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  1. 3 points
    Hi. I live in Tempe, Arizona I have been a student of the CW for 30 years. I have eight ancestors who fought for the Federals and a whole lot more for the Confederacy. Shiloh is one of many battles in which I have an interest. I am a member of the Scottsdale, Arizona CWRT, Battlefield Trust, Civil War Talk. I look forward to learning more about Shiloh
  2. 3 points
    Most people reference Gott's book when giving Confederate strength at Fort Donelson. Gott mostly uses the "tabular statement" compiled at the time: He then proceeds to make a few imputations for units not included above. Investigation has shown that every unit he imputed is already in this list. They are: Culbertson's Battery of 300; these were the men manning the water battery, but were detachments from units in the list. The battery was manned by Maury's (Ross') battery, Coy A of 30th TN and Coy A of 50th TN. These units are on the list, and Gott double counts them. Melton's scouts are listed in the table as having 15 men. Gott gives them 58. Major Fielding Gowan's Tennessee cavalry squadron is listed on the table as having 60. Gott estimates 170. The Kentucky cavalry coys were attached to Forrest's regiment, and are included in it (see the returns below). Gott doesn't list sources, but gives Huey's coy an incredible 112. Also, for no reason Gott added 150 surrendered to the 48th TN. Finally, there is an addition error in his artillery table. We also have the returns for the formations a mere two weeks prior to Fort Donelson: Of these formations, the majority of the 4th Division, the whole of Floyd's "division" and Clark's brigades, and the artillery and 7 regiments of Buckner's division were at Donelson. Fortunately Buckner broke down the regiments strengths in his report and it is close to 7/12ths of his January return, and can be accepted. The PFD at Donelson can be (over)estimated thus: Thus the estimate of 13,000 given by the likes of Pillow seems accurate. Note that the highest figure given by any confederate is by Preston Johnston, but he double counted Clark's and Floyd's brigades. Removing the double counts give 15,000, which is consistent with the returns.
  3. 2 points
    My name is Kristen Pawlak and I am very glad to now be a part of the Shiloh Discussion Group, especially it being the anniversary of the first day. A native Missourian, I am very interested in the Missouri troops of both sides that fought at Shiloh. I also have several ancestors with the 12th Tennessee and 47th Tennessee Infantry regiments. I am looking forward to meeting many other members of this group! Thanks for having me!
  4. 2 points
    Battlefield America prints a series of these maps. You can get them from www.trailheadgraphics.com. You can usually find them at the bookshop at the Shiloh VC (that's the Visitors' Center for those of us in the know). Don't leave home without one!
  5. 2 points
    Quite amusing. I learned a lot from that animation he was running. Despite my many visits and extensive (and extended) battlefield hikes there, I guess I just didn't understand the geography.
  6. 2 points
    Edward Jonas Tracking this man is difficult because there were two Edward Jonas, both accorded credit as belonging to the 50th Illinois, an Uncle (1817 - 1867) and his nephew, and it is obvious that researchers have combined the experiences of the two; and in some cases credit has been given to the wrong man for accomplishments of the other. The subject of interest is Edward Jonas, the nephew. Edward was born into one of the first Jewish families in Quincy: his father, Abraham is recognized as bringing Freemasonry from his native England to Illinois; and Abraham had many and varied business interests; and Abraham Jonas belonged to a circle of friends that included Senator Orville Browning and the politician Abraham Lincoln. Following the Inauguration of Lincoln as President, Abraham Jonas, with support from Orville Browning was installed as Postmaster of Quincy. And Edward Jonas was appointed as Principal Assistant to the Postmaster (and he was only 17 years old in 1861.) Later that year the 50th Illinois Volunteers began recruiting; and on September 12th the underage Edward got his father's approval and became a Private in Company C. About that same time in September 1861 Brigadier General Benjamin Prentiss was back in Quincy, cooling his heels, under arrest for failing to obey the lawful orders of his superior officer, Brigadier General U.S. Grant. The Court Martial expected by Prentiss failed to eventuate; and General Prentiss was returned to duty in Northern Missouri. And the 50th Illinois was sent to St. Joseph Missouri (in Prentiss' District) and operated between that Missouri River port and Hannibal, on the Mississippi River, from October through December 1861. And it was most likely during this period that Benjamin Prentiss, still short of staff, found a position for Private Edward Jonas as Orderly (some references record “Secretary.”) The 50th Illinois Infantry left Missouri in January and joined General Grant's operation in Kentucky at Smithland. And General Prentiss left Missouri mid-March and joined General Grant's operation on the Tennessee River no later than the First day of April 1862. The next time Private Jonas appears in the historical record is in the Madison Georgia Prison manifest on page 10, his name and Robert Porter's name just below the line entry for Brigadier General Prentiss; so Jonas, Porter and Prentiss were all captured on 6 April 1862. And they all remained confined together until the 7 OCT 1862 release of all the Shiloh Federal officers from Madison Prison, after which Private Jonas likely remained in company with General Prentiss to Illinois, enjoyed a welcome respite with his family at Quincy; and early in 1863 returned to duty (as Second Lieutenant) as Prentiss (promoted to Major General) gained assignment as commander of the District of Eastern Arkansas. The Battle of Helena was fought in July 1863; and soon afterwards General Prentiss resigned from the Army. Suddenly in need of employment, Lieutenant Jonas was initially incorporated on the staff of Major General Stephen Hurlbut. But in 1864 Lieutenant Jonas was taken onto the staff of Major General Grenville Dodge: Edward Jonas is 4th standing man from right. [Above image of Major General Grenville Dodge and his Staff in the Public Domain.] Performing the duties of ADC, Edward Jonas was promoted to Captain, and gained two brevet promotions before the end of the war. After the war, Edward Jonas briefly returned to Quincy. But, his father, Abraham, had passed away in 1864; and most of the Jonas family relocated to Louisiana. Edward soon joined them and settled in New Orleans, where he appears to have become a property developer. Edward Jonas died in New Orleans in 1918. But, for those of us at SDG the revelation with most potential interest was brought to my attention by Author and SDG contributor, Joseph Rose: Edward Jonas wrote a paper titled, “Reminiscence of Battle of Shiloh.” In 1889/ 1890 Mr. Jonas was contacted in New Orleans by Henry M. Cist, a former soldier in the Volunteer Army from Ohio (several different regiments; who rose from Private to Brigadier General) who at the time was corresponding secretary for the Society of the Army of the Cumberland. In response, Edward Jonas provided a 14-page paper (and it appears that document is on file with the Missouri Historical Society.) I will be in contact with them soon – COVID 19 permitting – in order to arrange to get a copy of Edward Jonas' recollection. [There is also indication of an early April 1862 (April1st?) Letter from Private Edward Jonas to his parents in Quincy. ] References: Madison Prison manifest Rosen, Robert N. “Jewish Confederates” ( 2000) Uni. South Carolina Press, page 152. https://civilwar.illinoisgenweb.org/r050/050-k-in.html 2/Lt Jonas to Co.K 50th Illinois. Dodge, MGen Grenville, “The Battle of Atlanta and Other Campaigns” (1911) page 137 for above Staff photograph. New York Times of Monday 21 APR 1862 page 8: “Edward Jonas, son of the Postmaster of Quincy was wounded and taken prisoner with Gen. Prentiss.” https://www.findagrave.com/memorial/89149678/edward-jonas Find-a-grave Edward's uncle (1817 - 1867). https://www.findagrave.com/memorial/82425289/edward-l-jonas Find-a-grave Edward Jonas b.1844 mohistory.org Civil War manuscripts. St. Tammany Farmer of 7 JAN 1905 pg.5 col.2 “Judge Bossier is now connected with Mr. E. Jonas of New Orleans, a brother of Mr. Jonas of the firm Farrar, Jonas & Kruttschnitt.”
  7. 2 points
    Andy Welcome to SDG. I grew up in Rock Island County, Illinois and the Civil War statues and street names are everywhere (especially across the river at Davenport.) Rock Island Arsenal was established during the Civil War: one of its first functions was as Prisoner of War Camp for thousands of men captured in the South, beginning 1863. And Abraham Lincoln's footprint is to be found at nearby Galesburg (site of one of the Lincoln-Douglas Debates) and on Rock Island (as a lawyer, Lincoln represented the railroad and bridge company against the steamboat owners that ran into the first bridge across the Mississippi River and destroyed it. It is still believed by many that then-Secretary of War, Jefferson Davis, had a hand in destruction of the bridge because he favored a more southern route for the Transcontinental Railroad, crossing the Mississippi River at Memphis.) And of course, Lincoln left his mark on Springfield, only three hours away, and a required pilgrimage for school students, year after year after... Hope you find participation in SDG a worthwhile experience. All the best Ozzy
  8. 2 points
    Wisconsin in the War Stumbled across this video while researching Pensacola in the Civil War... serendipity. Titled “ORNA Wisconsin in the Civil War” it runs for about 10 minutes; and the presenter, Lawrence Winkler, is both knowledgeable and engaging. Beginning at the 6-minute mark and running for a little over two minutes Winkler details the aftermath of the Battle of Shiloh from a Wisconsin perspective (and includes the contribution and tragedy of Governor Harvey.) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rP5VyNFj3hs ORNA Wisconsin in the Civil War, Episode Four As indicated, this is Episode 4 of a five episode set. The remaining episodes run about 10 minutes each, but they do not mention Battle of Shiloh. Instead, they provide an excellent background to Midwestern attitudes and outlooks on the American Civil War; the actual fact that the Civil War was TWO conflicts (one that mostly took place in Virginia, and the other one that took place everywhere else); and a solid introduction to military terms, military life, wounds versus disease, treatment of POWs, and addresses “What caused Midwestern soldiers to enlist, and then re-enlist?” [Overall, a great set of videos to direct friends and family to watch, after they pose the question: “Why are you so caught up in the Civil War?” ] https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCy7VpEkuHeIzDEIWSOd-iSQ Lawrence Winkler Home Page on YouTube (for all Five episodes.)
  9. 2 points
    In my dotage I realize that my former log-held belief that I understood the U.S. system was seriously flawed. For example, my local town council recently voted to allow retail sales of marijuana. At the start of the session they all rose and spoke, with hands over hearts, the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag of the United States...one nation, under God, indivisible... Two flags were in the room, one the Stars and Stripes, the other the State Flag of Illinois. They faced the former. The latter was not mentioned. Then they proceeded to pass an Ordinance that makes them all parties to a Federal felony (actually, it was a 6-5 vote). Eleven states have joined mine in this succession. We tried this States' Rights thing once before. That time it ended badly. We live in dangerous times, as also had been the case for our predecessors.
  10. 2 points
    as to #3..the stream in question at stoney lonesome..is a wet weather water-run from the springs north of stage rd and s\does continue south..older people that live along the stage road in this area retell of the large,deep cold swimming holes that they as kids played in..so there is a water feature in this area..also Purdy is more northwest of adamsb\ville than the map shows.
  11. 2 points
    From the Washington Post: http://www.washingto...36b8_story.html By Tony Horwitz, It’s often said that journalists write the first rough draft of history. But rarely do reporters draft history in quite so rough a fashion as Junius Browne and Albert Richardson did in the Civil War. (PublicAffairs) - ‘Junius and Albert's Adventures in the Confederacy: A Civil War Odyssey’ by Peter Carlson The two Northern correspondents narrowly escaped death in an artillery bombardment, only to be captured by Confederates. For 593 excruciating days, they skirmished with lice in Southern prisons as the real war raged on without them. Then, after a jailbreak and a harrowing trek through enemy territory, the reporters filed the story of a lifetime: their own. Peter Carlson narrates this tale of journalistic derring-do in “Junius and Albert’s Adventures in the Confederacy.” This title, which echoes the 1989 slacker film “Bill & Ted’s Excellent Adventure,” undersells the gravity of the reporters’ experience. But it’s also appropriate, because Carlson’s book unspools like a buddy flick: Two larkish fellows embark on a trip that goes desperately wrong and often veers into farce. At the start of the Civil War, Browne and Richardson belonged to the self-styled “Bohemian Brigade,” a journalistic troupe of insouciant thrill-seekers who gallivanted along the front. Like other reporters of that era, they made no pretense to objectivity and freely expressed the staunch abolitionism of their employer, the New York Tribune. Nor did they let the facts get in the way of a good story. At one point, to avoid being scooped by a competitor, Browne and a colleague composed “long, vivid, eyewitness accounts of a battle that occurred 200 miles beyond their eyesight,” Carlson writes. Their fabrications ran at length in the Tribune, a stunt that made the writers legendary among the Bohemian Brigade. But these cavalier “knights of the quill,” as Browne called them, also risked their lives to cover combat. In May 1863, Browne and Richardson tried to sneak past rebel cannon at Vicksburg aboard a Union barge filled with hay. An incoming shell burned and killed half the soldiers on board. The survivors were fished out of the Mississippi and jailed. It was customary at the time to quickly release or swap captured journalists. But Browne and Richardson wrote for the paper most hated in the South; the Confederate in charge of prisoner exchanges called them “the worst and most obnoxious of all non-combatants.” Also, soon after their capture, the warring parties suspended prisoner exchanges. So the men were shuttled among jails, including Richmond’s notorious Castle Thunder, before ending up at North Carolina’s Salisbury Prison, a mini-Andersonville where men perished in droves from exposure, disease and shootings by guards. Carlson’s story has so many twists, right up to the last page, that I won’t spoil it by telling more. But the exquisite plot is only one of the joys of reading this book. As a veteran journalist (including 22 years at The Washington Post), Carlson captures the competitive yet collegial world of reporters in the field and their tortured relationship with distant editors. He also has an ear for quotes and an eye for detail, and shares with the Bohemian Brigade a keen sense of the ridiculous. Though the Northern reporters were hated Yanks, they were also curiosities. So Southerners flocked to visit the inmates — and to declare their willingness to “die in the last ditch” for the Cause. This line was repeated so often, Carlson writes, that it became a running gag for the reporters: “Where is this ditch? How deep is it? They’re going to need a very big ditch to hold all these Rebels who keep promising to die in it.” He also quotes the absurd reports in Southern papers, including this one on Gettysburg: “The Confederates were repulsed but cannot, at present, with justice or candor, be said to have suffered defeat.” Carlson excels as well at drawing characters, particularly the odd couple at the heart of his book. Browne, the well-schooled son of a banker, was a bookish scribe who filled his florid dispatches with Classical allusions. Richardson, a rugged farm boy, was plainspoken and ingratiated himself with all he met. Yet the two became inseparable and sustained each other through hardships and despair that neither could endure alone. “The North for us is like the grave,” Richardson wrote, after letters stopped reaching inmates, “no voice ever comes back to us from it.” If there’s a flaw in this fine book, it’s that Carlson tells his story almost too well. He’s shorn away anything that might interrupt the flow of his taut, lively narrative. This makes for a rollicking read, but at times I wanted more context and reflection — on the telegraph, for instance, a technology that transformed the news business in the mid-19th century as dramatically as the Internet has changed the media in our own time. Also, while Carlson details his deep research in the book’s endnotes, his text doesn’t address whether Browne and Richardson were reliable sources in the telling of their own story. Given the flagrant bias and outright fictions that Carlson documents in the dispatches of the Bohemian Brigade, I doubted some of the witty repartee and incredible adventures that Browne and Richardson recalled, much of it in books they wrote after returning home. But even if the two men embellished, their ordeal has resonance far beyond its drama and drollery. The reporters were forced into close, extended contact with captured Northerners and Southerners of every stripe — deserters, slaves, brutish guards, mountain guerrillas — and they experienced the behind-the-lines horror of the conflict. As a result, they witnessed, and later exposed, a theater of the war that was barely known to their colleagues at the front or to the Northern public. This remains an aspect of the Civil War that is little known to most Americans. The journalists’ experiences of both battle and captivity also speak to the enduring challenge of war reporting. Upon seeing combat for the first time, Browne wrote, “No one here seems to have any knowledge of anything, the leading officers having little more information than the privates.” As Carlson acutely notes, Browne’s one-line observation “sums up the ‘fog of war’ so well that it could be included in nearly every battle dispatch in every war ever fought.” Tony Horwitz is the author of “Confederates in the Attic” and “Midnight Rising: John Brown and the Raid That Sparked the Civil War.” Jim
  12. 2 points
    On January 10, 1861 the state of Florida became the third state to secede from the Union. One of the first items on the agenda was to send Florida state militia to seize the navy yard at Pensacola along with Fort McRee, Fort Barrancas and Fort Pickens. On January 9 the navy transported the command of Lt. Slemmer from Fort Barrancas to Fort Pickens due to the trouble brewing. On the big day, January 12, 1861, Commodore Walke was in command of a stores ship appropriately named Supply. He was anchored near Fort Pickens assisting Lt. Slemmer in delivering supplies and preparing to defend Fort Pickens. Walke was to proceed to the port of Vera Cruz, Mexicio after dropping supplies at Fort Pickens. The Wyandotte, armed with at least some guns was also nearby. The navy yard was under the command of Captain James Armstrong. The yard had a small force of marines, soldiers and civilian workers along with some of their families. There had been no pay received for several months. A Florida militia force of 600 to 800 men arrived at the fort and Armstrong capitulated without a fight. Armstrong was court martialed for “neglect of duty” and suspended from service for five years. The plight of the men and families in the navy yard was dire. They had no money and no way to subsist in what was now enemy territory. Of course, some of the individuals were Southern supporters and did not need a ride home. Walke steamed into the harbor the next day under a flag of truce to take aboard all persons wanting to return to the north. A total of 106 men, women and children boarded the Supply. Nineteen days later the Supply arrived at New York and Walke’s human cargo disembarked the ship. The passengers included the wife and child of Lt. Slemmer. Walke was promptly court-martialed for disobeying orders and leaving his station because he was supposed to go to Vera Cruz. Walke was found not guilty of leaving station since New York was a navy port but he was found guilty of disobeying orders. His punishment was a letter of admonishment from the Secretary of the Navy. On January 16 the Florida authorities demanded the surrender of Fort Pickens by Lt. Slemmer. He told them to pound sand and Fort Pickens remained in Union hands throughout the war. Everything I wrote here I just learned in the last couple days so I hope it is accurate. For those interested the story is related in the beginning of Walke’s Naval Scenes and Reminiscences of the Civil War of the United States on the Southern and Western Waters. https://books.google.com/books?id=-SoOAAAAQAAJ&pg=PA63&lpg=PA63&dq=Walker+naval+scenes+and+reminiscence&source=bl&ots=O2fr7_oYdp&sig=ACfU3U1RK16Y3Jhoxpq61jdGJtm5k3t_sw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjGioShrr3kAhVLOK0KHVd9AI8Q6AEwFnoECAYQAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false Volume 4 of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies has a transcript of the court martial of James Armstrong which I found interesting but did not read the whole thing. https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=coo.31924051350837&view=1up&seq=111 Hank
  13. 2 points
    At Fort Henry the gunboat Essex took a shell through their middle boiler. The scalding steam trapped the two civilian pilots in the pilot house and killed them instantly. One pilot was found with his hand still on the wheel. The names were Marshall Ford and James McBride. At Fort Donelson, Foote’s flagship was the St. Louis. A shell penetrated the 1.5 inches of iron plate and 15 inches of oak timber sending deadly splinters along with shell fragments ricocheting throughout the pilot house. F. A. Riley, the pilot, died at the wheel. Foote was injured in his foot but was able to pry Riley’s dead fingers from the wheel and took over steering the boat. Foote thought his wound was not serious and he would be over it in a week. But it never healed and three months later he had to relinquish command of the gunboat fleet on the Mississippi. He died about a year later. The Carondelet stayed in the fight the longest at Fort Donelson. A 128-pound shell smashed into the pilot house and sent iron splinters and wood splinters into the two civilian pilots, mortally wounding one. His name was William Hinton. Later another shell hit the pilot house wounding another pilot. On board the Louisville, a pilot was wounded. The pilot house on the boats was a prime target for the enemy’s cannon. At Forts Henry and Donelson four civilian pilots were killed and at least three others wounded. Pilots were usually well-known on the rivers and served under dangerous conditions. At Forts Henry and Donelson the pilot houses on the gunboats were, indeed, a slaughter pen. This was a great question as I had never heard the term slaughter pen applied at Forts Henry and Fort Donelson. I tried a simple google search with forts Henry and Donelson and slaughter pen and the following book appeared: A History of the United States Navy, from 1775 to 1893, Volume 2 By Edgar Stanton Maclay. Page 330. Here is the link I found. It is long but when I tried to find a shorter one it was not the same book although it had the same title. https://books.google.com/books?id=UHWpn7IEuMoC&pg=PA330&lpg=PA330&dq=Slaughter+Pen+fort+donelson&source=bl&ots=gdumFKu_en&sig=ACfU3U2dvG_a0-xwGC8NzX_N401kgx69Jg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwid5Y3Y27jkAhUKM6wKHT5cDco4ChDoATAEegQIBxAB#v=onepage&q&f=false To verify what boat William Hinton was on I referred to Walke’s “The Western Flotilla at Fort Donelson, Island Number Ten, Fort Pillow and Memphis” in Battles and Leaders, Vol. 1 Hank
  14. 2 points
    Knowing that Wickliffe and Hardcastle were part of the party that crossed the desert from California with Albert Sidney Johnston it appeared that was the connection. A simple search of the other two revealed they also were part of Johnston's entourage. Brewer showed up on the SNMP facebook page. Ridley survived the war and lived till 1909 but Brewer was killed in Virginia in 1864. Hank
  15. 2 points
    Grant put in his memoirs that on January 6 he wrote Halleck and asked permission to see Halleck in St. Louis. He did not actually visit Halleck at that time. Halleck gave him another assignment. In the ORs, vol. 7 page 534 is Grant’s letter to Halleck ending with “If it meets with the approval of the Gen. Comd.g the Department I would be pleased to visit Head Quarters on business connected with this command.” However, on the same day, January 6, Halleck sent Grant an order, (ORs, vol. 7, page 533). “I wish you to make a demonstration in force on Mayfield and in the direction of Murray. Forces from Paducah and Fort Holt should meet at Mayfield and threaten Camp Beauregard and Murray, letting it be understood that Dover (i. e. Fort Donelson) is the object of your attack.” Halleck told Grant to avoid a battle as they were not ready. Nowhere in this order is Fort Henry mentioned. Grant made preparations in response to the January 6 order from Halleck. Grant ordered a column from Cairo under BG John McClernand and a column from Paducah under BG C. F. Smith to make the demonstrations. In his instructions to C. F. Smith dated January 8, 1862 (Grant Papers, vol. 4, page 11) Grant wrote that he would send Smith a gunboat and Smith should send the gunboat and a transport carrying a section of Artillery and infantry up the Tennessee River. Grant made no mention of Fort Henry but thought it would aid in the deception and help prevent rebel reinforcements moving from Columbus to Bowling Green. On January 9, 1862, three days after Halleck ordered Grant to make the demonstration, Halleck wrote McClellan informing him that he had just received McClellan’s message from the third of January the previous evening. (ORs, vol. 7, page 539) Halleck did not receive McClellan’s so-called order from January 3 until the evening of January 8. By that time Halleck had already set Grant in motion to make the demonstrations. Halleck enclosed a copy of his orders to Grant for McClellan’s information. On January 10 Halleck again wrote McClellan about McClellan’s letter of January 3. (OR. Vol. 7, page 543) This time Halleck alluded that if he followed the “order” of January 3 it would cause the loss of Missouri and did McClellan really want to do that? McClellan replied to Halleck on January 13 that Halleck had not read the letter of January 3 “with much care.” McClellan declared “There is nothing in my letter that can reasonably be construed into an order…” McClellan claimed what he wanted from Halleck was his views on how to accomplish the stated goals. (ORs, vol. 7, page 547) On January 1, 1862 the commander-in-chief, President Abraham Lincoln, telegraphed Halleck that McClellan was sick and should not be disturbed with business. Halleck was ordered by the President to work directly with Buell at once. (ORs, vol. 7, page 526) Buell received the same admonitions from the President. He wrote a message to Halleck on January 3, 1862. (ORs, vol. 7, page 526). Buell declared that the power of the Confederacy is on the line from Columbus to Bowling Green and in the center the forts on the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers. Buell wrote an attack on the flanks and center was of importance and should be done simultaneously so the Confederates could not move troops around. Buell stated that two gunboat expeditions should go the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. (hint, hint to Halleck). But Halleck did not have the troops for such expeditions and the ironclad gunboats were not ready for service. Buell pressured Halleck with; “whatever is to be done must be done in a few days.” Halleck apparently got the impression Buell was, finally, going to move against Bowling Green. He could not mount the river expeditions but he could send Grant out on the demonstrations in order to prevent rebel reinforcements being sent from Columbus to Bowling Green. In his January 6, 1862 order to Grant, Halleck told Grant that was the object of the demonstrations. (ORs, vol. 7, page 534) On January 6, 1862 Halleck sent a long synopsis to Lincoln and offered his opinion about an advance on Columbus while Buell moved on Bowling Green. It would be a repetition of the “strategic error which produced the disaster of Bull Run.” Halleck claimed such a plan would fail ninety-nine times out of hundred and was “condemned by every military authority I have [he had] ever read.” (ORs, vol. 7, page 533) On the same day that Halleck wrote Lincoln about how dumb an attack on Columbus would be Feis (William Feis, Grant's Secret Service) wants us to believe Grant wrote Halleck for a meeting to propose just such an undertaking. Feis wrote “Instead of going to St. Louis that January to propose a campaign against Forts Henry and Donelson, it is more probable that Grant hoped to convince Halleck that the time had come to eliminate Columbus.” (page 60 of Feis book) But Halleck had already pointedly stated that the true line of operations was to split the rebel defensive line in the center at the twin Forts Henry and Donelson. In late December Halleck had dinner with Sherman and Halleck’s aide, BG Cullom at the Planter’s House in St. Louis. Halleck laid a map on the table showing the rebel defensive line and asked his two guests where would be the best place to break it. They replied “in the center.” Halleck whole heartedly agreed and declared the true line of operations was to attack the rebel line on the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. If Grant went to St. Louis to champion a movement against Columbus it is no wonder Halleck would toss him out. It seems to me that requesting permission from your superior officer to do something the superior officer had already condemned and told the President of the United States it would be a strategic error would not end well. Then Feis misleads us by claiming McClellan called for a demonstration against Columbus on January 3, 1862. In addition, McClellan wanted Halleck to send expeditions up the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers to freeze troops at Fort Donelson, Fort Henry and Clarksville. If that was not enough McClellan wanted Halleck to seize Columbus if the place seemed vulnerable. Feis wrote; “Then to accomplish this mission, Halleck ordered Grant to march east of Columbus toward Mayfield and Murray…” What is not stated is that Halleck had neither the men nor the gunboats to “accomplish this mission.” Halleck ordered Grant out with the demonstrations to keep any reinforcements moving from Columbus to Bowling Green. Feis then noted Halleck ordered Grant (Feis did not give the date but it was Jan. 6) to “make a demonstration in force on Mayfield and in the direction of Murray” using forces from Cairo and Paducah. Grant is to act like he is an advance guard of a larger force and after the demonstration is deemed finished the forces should slowly retreat back to a Paducah. Nowhere in Halleck’s instructions is there a mention of Fort Henry. Then Feis wrote “Halleck cautioned against engaging the enemy and conveniently neglected to mention McClellan’s instructions to take Columbus if the opportunity arose.” Since Halleck did not receive McClellan’s letter mentioning Columbus until the night of January 8 how could he have passed along McClellan’s instructions in an order he prepared for Grant on January 6? Feis did not explain how that would be possible. Feis also does not mention McClellan writing Halleck that only a pea-brained nincompoop would have considered McClellan’s letter of January 3 as instructions. (ORs, vol. 7, page 547) As of January 6, Halleck was not considering making any movements towards rebel strongholds until he had the situation in Missouri under control. Halleck estimated that would be around mid-February. Halleck wrote McClellan on January 20, just as Grant was returning to Cairo from the demonstration, and outlined his plan for future operations. (ORs, vol. 8, page 509)It did not include a direct assault on Columbus. He thought that was impracticable and “not a proper line of operations.” Halleck declared that a more feasible plan would be expeditions up the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers towards Nashville. That would turn Columbus and cause the rebels to evacuate Bowling Green. Halleck noted he had thoroughly studied the defenses of Columbus and found them strong. Halleck wrote it would take a large siege train and a “terrible loss of life” to take Columbus. To send expeditions up the two rivers Halleck estimated it should not be attempted with no less than 60,000 men. There were only 15,000 troops available at Cairo and Paducah at that time and the gunboats were looking for crews. It has been noted that nowhere in Halleck’s order to Grant and Grant’s order to C. F. Smith is Fort Henry mentioned as a place to be threatened. The instructions from Halleck were to act as if Dover (Fort Donelson) was the target of the movement. Feis showed on page 61 of his book why one should always be skeptical of authors who are quoting short segments of reports with parts not included. Feis wants to present the idea that there was a lost opportunity to take Columbus according to McClernand’s report to Halleck of January 24. Feis wrote: “As Union troops neared Columbus during the operation, McClernand interpreted the “non-appearance” of any significant Confederate resistance to mean the enemy was “closely collected around camp fires within their entrenchments, and indisposed to take the field.” That moment, he later wrote, was perhaps the most “favorable time…for [a] successful attack and the capture of Columbus.” After observing the disappointment evinced by his men when the demonstration ended without an attempt to storm the stronghold, McClernand urged Halleck to launch an immediate attack while the enemy remained vulnerable.” (Feis book page 61) In the ORs, vol. 7, page 69 we find what McClernand wrote from which Feis cherry-picked quotations to make the claim of the “lost opportunity” to take Columbus by storm. “It was discovered that an abatis of fallen timber a half mile in width surrounded the enemy’s intrenchments. The rigor of the weather and the non-appearance of any considerable rebel force led to the belief that they were closely collected around camp fires within their intrenchments, and indisposed to take the field. It is believed that with suitable preparation on our part a favorable time was thus afforded for successful attack and the capture of Columbus.” Note Feis left out “It is believed that with suitable preparation on our part…” What McClernand noted was if the Union army had made suitable preparations they might have been able to make a successful attack on Columbus. But the army was conducting a demonstration against Columbus with no intention to attack it. Feis claimed that after McClernand stated the rebels were “indisposed to take the field” he later wrote that at that moment it was maybe the most “favorable time” to had made a successful attack. I guess technically that is true but the two referenced sentences are in the same report adjacent to each other so it was probably no more than 30 seconds. Next Feis told us that McClernand’s men were disappointed they were denied the opportunity to attack Columbus and that McClernand wanted Halleck to make an immediate attack while the rebels were vulnerable. But McClernand’s report does not say the men were disappointed they did not attack Columbus. They were disappointed that they were recalled to Cairo. I doubt the men were disappointed they were not allowed to attack through a half mile of abatis during terrible weather against intrenchments manned by an unknown number of Confederates. McClernand wrote that the advance by the Union forces was welcomed by Unionists in the area. With the withdrawal from the area McClernand was concerned of the reprisals that might be visited on the Unionists. McClernand wrote: “This consideration, with others having great weight with me, prompts me in conclusion to presume upon your indulgence so far as to urgently recommend a renewed advance of our forces, if not immediately upon Columbus, at least so far as to regain the ground we recently occupied.” McClernand went on to describe a scenario where the army could lay siege to Columbus avoiding the need to actually attempt to carry the works. The Union army did not lose an opportunity to take Columbus during the demonstrations because that was never the intent and they were not prepared to do so. Feis next lets us know that “Grant also lamented the lost opportunity. “My orders were such and the force with me also so small,” he complained, “that no attack [upon Columbus] was allowable.” This was a letter to his sister. (Grant Papers, vol. 4, page 96) Feis put [upon Columbus] into the quotation. Grant did not mention a specific location where he was not allowed to attack. The “no attack” order was placed on both McClernand and C. F. Smith. Grant’s orders to not attack applied to the whole area of the demonstrations. Halleck cobbled together as many troops as he could for the demonstration but the force was too small to attack Columbus. In Grant’s memoirs he wrote that Smith reported he thought it practicable to capture Fort Heiman. Smith sent two letters to Grant, one dated Jan. 21 and the other Jan. 22. The letters were forwarded to Halleck in St. Louis on January 23. (Grant papers, vol. 4, page 90) Neither of these letters mentioned Fort Heiman. The Confederates did not start serious work on Fort Heiman until around January 15. A citizen alerted Sidney Johnston of that fact and he telegraphed Tilghman to immediately intrench at Fort Heiman and work all night. (Johnston biography by Johnston, page 423) Fort Heiman was not finished and no cannon were in place when Smith did his demonstration. The attack plan used by Grant put no emphasis upon seizing Fort Heiman before attacking Fort Henry. Grant is not always correct in his memoirs and this could be an example of his memory not quite getting it right. It is Smith’s letter of Jan. 22 where he described his approach to Fort Henry and how easy it would be to take it with just two gunboats. It should also be noted that Smith decided to take a look at Fort Henry because he had a day to kill as the troops unloaded a steamer full of supplies 20 miles north of Fort Henry. On page 62 of his book Feis claimed that because Grant declared the mission a success before receiving a report from Smith proves that Grant was fixated on Columbus. Fort Henry and Donelson were secondary. On January 18 Grant sent a letter to McClernand starting with “The object of the expedition having been accomplished all the forces will now be withdrawn…” Grant informed Halleck the day before that he had heard from Columbus and no forces had left there for several days. That was the object of the mission – to prevent any troops from moving from Columbus to Bowling Green. On January 20 Grant wrote Halleck upon Grant’s return to Cairo the same day. Grant wrote he would prepare a report of the expedition but if Halleck would allow him to visit headquarters he would make the report in person. Grant mentioned he had not received anything official from C. F. Smith but he had information that Camp Beauregard had been destroyed (it was, by the rebels) and that the small expedition that had gone up the Tennessee River had landed two and a half miles below Fort Henry. Feis wants us to believe that since Grant requested a face-to-face meeting with Halleck before having a report from Smith that meant Grant had Columbus foremost on his mind as opposed to Forts Henry and Donelson. What Feis does not tell us is that, while Grant did not have a report from Smith, he had a report from Lt. Phelps detailing how Phelps had feigned an attack on Fort Henry on January 17 with two gunboats and a steamer with 500 infantry aboard under the orders of Smith. (ORs of the navy, page 507) The premise that Grant asked for a meeting with Halleck without any information about Smith’s foray up the Tennessee is false because Phelps made a foray up the Tennessee and he made a report on it. Feis argued that Grant was fixated on Columbus and one of his reasons stated was “the lack of attention paid to the rivers before January.” That statement would come as a surprise to Flag-Officer Foote and Lt. Phelps. Here is a list showing the number of times the Navy sent a gunboat up the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers to “pay attention” to what was going on at Forts Henry and Donelson. This list is based on reports in the Official Records of the Navy. There could have been other trips. September 8, 1861 – (ORs, vol. 4, page 404). Right after Grant occupied Paducah a Lincoln gunboat was reported to have been seen on the Tennessee River 30 miles below Fort Henry. Grant left two gunboats at Paducah. Early on gunboat captains were warned to proceed cautiously up the rivers lest they encounter rebel masked batteries. October 19, 1861 – (ORN, vol. 22, page 374) – Lt. Phelps steamed the Conestoga up the Cumberland to Eddyville where low water prevented him from going further. October 27, 1861 – (page 379) – Lt. Phelps returned to Eddyville with a steamer transporting 300 infantry to attack a rebel camp near Eddyville. C. F. Smith (page 380) also wrote a report. October 30, 1861 – (page 396) – Commander Porter took the New Era up the Cumberland River to Ingram’s Shoals where the Confederates had blocked the river with sunken barges. Ingram Shoals was approximately 30 miles below Dover. Porter was to pick up volunteers who wanted to join the US army. Porter wrote he heard about Fort Henry and that with his boat they could take it. November 6, 1861 – (page 394) Lt. Phelps managed to get his boat over Ingram Shoals and proceeded to within three miles of Fort Donelson. Phelps returned to Paducah, made his report and noted he was leaving again, immediately, to the same location to try to stop the trading going on. On page 427 of the ORN is a report by C. F. Smith of November 8, 1861 giving details of the forts on the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. Smith noted that Lt. Phelps is constantly moving his vessel up and down the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. November 17, 1861 – (page 435) – Lt. Phelps wrote a long report about his trip up the Cumberland River to as close to Fort Donelson he could get. He noted that he had done this several times already. On page 451 is a report by Foote dated December 5 noting that four gunboats have arrived and he needs men to man them. As soon as he gets them he wants to go up the Tennessee River and destroy rebel boats and a battery. December 8, 1861 – (page 457) – Lt. Phelps again steamed up the Cumberland to Fort Donelson and wrote a long report about his trip. December 10, 1861 – (page 461) – Lt. Phelps returned to Paducah and then immediately turned around and went back up the Cumberland to pick up refugees. He, again, made it close to Fort Donelson. January 6, 1862 – (Page 486) – Low water hampered operations on the rivers. Lt. Phelps wrote a long report about his close visit to Fort Henry. He added more information on Fort Donelson. He did this report on the same day Halleck wrote the order to Grant to make the demonstrations. I guess what constitutes “lack of attention” is in the eyes of the beholder. It took Halleck two days to approve Grant’s visit to St. Louis. He sent a telegram to Grant on January 22. C. F. Smith wrote letters about his undertakings on January 21 and 22. The January 21 letter spoke of the lousy road conditions. The January 22 letter is the one Smith mentioned that Fort Henry could be taken with two gunboats. Both of these letters were forwarded to Halleck on January 23. Grant made plans to leave for St. Louis the night of the January 23. Grant did not have Smith’s letters when he made the request for a visit to Halleck but he had them when he left for St. Louis. The idea that Feis put forth about Grant being a Johnny-come-lately to the idea that the true line of operations should be up the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers is contradicted by Col. John W. Emerson in a series of stories in the Jan-Apr-June issues of The Midland Monthly. The title is “Grant’s Life in the West.” Starting on pages 114-119, continued on 219-221, Emerson recounts the circumstances of how Grant, in August of 1861, identified the true line of operations for Federal advance to be the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. Grant laid out a plan and through his benefactor, Elihu Washburne, submitted it to President Lincoln. Of interest on pages 409-411 is an account of Grant’s meeting with Halleck in St. Louis. https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015011958785&view=1up&seq=6 Emerson referenced an account by John Thayer in McClure’s magazine, Vol. V, June to Nov. 1895, “Grant at Pilot Knob,” 433-437. Thayer wrote about Grant having plans about a campaign up the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers while he was at Pilot Knob in August 1861. https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015030656162&view=1up&seq=7 Luckily, I had a copy of Bruce Catton’s. Grant Moves South. Catton discusses the Emerson and Thayer articles. (pages 28-30) Catton points out some inconsistencies but does not downright reject these accounts as these are men who were there. However, there are some aspects in the accounts which are new to me and I had not heard them before so a little more digging is required. The point is that Grant, like many others, recognized the military significance of expeditions up the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. Grant also discussed attacks on Columbus from early on. Grant wrote in his memoirs that on January 6 he wanted to meet with Halleck and present a plan for expeditions up the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. The idea that he was going to convince Halleck to let him move against Columbus makes no sense. There were about 13,000 men at Columbus behind fortifications and abatis. On January 6 Halleck wrote the President and informed him that he had 15,000 men at Cairo, Fort Holt and Paducah. Leaving guards at those places meant his available force was around 10,000 which is about the number he ordered out on the demonstrations. As Halleck wrote it would be madness to try to do anything significant (like attack Columbus) with such a small number. Grant asked for a meeting with Halleck in a letter dated Jan. 20. That does not mean he was going to take off for St. Louis without having heard from C. F. Smith. He wanted to give Halleck a report of the demonstrations in person. Grant made his departure after he received Smith’s letters. Grant has the sequence wrong in his memoirs because he did ask for the meeting before reading Smith’s letter which confirmed his view. Feis’s claim that Grant was fixated on Columbus and only changed his direction later is an analysis too contrived for me. When you factor in all the mistakes Feis made in his book and other evidence not included his conclusion fails. For instance, Feis wrote on page 63 that Smith found the roads horrible and that Grant, therefore, “knew that any reinforcements sent from Columbus to aid Fort Henry would be unable to get there very fast.” But any infantry going from Columbus to Fort Henry could have taken the railroad from Columbus to Danville on the Tennessee River where Tilghman, commander at Fort Henry, could have sent a couple steamboats to pick up the troops and take them to Fort Henry. Grant and Foote formed a tag team to hound Halleck to let them move against Fort Henry. But Foote claimed that Grant originally wanted to go up the Cumberland against Fort Donelson. Early reports had Fort Donelson as weaker than Fort Henry. Foote wrote in a report (ORN, page 314) to Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy, November 13, 1862, that when four of the ironclads were ready Foote proposed to Grant to take the boats and 6,000 troops and attack Fort Henry. Foote wrote that Grant preferred to attack Fort Donelson on the Cumberland. Foote claimed he convinced Grant to attack Fort Henry if Halleck’s agreement could be obtained. No dates are given but I assume this occurred before Grant went to see Halleck in St. Louis. Grant returned to Cairo after his rebuff from Halleck the morning of Jan. 28. Perhaps it is on his return that Foote convinced Grant to get Halleck to agree to let them attack Fort Henry for it is on Jan. 28 that both Grant and Foote sent telegrams to Halleck to let them take Fort Henry. (Grant Papers, vol. 4, page 99) Grant followed through with another telegram on Jan. 29 and Halleck, finally, gave his consent on Jan. 30. Halleck’s time frame had him ordering an advance in mid-February. What convinced him to go now was not the telegrams from Foote and Grant. But those telegrams showed Halleck that those two were ready and itching to attack the rebels now. On Jan. 29 Halleck received a short telegram from McClellan (ORs, vol. 7, page 571) passing along information from a deserter that Beauregard was ordered to Kentucky to assist Johnston and that he was coming with 15 regiments. Of course, it wasn’t true but Halleck acted as if it was. He sent McClellan a telegram on January 30 (ORs, vol. 7, page 571) telling him that his telegram had been received and that Grant and Foote would be immediately ordered to attack Fort Henry so as to take possession before Beauregard showed up. As further confirmation that it was the Beauregard news that prompted Halleck to act on February 6 Halleck telegraphed McClellan and ended with the sentence “I was not ready to move, but deemed best to anticipate the arrival of Beauregard’s forces.” I have searched in vain for any reaction from Halleck to the fact he sent out the demonstrations in early January based on his belief Buell was about to move against Bowling Green and that never happened. Then Halleck ordered the advance on Fort Henry because McClellan told him Beauregard was coming west with 15 regiments and that never happened either. When Grant wrote his memoirs it was 20 years after the events. He has some details wrong but his remembrance that when he requested to meet with Halleck in January of 1862 to propose a movement up the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers because that was the true line of operations is not fiction. Sure, Grant was interested in taking Columbus but in early January there were more Confederates at Columbus behind fortifications and abatis than Grant could muster against them. Anyway, Halleck was calling the shots, not Grant, and Halleck had no intention of sending a force against Columbus. The movement against the center of Johnston’s defensive line was an obvious military objective. The idea was put forth by many people so no one is given the credit for thinking of it. Grant noted this when he wrote to his benefactor, Elihu Washburne, on March 22, 1862. From Bruce Catton’s, Grant Moves South, page 29; “Grant wrote to Washburne saying that it was idle to give credit for the move up the Tennessee to any specific general; the strategic soundness of the plan was obvious, he said—‘General Halleck no doubt thought of this route long ago, and I am shure I did.’” Hank
  16. 2 points
    Randolph. He was not a slave because Johnston had manumitted him when Johnston went to the west coast. Randolph, or Ran, went with Johnston to California as a free man and received wages for his services as cook. Johnston also wrote that Ran was a good with the mules. (Source: Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston by Colonel William Preston Johnston)
  17. 2 points
    67th Tigers Thanks for providing clarity and documentation supporting Confederate troop numbers and identity of units assigned to Fort Donelson before the surrender of 16 FEB 1862. Another source of information: Prisoner of War records. The approximately 12000 Rebel prisoners were progressively shipped north after February 16th to Camp Douglas, Illinois (about 8000 men), Camp Morton, Indiana (3000) and Camp Chase, Ohio (800). These records are accessible at Family Search via the link https://www.familysearch.org/search/collection/1916234. [Click on "Browse through 51108 images" for record access. Free account with Family Search required for access to their records -- takes two minutes.] In addition, it appears one unit was assigned to Fort Donelson, but for some reason was posted opposite the fort, on the east bank of the Cumberland River. Scott's Louisiana Regiment (of cavalry) may have been kept on the other side of the river, on the orders of General Buckner, due to a recent outbreak of measles in the regiment. The location proved fortuitous, because the regiment was not surrendered; after February 16th Scott's Louisiana made its way east, passed through Nashville, and is next reported ahead of Buell's Army of the Ohio in March, likely responsible for destroying the bridge over Duck River near Columbia. Cheers Ozzy
  18. 1 point
    In March/ April 1864 a massive inspection of Confederate Artillery was conducted by BGen W. N. Pendleton, Chief of Artillery, Army of Northern Virginia as ordered by General Samuel Cooper. The results of that inspection, listing names of batteries, names of commanders (and other significant officers), battles engaged, losses incurred, current requirements, date and location of initial muster are to be found in OR ser.1 vol.32 (part 3) pages 684 - 709. The best collection of information, confirming the presence at Shiloh of particular artillery is included in Notes of the report attributed to LtCol J. H. Hallonquist (pages 697 - 709) although the earlier pages of the report (684 - 697) also contain details of batteries known to have been at Shiloh. This link works well: https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=coo1.ark:/13960/t9g458x7p&view=1up&seq=690 [OR 32 pt3 pp.684 - 709].
  19. 1 point
    Good point there. I found this. I thought I might, as I had seen Ellis' name come up in regards to Cleburne and Forrest. "Ellis, Powhatan, Papers, 1856–1890. 1,592 items. Mss1EL595a. Contains the papers of Powhatan Ellis (1829–1906) of Richmond. Included in the collection is an undated autobiographical sketch by Powhatan Ellis containing a brief outline of his service during the war on the staffs of Lloyd Tilghman, Bushrod Rust Johnson, Patrick Ronayne Cleburne, William Wirt Adams, William Wing Loring, William Thompson Martin, Leonidas Polk, Stephen Dill Lee, Richard Taylor, and Nathan Bedford Forrest (section 55)." Link: https://www.virginiahistory.org/collections-and-resources/how-we-can-help-your-research/researcher-resources/guides-researchers-3--4
  20. 1 point
    well now i am, comfused..i rad where 72nd was down skirmish fighting around owl creek bridge..not at crump landing..guess ive not heard the rest of the story.
  21. 1 point
    Thanks for these details! Pieces of the puzzle that start to form a picture. I like the Dodge staff photo. John King joined Ford's Independent Cavalry. Ford was from Ottawa, Il as was WHL Wallace. Thanks gain for the pains taking research. RBN
  22. 1 point
    He just needs to visit Shiloh and will discover it was not just a "little" battle...
  23. 1 point
    Memoirs of Francis T. Moore, 2nd Illinois Cavalry Serendipity. The result of research by which something truly interesting is uncovered while searching for something else. Such occurred with the subjects of this post, revealed as more neglected members of the team associated with Brigadier General Prentiss. In part because of my recent exchange with Rbn3 the search for information regarding the staff of General Prentiss was done in a different way; a modification or two applied to the search terms. And in consequence a Hit returned that revealed the existence of Francis T. Moore. A carriage maker from Quincy, Moore enlisted as a Private in the Adams County Dragoons in Summer 1861; that unit became Company L of the 2nd Illinois Cavalry. And before Summer was over Private Moore and Company L found themselves in Missouri, operating in vicinity of Pilot Knob and Iron Mountain, and incorporated onto Prentiss's staff as his bodyguard. While performing that duty, Company L was present for “the second seniority dispute” IRT Prentiss vs. BGen Grant. As Francis Moore later wrote: “We were just informed that General Prentiss had been superseded by General Grant; no reason given, but there must be some cause. And it was a shame General Prentiss had to go, because he was well liked by the entire command, and we shall be sorry to lose him.” Revealing what was known at the time of Grant, Moore states: “He was late Colonel of the 21st Illinois. We have had no access to newspapers for days, perhaps weeks; so we have no knowledge of what has taken place and why... General Grant we know little or nothing of. He was an officer in the Mexican War and belongs to the Regular army.” [And the brief affiliation of Company L with General Prentiss came to an end... Interesting that “Captain Grant” and “regular army” were successfully traded as valid currency for Civil War rank and status.] This Memoir was created by Francis T. Moore (who eventually rose to Captain of Company L) after the war, making use of newspaper clippings, Harper's Weekly magazines, and his own daily diary. The Grant versus Prentiss dispute is contained pages 30 – 35 and also features thorough description of the Battle of Belmont. Period sketches created by the author are scattered throughout. And a clear depiction of Civil War cavalry tactics, and how they evolved during the four years is presented. Captain Moore wandered further and further afield from Quincy after the war, and eventually found himself in California. While resident of National City he wrote his Memoirs; and they mostly rested on a shelf, unread, in the Special Collections of University of California at San Diego until noticed by a Librarian. She and her husband had a read, tidied them up, and re-released them in 2011 on amazon.com as “The Story of My Campaign: the Civil War Memoirs of Captain Francis T. Moore, Second Illinois Cavalry.” Cheers Ozzy References: https://www.hsqac.org/quincy-s-memoir-chronicles-civil-war Bio of Francis Moore of Quincy Illinois. https://books.google.com.au/books?id=c628DwAAQBAJ&pg=PT2&lpg=PT2&dq=Memoir+of+francis+t.+moore+2nd+illinois+cavalry&source=bl&ots=9QuxmcYR_6&sig=ACfU3U0kZbRdj2CRpBZFmE4PqiUBiC99_g&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiykI3-2-ToAhXFxzgGHXG6B4IQ6AEwB3oECAsQKA#v=snippet&q=Prentiss&f=false Limited access to "The Memoirs of Captain Francis T. Moore" https://www.amazon.com/Story-My-Campaign-Captain-Illinois/dp/0875804411 Full access to "The Memoirs of Captain Francis Moore" (2011) by Thomas Bahde, with Forward by Michael Fellman. N.B. At the end of the war, Francis Moore revealed that his favorite Generals were Grant and Grierson. [And “Grierson” is the other search term I used to find this Memoir.]
  24. 1 point
    Andy Valid points. As Captain John Pope, that officer rode in company with President-elect Lincoln aboard the Inauguration Train from Springfield. John Pope was afterwards installed as Senior Brigadier General from Illinois. And later, John Pope was acknowledged as The Successful Commander at the extremely difficult venture, Island No.10 (which involved coordination with Navy ironclads, Steiner's balloon, special raider operations, marching across thirty miles of swampland, cutting a 9-mile canal for steamboats through that swampland... And then, Major General Pope was accorded credit for "causing the Rebel Army to dissolve before his very eyes" on account of his pursuit of Beauregard's Army 35 miles south of Corinth in June 1862. Despite the fact Pope's (and Halleck's) reports of Unbelievable Success at and after Corinth were inflated, and thus, unbelievable... The co-Commanders-in-Chief of the Union Army (President Lincoln and Secretary of War Stanton) were willing to believe any tales of Success... and especially after McClellan's Peninsula Campaign came to nothing in early July 1862. Right place, at the right time, for Pope AND Halleck. Reference: OR 10 pp.236 - 278 make for shocking reading, as Pope and Halleck justify their determination to halt pursuit south of Corinth and concentrate instead on rebuilding the South's damaged railroads.
  25. 1 point
    Head-quarters Military Division of the Mississippi Prof. Henry Coopee, Philadelphia Dear Sir: In the June # of the United States Service Magazine I find a brief sketch of Lt. General U S Grant, in which I see you are likely to perpetuate an error, which Gnl Grant may not deem of sufficient importance to correct. To Gnl Buell's noble, able and gallant conduct, you attribute the fact that the disaster of April 6th., at Pittsburg Landing, was received, and made a victory of the following day. Ad Gnl Taylor is said, in his latter days, to have doubted whether he was at the battle of Buena Vista at all, on account of the many things having transpired there, according to historians, which he did not see, so I begin to so doubt whether I was at the battle of Pittsburg Landing of April 6th & 7th, 1862. Gnl grant visited my division about ten A. M., when the battle raged fiercest. I was then on the right, After some general conversation, he remarked that I was doing right in stubbornly opposing the progress of the enemy; and in answer to my inquiry as to cartridges, he told me that he had anticipated their want, anfd given orders accordingly; he then said his presence was more needed at the left. About two P.M. of the 6th, the enemy materially slackened his attack on me, and about four P. M., I deliberately made a line behind McArthur's drill field, placing batteries on chosen grounds, repelling easily a cavalry attack, and watched the cautious approach of the enemy's infantry, that never dislodged me there. I selected that line in advance of a bridge across Snake Creek, by which we had all day been expecting the approach of Lew Wallace's division from Crump's Landing. About five P. M., before the sun set, Gnl Grant again came to me, and after hearing my report of matters, explained to me the situation of affairs on the left, which was not as favorable; still the enemy had failed to reach the landings of the boats. We agreed that the enemy had expended the furore of their attack, and we estimated out loss, and approximately our then strength, including Lewis Wallace's fresh division, expected each minute. He then ordered me to get all things ready, and at daylight the next day to assume the offensive. That was before Gnl Buell had arrived, but he was known to be near at hand. Gnl Buell's troops took no essential part in the first day's fight, and Grant's army, though collected together hastily, green as militia, some regiments arriving without cartridges even, and nearly all hearing the dread sound of battle for the first time, had successfully withstood and repelled the first day's teriffic onset of a superior enemy, well commanded and well handled. I know I had orders from Gnl Grant to assume the offensive before I knew Gnl Buell was on the west side of the Tennessee. I think Gnl Buell, Col Fry. and others of Gnl Buell's staff, rode up to where I was about sunset, about the time Gnl grant was leaving me. Gnl Buell asked me many questions, and got off me a small map, which I had made for my own use, and told me that by daylight he could have 18,000 fresh men, which I knew would settle the matter. I understood grant's force was to advance on the right of the Corinth Rd and Buell's on the left, and accordingly at daylight I advanced my divison by the flank, the resistance being trivial, up to the very spot where the day before the battle had been the most severe, and then waited till near noon for Buell's troops to get up abreast, when the entire line advanced and recovered all the ground we had ever held. I know that with the exception of 1 or 2 severe struggles, the fighting of April 7 was easy, as compared with that of the 6th. I never was disposed, nor am I now, to question anything done by Gnl Buell and his army , and know that, approaching our field of battle from the rear, he encountered that sickening crowd of laggards and fugitives that excited his contempt and that of his army, who never gave full credit to those in the front line, who did fight hard, and who had at four P. M., checked the enemy, and were preparing the next day to assume the offensive. I remember the fact better than Gnl Grant's anecdote of the Donelson battle, which he told me then for the first time - that, t a certain period of the battle, he saw that either was ready to give way if the other showed a bold front, and he determined to do that very thing, to advance on the enemy when, as he prognosticated, the enemy surrendered. At four P.M., on April 6th, he thought the appearance the same, and he judged, with Lew Wallace's fresh division and such of our startled troops as had recovered their equilibrium, he would be justified in dropping the defensive and assuming the offensive in the morning. And I repeat, I received such orders before I knew Gnl Buell's troops were at the river. I admit that I was glad that Buell was there, because I knew his troops were older than ours, and better systemized and drilled, and his arrival made that certain which before was uncertain. l have heard this question much discussed, and must say that the officers of Buell's army dwelt to much on the stampede of some of our raw troops, and gave us too little credit for the fact that for one whole day, weakened as we were by the absence of Buell's army, long expected; of Lew Wallace's division only 4 miles off, and of the fugitives from our ranks, we had beaten off our assailants for the time. At the same time our Army of the Tennessee have indulged in severe criticism at the slow approach of that army which knew the danger that threatened us from the concentrated armies of Johnston, Beauregard and Braggs that lay at Corinth. In a war like this, where opportunities of personal prowess are as plenty as Backberries to those who seek them at the front, all such criminations should be frowned down; and were it not for the military character of your journal I would not venture to offer correction of a very popular error. I will also avail myself of this occasion to correct another common mistake in attributing to Gnl grant the selection of the battlefield. It was chosen by the veteran soldier Maj Gnl C F Smith, who ordered my division to disembark there, and strike the Charleston Railroad. This order was subsequently modified by his ordering Hurlbut's division to disembark there, and mine higher up the tennessee to the mouth of Yellow Creek, to strike the railroad at Burnsville. But floods prevented our reaching the railroad, when Gnl Smith ordered me in person also to disembark at Pittsburg, and take post well out, so as to make plenty of room, with Snake and Lick Creeks the flanks of a camp for the grand army of invasion. It was Gnl Smith who selected the field of battle, and it was well chosen. On any other we surely would have been overwhelmed, as both Lick and Snake creeks forced the enemy to confine his movements to a direct front attack, which new troops are better qualified to resist than where flanks are exposed to a real or chimerical danger. Even the divisions of that army were arranged in that camp by Gnl Smith's orders, my division forming as it were, the outlying pickets, whilst McClernand's and Prentiss' were the real line of battle, with W H L wallace in support of the right wing, and Hurlbut of the left; Lew Wallace's division being detached. all these subordinate dispositions were made by order of Gnl Smith, before Gnl Grant succeeded him to the command of all the forces up the Tennessee - headquarters at Savannah. If there was any error in putting that army on the W side of the Tennessee, exposed to the superior force of the enemy also assembling at Corinth, the mistake was not Gnl Grant's - but there was no mistake. It was necessary that a combat, fierce and bitter, to test the manhood of the two armies, should come off, and that was as good a place as any. It was not then a question of military skill and strategy, but of courage and pluck, and I am convinced that every life lost to us that day was necessary; for otherwise at Corinth, at Memphis, at Vicksburg, we would have found harder resistance, had we not shown our enemies that, rude and untutored as we then were, we could fight as well as they.
  26. 1 point
    As mentioned previously, John Fremont (promoted to Major General at start of the Civil War) was in Europe procuring small arms, artillery and cavalry equipment in April 1861 and is responsible for equipping Midwestern regiments – many of which fought at Shiloh – with modern equipment. On return to New York and Washington, Fremont debriefed President Lincoln and then set off for St. Louis, where he enjoyed a good working relationship with Brigadier General Nathaniel Lyon (until that man's death at Wilson's Creek in August 1861.) During his tenure as Commander, Department of the West, MGen Fremont constructed the defences that encircled St. Louis; extended the telegraph to the end of all Missouri railroad lines; initiated the Camp of Instruction at Benton Barracks; contracted for “Pook ironclads” and initiated a Corps of Telegraph Operators, and a Corps of Intelligence Collectors known as Jessie Scouts. He also managed to defuse a tense situation that erupted between Brigadier Generals Grant and Prentiss concerning seniority. But John Fremont, initially a Naval contractor and NOT a graduate of West Point was a Regular Army officer until he resigned in 1848 “due to irregularities” regarding his involvement regarding the soon-to-be State of California. During his military service, Army Officer Fremont instituted and promoted the U.S. Army Corps of Topographical Engineers about 1838; and then set off on treks of discovery across the West of America (these treks so caught the American imagination, that the trails blazed by Fremont and followed by settlers of the West earned him the name, “Pathfinder.”) A Corps of Topographical Engineers with interest in Civil War history (and generation of accurate Civil War maps) has recently departed from the internet and “gone dark.” While searching for their new online location, ran across ANOTHER topographical engineers site, with their own magazine: LIDAR. This group appears to have been established in 2010 and consists primarily of retired members of the U.S. Army Corps of Topographical Engineers... (or whatever the Army calls that group of map-makers, spatial engineers and topographical intelligence collectors today.) Their magazines (about six per year) occasionally include Civil War material, such as: https://lidarmag.com/2004/02/29/bookmarks-pathfinder-john-charles-frmont-and-the-course-of-american-empire-by-tom-chaffin-2/ John Fremont. http://lidarmag.com/wp-content/uploads/PDF/LIDARMagazine_Maune-TopographicEngineers_Vol6No3.pdf Explanation of Topographical Engineers. and this is the site for their archives: https://lidarmag.com/archives/ LIDARMagazine N.B. After leaving the Army, John Fremont made a fortune during the California Gold Rush. He invested much of his wealth in the purchase of small arms in Europe in May/ June 1861.
  27. 1 point
    Hello Idaho Native, when was the account you posted originally published? Hello Ozzy, yes indeed Sherman engaged in some serious 'CYA' and got away with never really having to answer for his arrogant dismissal of the overwhelming amount of intelligence of an impending attack in the days leading up to April 6th, even going so far as issuing an order to arrest Lieutenant Eagler of the 77th Ohio for his report of seeing the enemy to his front, which was not obeyed. No explanation of why he did not have the men entrench, and something that has always stood out to me, his odd placement of the camp of the 53rd Ohio, all alone with no close support, out in front of the army. Thanks.
  28. 1 point
    I saw this and wanted my fellow Shilohians to view what a two man front and advance looked like-- This is it-- just picture in your mind a line like this 2 milles long and 3 files like this one in depth. With all the flags, the Officers mounted in front, horse drawn cannons racing between the ranks-- the drums and the music--
  29. 1 point
    Issued by the War Department on 14 July 1862 (by order of Secretary of War Stanton, and signed by Adjutant General Thomas) General Orders No.78 begins: “The many evils that arise from giving furloughs to enlisted men, require that the practice shall be discontinued...” What “evils” are these? For those familiar with Henry Halleck's pet peeve, Abuse of the Furlough System, the second sentence in the document provides clarity: “Hospitals, provided with ample medical attendance, nurses, food, and clothing, are established by the Government, at great expense, not only near the scenes of active military operations, but in many of the Northern States...” In explanation, sick soldiers were no longer permitted to be sent home to recuperate from wounds or illness (except for Officers, who were exempt from G.O. No.78). And by force of Law, anyone violating this General Order was subject to Court-marshal. [Coincidentally, the Hill-Dix Cartel, which codified the Prisoner of War exchange and repatriation system, became effective 22 July 1862. General Orders No.78 effectively elevated the diagnoses of Army Surgeons to equate with the decisions taken by Colonels of Regiments in regard to men under their charge: once admitted to Hospital, it was unlawful to leave without receiving the authority of the Head Surgeon.] Note: for those who follow Private Cyrus Ballard's story, this is likely what led to his being recorded as "deserter." He absented himself from a Smallpox Hospital without authority. How does this relate to the Battle of Shiloh? Over 2000 Federal soldiers were taken prisoner during the April 1862 contest; and most of them were still confined in Southern prisons when the Dix-Hill Cartel took effect in July. One of the components of the Exchange system (as promoted by SecWar Stanton) involved the establishment of Camps of Instruction (which became better known as Parole Camps) where Federal soldiers, lately confined in Confederate prisons, and who were granted their departure “on their Parole” to return to the United States, on condition that “they do not take up arms or otherwise support the war effort of the North until properly exchanged” were confined by the Federal Government until “the proper exchange” took place. [It can be argued that Edwin Stanton initiated the Parole Camp system due to the fact he did not trust men allowed to return home “until properly exchanged” to again return to military service when notification arrived at their homes that their Exchange had been effected... without considering that almost all of these men in 1862 were Volunteers – not draftees – who had committed themselves to a Higher Calling.] The effect: All of the Shiloh Federal prisoners released from confinement in the South after Hill-Dix were processed out “on their Parole” at Libby Prison in Richmond; and then transported north. After seven months in confinement, many were dangerously unwell; and most had lost a significant portion of their pre-confinement body weight, some weighed less than half what they had in April 1862. Officers arrived at Annapolis Maryland, were granted thirty days of leave, and departed for homes across the Midwest. The enlisted soldiers arrived at Annapolis (or Portsmouth Grove in Rhode Island) and went into confinement at the Parole Camps in those locations. Sick soldiers were confined in the Parole Camp Hospital (which in the case of Annapolis was a “tent facility” two miles from downtown Annapolis.) Everyone waited until their Exchange came through; or in the case of Hospital patients, they got well and were exchanged... or they died. Portsmouth Grove buried over 100 former POWs (most from Missouri) in the Cemetery adjacent to the Parole Camp. Annapolis National Cemetery recorded over 2000 Federal burials before the end of the war. References: https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=hvd.hl27qz&view=1up&seq=362 General Orders No.78 of 14 July 1862 https://www.findagrave.com/cemetery/2690755/lovell-general-hospital-cemetery Portsmouth Grove Parole Camp Cemetery https://www.nps.gov/nr/travel/national_cemeteries/Maryland/Annapolis_National_Cemetery.html Annapolis National Cemetery
  30. 1 point
    I believe that I found it in Don Carlos Buell - Most Promising of All by Stephen D. Engle that as a "parlor trick" Buell would pick up his wife and place on the mantle of a fire-place to demonstrate his strength.
  31. 1 point
    Shiloh video by gaming guy The void being left by the inadequate teaching of History in public schools is being filled, in part, by an unexpected history advocate: the online gaming community. Dedicated to “authenticity” in recreating historic Battle Games, the school-age generation is being taught history, unawares, through participation in online games. With the above in mind... ran across this interesting video while searching for recent releases on Battle of Shiloh: “History Guy Gaming” has done other battlefield videos (Gettysburg, Antietam, Bull Run), and provided a review of the Battle of Shiloh game (Ultimate General) in 2017. His description of the events of April 1862 reflects the understanding of someone who was educated during the 1980 – 2000 period (with the summary of events and condensing of outcomes “necessary” to get through Civil War History in the least amount of time evident), but with obvious individual study undertaken. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=syQ6wKjcFzE "The Battle of Shiloh" by History Guy Gaming (published on YouTube 6 SEP 2019.) Following a brief introduction, the tour of Shiloh NMP begins at 3 minute mark, with the undeniable truth: “Visiting a battlefield results in better perspective and greater understanding.” At 3:55 mark the battle begins with Peabody's unauthorized patrol (conducted by Major Powell.) 6:00 The Union defense of Duncan Field. Unfortunately, the narrator uses a modern map, and is further led astray by the location of General WHL Wallace's mortal wounding. Now that a key Union defensive line is re-named as “The Thicket,” he comes to the wrong conclusion (that the Hornet's Nest was co-located with the site of Wallace's wounding.) Since all histories of the Battle of Shiloh prior to 2010 make mention of the Hornet's Nest, those seeking the location of that site during visits to the park will struggle just that little bit, from now on. 9:00 Sherman's experience with repelling Rebel attacks. [CSA mass grave visited.] 10:50 Shiloh Church. 13:30 The mistake of General Albert Sidney Johnston. 16:15 Hornet's Nest (part 2) 18:30 Ruggles Battery a.k.a. “Thunder in the Thicket” 18:45 General Johnston's mortal wound. 23:30 Albert Sidney Johnston's loss; and relevance to War in the West. 24:00 Indian mounds. 24:50 Union retreat to heights above Pittsburg Landing: Grant's Last Line (Buell arrives.) 27:10 Dill Branch: Union gunboats versus Rebel advance. 28:30 “Lick 'em tomorrow, though” – U.S. Grant. 28:40 Day Two (and Fallen Timbers) 30:00 Shiloh National Cemetery. 32:30 Visitor Center (and review). [The review of online game "Ultimate General: Battle of Shiloh" https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vj9sQKBu9U0 by History Guy Gaming on 30 DEC 2016.]
  32. 1 point
    One thing about electronic resources: existing references are subject to change without notice... The "Shiloh Animated Map" by American Battlefield Trust was upgraded middle of 2019 (although it just gained my notice, by accident, today.) After two views of the 18-minute presentation, I am impressed with the improvements incorporated; and I feel that the 2019 edition more accurately depicts the Battle of Shiloh than previously. Have a look, yourself; and feel free to comment: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tlhlk3bp-f4
  33. 1 point
    CSuniforms, Thanks for your contribution. As regards U.S. Grant's acknowledged ability to "write terse, concise orders," that is just one of many desired skills that can be taught to young leaders. [Whereas "the ability to ride a horse," so important in Grant's day, is a skill no longer deemed necessary... most of the time.]
  34. 1 point
    I had an interest in such a question on Grant years ago. I was researching US Grant and the Battle of Belmont, MO. fought on November 7th, 1861. I have not been able to get a definitive answer, but at one point, post WW 1, that the Staff at West Point tried to put together basically, a class or study on what makes a great and successful General. What traits are shared, what attributes, what brain power, what cognitive gift do they have and can it be taught to others. I do not think it went anywhere, but the attempt to try and understand US Grant as a Commander was done. What I saw in Grant was how he would listen to others. Get their views on a subject, attack, retreat, move and how to move-- then take a break, come back, and using all he heard give a succinct order that all had part in. Another was ability to write an order that was to the point and easy to understand. That he would rise at dawn, work all day, writing orders etc., then in the evening eat something and sit around the campfire and listen to jokes and bantering, he loved it. His War Secretary was asked what made Grant successful. His answer, "success?, we followed Grant because he was successful." He just did it---
  35. 1 point
    Just a couple more references to add to this McNairy County site: http://www.mcnairytnhistory.com/images/-_looking_back_ii.pdf "Looking Back at McNairy County" by Nancy Wardlaw Kennedy (2004) especially Page 3 (Table of Contents), Page 24 (Stantonville History) and Page 43 (Isham Forsythe connections). Names of interest, due to proximity to Hardin County and Pittsburg Landing include Duncan, Bell, Crump, Harrison, Adams, Chambers, Wright and Michie (Mickey). Locations mentioned include various ridges, church cemeteries and roads. Investigating one of the Church cemeteries led to discovery of: https://www.findagrave.com/cemetery/10240/memorial-search?firstName=&lastName=Michie&page=1#sr-54445076 Carter Cemetery (with Michie family burials). This cemetery is just east of Michie Tennessee, and about three miles south of Pebble Hill Cemetery (Pebble Hill Cemetery was adjacent to, or in close proximity to site of "Mickey's White House.") Because Carter Cemetery pre-dates the Civil War, there are likely burials of interest to SDG members.)
  36. 1 point
    For those interested in "what Civil War records are held at the National Archives?" the Guide to Civil War Records (1962) provides over 600 pages of detail. Some records (such as individual soldier CMSR -- combined military service records) are readily available (for a fee, ranging from $35 - $100). Others are only accessible by patrons and researchers fronting up to the National Archives at Washington D.C. Recommend begin pages 250 - 266 and expand enquiries from that explanatory segment. https://books.google.com.au/books?id=z8XhAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA490&lpg=PA490&dq=naval+historical+center+william+w.+McKean&source=bl&ots=famnoNNACR&sig=ACfU3U3sQ0wmtWOcWmHdqD8ISZe2fmmKLA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwiC0cuWmp3mAhVo6nMBHZruCtsQ6AEwBnoECAcQAQ#v=onepage&q=fishing&f=false
  37. 1 point
    I watched the Prentiss walk on You-Tube-- It was awesome, but there is an addition... At Fraley? Field and the first contact between the 3rd Miss Batt. and the 25th Missouri-- Professor Tim stated he believed the troops were armed with smoothbores... No they were not... Research shows the 25th MO. were issued Model 1842 rifles, .69 cal. firing big minies with long range rear sites and the Confederates some had rifles and even Sharps Rifles-- a very accurate and devastating weapon. The casualties were minimal-- not because of the use of smoothbores, but the darkness and distance between the contestants. At distances of 300 yards or more-- a soldier would have trouble sighting in and hitting a target-- especially when bullets are flying your way. The 16th Wisconsin were armed with the Class A Dresden Suhl Rifle, the 12th Michigan with .54 caliber Austrian rifles, and the 21st MO, Model 1842 rifled muskets, .69 caliber --all of them in Peabody's Brigade. The 23rd and 21st wore short jackets and bummers, the 18th Wisconsin in the State 5 button blouse and bummers some in black hats, and the 12th, I am still working on as to uniforms-- Tom
  38. 1 point
    [Henry Burnett from Wikipedia.] A big, burly man, Henry Burnett (had he participated in Battle of Shiloh) could have been the antithesis of Army of the Ohio officer, William “Bull” Nelson... Born in Virginia in 1825, Henry moved with his family to Kentucky while young and was educated at Hopkinsville. Entering local politics in 1850, Henry Burnett parlayed his experience into a run for National politics, and was elected as Member of Congress, representing Kentucky's First District in 1854. During the next six years, Congressman Burnett developed a reputation as gifted speaker of biting oratory, able to shame into silence opponents. With the nation edging towards Disunion, Henry Burnett threw his support behind the Cotton States. Returned to the U.S. House of Representatives following the Special Kentucky election of June 1861, Henry Burnett devoted his energy elsewhere: in response to Brigadier General Bull Nelson forming Union Camp of Instruction at Camp Dick Robinson, a rival training ground was named Camp Burnett. And Congressman Burnett organized a regiment of Kentucky troops to oppose Federal incursion into the State (and was elected Colonel of what became the 8th Kentucky Infantry, CSA.) In November, Colonel Burnett chaired the Russellville Convention, which created a shadow government for Kentucky and elected George W. Johnson as Governor (and which resulted in Kentucky getting the 13th star on the Confederate flag.) Sometime after the CSA Capital of Kentucky was established at Bowling Green, Henry Burnett took the field and joined the 8th Kentucky Volunteers. (And on December 3rd 1861 Mr. Burnett was expelled from the U.S. House of Representatives.) Present at Fort Donelson, Henry Burnett took advantage of a steamer evacuating General Floyd and General Pillow and other important people, and made his escape before the surrender. Henry Cornelius Burnett died in 1866. References: https://completely-kentucky.fandom.com/wiki/Henry_Cornelius_Burnett https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/8th_Kentucky_Infantry http://sites.rootsweb.com/~orphanhm/campboone.htm Camp Boone, Camp Burnett and the Orphan Brigade https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_United_States_Representatives_from_Kentucky https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fort_Donelson_Confederate_order_of_battle Colonel Burnett is not listed (but Generals Floyd and Pillow are...) https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn84024443/1862-02-28/ed-1/seq-1/#date1=1862&index=10&rows=20&words=Floyd&searchType=basic&sequence=0&state=Tennessee&date2=1862&proxtext=Floyd&y=0&x=0&dateFilterType=yearRange&page=1 Athens Tennessee Post of 28 FEB 1862 page one has details IRT Battle of Fort Donelson (and mentions the steamer used by General Floyd, General Pillow and 800 others to evacuate was the Anderson.) Elsewhere, this steamer is named as the "General Anderson."
  39. 1 point
    "How the Rebels went out, and We came In [to Nashville]" First of Nelson's force to enter; owner of the Flag flying over the State House. [From Gallipolis Journal of Ohio, 13 MAR 1862, page 2.]
  40. 1 point
    Bravo Zulu, Hank! Answer correct, and excellent summary of the January 1861 “situation” at Pensacola, provided for extra credit. For everyone else wondering, “What does Florida have to do with the Battle of Shiloh?” a reminder: Twenty percent of the Confederate participants at Shiloh had been members of Bragg's Army of Pensacola. Notable senior officers Withers, Jackson, Anderson, Ruggles, Gladden, Chalmers (and perhaps SAM Wood) all had experience in Pensacola/ Mobile. The regiments trained by Bragg at Pensacola were sent from Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, Florida and Louisiana. But the situation in regard to U.S. Navy officers sent west following outbreak of war in April 1861 is not generally considered: Andrew Hull Foote entered military service in 1822 and at the outbreak of the Secession Crisis was second-in-command at Brooklyn Navy Yard, biding his time, with retirement from the Navy in 1862 his likely future. Henry Walke “ruined” his Naval career with the Atlantic Squadron as result of being Court Martialed for “failure to follow orders.” Instead of continuing service with the deepwater Navy, Walke was “sent away west” and took command of USS Tyler (one of the early “stop-gap” gunboats, derisively termed “timberclads” (before the contracted ironclads were ready for service.) The point: "Did the U.S. Navy send their A - Team?" [From results achieved, one would claim, "YES!" ...however, surviving documents indicate otherwise.] Yours to ponder... Ozzy
  41. 1 point
    First time I visited Rio de Janeiro many years ago, I arrived by ship. The night before, from a distance of one hundred miles, a star appeared on the southern horizon that seemed to mark the location of Brasil's most reknowned city; and the ship adjusted course and aimed for the star. Curiously, that star did not rise, but remained in place, hovering just above the horizon... but did disappear with the rising of the sun. Of course, what I had seen was not a star, but the brightly illuminated Christ Redeemer Statue that is the symbol of Rio. Next day I went with friends to the top of Mount Corcovado to visit the statue with its welcoming outstretched arms: a small bronze plaque, about a foot square, gave details of the statue and its completion in 1931 ( designed by Heitor da Silva Costa, with assistance from artist Carlos Oswald and sculptor Paul Landowski.) And adjacent to the small plaque was an ENORMOUS sign, three yards wide and a yard high that proclaimed, “Lighting Provided by General Electric.” This story is provided to illustrate the similar feeling of utter disbelief I experienced upon investigating more closely the Thom Maps: “Map of Field of Shiloh” and “Map of the Country between Monterey and Corinth.” Because, boldly proclaimed on both of these beautiful, precise maps are names of commanders Halleck, Grant or Buell, with slightly smaller credit for construction of each map accorded to Staff Officer George Thom. But well away from these bold names, along one edge of each map (and requiring a magnifying glass to read): Otto H. Matz. Naturally, it could be assumed that Otto Matz was a West Point graduate, assisting George Thom with creation of these highly detailed charts, but such is not the case. Matz was born in Prussia in 1830, was trained at the Berlin Polytechnic Institute, and migrated to America while a young man. When the Civil War erupted, Otto Matz offered his services; and he soon found himself assisting Henry Halleck's staff officer, George Thom. When Henry Halleck (and Colonel Thom) were called east in July 1862, Major Matz remained in the west and was incorporated onto General Grant's staff (and assisted with the after-battle Map of Fort Donelson, the Map of Milliken's Bend, Louisiana, and produced maps used during the Vicksburg Campaign.) After the war, Otto Matz returned to Chicago and resumed his work as architect (and he was notably involved with rebuilding Chicago after the Great Fire of 1871.) He died in 1919. References: https://www.loc.gov/search/?fa=contributor:matz,+otto+h. [Some of the maps created by Otto Matz on file with Library of Congress.] http://bobrugo.us/GenealogyFiles/MatzPublic/WP01/WP01_023.HTM Otto H. Matz https://archive.org/stream/CityOfChicagoLandmarkDesignationReports/CourthousePlace#page/n1/mode/1up A Chicago creation of Otto H. Matz (see pp. 3- 4) SDG topic "Bushrod Johnson's Brigade, morning of 6 April" by Billy1977 (see post of 3 SEP 2016: the Thom maps).
  42. 1 point
    Well done, Mona! Captain Sheridan was indeed on the staff of Henry Halleck, and got himself “ordered to Pittsburg Landing” (but too late to take part in the Battle of Shiloh.) But, there is more to the story... Philip Sheridan was one of those officers who found himself “out West” as the Secession Crisis unfolded; and he left San Francisco to return east at about the same time General Albert Sidney Johnston departed California (except Johnston took the overland route, while Sheridan took the steamship to the Isthmus, then from Aspinwall to New York City.) Assigned to the 13th U.S. Infantry, Captain Sheridan headed for Missouri, and while in St. Louis in early November, dropped in to “say Hello” to Major General Henry Halleck (who had just taken over command, and had his HQ there.) MGen Halleck decided he needed an audit of General Fremont's papers and expenditures and Captain Sheridan, with recent experience with quartermaster duties, was put onto the job. Halleck appears to have been satisfied with the quality of Sheridan's work; and Captain Sheridan was next assigned to General Curtis, in a similar QM capacity. And Philip Sheridan, who was reknowned for short temper, impatience and “being argumentative at inappropriate times,” had a falling out with General Curtis in March 1862. Captain Sheridan got himself reassigned to Halleck; and General Halleck sent him north to acquire horses. It was while in Chicago that Captain Sheridan learned of the Battle of Shiloh, and got himself orders to Pittsburg Landing (and upon arrival MGen Halleck put Philip Sheridan under control of Colonel George Thom. But instead of making maps, Captain Sheridan was assigned to improving and building roads.) And along the way, Philip Sheridan struck up a friendship with General William Tecumseh Sherman: by early May, it appeared that General Sherman had come through with a Colonelcy for Sheridan, in command of a new Ohio regiment. But that fell through. Shortly afterwards, the Governor of Michigan (who happened to be in Tennessee visiting Michigan regiments) took notice of the “available West Point graduate” Philip Sheridan, and offered him Colonelcy of the 2nd Michigan Cavalry... which Sheridan accepted. And Colonel Sheridan took part in the March on Corinth. Reference: Personal Memoirs of Philip Sheridan, pages 120- 144.
  43. 1 point
    i believe he was acquiring horses at the time of the battle of Shiloh but came on and was quartermaster dept for gen Halleck on his approach to Corinth
  44. 1 point
    Mona Hope you are able to find what you are looking for. For possible assistance, the attached link is for Family Search, the Mormon Church ancestry search site provided free on the internet ( but requires two minutes to establish an account.) I've used Family Search with great success for the past ten years. https://www.familysearch.org/en/
  45. 1 point
    The following is an abridged article from Military Miscellanies, written by an officer who knew Grant at Shiloh and West Point: "One afternoon in June 1843 while I was at West Point, a candidate for admission, I wandered into the Riding Hall and became part of a large assembly of spectators, there to view the final mounted exercises of the graduating class. When the regular service was completed, the Riding Master placed the leaping-bar higher than a man's head and called, "Cadet Grant." A clean-faced, slender, blue-eyed young fellow, weighing about 120 pounds dashed from the line on a chestnut-sorrel horse and galloped down the opposite side of the hall. As he turned at the farther end and came into the straight stretch across which the bar was placed, the horse increased his pace, measured his stride, and bounded high into the air, and cleared the bar, carrying his rider as if man and beast were welded together. The spectators were breathless; but Cadet Grant remained a living image in my memory. "A few months before graduation one of Grant's classmates, James A. Hardie, said to his friend and instructor, "Well, sir, if a great emergency arises in this country during our lifetime, Sam Grant will be the man to meet it." If I had heard Hardie's prediction, I doubt not that I would have believed in it, for I believed the young man who had performed the feat of horsemanship I had witnessed could do anything. "I was not one of the so-called "Grant men" of the Army. It was not until after the war that I became well acquainted with him. But that acquaintance began with the cadet, and matured with the General; and was not disturbed by partiality or interest. I do not number myself among those who attempt to "lift him above the imperfections of man," but instead see him "as Great" in spite of his human frailties. Military men would call him "unsoldierly" in feeling, bearing and appearance. Yet he was a great General, and the most essential trait of soldiership -- obedience -- was next to a religion with him. He knew the value of discipline in an army, but he had neither taste nor aptitude for establishing or enforcing it, and instinctively relied more upon "the man" than upon "the soldier" in his dealings. He loves and cherishes his army associations above all others, but did not like the profession of arms. In a recent interview, I pressed him upon this matter -- his fondness for purely military affairs -- and the General selected a page from his collection and offered it me, upon which was recorded his intention (while a cadet) to prepare himself for a professorship in some institution of higher learning and leave the military service. "In disposition Grant presents as patient, kind and considerate. In manner, quiet, natural and unassuming; somewhat diffident, but not bashful or awkward. Although well educated, it is probably true that the first impression many have is of a plain man, without elements of greatness. Closer association rarely fails to promote firm belief in his extraordinary reserve power. Truth, courage, tenacity and self-reliance are his ruling traits: as General, he did not hesitate in choosing the best course. And if "the best course" was selected by higher authority, he would execute that plan with as much vigor and fidelity as if it had been his own. He did not trouble himself about the past or the future, but concentrated all his faculties upon the matter he was at the moment called upon by his duty to deal with. "Neither responsibility, nor turmoil, nor danger, nor pleasure, nor pain, impaired the force of his resolution, or interrupted the steady flow of his intellect. The war is full of illustrations of his bravery and determination of character, and of his self-reliance and self-possession under trying circumstances. " The General possesses some humor, and occasionally tells a story; but rarely indulges in figures of speech, and does not exaggerate or emphasize, even for the purpose of illustration. He makes no use of expletives, and has little use of adjectives. He would not indulge in profane language, even if he had no religious scruples on the subject. Though not without a temper, Grant is so patient and matter-of-fact that he never feels inclined to "damn things" as some men do. In conversation, he speaks freely and openly; but he does not talk for its own sake: speaking only because he has something to tell. If he does not wish to express his thoughts, he remains silent. "Grant has unlimited faith in those he has taken to heart; his friendships are accompanied by the fullest confidence. A friend "under fire" is never abandoned; and a friend in disgrace or in trouble can rely upon him until the General, himself, finds him guilty. "General Grant long thought himself badly treated by Halleck, yet I have only ever heard him say two or three things against General Halleck. Grant believed himself unjustly accused after Fort Donelson... "The bulk of Grant's admiration and friendship resides with Sherman, McPherson and Sheridan. The day before he started from Nashville to Washington in March 1864, to receive his commission as Lieutenant General, Grant wrote a letter to Sherman expressing a full sense of his obligations to subordinates, and saying, "I want to express my thanks to you and McPherson as the men to whom, above all others, I feel indebted for whatever I have had of success..." "During the war, Grant had antipathies as well as attachments: his relations to his generals would form a striking chapter of history. "The time has not yet come for final judgment of General Grant: he has benefited from great abilities, and great opportunities. "Chance" is undoubtedly an important factor in the race of Glory, and perhaps it favored Grant in the War of the Rebellion. General Sherman goes so far as to say, "Had C.F. Smith lived, Grant would have disappeared to history after Fort Donelson." But that is conjecture. Grant is one of the "singular few" who possessed qualities that would have gained for him a higher place in history, no matter who had lived to compete with him in our great War. We who met him face to face know." More details to come... Ozzy
  46. 1 point
    Besides family, the people who know us best are those we attended school with. Here are a couple of observations of Ulysses S. Grant (one of which you've probably encountered already. But the other...) "One day at West Point, as our section in mathematics was marching to recitation hall, Frank Gardner produced an old silver-cased watch, about four inches in diameter. It, as a curiosity, was passed along from one lad to another... it chanced to be in Grant's hands as we reached the door of the recitation room, and he tucked it into his tunic and buttoned it up. The regular Professor was absent; Cadet Z. B. Tower occupied his chair. He sent four cadets to the blackboards, Grant being one. Grant quickly solved his math problem, and turned to begin his demonstration, when all of a sudden the room was filled with a sound not unlike a Chinese gong. All looked amazed, and Tower, thinking the noise was in the hall, ordered the door closed. And that only made the matter worse. Grant, with a sober countenance, continued his demonstration. The racket ceased, and shortly afterwards, so did Grant. Tower had no idea from whence the noise came (Gardner had accidentally set the alarm on the ancient timepiece concealed in Grant's bosom.) Tower's bewilderment, and Grant's sobriety afforded us much amusement." Rufus Ingalls (USMA 1843) was known at West Point as "the Prince of Good Fellows." During the Civil War, he served as Chief Quartermaster of the Army of the Potomac; and one night during Spring of 1865, at City Point, he and General Grant and a few others were sitting around their camp fire. Conversation had lapsed into silence, which after a while was suddenly broken by Grant exclaiming: "Ingalls, do you expect to take that yellow dog of yours into Richmond with you?" Ingalls nodded. "Oh yes, General. You see, he belongs to a long-life breed." Silence returned, but many of the witnesses had to remove themselves for a time...
  47. 1 point
    Uniform and Flag stories from Shiloh These are some of the interesting incidents involving uniforms and flags at Battle of Shiloh: the 12th Illinois Infantry changed out of its old grey uniform into blue during the march to battle, morning of April 6th 1862; at least one "friendly fire" incident occurred, involving Rebel troops shooting their own due to the wearing of dark blue (or black) jackets; recent volunteers signed into Union service at Savannah during March/April 1862 ( 40th Illinois, 46th Ohio and 14th Iowa) may not have been issued with proper uniforms prior to Battle of Shiloh; the Jessie Scouts wore Rebel uniforms when performing their duties (but wore a distinctive scarf or armband -- usually white -- upon return to Union lines to avoid being shot by friendly troops) the "Stars and Bars" Flag (1st CSA National Flag) continued to pose problems at Shiloh (misidentified as American Flag) at least one Confederate regiment was ordered to wear its jackets inside out (with cream-coloured liner obscuring the dark colour of the uniform jacket) everyone knows the "white flag" represents surrender; but at the time of Shiloh, the "yellow flag" meant Hospital (and sometimes a "red flag" was used) ambulance wagons and steamers pressed into Hospital service usually carried no marker (and Hospital boats were sometimes used to carry munitions) when representatives from General Beauregard travelled to Richmond, end of April, to present the General's Shiloh Report to President Davis, they also carried with them 28 flags, banners and pennants captured at Shiloh. Cheers Ozzy
  48. 1 point
    Oh please dont get Jim started again!
  49. 1 point
    Brent, in addition to the excellent sources that Ozzy provided, here is a very good article on the 47th Tennessee at Shiloh that I came across a while back. It's written by a historian named Sean Michael Chick, who has authored a book on Petersburg: https://emergingcivilwar.com/2016/09/08/the-47th-tennessee-infantry-at-shiloh/ Unfortunately, with one exception, he doesn't list any sources, but he does appear to have done some serious research on the regiment. He also includes a picture of Colonel Hill, adding in the comments that he found it online. I don't know if that means he's uncertain of its authenticity, but he did include the image with the article. He looks like a good source of information about the regiment. The one source that he mentions, in the article itself, is the West Tennessee Whig newspaper. Also, the University of Memphis has a collection of letters from Private John J. Davis of the 47th Tennessee, written to his wife. I was able to download a pdf of the transcribed letters, or perhaps transcribed portions of the letters, I'm not certain. Here's the link to the overview page: http://uldr.memphis.edu/vital/access/manager/Collection/vital:109 And the page where you can download the pdf file: http://uldr.memphis.edu/vital/access/manager/Repository/vital:1890?root=vital%3A109 While checking the Tennessee State Library and Archives for something on the West Tennessee Whig, I also came across a listing for a small book or pamphlet on the 47th Tennessee written by a Brent Cox. Would that be you? Perry
  50. 1 point
    On April 4, I propose to follow a portion of the route of Trabue's Brigade taken during the action of April 6. I am still working out the exact details of the route, but I may start at Water Oaks Pond. Buskwacking will be required for much of the excursion (Gentsch and Skapteson have trained me well). I will not have prepared much commentary beyond Trabue's report in the OR. If I am reading Dr Gentsch's synopsis of his April 6 morning Assault on the Federal Right Flank hike correctly, my excursion will pick up where his ends. I expect to start at about 1400 on April 4 and suspect that the jaunt will take a couple of hours to complete. I would be delighted others would join me. Please drop me a note if you would like to participate, so that we can exchange telephone numbers. I will be driving downrom Louisville earlier on the 4th and will need to contact you in the event that my approach to the battlefield is even more delayed than Buell's.
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