacks of CYA. Times were massaged to make it appear Grant arrived aboard Tigress earlier than he did; “Nelson’s Division was camped south of Savannah, to facilitate Nelson marching that division through the swamp, if necessary” …is hog-wash. Reports were intentionally adjusted, in an effort to deflect blame (for bad decisions made by U.S. Grant.) · General Grant sending orders to Lew Wallace, in the manner he did via Baxter, only makes sense if Grant was not aware of the availability of the Shunpike. These orders (specifying that Wallace join the right of the Army) were sent away to Lew Wallace after Grant met WHL Wallace, but before Grant met Sherman. Grant sending away Bennett (less than an hour after sending away Baxter) only makes sense if General Grant suddenly realized that more than one option was available to Lew Wallace; an option that Grant only just realized: the Shunpike. [As Grant stated in his Memoirs, “I never could see, and do not now see, why any order was necessary further than to direct him to come to Pittsburg Landing…” U.S. Grant believed, up until the end of his life, that he had ordered Lew Wallace “to Pittsburg Landing,” but in neither of the orders (sent via Baxter or Bennett) did Grant specify Pittsburg Landing: Baxter’s orders directed Wallace to take position on the right of the Army; and Bennett’s verbal orders to Wallace were for Lew Wallace to “follow me to the battlefield” …but Lew Wallace already had trusted guides, capable of leading him to the battlefield, via the Shunpike.] · Andrew Hickenlooper, Sr. (father to Captain Andrew Hickenlooper, 5th Ohio Independent Light Artillery) was 65 years old, a member of the 5th Ohio Cavalry (assigned to Hurlbut) and became part of General Grant’s bodyguard after Grant left Hurlbut and rode west (to where the 5th Ohio Battery was in position, on the right of Prentiss.) Captain Hickenlooper in MOLLUS (Ohio) vol.5 page 431, makes mention of how he “witnessed General Grant, and the unexpected appearance of his father, riding in company with General Grant” while he was in position with General Prentiss in the Hornet’s Nest. Father and son had time for only a moment’s recognition, before Grant and his party rode away (to the west) and disappeared from sight. · How could BGen Stephen Hurlbut have learned of the repair of the Shunpike and its bridges? The 5th Ohio Cavalry was the main unit involved in that undertaking (primarily the Battalion under Major Hayes.) Colonel Taylor was in overall command of the 5th Ohio Cavalry; and Colonel Taylor was assigned to Hurlbut’s 4th Division. · As for Grant “sending away Rawlins” (after the 10 a.m. meeting with Sherman) there is no evidence Rawlins accompanied General Grant beyond his initial meeting with BGen WHL Wallace. The AAG received orders direct from Grant (who then departed to meet with Sherman) while AAG Rawlins made his way to “the log house, at the Landing” to establish an HQ (and in process met Baxter, and sent him on the errand.) Rawlins indicates he was not with Grant when the General met the 2nd Illinois Cavalry, lined up (but reports his knowledge of the sending of Bennett as having been told him by General Grant, in OR 10 page 185, bottom of page.) References: SDG “General Grant’s Decisions” 28 DEC 2016 SDG “Grant’s 9:30 arrival at Pittsburg Landing” (for details of the sandy-haired lieutenant, hatless, and with a bloody gash in his forehead, who reported to MGen Wallace) SDG “From a Jack to a King” 10 APR 2017 SDG “Where was Grant?” 21 DEC 2016 History of Company A, 2nd Illinois Cavalry by Samuel Fletcher MOLLUS (Ohio) Volume 5 OR 10 (part one) Grant’s Memoirs Sherman’s Memoirs Military History of U.S. Grant by Adam Badeau
  48. 1 point
    In process of researching the information IRT Henry M. Bentley (Philadelphia Inquirer) ran across The North Reports the Civil War by J. Cutler Andrews (1955). This resource is of value because it details the relationship of the Press and the U.S. Government (and military and naval commanders) during the period 1860 - 1870, and discusses the fine line between "informing the public" and "committing treason" (due to early, and too precise broadcast of intended operations), which resulted in censorship, and reporters being expelled from military camps (or placed under arrest.) The North Reports the Civil War also contains a ten-page listing of all men (and women) who worked as war correspondents during the War of the Rebellion (the only omission found, Henri Lovie, who wrote and sketched for Frank Leslie's Illustrated.) List begins page 751. On page 172, in the Chapter "An Affray with General Halleck," the Battle of Shiloh is discussed (based on the published articles of the reporters who were present on April 6 and 7, 1862.) This concocted History, full of errors, attests to the faulty information presented to the Northern newspaper readers in April and May 1862 (most errors arising from reporters straying too far from "what they observed," into speculation concerning "the big picture," or "how events developed." ) Available online through University of Pittsburgh: https://digital.library.pitt.edu/islandora/object/pitt%3A31735057893608/viewer#page/186/mode/1up Cheers Ozzy
  49. 1 point
    Jimj .just shows youve been up north TOO long.
  50. 1 point
    tom..as to Parkersbeing "an affiltated site" maintained under the laws applicable of the NPS...does that mean we( am a member of Parkers Crossroads Battlefield assn)cant have our Lantern walks and other activities at nite on site?????thanks...
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