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  1. 3 points
    Most people reference Gott's book when giving Confederate strength at Fort Donelson. Gott mostly uses the "tabular statement" compiled at the time: He then proceeds to make a few imputations for units not included above. Investigation has shown that every unit he imputed is already in this list. They are: Culbertson's Battery of 300; these were the men manning the water battery, but were detachments from units in the list. The battery was manned by Maury's (Ross') battery, Coy A of 30th TN and Coy A of 50th TN. These units are on the list, and Gott double counts them. Melton's scouts are listed in the table as having 15 men. Gott gives them 58. Major Fielding Gowan's Tennessee cavalry squadron is listed on the table as having 60. Gott estimates 170. The Kentucky cavalry coys were attached to Forrest's regiment, and are included in it (see the returns below). Gott doesn't list sources, but gives Huey's coy an incredible 112. Also, for no reason Gott added 150 surrendered to the 48th TN. Finally, there is an addition error in his artillery table. We also have the returns for the formations a mere two weeks prior to Fort Donelson: Of these formations, the majority of the 4th Division, the whole of Floyd's "division" and Clark's brigades, and the artillery and 7 regiments of Buckner's division were at Donelson. Fortunately Buckner broke down the regiments strengths in his report and it is close to 7/12ths of his January return, and can be accepted. The PFD at Donelson can be (over)estimated thus: Thus the estimate of 13,000 given by the likes of Pillow seems accurate. Note that the highest figure given by any confederate is by Preston Johnston, but he double counted Clark's and Floyd's brigades. Removing the double counts give 15,000, which is consistent with the returns.
  2. 3 points
    Thanks for this. Another little piece of Civil War Chicagoiana to add to my collection. Rumsey was late to his own funeral...but for a poignant reason.
  3. 3 points
    I located Sgt. William H. Busbey's post-war article about his being near Grant's Savannah headquarters and on Tigress during the trip to Pittsburg Landing on April 6th in the Chicago Inter-Ocean. Some obvious errors make it not completely reliable, and it may be completely unreliable, but it does make for interesting reading: "I was at Savannah in April, 1862, associated with the work of the Adams Express company . Myself and another young man employed in the same office were sleeping on the night of April 5 in a house in Savannah three or four blocks from the river. General Grant's headquarters at Savannah were in a house very close to the river. We were on higher ground than he was, and about daylight on the morning of April 6 the young man sleeping with me jumped out of bed with the exclamation, 'There's firing up at the Landing.' We could hear very distinctly the boom of cannon, and when we went to the east window we could hear, or thought we could hear, the sound of musketry. Pittsburg landing was nine miles away, but in the still morning air the roar of musketry came to us." "We dressed hurriedly, ran down to General Grant's headquarters, where we found General Webster, chief of artillery, in his night shirt on the porch listening intently to the sound of firing. We saw him run into the house, and another officer came out with him. They listened a minute, ran in again, and General Grant came out in his night dress. The three figures stood like statues while Grant listened, and then the General gave an order that put everything in a whirl. Ned Osborne of Chicago was at that time in command of Grant's headquarters guard, and under excitement he was a very active man." "In a few minutes staff officers were awake and dressed, the escort was mounted and ready to go, and the General and staff boarded at once the steamer Tigress. I remembered as I looked over the steamers at the landing tht the Tigress was the only vessel that had steam up, and comprehending that Grant would go on that vessel, my comrade and myself went down and climbed on in advance of the General and his staff. There was a ittle wait for the escort and horses of the officers, but when all were on board the steamer did not move. Inquiry developed the fact that neither the captain nor the pilot was awake or had received any notice of the journey. They were stirred up in short order, and soon the Tigress started up the river for Pittsburg Landing." "About four miles above Savannah we came to Crump's landing. General Lew Wallace, in command of the division at that point, was on the steamer Jessie K. Bell. When we came up within fifty yards of the Bell, Grant shouted to Wallace, asking if he had any news from the front. Wallace shouted back saying that a courier had just arrived with the report that Sherman had been attacked by a heavy force. Grant, with great intensity of manner, asked: 'Does the dispatch say a heavy force?' Wallace replied that it did and Grant ordered the captain of the Tigress to make all possible speed for Pittsburg Landing." "As we started General Wallace shouted in surprise: 'General Grant, have you no orders for me?' and Grant, after thinking a moment, shouted back, 'Hold yourself in readiness to march.' Then we steamed away, but in a few minutes Ross came to me and said: 'It is a general attack this time, sure.' I asked him how he knew and he said that Captain Baxter had just received orders from Grant to take a steam tug and carry orders back to General Wallace to move at once and take position on the right of the Union force engaged in battle. We arrived at Pittsburg Landing in a short time and General Grant rode away at once toward the front." [The article went on about Busbey's experiences in the battle, including hauling guns up the bluff for Webster, the boats in the river, and Mother Bickerdyke.]
  4. 2 points
    as to #3..the stream in question at stoney lonesome..is a wet weather water-run from the springs north of stage rd and s\does continue south..older people that live along the stage road in this area retell of the large,deep cold swimming holes that they as kids played in..so there is a water feature in this area..also Purdy is more northwest of adamsb\ville than the map shows.
  5. 2 points
    From the Washington Post: http://www.washingto...36b8_story.html By Tony Horwitz, It’s often said that journalists write the first rough draft of history. But rarely do reporters draft history in quite so rough a fashion as Junius Browne and Albert Richardson did in the Civil War. (PublicAffairs) - ‘Junius and Albert's Adventures in the Confederacy: A Civil War Odyssey’ by Peter Carlson The two Northern correspondents narrowly escaped death in an artillery bombardment, only to be captured by Confederates. For 593 excruciating days, they skirmished with lice in Southern prisons as the real war raged on without them. Then, after a jailbreak and a harrowing trek through enemy territory, the reporters filed the story of a lifetime: their own. Peter Carlson narrates this tale of journalistic derring-do in “Junius and Albert’s Adventures in the Confederacy.” This title, which echoes the 1989 slacker film “Bill & Ted’s Excellent Adventure,” undersells the gravity of the reporters’ experience. But it’s also appropriate, because Carlson’s book unspools like a buddy flick: Two larkish fellows embark on a trip that goes desperately wrong and often veers into farce. At the start of the Civil War, Browne and Richardson belonged to the self-styled “Bohemian Brigade,” a journalistic troupe of insouciant thrill-seekers who gallivanted along the front. Like other reporters of that era, they made no pretense to objectivity and freely expressed the staunch abolitionism of their employer, the New York Tribune. Nor did they let the facts get in the way of a good story. At one point, to avoid being scooped by a competitor, Browne and a colleague composed “long, vivid, eyewitness accounts of a battle that occurred 200 miles beyond their eyesight,” Carlson writes. Their fabrications ran at length in the Tribune, a stunt that made the writers legendary among the Bohemian Brigade. But these cavalier “knights of the quill,” as Browne called them, also risked their lives to cover combat. In May 1863, Browne and Richardson tried to sneak past rebel cannon at Vicksburg aboard a Union barge filled with hay. An incoming shell burned and killed half the soldiers on board. The survivors were fished out of the Mississippi and jailed. It was customary at the time to quickly release or swap captured journalists. But Browne and Richardson wrote for the paper most hated in the South; the Confederate in charge of prisoner exchanges called them “the worst and most obnoxious of all non-combatants.” Also, soon after their capture, the warring parties suspended prisoner exchanges. So the men were shuttled among jails, including Richmond’s notorious Castle Thunder, before ending up at North Carolina’s Salisbury Prison, a mini-Andersonville where men perished in droves from exposure, disease and shootings by guards. Carlson’s story has so many twists, right up to the last page, that I won’t spoil it by telling more. But the exquisite plot is only one of the joys of reading this book. As a veteran journalist (including 22 years at The Washington Post), Carlson captures the competitive yet collegial world of reporters in the field and their tortured relationship with distant editors. He also has an ear for quotes and an eye for detail, and shares with the Bohemian Brigade a keen sense of the ridiculous. Though the Northern reporters were hated Yanks, they were also curiosities. So Southerners flocked to visit the inmates — and to declare their willingness to “die in the last ditch” for the Cause. This line was repeated so often, Carlson writes, that it became a running gag for the reporters: “Where is this ditch? How deep is it? They’re going to need a very big ditch to hold all these Rebels who keep promising to die in it.” He also quotes the absurd reports in Southern papers, including this one on Gettysburg: “The Confederates were repulsed but cannot, at present, with justice or candor, be said to have suffered defeat.” Carlson excels as well at drawing characters, particularly the odd couple at the heart of his book. Browne, the well-schooled son of a banker, was a bookish scribe who filled his florid dispatches with Classical allusions. Richardson, a rugged farm boy, was plainspoken and ingratiated himself with all he met. Yet the two became inseparable and sustained each other through hardships and despair that neither could endure alone. “The North for us is like the grave,” Richardson wrote, after letters stopped reaching inmates, “no voice ever comes back to us from it.” If there’s a flaw in this fine book, it’s that Carlson tells his story almost too well. He’s shorn away anything that might interrupt the flow of his taut, lively narrative. This makes for a rollicking read, but at times I wanted more context and reflection — on the telegraph, for instance, a technology that transformed the news business in the mid-19th century as dramatically as the Internet has changed the media in our own time. Also, while Carlson details his deep research in the book’s endnotes, his text doesn’t address whether Browne and Richardson were reliable sources in the telling of their own story. Given the flagrant bias and outright fictions that Carlson documents in the dispatches of the Bohemian Brigade, I doubted some of the witty repartee and incredible adventures that Browne and Richardson recalled, much of it in books they wrote after returning home. But even if the two men embellished, their ordeal has resonance far beyond its drama and drollery. The reporters were forced into close, extended contact with captured Northerners and Southerners of every stripe — deserters, slaves, brutish guards, mountain guerrillas — and they experienced the behind-the-lines horror of the conflict. As a result, they witnessed, and later exposed, a theater of the war that was barely known to their colleagues at the front or to the Northern public. This remains an aspect of the Civil War that is little known to most Americans. The journalists’ experiences of both battle and captivity also speak to the enduring challenge of war reporting. Upon seeing combat for the first time, Browne wrote, “No one here seems to have any knowledge of anything, the leading officers having little more information than the privates.” As Carlson acutely notes, Browne’s one-line observation “sums up the ‘fog of war’ so well that it could be included in nearly every battle dispatch in every war ever fought.” Tony Horwitz is the author of “Confederates in the Attic” and “Midnight Rising: John Brown and the Raid That Sparked the Civil War.” Jim
  6. 2 points
    On January 10, 1861 the state of Florida became the third state to secede from the Union. One of the first items on the agenda was to send Florida state militia to seize the navy yard at Pensacola along with Fort McRee, Fort Barrancas and Fort Pickens. On January 9 the navy transported the command of Lt. Slemmer from Fort Barrancas to Fort Pickens due to the trouble brewing. On the big day, January 12, 1861, Commodore Walke was in command of a stores ship appropriately named Supply. He was anchored near Fort Pickens assisting Lt. Slemmer in delivering supplies and preparing to defend Fort Pickens. Walke was to proceed to the port of Vera Cruz, Mexicio after dropping supplies at Fort Pickens. The Wyandotte, armed with at least some guns was also nearby. The navy yard was under the command of Captain James Armstrong. The yard had a small force of marines, soldiers and civilian workers along with some of their families. There had been no pay received for several months. A Florida militia force of 600 to 800 men arrived at the fort and Armstrong capitulated without a fight. Armstrong was court martialed for “neglect of duty” and suspended from service for five years. The plight of the men and families in the navy yard was dire. They had no money and no way to subsist in what was now enemy territory. Of course, some of the individuals were Southern supporters and did not need a ride home. Walke steamed into the harbor the next day under a flag of truce to take aboard all persons wanting to return to the north. A total of 106 men, women and children boarded the Supply. Nineteen days later the Supply arrived at New York and Walke’s human cargo disembarked the ship. The passengers included the wife and child of Lt. Slemmer. Walke was promptly court-martialed for disobeying orders and leaving his station because he was supposed to go to Vera Cruz. Walke was found not guilty of leaving station since New York was a navy port but he was found guilty of disobeying orders. His punishment was a letter of admonishment from the Secretary of the Navy. On January 16 the Florida authorities demanded the surrender of Fort Pickens by Lt. Slemmer. He told them to pound sand and Fort Pickens remained in Union hands throughout the war. Everything I wrote here I just learned in the last couple days so I hope it is accurate. For those interested the story is related in the beginning of Walke’s Naval Scenes and Reminiscences of the Civil War of the United States on the Southern and Western Waters. https://books.google.com/books?id=-SoOAAAAQAAJ&pg=PA63&lpg=PA63&dq=Walker+naval+scenes+and+reminiscence&source=bl&ots=O2fr7_oYdp&sig=ACfU3U1RK16Y3Jhoxpq61jdGJtm5k3t_sw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjGioShrr3kAhVLOK0KHVd9AI8Q6AEwFnoECAYQAQ#v=onepage&q&f=false Volume 4 of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies has a transcript of the court martial of James Armstrong which I found interesting but did not read the whole thing. https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=coo.31924051350837&view=1up&seq=111 Hank
  7. 2 points
    At Fort Henry the gunboat Essex took a shell through their middle boiler. The scalding steam trapped the two civilian pilots in the pilot house and killed them instantly. One pilot was found with his hand still on the wheel. The names were Marshall Ford and James McBride. At Fort Donelson, Foote’s flagship was the St. Louis. A shell penetrated the 1.5 inches of iron plate and 15 inches of oak timber sending deadly splinters along with shell fragments ricocheting throughout the pilot house. F. A. Riley, the pilot, died at the wheel. Foote was injured in his foot but was able to pry Riley’s dead fingers from the wheel and took over steering the boat. Foote thought his wound was not serious and he would be over it in a week. But it never healed and three months later he had to relinquish command of the gunboat fleet on the Mississippi. He died about a year later. The Carondelet stayed in the fight the longest at Fort Donelson. A 128-pound shell smashed into the pilot house and sent iron splinters and wood splinters into the two civilian pilots, mortally wounding one. His name was William Hinton. Later another shell hit the pilot house wounding another pilot. On board the Louisville, a pilot was wounded. The pilot house on the boats was a prime target for the enemy’s cannon. At Forts Henry and Donelson four civilian pilots were killed and at least three others wounded. Pilots were usually well-known on the rivers and served under dangerous conditions. At Forts Henry and Donelson the pilot houses on the gunboats were, indeed, a slaughter pen. This was a great question as I had never heard the term slaughter pen applied at Forts Henry and Fort Donelson. I tried a simple google search with forts Henry and Donelson and slaughter pen and the following book appeared: A History of the United States Navy, from 1775 to 1893, Volume 2 By Edgar Stanton Maclay. Page 330. Here is the link I found. It is long but when I tried to find a shorter one it was not the same book although it had the same title. https://books.google.com/books?id=UHWpn7IEuMoC&pg=PA330&lpg=PA330&dq=Slaughter+Pen+fort+donelson&source=bl&ots=gdumFKu_en&sig=ACfU3U2dvG_a0-xwGC8NzX_N401kgx69Jg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwid5Y3Y27jkAhUKM6wKHT5cDco4ChDoATAEegQIBxAB#v=onepage&q&f=false To verify what boat William Hinton was on I referred to Walke’s “The Western Flotilla at Fort Donelson, Island Number Ten, Fort Pillow and Memphis” in Battles and Leaders, Vol. 1 Hank
  8. 2 points
    Knowing that Wickliffe and Hardcastle were part of the party that crossed the desert from California with Albert Sidney Johnston it appeared that was the connection. A simple search of the other two revealed they also were part of Johnston's entourage. Brewer showed up on the SNMP facebook page. Ridley survived the war and lived till 1909 but Brewer was killed in Virginia in 1864. Hank
  9. 2 points
    Grant put in his memoirs that on January 6 he wrote Halleck and asked permission to see Halleck in St. Louis. He did not actually visit Halleck at that time. Halleck gave him another assignment. In the ORs, vol. 7 page 534 is Grant’s letter to Halleck ending with “If it meets with the approval of the Gen. Comd.g the Department I would be pleased to visit Head Quarters on business connected with this command.” However, on the same day, January 6, Halleck sent Grant an order, (ORs, vol. 7, page 533). “I wish you to make a demonstration in force on Mayfield and in the direction of Murray. Forces from Paducah and Fort Holt should meet at Mayfield and threaten Camp Beauregard and Murray, letting it be understood that Dover (i. e. Fort Donelson) is the object of your attack.” Halleck told Grant to avoid a battle as they were not ready. Nowhere in this order is Fort Henry mentioned. Grant made preparations in response to the January 6 order from Halleck. Grant ordered a column from Cairo under BG John McClernand and a column from Paducah under BG C. F. Smith to make the demonstrations. In his instructions to C. F. Smith dated January 8, 1862 (Grant Papers, vol. 4, page 11) Grant wrote that he would send Smith a gunboat and Smith should send the gunboat and a transport carrying a section of Artillery and infantry up the Tennessee River. Grant made no mention of Fort Henry but thought it would aid in the deception and help prevent rebel reinforcements moving from Columbus to Bowling Green. On January 9, 1862, three days after Halleck ordered Grant to make the demonstration, Halleck wrote McClellan informing him that he had just received McClellan’s message from the third of January the previous evening. (ORs, vol. 7, page 539) Halleck did not receive McClellan’s so-called order from January 3 until the evening of January 8. By that time Halleck had already set Grant in motion to make the demonstrations. Halleck enclosed a copy of his orders to Grant for McClellan’s information. On January 10 Halleck again wrote McClellan about McClellan’s letter of January 3. (OR. Vol. 7, page 543) This time Halleck alluded that if he followed the “order” of January 3 it would cause the loss of Missouri and did McClellan really want to do that? McClellan replied to Halleck on January 13 that Halleck had not read the letter of January 3 “with much care.” McClellan declared “There is nothing in my letter that can reasonably be construed into an order…” McClellan claimed what he wanted from Halleck was his views on how to accomplish the stated goals. (ORs, vol. 7, page 547) On January 1, 1862 the commander-in-chief, President Abraham Lincoln, telegraphed Halleck that McClellan was sick and should not be disturbed with business. Halleck was ordered by the President to work directly with Buell at once. (ORs, vol. 7, page 526) Buell received the same admonitions from the President. He wrote a message to Halleck on January 3, 1862. (ORs, vol. 7, page 526). Buell declared that the power of the Confederacy is on the line from Columbus to Bowling Green and in the center the forts on the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers. Buell wrote an attack on the flanks and center was of importance and should be done simultaneously so the Confederates could not move troops around. Buell stated that two gunboat expeditions should go the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. (hint, hint to Halleck). But Halleck did not have the troops for such expeditions and the ironclad gunboats were not ready for service. Buell pressured Halleck with; “whatever is to be done must be done in a few days.” Halleck apparently got the impression Buell was, finally, going to move against Bowling Green. He could not mount the river expeditions but he could send Grant out on the demonstrations in order to prevent rebel reinforcements being sent from Columbus to Bowling Green. In his January 6, 1862 order to Grant, Halleck told Grant that was the object of the demonstrations. (ORs, vol. 7, page 534) On January 6, 1862 Halleck sent a long synopsis to Lincoln and offered his opinion about an advance on Columbus while Buell moved on Bowling Green. It would be a repetition of the “strategic error which produced the disaster of Bull Run.” Halleck claimed such a plan would fail ninety-nine times out of hundred and was “condemned by every military authority I have [he had] ever read.” (ORs, vol. 7, page 533) On the same day that Halleck wrote Lincoln about how dumb an attack on Columbus would be Feis (William Feis, Grant's Secret Service) wants us to believe Grant wrote Halleck for a meeting to propose just such an undertaking. Feis wrote “Instead of going to St. Louis that January to propose a campaign against Forts Henry and Donelson, it is more probable that Grant hoped to convince Halleck that the time had come to eliminate Columbus.” (page 60 of Feis book) But Halleck had already pointedly stated that the true line of operations was to split the rebel defensive line in the center at the twin Forts Henry and Donelson. In late December Halleck had dinner with Sherman and Halleck’s aide, BG Cullom at the Planter’s House in St. Louis. Halleck laid a map on the table showing the rebel defensive line and asked his two guests where would be the best place to break it. They replied “in the center.” Halleck whole heartedly agreed and declared the true line of operations was to attack the rebel line on the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. If Grant went to St. Louis to champion a movement against Columbus it is no wonder Halleck would toss him out. It seems to me that requesting permission from your superior officer to do something the superior officer had already condemned and told the President of the United States it would be a strategic error would not end well. Then Feis misleads us by claiming McClellan called for a demonstration against Columbus on January 3, 1862. In addition, McClellan wanted Halleck to send expeditions up the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers to freeze troops at Fort Donelson, Fort Henry and Clarksville. If that was not enough McClellan wanted Halleck to seize Columbus if the place seemed vulnerable. Feis wrote; “Then to accomplish this mission, Halleck ordered Grant to march east of Columbus toward Mayfield and Murray…” What is not stated is that Halleck had neither the men nor the gunboats to “accomplish this mission.” Halleck ordered Grant out with the demonstrations to keep any reinforcements moving from Columbus to Bowling Green. Feis then noted Halleck ordered Grant (Feis did not give the date but it was Jan. 6) to “make a demonstration in force on Mayfield and in the direction of Murray” using forces from Cairo and Paducah. Grant is to act like he is an advance guard of a larger force and after the demonstration is deemed finished the forces should slowly retreat back to a Paducah. Nowhere in Halleck’s instructions is there a mention of Fort Henry. Then Feis wrote “Halleck cautioned against engaging the enemy and conveniently neglected to mention McClellan’s instructions to take Columbus if the opportunity arose.” Since Halleck did not receive McClellan’s letter mentioning Columbus until the night of January 8 how could he have passed along McClellan’s instructions in an order he prepared for Grant on January 6? Feis did not explain how that would be possible. Feis also does not mention McClellan writing Halleck that only a pea-brained nincompoop would have considered McClellan’s letter of January 3 as instructions. (ORs, vol. 7, page 547) As of January 6, Halleck was not considering making any movements towards rebel strongholds until he had the situation in Missouri under control. Halleck estimated that would be around mid-February. Halleck wrote McClellan on January 20, just as Grant was returning to Cairo from the demonstration, and outlined his plan for future operations. (ORs, vol. 8, page 509)It did not include a direct assault on Columbus. He thought that was impracticable and “not a proper line of operations.” Halleck declared that a more feasible plan would be expeditions up the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers towards Nashville. That would turn Columbus and cause the rebels to evacuate Bowling Green. Halleck noted he had thoroughly studied the defenses of Columbus and found them strong. Halleck wrote it would take a large siege train and a “terrible loss of life” to take Columbus. To send expeditions up the two rivers Halleck estimated it should not be attempted with no less than 60,000 men. There were only 15,000 troops available at Cairo and Paducah at that time and the gunboats were looking for crews. It has been noted that nowhere in Halleck’s order to Grant and Grant’s order to C. F. Smith is Fort Henry mentioned as a place to be threatened. The instructions from Halleck were to act as if Dover (Fort Donelson) was the target of the movement. Feis showed on page 61 of his book why one should always be skeptical of authors who are quoting short segments of reports with parts not included. Feis wants to present the idea that there was a lost opportunity to take Columbus according to McClernand’s report to Halleck of January 24. Feis wrote: “As Union troops neared Columbus during the operation, McClernand interpreted the “non-appearance” of any significant Confederate resistance to mean the enemy was “closely collected around camp fires within their entrenchments, and indisposed to take the field.” That moment, he later wrote, was perhaps the most “favorable time…for [a] successful attack and the capture of Columbus.” After observing the disappointment evinced by his men when the demonstration ended without an attempt to storm the stronghold, McClernand urged Halleck to launch an immediate attack while the enemy remained vulnerable.” (Feis book page 61) In the ORs, vol. 7, page 69 we find what McClernand wrote from which Feis cherry-picked quotations to make the claim of the “lost opportunity” to take Columbus by storm. “It was discovered that an abatis of fallen timber a half mile in width surrounded the enemy’s intrenchments. The rigor of the weather and the non-appearance of any considerable rebel force led to the belief that they were closely collected around camp fires within their intrenchments, and indisposed to take the field. It is believed that with suitable preparation on our part a favorable time was thus afforded for successful attack and the capture of Columbus.” Note Feis left out “It is believed that with suitable preparation on our part…” What McClernand noted was if the Union army had made suitable preparations they might have been able to make a successful attack on Columbus. But the army was conducting a demonstration against Columbus with no intention to attack it. Feis claimed that after McClernand stated the rebels were “indisposed to take the field” he later wrote that at that moment it was maybe the most “favorable time” to had made a successful attack. I guess technically that is true but the two referenced sentences are in the same report adjacent to each other so it was probably no more than 30 seconds. Next Feis told us that McClernand’s men were disappointed they were denied the opportunity to attack Columbus and that McClernand wanted Halleck to make an immediate attack while the rebels were vulnerable. But McClernand’s report does not say the men were disappointed they did not attack Columbus. They were disappointed that they were recalled to Cairo. I doubt the men were disappointed they were not allowed to attack through a half mile of abatis during terrible weather against intrenchments manned by an unknown number of Confederates. McClernand wrote that the advance by the Union forces was welcomed by Unionists in the area. With the withdrawal from the area McClernand was concerned of the reprisals that might be visited on the Unionists. McClernand wrote: “This consideration, with others having great weight with me, prompts me in conclusion to presume upon your indulgence so far as to urgently recommend a renewed advance of our forces, if not immediately upon Columbus, at least so far as to regain the ground we recently occupied.” McClernand went on to describe a scenario where the army could lay siege to Columbus avoiding the need to actually attempt to carry the works. The Union army did not lose an opportunity to take Columbus during the demonstrations because that was never the intent and they were not prepared to do so. Feis next lets us know that “Grant also lamented the lost opportunity. “My orders were such and the force with me also so small,” he complained, “that no attack [upon Columbus] was allowable.” This was a letter to his sister. (Grant Papers, vol. 4, page 96) Feis put [upon Columbus] into the quotation. Grant did not mention a specific location where he was not allowed to attack. The “no attack” order was placed on both McClernand and C. F. Smith. Grant’s orders to not attack applied to the whole area of the demonstrations. Halleck cobbled together as many troops as he could for the demonstration but the force was too small to attack Columbus. In Grant’s memoirs he wrote that Smith reported he thought it practicable to capture Fort Heiman. Smith sent two letters to Grant, one dated Jan. 21 and the other Jan. 22. The letters were forwarded to Halleck in St. Louis on January 23. (Grant papers, vol. 4, page 90) Neither of these letters mentioned Fort Heiman. The Confederates did not start serious work on Fort Heiman until around January 15. A citizen alerted Sidney Johnston of that fact and he telegraphed Tilghman to immediately intrench at Fort Heiman and work all night. (Johnston biography by Johnston, page 423) Fort Heiman was not finished and no cannon were in place when Smith did his demonstration. The attack plan used by Grant put no emphasis upon seizing Fort Heiman before attacking Fort Henry. Grant is not always correct in his memoirs and this could be an example of his memory not quite getting it right. It is Smith’s letter of Jan. 22 where he described his approach to Fort Henry and how easy it would be to take it with just two gunboats. It should also be noted that Smith decided to take a look at Fort Henry because he had a day to kill as the troops unloaded a steamer full of supplies 20 miles north of Fort Henry. On page 62 of his book Feis claimed that because Grant declared the mission a success before receiving a report from Smith proves that Grant was fixated on Columbus. Fort Henry and Donelson were secondary. On January 18 Grant sent a letter to McClernand starting with “The object of the expedition having been accomplished all the forces will now be withdrawn…” Grant informed Halleck the day before that he had heard from Columbus and no forces had left there for several days. That was the object of the mission – to prevent any troops from moving from Columbus to Bowling Green. On January 20 Grant wrote Halleck upon Grant’s return to Cairo the same day. Grant wrote he would prepare a report of the expedition but if Halleck would allow him to visit headquarters he would make the report in person. Grant mentioned he had not received anything official from C. F. Smith but he had information that Camp Beauregard had been destroyed (it was, by the rebels) and that the small expedition that had gone up the Tennessee River had landed two and a half miles below Fort Henry. Feis wants us to believe that since Grant requested a face-to-face meeting with Halleck before having a report from Smith that meant Grant had Columbus foremost on his mind as opposed to Forts Henry and Donelson. What Feis does not tell us is that, while Grant did not have a report from Smith, he had a report from Lt. Phelps detailing how Phelps had feigned an attack on Fort Henry on January 17 with two gunboats and a steamer with 500 infantry aboard under the orders of Smith. (ORs of the navy, page 507) The premise that Grant asked for a meeting with Halleck without any information about Smith’s foray up the Tennessee is false because Phelps made a foray up the Tennessee and he made a report on it. Feis argued that Grant was fixated on Columbus and one of his reasons stated was “the lack of attention paid to the rivers before January.” That statement would come as a surprise to Flag-Officer Foote and Lt. Phelps. Here is a list showing the number of times the Navy sent a gunboat up the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers to “pay attention” to what was going on at Forts Henry and Donelson. This list is based on reports in the Official Records of the Navy. There could have been other trips. September 8, 1861 – (ORs, vol. 4, page 404). Right after Grant occupied Paducah a Lincoln gunboat was reported to have been seen on the Tennessee River 30 miles below Fort Henry. Grant left two gunboats at Paducah. Early on gunboat captains were warned to proceed cautiously up the rivers lest they encounter rebel masked batteries. October 19, 1861 – (ORN, vol. 22, page 374) – Lt. Phelps steamed the Conestoga up the Cumberland to Eddyville where low water prevented him from going further. October 27, 1861 – (page 379) – Lt. Phelps returned to Eddyville with a steamer transporting 300 infantry to attack a rebel camp near Eddyville. C. F. Smith (page 380) also wrote a report. October 30, 1861 – (page 396) – Commander Porter took the New Era up the Cumberland River to Ingram’s Shoals where the Confederates had blocked the river with sunken barges. Ingram Shoals was approximately 30 miles below Dover. Porter was to pick up volunteers who wanted to join the US army. Porter wrote he heard about Fort Henry and that with his boat they could take it. November 6, 1861 – (page 394) Lt. Phelps managed to get his boat over Ingram Shoals and proceeded to within three miles of Fort Donelson. Phelps returned to Paducah, made his report and noted he was leaving again, immediately, to the same location to try to stop the trading going on. On page 427 of the ORN is a report by C. F. Smith of November 8, 1861 giving details of the forts on the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. Smith noted that Lt. Phelps is constantly moving his vessel up and down the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. November 17, 1861 – (page 435) – Lt. Phelps wrote a long report about his trip up the Cumberland River to as close to Fort Donelson he could get. He noted that he had done this several times already. On page 451 is a report by Foote dated December 5 noting that four gunboats have arrived and he needs men to man them. As soon as he gets them he wants to go up the Tennessee River and destroy rebel boats and a battery. December 8, 1861 – (page 457) – Lt. Phelps again steamed up the Cumberland to Fort Donelson and wrote a long report about his trip. December 10, 1861 – (page 461) – Lt. Phelps returned to Paducah and then immediately turned around and went back up the Cumberland to pick up refugees. He, again, made it close to Fort Donelson. January 6, 1862 – (Page 486) – Low water hampered operations on the rivers. Lt. Phelps wrote a long report about his close visit to Fort Henry. He added more information on Fort Donelson. He did this report on the same day Halleck wrote the order to Grant to make the demonstrations. I guess what constitutes “lack of attention” is in the eyes of the beholder. It took Halleck two days to approve Grant’s visit to St. Louis. He sent a telegram to Grant on January 22. C. F. Smith wrote letters about his undertakings on January 21 and 22. The January 21 letter spoke of the lousy road conditions. The January 22 letter is the one Smith mentioned that Fort Henry could be taken with two gunboats. Both of these letters were forwarded to Halleck on January 23. Grant made plans to leave for St. Louis the night of the January 23. Grant did not have Smith’s letters when he made the request for a visit to Halleck but he had them when he left for St. Louis. The idea that Feis put forth about Grant being a Johnny-come-lately to the idea that the true line of operations should be up the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers is contradicted by Col. John W. Emerson in a series of stories in the Jan-Apr-June issues of The Midland Monthly. The title is “Grant’s Life in the West.” Starting on pages 114-119, continued on 219-221, Emerson recounts the circumstances of how Grant, in August of 1861, identified the true line of operations for Federal advance to be the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. Grant laid out a plan and through his benefactor, Elihu Washburne, submitted it to President Lincoln. Of interest on pages 409-411 is an account of Grant’s meeting with Halleck in St. Louis. https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015011958785&view=1up&seq=6 Emerson referenced an account by John Thayer in McClure’s magazine, Vol. V, June to Nov. 1895, “Grant at Pilot Knob,” 433-437. Thayer wrote about Grant having plans about a campaign up the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers while he was at Pilot Knob in August 1861. https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015030656162&view=1up&seq=7 Luckily, I had a copy of Bruce Catton’s. Grant Moves South. Catton discusses the Emerson and Thayer articles. (pages 28-30) Catton points out some inconsistencies but does not downright reject these accounts as these are men who were there. However, there are some aspects in the accounts which are new to me and I had not heard them before so a little more digging is required. The point is that Grant, like many others, recognized the military significance of expeditions up the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. Grant also discussed attacks on Columbus from early on. Grant wrote in his memoirs that on January 6 he wanted to meet with Halleck and present a plan for expeditions up the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers. The idea that he was going to convince Halleck to let him move against Columbus makes no sense. There were about 13,000 men at Columbus behind fortifications and abatis. On January 6 Halleck wrote the President and informed him that he had 15,000 men at Cairo, Fort Holt and Paducah. Leaving guards at those places meant his available force was around 10,000 which is about the number he ordered out on the demonstrations. As Halleck wrote it would be madness to try to do anything significant (like attack Columbus) with such a small number. Grant asked for a meeting with Halleck in a letter dated Jan. 20. That does not mean he was going to take off for St. Louis without having heard from C. F. Smith. He wanted to give Halleck a report of the demonstrations in person. Grant made his departure after he received Smith’s letters. Grant has the sequence wrong in his memoirs because he did ask for the meeting before reading Smith’s letter which confirmed his view. Feis’s claim that Grant was fixated on Columbus and only changed his direction later is an analysis too contrived for me. When you factor in all the mistakes Feis made in his book and other evidence not included his conclusion fails. For instance, Feis wrote on page 63 that Smith found the roads horrible and that Grant, therefore, “knew that any reinforcements sent from Columbus to aid Fort Henry would be unable to get there very fast.” But any infantry going from Columbus to Fort Henry could have taken the railroad from Columbus to Danville on the Tennessee River where Tilghman, commander at Fort Henry, could have sent a couple steamboats to pick up the troops and take them to Fort Henry. Grant and Foote formed a tag team to hound Halleck to let them move against Fort Henry. But Foote claimed that Grant originally wanted to go up the Cumberland against Fort Donelson. Early reports had Fort Donelson as weaker than Fort Henry. Foote wrote in a report (ORN, page 314) to Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy, November 13, 1862, that when four of the ironclads were ready Foote proposed to Grant to take the boats and 6,000 troops and attack Fort Henry. Foote wrote that Grant preferred to attack Fort Donelson on the Cumberland. Foote claimed he convinced Grant to attack Fort Henry if Halleck’s agreement could be obtained. No dates are given but I assume this occurred before Grant went to see Halleck in St. Louis. Grant returned to Cairo after his rebuff from Halleck the morning of Jan. 28. Perhaps it is on his return that Foote convinced Grant to get Halleck to agree to let them attack Fort Henry for it is on Jan. 28 that both Grant and Foote sent telegrams to Halleck to let them take Fort Henry. (Grant Papers, vol. 4, page 99) Grant followed through with another telegram on Jan. 29 and Halleck, finally, gave his consent on Jan. 30. Halleck’s time frame had him ordering an advance in mid-February. What convinced him to go now was not the telegrams from Foote and Grant. But those telegrams showed Halleck that those two were ready and itching to attack the rebels now. On Jan. 29 Halleck received a short telegram from McClellan (ORs, vol. 7, page 571) passing along information from a deserter that Beauregard was ordered to Kentucky to assist Johnston and that he was coming with 15 regiments. Of course, it wasn’t true but Halleck acted as if it was. He sent McClellan a telegram on January 30 (ORs, vol. 7, page 571) telling him that his telegram had been received and that Grant and Foote would be immediately ordered to attack Fort Henry so as to take possession before Beauregard showed up. As further confirmation that it was the Beauregard news that prompted Halleck to act on February 6 Halleck telegraphed McClellan and ended with the sentence “I was not ready to move, but deemed best to anticipate the arrival of Beauregard’s forces.” I have searched in vain for any reaction from Halleck to the fact he sent out the demonstrations in early January based on his belief Buell was about to move against Bowling Green and that never happened. Then Halleck ordered the advance on Fort Henry because McClellan told him Beauregard was coming west with 15 regiments and that never happened either. When Grant wrote his memoirs it was 20 years after the events. He has some details wrong but his remembrance that when he requested to meet with Halleck in January of 1862 to propose a movement up the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers because that was the true line of operations is not fiction. Sure, Grant was interested in taking Columbus but in early January there were more Confederates at Columbus behind fortifications and abatis than Grant could muster against them. Anyway, Halleck was calling the shots, not Grant, and Halleck had no intention of sending a force against Columbus. The movement against the center of Johnston’s defensive line was an obvious military objective. The idea was put forth by many people so no one is given the credit for thinking of it. Grant noted this when he wrote to his benefactor, Elihu Washburne, on March 22, 1862. From Bruce Catton’s, Grant Moves South, page 29; “Grant wrote to Washburne saying that it was idle to give credit for the move up the Tennessee to any specific general; the strategic soundness of the plan was obvious, he said—‘General Halleck no doubt thought of this route long ago, and I am shure I did.’” Hank
  10. 2 points
    Randolph. He was not a slave because Johnston had manumitted him when Johnston went to the west coast. Randolph, or Ran, went with Johnston to California as a free man and received wages for his services as cook. Johnston also wrote that Ran was a good with the mules. (Source: Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston by Colonel William Preston Johnston)
  11. 2 points
    67th Tigers Thanks for providing clarity and documentation supporting Confederate troop numbers and identity of units assigned to Fort Donelson before the surrender of 16 FEB 1862. Another source of information: Prisoner of War records. The approximately 12000 Rebel prisoners were progressively shipped north after February 16th to Camp Douglas, Illinois (about 8000 men), Camp Morton, Indiana (3000) and Camp Chase, Ohio (800). These records are accessible at Family Search via the link https://www.familysearch.org/search/collection/1916234. [Click on "Browse through 51108 images" for record access. Free account with Family Search required for access to their records -- takes two minutes.] In addition, it appears one unit was assigned to Fort Donelson, but for some reason was posted opposite the fort, on the east bank of the Cumberland River. Scott's Louisiana Regiment (of cavalry) may have been kept on the other side of the river, on the orders of General Buckner, due to a recent outbreak of measles in the regiment. The location proved fortuitous, because the regiment was not surrendered; after February 16th Scott's Louisiana made its way east, passed through Nashville, and is next reported ahead of Buell's Army of the Ohio in March, likely responsible for destroying the bridge over Duck River near Columbia. Cheers Ozzy
  12. 2 points
    Of more importance to the Battle of Shiloh is the observation of General Bragg as to the condition of the Confederate Army concentrating in Corinth. Bragg was appalled at the supply situation and the discipline of the troops. He called them, "a mob" and not an Army. He was ordered to get them some training and to do his best to prepare them for Battle. Their weapons were inferior. They had plenty of cannons, but not enough trained crews to man them. A point to make for the Battle of Shiloh-- Johnston went in on a hope and a prayer that surprise and the bayonet would win the day. Braxton Bragg agreed with that after what he witnessed. Not saying the Southerners were not brave or worthy, just that they were thrown into Battle with little formal training and a lack of needed supplies-- Class A firearms one of them...
  13. 2 points
    As we know, after his defeat at Pea Ridge, Arkansas (also known as Elkhorn Tavern) Major General Earl Van Dorn of the Trans-Mississippi was requested to support the forces of General Albert Sidney Johnston in Tennessee… but there was no apparent urgency in the request. Van Dorn arrived at Memphis about 8 April 1862 and stopped at The Gayoso House. Also in Memphis was Mrs. Mary Ann Webster Loughborough, whose husband James, was a Captain on the Staff of Brigadier General Cockrell. Mary Webster of New York married James Loughborough in Kentucky a few years earlier; then the couple moved west and established themselves in St. Louis, Missouri (and subsequently gravitated towards the Rebel cause.) In early April 1862 Mrs. Loughborough wrote the following letter to a friend, revealing the presence of notable Confederates in Memphis: Gayoso House, Memphis, April, 1862. My dear J——: I am just in from dinner; and you would be amused to see the different faces—I might as well say the different appetites; for the Army of Missouri and Arkansas have been undergoing rigorous fasts of late; and the little episode of the battle of Elkhorn and the consequent privations have helped not a little the gaunt appearance of these military characters. All eat, eat rapidly; from General V—— D—— down to the smallest lieutenant, whose manner of playing the epicure over the different dishes ordered, is a study. The confidential consultations with the waiter over them, together with the knowing unconsciousness of bestowing his small change, almost convinces me that he is a brigadier-general, or a colonel, at least. You see streaming in constantly this tide of human beings, to eat, stare at the ladies, talk, and order much wine in the excitement of military anecdotes; for you must understand that a civilian is a “rara avis” amid the brilliant uniforms of the dining room. Yet, amid all this mass and huge crowd, the majority are polished gentlemen, who have evidently seen much of the world, and who are men of purpose and character. General V—— D—— and staff sit not far from me—looked at rather jealously by the Missourians, as ranking and commanding them over their favorite general. Yet, he always treats the old general with the utmost consideration and courtesy. On the other side sits General P——, with his kind, benevolent face. The poor old gentleman finds at the table his lightest reserves become his heaviest forces: nearly all his staff are about him. And, as I sit half amused at the expression of some faces, and thinking deeply of the mute, yet determined impress of character on others, two gentlemen come in—one in plain citizen’s clothing, with heavy black beard and high forehead—with stooping gait and hands behind him. I am told he is Governor J——, of Missouri. His face puzzles me—it is thoughtful and singular. By his side, with tall, lithe, slender figure, fully erect, walks General J—— T——. You will scarcely think it possible that this is the so-frequently talked of J—— T——. I thought him an ordinary man, did not you? Yet, this is anything but an ordinary man. The keen dark eye sweeps the room as he enters, taking us all in at a glance—a quick, daring, decisive, resolute face. I can make nothing more out of him. Yet, there is more of thought and intellect than you see at first. He is dressed in full uniform, with sword and sash, and has quite a military air. There are many Saint Louisians here; you see them scattered around the tables quite plentifully. General C—— is among the number. He sits at some distance, and looks quite worn and sad. You know—do you not?—that he is the father of young Churchill Clark, who was killed at Elkhorn. Have I ever told you his history? It is this: He graduated at West Point in the commencement of the war; and knowing and having a great admiration for General P——, he joined him at once: he was put in command of some artillery; and showing himself a youth of courage and ability—for he was only twenty years old—his command was increased. Throughout the constant trials and sufferings of the campaign, he showed himself equal in courage, daring, and judgment, to many older heads. He was particularly beloved by General P——. At Elkhorn, as ever, his battery sustained itself with coolness and bravery. As the general rode by, he said some cheering words to young Clark, who took off his cap and waved it, saying, “General, we will hold our own,” or words to that effect, when a ball sped from the enemy, and crashed in the young, ardent brain as he spoke. I have been told that the general was affected to tears. He knelt by his side, vainly seeking for some trace of the strong, young life, but the pulses were stilled forever; and Churchill Clark lay a stiffened corpse in the long, wet grass at Elkhorn. And so his father sits silent and alone, and all respect the grief that none can assuage. In a few days we leave. The gentlemen all go to Corinth, where a battle, in all probability, will take place before long. Fort Pillow can hardly hold out, under the daily bombardment that we hear from the gunboats; and if it falls, Memphis, on taking leave of the Confederate officers, will usher in the Federal to quarters in the Gayoso. Adieu.
  14. 2 points
  15. 2 points
    Great photo... and of benefit to learn that the significant action in the Plum Orchard has finally been recognized... 🙂
  16. 2 points
    maybe due to the addition of "Plum Orchard Rd"
  17. 2 points
    There are two pieces of communication (one constructed on April 5th, and the other generated on April 6th 1862) both of which are important in their own way to explain “how the Battle of Shiloh unfolded.” And both documents have "issues." The first item is a telegram constructed at St. Louis and sent under signature of Major General Henry Halleck on Saturday 5 April 1862. Fitting Halleck’s style of issuing concise orders, the two-line telegram begins by listing the recently promoted Major Generals by order of seniority: Buell, Pope, McClernand, C.F. Smith, Wallace. The inclusion of John Pope is significant because Major General Pope would soon join the Advance on Corinth. And the place held by John McClernand (ahead of Charles Ferguson Smith) may have come as a surprise to Major General Ulysses S. Grant… but no matter, as the late formal notice of MGen McClernand’s seniority did not provide opportunity to ‘Provide him with benefits of seniority to which he was entitled” i.e., the Shell Game played by Generals Grant, Smith, Sherman and Captain McMichael had worked perfectly; and now, at this late hour, McClernand would be notified in due course of his official seniority (likely after U.S. Grant established his HQ at Pittsburg Landing… When McClernand operating as “acting commander” had odds somewhere between Slim and None.) The second line of Halleck’s telegram reads: “You will act in concert [with General Buell] but he will exercise his separate command, unless the enemy should attack you. In that case you are authorized to take the general command.” The wording of this second line, giving Grant emergency authority over Buell in case of attack by Rebels, has significant implications. And yet, when the conduct of Day Two at Shiloh is closely examined, there is nothing more significant in regard to General Grant exercising command, than, “You take the left; and I’ll take the right” during the advance of Monday morning (coordination at its most minimal.) Which leads one to ponder: When did General Grant receive this telegram from Henry Halleck? If it was sent by telegraph from St. Louis late morning of April 5th, it likely arrived at the Fort Henry telegraph office before noon. If a steamer picked up the mail and telegraph traffic at 1 p.m., (perhaps the Minnehaha) then the 5 April telegram would arrive about midnight… plenty of time for Grant to read and understand the contents. But, at 2 p.m. on Sunday, April 6th, where was this telegram from Halleck? The cool indifference shared between Grant and Buell (with Buell simply left at the waterfront, while Grant headed away west to take care of business) does not represent “someone in possession of an important telegram, giving them extraordinary authority.” Instead, it seems to indicate General Grant has not yet received the telegram; or he has seen it… but left it behind at the Cherry Mansion. The second communication was constructed on Sunday morning by Captain A.S. Baxter, the AQM for Grant’s Army, as he rode the steamer Tigress north to relay Grant’s orders (likely relayed from Grant, through Captain John Rawlins, to Baxter.) Finding the orders complex and difficult to remember in detail, Captain Algernon Baxter scanned the floor of the Ladies’ Cabin, found a soiled bit of paper, and wrote the orders (as he best remembered them) onto that scrap (later recorded as “containing a heel mark and tobacco stain.”) Upon arrival at Crump’s Landing, Captain Baxter found Lieutenant Ross – Aide to Major General Wallace – waiting. The two rode away west and reported to MGen Wallace at, or just before 11:30 a.m. Captain Baxter presented General Wallace with the impromptu order; Wallace asked why it was not signed. Baxter explained he “created the memorandum, himself, out of fear he would “forget some detail” unless he did so.” General Wallace passed the “written order” to his Staff, and asked Baxter about the current state of affairs [Baxter left Pittsburg Landing between 10 and 10:30.] Captain Baxter replied, “We are driving them.” General Wallace was satisfied; Wallace’s staff officers were satisfied. The order was accepted, and Captain Baxter took his departure within three minutes of arrival at Stony Lonesome. Captain Frederick Kneffler, Lew Wallace’s AAG, wound up with the “written order.” He tucked it under his sword belt… and subsequently lost it. Ever since, the loss of that written order, or memorandum, has been significant because it would provide tangible proof of what Major General Wallace had been ordered to do. And, it is not difficult to envision the memorandum, jiggling loose from Captain Kneffler’s sword belt, and blowing away… to be beaten by heavy rain that night; ultimately washed into the Snake River, then Tennessee River… lost forever. But, paper was in short supply, always. Letters by soldiers were often written making use of every millimetre of space, including margins and borders. As likely as the memorandum being lost forever, it was just as likely noticed, clinging to trampled stubble, by some soldier… one of thousands following behind Kneffler on his horse. This soldier would have snatched it up, and possibly sent it as souvenir with his own letter, a few days later. My point: there is every chance that the Lew Wallace memorandum from Baxter still exists, contained in a box of Civil War letters and paraphernalia, and the owners have no idea what they have in their possession. But, with all the other material being revealed on a weekly basis, one day this piece of history might just surprise everyone, and re-emerge.
  18. 2 points
    [Part three of Corinth, interrupted] Grant’s operation, with HQ at Savannah was kept on the back burner: just active enough to keep Rebel commanders guessing, but not sufficiently robust to allow General Grant to take the reins pre-emptively. The first benefit to Grant from success further west was assignment of Benjamin Prentiss to command of the newly created Sixth Division (although Halleck tasked Brigadier General Prentiss with other duties enroute, delaying his ultimate arrival at Pittsburg Landing.) In addition, Grant was aware that Don Carlos Buell was marching south and west to effect a join at Savannah (but Grant was frustrated by the slow pace of the Army of the Ohio.) Still, these troop additions were approved by Halleck, and were part of the overall plan to initiate the Operation against Corinth, in the proper sequence… after Victory at Island No.10 (when another source of manpower (Pope), as well as ammunition and abundant supplies would be made available.) References: SDG topics “Just supposin’ begun 26 FEB 2018 and “Full Hospitals” begun 30 JAN 2018 for Prentiss tasks enroute to Savannah Tennessee. SDG topic “Grant’s six divisions” begun 1 DEC 2018 details growth of Pittsburg force. OR 8 pages 633 – 4 telegram (23 MAR 1862) in which Henry Halleck lays out his “Programme” for SecWar Stanton, which includes, “Pope’s progress is necessarily slow,” and, “I have directed General Grant to make no move until Buell’s column (now at Columbia) can form junction with him.” Also, Halleck asserts, “We must take Corinth in order to seriously injure Rebel communications.” [And Halleck proposes possible moves for T.W. Sherman (the other Sherman) and Benjamin Butler which “might take advantage of [Bragg’s Army] leaving Florida and Alabama.”] OR 8 page 631 communication of 21 MAR 1862 from MGen Halleck to F/O Foote: “Everything is progressing well on the Tennessee River towards opening your way down the Mississippi.” [Illustrates the “connected” nature of Halleck’s operations, and alludes to the “proper sequence” of those operations.] OR 8 page 643 telegram from Army AG Thomas to MGen Halleck of 25 MAR 1862: “BGen Thomas Davies has been assigned duty in Department of the Mississippi.” [In preparation for conduct of operations after success at Island No.10 Halleck has called for more trained general officers to assist, as part of Halleck’s program. General Thomas Davies will be assigned command of Second Division, following deaths of WHL Wallace… and C.F. Smith.] OR 8 page 649 telegram SecWar Stanton to MGen Halleck of 29 MAR 1862: “You will report without delay the strength and distribution of your command.” [Halleck’s response 30 March: “Buell 101,000 in KY and Tenn; Grant 75,000 in Tennessee; Pope 25000 at New Madrid; Curtis 23000 in Arkansas; Strong 9000 District of Cairo; Steele 6000 in Arkansas; Schofield 15000 District of St. Louis (including new regiments at Benton Barracks); Totten 4000 in Central Missouri; Loan 2000 in Northern Missouri; about 10000 men in Kansas, Nebraska and Colorado.”] And follows telegram of Halleck to Stanton of 28 MAR 1862 revealing “elevated level of sickness experienced by men on Tennessee River expedition” (and lays blame on brigade and regimental surgeons of volunteers.) One-in-three reported sick, and is of concern because Halleck intends to make use of Grant’s Army… soon. OR 8 page 660 communication MGen Halleck to F/O Andrew Foote of 5 APR 1862: “I shall want a gunboat at Cairo ready to go up the Tennessee River in the early part of next week.” [With the successful run of USS Carondelet past the guns of Island No.10 on April 4th, Halleck knows it is “a matter of days” before Pope crosses his army and forces the trapped Rebels to surrender (in rear of Island No.10).] OR 8 page 661 communication Halleck to MGen Samuel Curtis (Army of the Southwest) on April 5th 1862: “Price and Van Dorn will soon leave your front [and the great battle of the war is to be fought on the Tennessee River.]” OR 8 page 672 telegram Halleck to Stanton of 7 APR 1862: “Buell’s advance force has reached Grant; entire force will connect in two or three days” [sent before news arrived at St. Louis IRT Battle of Shiloh initiated early 6 APR 1862.] OR 8 page 676 communication of 8 APR 1862 from Assistant Secretary of War Thomas Scott to Henry Halleck, alluding to “sequence of events” after Surrender of Island No.10.
  19. 2 points
    and found in the area of this high ground were numerous springs...good water..army is fueled by coffee. unlike what was to be had in Corinth later...
  20. 1 point
    Shiloh video by gaming guy The void being left by the inadequate teaching of History in public schools is being filled, in part, by an unexpected history advocate: the online gaming community. Dedicated to “authenticity” in recreating historic Battle Games, the school-age generation is being taught history, unawares, through participation in online games. With the above in mind... ran across this interesting video while searching for recent releases on Battle of Shiloh: “History Guy Gaming” has done other battlefield videos (Gettysburg, Antietam, Bull Run), and provided a review of the Battle of Shiloh game (Ultimate General) in 2017. His description of the events of April 1862 reflects the understanding of someone who was educated during the 1980 – 2000 period (with the summary of events and condensing of outcomes “necessary” to get through Civil War History in the least amount of time evident), but with obvious individual study undertaken. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=syQ6wKjcFzE "The Battle of Shiloh" by History Guy Gaming (published on YouTube 6 SEP 2019.) Following a brief introduction, the tour of Shiloh NMP begins at 3 minute mark, with the undeniable truth: “Visiting a battlefield results in better perspective and greater understanding.” At 3:55 mark the battle begins with Peabody's unauthorized patrol (conducted by Major Powell.) 6:00 The Union defense of Duncan Field. Unfortunately, the narrator uses a modern map, and is further led astray by the location of General WHL Wallace's mortal wounding. Now that a key Union defensive line is re-named as “The Thicket,” he comes to the wrong conclusion (that the Hornet's Nest was co-located with the site of Wallace's wounding.) Since all histories of the Battle of Shiloh prior to 2010 make mention of the Hornet's Nest, those seeking the location of that site during visits to the park will struggle just that little bit, from now on. 9:00 Sherman's experience with repelling Rebel attacks. [CSA mass grave visited.] 10:50 Shiloh Church. 13:30 The mistake of General Albert Sidney Johnston. 16:15 Hornet's Nest (part 2) 18:30 Ruggles Battery a.k.a. “Thunder in the Thicket” 18:45 General Johnston's mortal wound. 23:30 Albert Sidney Johnston's loss; and relevance to War in the West. 24:00 Indian mounds. 24:50 Union retreat to heights above Pittsburg Landing: Grant's Last Line (Buell arrives.) 27:10 Dill Branch: Union gunboats versus Rebel advance. 28:30 “Lick 'em tomorrow, though” – U.S. Grant. 28:40 Day Two (and Fallen Timbers) 30:00 Shiloh National Cemetery. 32:30 Visitor Center (and review). [The review of online game "Ultimate General: Battle of Shiloh" https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vj9sQKBu9U0 by History Guy Gaming on 30 DEC 2016.]
  21. 1 point
    CSuniforms, Thanks for your contribution. As regards U.S. Grant's acknowledged ability to "write terse, concise orders," that is just one of many desired skills that can be taught to young leaders. [Whereas "the ability to ride a horse," so important in Grant's day, is a skill no longer deemed necessary... most of the time.]
  22. 1 point
    Just a couple more references to add to this McNairy County site: http://www.mcnairytnhistory.com/images/-_looking_back_ii.pdf "Looking Back at McNairy County" by Nancy Wardlaw Kennedy (2004) especially Page 3 (Table of Contents), Page 24 (Stantonville History) and Page 43 (Isham Forsythe connections). Names of interest, due to proximity to Hardin County and Pittsburg Landing include Duncan, Bell, Crump, Harrison, Adams, Chambers, Wright and Michie (Mickey). Locations mentioned include various ridges, church cemeteries and roads. Investigating one of the Church cemeteries led to discovery of: https://www.findagrave.com/cemetery/10240/memorial-search?firstName=&lastName=Michie&page=1#sr-54445076 Carter Cemetery (with Michie family burials). This cemetery is just east of Michie Tennessee, and about three miles south of Pebble Hill Cemetery (Pebble Hill Cemetery was adjacent to, or in close proximity to site of "Mickey's White House.") Because Carter Cemetery pre-dates the Civil War, there are likely burials of interest to SDG members.)
  23. 1 point
    I watched the Prentiss walk on You-Tube-- It was awesome, but there is an addition... At Fraley? Field and the first contact between the 3rd Miss Batt. and the 25th Missouri-- Professor Tim stated he believed the troops were armed with smoothbores... No they were not... Research shows the 25th MO. were issued Model 1842 rifles, .69 cal. firing big minies with long range rear sites and the Confederates some had rifles and even Sharps Rifles-- a very accurate and devastating weapon. The casualties were minimal-- not because of the use of smoothbores, but the darkness and distance between the contestants. At distances of 300 yards or more-- a soldier would have trouble sighting in and hitting a target-- especially when bullets are flying your way. The 16th Wisconsin were armed with the Class A Dresden Suhl Rifle, the 12th Michigan with .54 caliber Austrian rifles, and the 21st MO, Model 1842 rifled muskets, .69 caliber --all of them in Peabody's Brigade. The 23rd and 21st wore short jackets and bummers, the 18th Wisconsin in the State 5 button blouse and bummers some in black hats, and the 12th, I am still working on as to uniforms-- Tom
  24. 1 point
    Does anyone know if the tree marking the grave of Surgeon Samuel Everett is still there and, if so, has it been identified? Is the big "E" carved in it still visible? Dr. Samuel Everett – enlisted April 29, 1861 as Surgeon 7th IL Infantry; honorable muster out July 29, 1861. Appointed Surgeon 10th IL Infantry July 31, 1861; Brigade Surgeon of USV, Sept. 14, 1861. Killed at Shiloh on April 6, 1862, he was, allegedly, the first Union Medical Officer killed in battle. In March 1862, Dr. Everett left St. Louis and reported for duty at Pittsburg Landing. During the Battle of Shiloh, he served as Chief Surgeon for Gen. Prentiss. A May 3, 1862 article in the Quincy [IL] Whig Republican newspaper states: "Dr. Samuel W. Everett ... was killed early in the action of Sunday morning, April 6, while gallantly cheering on and encouraging the men to stand their ground, and renew their exertions to repulse the over-whelming attack of the rebels on their division." Dr. Everett’s brother, Edward Everett, traveled to Pittsburg Landing to retrieve his brother's body, intending to return it for burial in Quincy. He was unable to obtain a satisfactory metal casket, and left Dr. Everett where he was buried. Edward kept a journal of his trip to Shiloh writing: On another page of the diary, Edward wrote: “Grave near an oak tree: A large E cut out with an axe; Name carved above; Head SW from letter H -- 9 ft.; Foot W from letter F--4 ft.; About 3 miles from upper landing SW from it clearing 100 yards S; A firm board at head with: Dr. Everett, Brigadier Surgeon of Gen’l. Prentiss Staff, Died April 6, 1862.” (Image of diary page below - courtesy of Historical Society of Quincy and Adams County) Just wondering if the tree is extant and identifiable? And if any of the writing is still visible? Thanks!
  25. 1 point
    Ran across an extremely interesting 250 page Doctorate Dissertation on the Life of McPherson. Produced in 2016 this work by Eric Dudley sheds light on West Point Graduate McPherson that many of us either take for granted, or ignore. Some highlights: Born in 1828 Jimmy McPherson just “made the cut” before becoming too old for admission to the U.S. Military Academy. Graduating in 1853, Lieutenant McPherson was 24 years old and ranked Number One in his West Point Class. Initially assigned to Instructor duty at West Point, McPherson put his Engineer training to use at Fort Delaware (south of Philadelphia) improving that facility; then went to San Francisco in 1857 to complete the fort on Alcatraz Island. Still a Lieutenant in the Army Corps of Engineers during most of his stay in California, McPherson followed with interest the deterioration of the Nation taking place “Back East” via slow mail from New York – Panama – San Francisco (six weeks delayed.) With initiation of the Pony Express the delay in receiving news diminished to 8 – 12 days (with no telegraph to San Francisco during McPherson's stay.) Captain McPherson did not depart California (via steamer to Panama; then steamer to New York) until last week of July/ first week of August 1861. During McPherson's stay in California, he would have met Henry Halleck; become re-acquainted with William Tecumseh Sherman; and served under Albert Sidney Johnston. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c6a4/98c03e2ee2cc70f6fe249be693588b0bb37a.pdf The Memory & Memorialization of James B. McPherson (2016)
  26. 1 point
    The above review of “Junius and Albert's Adventure” is pretty good... as far as it goes. Unfortunately, no one bothered to actually read the book (which was gifted to me a few days ago by my daughter, who found it in a bookshop in Castlemaine, Victoria.) Pages 25 – 41 detail Junius Browne and Albert Richardson reporting in the West, beginning in General Fremont's Missouri during Autumn of 1861. And the first revelation of significance to readers at SDG: the two reporters were present during the Fort Henry operation (Browne accompanied the marching infantry belonging to McClernand, while Richardson found a large tree, climbed high into its branches, and observed the fort vs. ironclads gunnery duel.) Afterwards, Albert Richardson returned to Cairo to send off his story; Junius Browne (despite injury due to accidental powder keg explosion) accompanied Grant's Army to Fort Donelson, and continued to report from the field, detailing actions of soldiers, and incidental meetings with local people and their views on the war. After the surrender of Buckner, Browne interviewed Confederate prisoners, and then returned to Cairo to send away his story (which was published over two PAGES in the New York Tribune of February 22, 1862.) Neither Browne nor Richardson was present for the Battle of Shiloh: Browne heard of an operation taking place in Arkansas, and hurried south to observe the action, but had only reached southern Missouri when the Battle of Pea Ridge took place. Not allowing lack of facts to get in the way of a good story, Junius Browne collected enough rumors concerning the battle, and “borrowed” information from rival reporter Thomas Knox, and in cooperation with Richard Colburn concocted a story of how “Siegel saved the Day at Pea Ridge” (and beat rival reporters to publish the full page report on Pea Ridge, first.) Afterwards, learning that “the next big event” was to take place at Island No.10 Browne rejoined Richardson and gained passage aboard a steamer bound for that Mississippi River confrontation... and both men missed the Battle of Shiloh. However, as mentioned in SDG post “Drawings” of 27 MAR 2018 Henri Villard met Richardson at Cairo on April 10 (Villard had travelled with Buell's Army of the Ohio, and observed much of Day Two firsthand.) After learning details from Henri Villard, Albert Richardson journeyed south, met with members of General Grant's staff, and was able to concoct a report on the Battle of Shiloh, which was submitted to the New York Tribune in late April. Browne and Richardson are next recorded aboard USS Benton on the Mississippi River, observing the Battle of Memphis of 6 June 1862...
  27. 1 point
    "How the Rebels went out, and We came In [to Nashville]" First of Nelson's force to enter; owner of the Flag flying over the State House. [From Gallipolis Journal of Ohio, 13 MAR 1862, page 2.]
  28. 1 point
    Had never seen this complete list in print before, but it is the Seniority List of Generals in the Provisional Confederate Army, just prior to Battle of Bull Run (First Manassas). Of interest to SDG because of the many names associated with Fort Donelson, Shiloh and Siege of Corinth (and it is interesting to see a list of Confederate Generals without Albert Sidney Johnston's name near the top... but General Johnston was enroute from California when this list was printed in St. Mary's Beacon of Leonardtown, Maryland 18 July 1861.) https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/sn89060119/1861-06-13/ed-1/seq-2/ St. Mary's Beacon of 18 July 1861 page 2.
  29. 1 point
    The 33rd Alabama Infantry arrived at Corinth too late to take part in the Battle of Shiloh, but the regiment was present during the April/ May 1862 Siege of Corinth (Hawthorn's 5th Brigade of Hardee's Corps.) With companies arriving at Pensacola Florida in March 1862, the 33rd Alabama was organized by April 1st 1862 and assigned “defense” of Fort McRee (a coastal fortification across the pass from Union-held Fort Pickens, Rebel-held Fort McRee had been reduced to rubble during the November 1861 gunnery duel.) However, it was determined that several of the guns under the collapsed fort were worth salvaging, so when the decision was made by Major General Bragg to evacuate Pensacola and move his Army north to Corinth, the 33rd Alabama was responsible for removing the guns at Fort McRee and accompanying them to Mobile (where they were loaded aboard a train and sent to another stronghold, most likely Vicksburg or Fort Pillow.) The 33rd Alabama afterwards served at Stone's River, and was noted for action at Nashville in 1864. The regiment also had the misfortune of being involved in a train wreck near Cleveland, Tennessee on 4 NOV 1862 which killed 17 members of the 33rd Alabama and injured seventy (which is the main reason this post is here: I had no idea that there were over 500 wrecks and accidents involving Confederate railroads during the Civil War... until now.) References: http://files.usgwarchives.net/al/butler/newspapers/train33rd.txt Train wreck. http://freepages.rootsweb.com/~alavols33rd/military/survivors.htm Victims of train wreck. https://civilwartalk.com/threads/railroad-accidents-kill-soldiers-during-civil-war.113583/ Train wreck discussion at civilwartalk. [Over 500 train wrecks and accidents occurred on Confederate lines during the Civil War. See http://www.csa-railroads.com/index.htm R.R. Accidents under "Essays and Documents" and scroll a little more than halfway down.] Note: The 16th Alabama, veterans of Shiloh, were aboard this same train, but occupied cars not affected by the derailment, and suffered no casualties.
  30. 1 point
    Returning to Henry Walke... The incident for which Commander Walke got into disciplinary trouble with the U.S. Navy occurred in January 1861. As commanding officer of USS Supply (a sail-powered collier and supply vessel running between Pensacola and Vera Cruz, delivering coal and provisions to the fleet) CDR Walke happened to be in Pensacola Bay when the State of Florida pressed for Federal arsenals and forts to be handed over; and before Commodore Armstrong turned over the Pensacola Navy Yard to Florida, he ordered CDR Walke “to sail USS Supply to Vera Cruz.” And Henry Walke did not follow those instructions, so he was obviously disobeying orders when he did not comply. The full truth, however, is convoluted: Commodore James Armstrong (some questioned his loyalty; others believed he was having a nervous breakdown). How valid were his orders? The situation at Pensacola was “fluid.” How does one “follow orders” when the orders may be illegal, or illegitimate? Commodore Armstrong received orders by telegram on 9 JAN 1861 ordering him to “cooperate with the Army in maintaining possession of the public property.” As part of this cooperation, Armstrong tasked Walke (and Supply) with delivering foodstuffs to Fort Pickens (where Army Lieutenant Slemmer had transferred his force of artillerists from Fort Barrancas.) Because the foodstuffs were not unloaded January 10th the USS Supply remained at Fort Pickens Wharf overnight. [Florida seceded from the Union January 10th.] Commodore Armstrong surrendered the Navy Yard at 1:30 p.m. on January 12th. Before surrendering “the property under his command,” USS Supply and USS Wyandotte were sent away: Supply to Vera Cruz; and Wyandotte to Cuba. [Neither vessel went more than a few miles south, before reversing course.] Both ships left Pensacola Bay and were “beyond Commodore Armstrong's control” when the Pensacola Navy Yard was surrendered. As result of the surrender, 34 Marines and fifty sailors (including Commodore Armstrong) were taken prisoner “by the State of Florida.” Many of these men had their families in Florida with them, living on base (as did the Army and Navy defenders still at Fort Pickens.) In all, over 100 Union citizens were in limbo after the surrender of January 12th. [CDR Walke's family was NOT in Florida, (for the sake of clarity).] On 16 JAN 1861, operating under flag of truce, CDR Walke sailed back inside Pensacola Bay and took the paroled prisoners aboard USS Supply. As well, the stranded wives and children, and civilian contractors (and their families) were taken aboard, removing all United States citizens who wished to evacuate. Outside Pensacola Bay, CDR Walke (the senior U.S. Government officer present) met with Lieutenant Berryman (USS Wyandotte) and Second Lieutenant Gilman (Slemmer's deputy) and confirmed that the Army would attempt to remain in possession of Fort Pickens. Then Walke tasked Berryman with remaining on station, to assist with defending Fort Pickens to the last (and evacuating the 82 men there, should that become necessary.) [The 81 men at Fort Pickens gained the service of a Hospital Steward.] Commander Walke sailed away, and reached New York Navy Yard nineteen days later (where he was charged, and his Court Martial took place in March 1861.) Issues What constitutes “valid orders?” What happens when the commander is no longer able to command, due to death, capture or incapacity; (when do his orders “die”)? Taking the initiative: “When disobeying orders, you had 'better be right.'” [Was Commander Henry Walke “right?”] Sometimes, things happen that cause “the plan” to be abandoned, by necessity. (You cannot plan for every situation; sometimes you must trust the judgment of trained junior officers and “acting” commanders.) [It is a common expression: “No military plan survives first contact with the enemy.” But, the plan then becomes a “framework” from which to operate and deviate.] “Better to beg for forgiveness, than to ask for permission.” [Time and distance can have unanticipated impact. The leaders in Washington, reliant on the telegraph for relaying orders (and still-active Military officers, following the surrender of Commodore Armstrong, over-reliant on electronic guidance) all suddenly found themselves unable to communicate... which illustrates the need to develop Trust, and sound decision-making, in junior officers before the telegraph line is cut.] Just a few observations... Ozzy
  31. 1 point
    As we know, the operation against Forts Henry and Donelson, combined with destruction of the railroad bridge on the Tennessee River south of Fort Henry, “turned” Fort Columbus. And that Rebel stronghold was evacuated end of February (completed 2 MAR 1862). But, there were other Rebel Forts that were turned during the Civil War: Island No.10 – This extremely strong position, occupying an S- bend in the Mississippi River was nearly surrounded by swamp (keeping infantry away.) Over seventy guns kept Union gunboats from attempting to force their way through the S- bend for the longest time. But the Achilles heel to Island No.10 was the protective swamp: a passage (Bissel's Canal) was cut through the swamp above Island Number 10 that looped west and south to re-enter the Mississippi River below Island No.10 at New Madrid (and New Madrid was captured earlier by John Pope marching his army across forty miles of swamp to reach that Rebel position.) Bissel's Canal allowed empty steamboats to reach Pope's Army at New Madrid for transport to the back of the Rebel defenses. And when Commander Walke's USS Carondelet “ran the gauntlet” at night, over sixty guns blazing away as he made the attempt, and reached Pope in early April 1862, the Carondelet provided the necessary protection for the transports loaded with Pope's men to make their passage: Island No.10 was turned at that point (and the garrison, unable to evacuate, surrendered April 8th.) Fort Jackson and Fort St. Philip – Defending the Mississippi River below New Orleans, complete with barrier chain and fire rafts, and protected by a number of gunboats, these two powerful forts were surrounded by swamps that kept enemy infantry away. Flag-officer Farragut (in cooperation with David Porter's Mortar Schooner fleet) battered Forts Jackson and St. Philip from two miles away and eventually felt confident to break the barrier chain and attempt to race his heavily armed wooden ships upriver between the two forts, and past the Rebel gunboats. In process of executing the night passage, all of the Rebel gunboats were neutralized, with the loss of one U.S. Navy vessel sunk. The Forts Jackson and St. Philip remained strong and lethal; but once Farragut got north of them (with Porter's fleet south of them) the “Rebel position was turned.” And the two Rebel forts surrendered on 28 April 1862 (and New Orleans surrendered soon afterwards.) Vicksburg. Each attempt by Williams and Grant to dig canals, re-channel the Mississippi River and leave Vicksburg high and dry was an attempt to turn Vicksburg... but the canal digging did not succeed. Instead, Vicksburg was passed, besieged, and ultimately forced to surrender (with food supplies almost exhausted.) Up until the day of surrender, the Rebel position remained strongly defended and effective in challenging ships on the Mississippi River.
  32. 1 point
    Confederate Operation against Pittsburg Landing Thanks for broaching this topic, first because of the date of “disagreement” of 1885 (OR 10 part 2 “communications” was published 1884, as was Alfred Roman's Military Operations of General Beauregard. William Preston Johnston's Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston was published in 1878.) And second, because it provides an opportunity to reassess and discuss “what we know” about actions and plans that resulted in the Battle of Shiloh. The first preparatory action: Beauregard was sent west (HQ at Jackson Tennessee) while General Albert Sidney Johnston moved south and then west from Nashville. [Beauregard clears out Fort Columbus (Military Ops of General Beauregard by Roman, pp. 234- 235) and uses a portion to garrison Island No.10 and the remainder becomes Beauregard's Army.] Ruggles moves to Corinth (and is put to work creating the defences there.) Hardee (until September 1861 in Arkansas; afterwards at Bowling Green) is part of Johnston's Army moving south from Nashville. Crittenden occupies Beirnsville. SAM Wood comes down with his force from vicinity of Knoxville. Bragg's Army of Pensacola is ordered north by Secretary of War Judah Benjamin (Bragg's Army concentrates at Corinth while Bragg meets personally with Beauregard at his HQ in Jackson.) Bragg also meets personally with ASJ on March 23rd (upon the General's arrival overnight at Corinth.) Combined with an expeditious recruiting effort in Mississippi and Tennessee, the accumulation of Rebel force congeals along the lines of the M & C R.R. and M & O R.R. Now that the units that will take part are present and identified, crucial preparations commence: Beauregard recognizes a lack of sufficient leaders, and requests specific men of talent be sent from the east; surveillance of Federal movements on the Tennessee River are conducted; it is recognized that U.S. Grant has established his Main Camp at Pittsburg Landing, and is obviously preparing for an operation against the M & C R.R (possibly to take place at Corinth). This provides an “opportunity,” which is awaited to initiate Confederate pre-emptive strike. It is noted that Lew Wallace is operating north of the main camp at Pittsburg Landing (but within supporting distance of the Main Camp.) As well, frequent expeditions involving substantial numbers of Federal troops are reported: one sent east to Pinhook; another sent towards Purdy; and several (involving W.T. Sherman) sent south towards the M & C R.R., or towards Corinth (and these operations by Sherman convince Confederates that Corinth is intended Federal target.) Meanwhile, it is recognized by Confederate planners that their problem becomes nearly insurmountable if Don Carlos Buell and his Army of the Ohio are permitted to effect the planned join with Grant's Army. Best if Confederate action can take place before Buell arrives (and as part of Confederate planning, Colonel B.H. Helm is maintaining surveillance of Buell's movement.) Target of Opportunity arrives. It is reported that Sherman has launched another expedition south about April 1st; and a movement by Lew Wallace of his Division towards Purdy next day is reported by scouts belonging to Cheatham (then at Bethel.) It appears that the “trigger” everyone has been watching for has been pulled: Grant's force is divided, with three gunboats and, perhaps, a brigade moving south, and a whole division moving west (and Buell still days away to the east.) President Davis has been in constant communication with General Johnston since early March, via telegraph and courier. Davis fully supports a pre-emptive strike, and offers suggestions on how best to accomplish it: President Davis even indicates his hope to travel west and accompany General Johnston in the coming Great Battle (Life of ASJ pages 517 & 520 and especially Letter of 26 MAR 1862 found page 522). It is obvious that General Johnston recognized and appreciated the recent achievements of General PGT Beauregard: not only at Fort Sumter and Manassas, but with reconstituting sufficient defence of the Mississippi River while “acquiring” the bulk of Polk's Army for “other use.” In addition, it was Beauregard who suggested Corinth as the Place of Concentration (see Military Ops of General Beauregard pp.258- 259). This recognition of talent led to Johnston offering command of the pending operation against Shiloh to General Beauregard; and when Beauregard graciously declines, the suggestion to draw up plans was agreed to by General Beauregard, who re-organizes the combined forces into the Army of the Mississippi (Military Ops of General Beauregard pages 266- 268). Colonel Thomas Jordan (on the Staff of General Beauregard since organizing in Summer 1861 the Spy Ring at Washington, D.C.) was made AAG of the Army of the Mississippi. It was Colonel Jordan, at direction of General Beauregard, (and agreement of General Johnston) who concocted the Attack Plan employed by Confederate forces at Shiloh (see top of page 271 thru 272 & 274 Military Ops of General Beauregard, with further confirmation to be found page 275 Letter of David Urquhart.) References: OR 11 (also referred to as OR 10 -- part 2 Correspondence) pages 387 - 392. SDG topic "Bragg's Memoirs" SDG topic "Albert Sidney Johnston's Staff" SDG topic "President Davis and Shiloh" (especially post of 9 June 2017 "The Battle got lost...") SDG topic "Beauregard's Elephant" The Military Operations of General Beauregard by Alfred Roman (1884) The Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston by William Preston Johnston (1878).
  33. 1 point
    thanks... i think i found a distant relative in clanton's..my father always told of a distant relative that was killed at stones river...i am going to research..wm allen and sydney allen and robert allen..thanks
  34. 1 point
    Finally having acquired my copy of “Grant Under Fire” by Joseph Rose, it may be of value to provide a brief examination of how the Battle of Fort Donelson is presented: It was heartening to find mention of mortars and Flag-Officer Foote's desire to have those weapons available (yet Foote went ahead and attempted his assault against Fort Donelson without them.) Rose addresses the curious fact of General Grant NOT leaving an officer in temporary command when he departed the vicinity of Fort Donelson to visit a wounded Flag-Officer Foote. And McArthur's brigade, borrowed from General Smith and positioned on the Union right, is mentioned for its role in fighting a losing battle to hold back the Confederate break-out of February 15th. Otherwise, the Fort Donelson operation is faithfully and predictably described, beginning with Colonel Forrest's unsuccessful effort to slow the Federal advance; the disposition of Grant's forces in a semi-circle just west of the Confederate stronghold; the addition of Lew Wallace's brigade (increased on site to Division strength) and Wallace's dilemma in responding to McClernand's request for assistance (with General Grant absent, and no one acting as his agent.) The attempted Rebel break-out, rolled back in the afternoon due to incompetence, and Federal reinforcements. And C.F. Smith, Jacob Lauman and James Tuttle share credit for advancing against the Confederate right, breaching the outer works, rendering Rebel possession of the fort untenable (with subsequent surrender next morning.) Grant Under Fire. If acquired solely for its accurate depiction of the Fort Donelson operation, it is worth the purchase. Ozzy
  35. 1 point
    Samuel Cooper After graduation commisioned Lt in Army light Artillery until 1837.Then he was appt. Chief Clerk of the US War Dept which he held until 1842 he was promoted to Col. and served in the Seminole War.he also saw action in the Mexican war.In 1852 he was promoted to Adj. General.He resigned his position in March 1861 to join the Confederate Army in Brigadier General;.He was asigned Adjutant and Inspector general of the Confederate Army directly under Jefferson Davis the entire war. 1862 he was promoted to full general..His final act was to preserve all records of the Confederate Army and turn them over to the US Govt.He retired to his plantation in VA until his death in 12-3-1876.He is buried in Christ Church Episcopol Cemetery in Alexandria VA..
  36. 1 point
    in today's light we can find alot of flaws in this film but in its defense..it was the first film portrayed for viewing at a battlefield, really reinacting had not come around as we know today so they recruited theater students from memphis state and there was a connection down in mississippi so several students from school there came up to portray soldiers and a factory there made some uniforms..and several locals were involved. and at this time i believe they did as well as could be on the animation .i believe it opened the door to all we have today in portraying battle action documentaries that we all view today.
  37. 1 point
    The following two letters were written by 17 year old Private M. E. Wescott to his mother in Farmington, Wisconsin. Ebenezer and his school friend, Samuel McClements, decided one day to wag school, run away and join a Wisconsin regiment (and must have lied about their ages to enlist without parental permission.) Briefly at Camp Randall, the two lads were soon underway with their regiment, bound for St. Louis. But, while the rest of the regiment went into camp at Benton Barracks, Company E boarded the steamer Imperial, departed St. Louis end of March, and arrived at Pittsburg Landing about four days later. References: https://archive.org/details/civilwarletters100wesc/page/n2 Civil War Letters by M. Ebenezer Wescott https://archive.org/details/rosterofwisconsi02wisco/page/64 Roster of Wisconsin Regiments https://digital.shsmo.org/digital/collection/dmr/id/15002/rec/3165 Daily Missouri Republican of 29 MAR 1862 reporting departure of steamer Imperial
  38. 1 point
    i wish the men that enlisted at savannah was accessable.i cant find it anywhere.. i wonder if his father ,phillip, survived the war he's death date is?? on find a grave. interesting .
  39. 1 point
    17th Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry, aka "The Wisconsin Irish Brigade" The 17th Wisconsin, consisting of a majority of men with Irish Last names, began forming at the end of 1861. (One man who intended to join the regiment as Quartermaster with rank of Second Lieutenant was Thomas Reynolds; but there were prolonged delays, and an opportunity presented that caused Reynolds to transfer to the 16th Wisconsin and be rewarded with rank of Major.) On 15 March 1862 the 17th Regiment was mustered into service at Camp Randall… but immediately, there was a problem: the newly mustered soldiers believed they were entitled to pay for enlisting; and they refused to leave Camp Randall until that pay was received. Colonel Doran talked to his men; and then Governor Harvey talked to the men; and over the course of three days, convinced them that the money owing would be paid in St. Louis. Whiskey flowed freely, and it appears the 17th Wisconsin made its way to St. Louis in dribs and drabs: about 400 in the first group, then 150 in the second group, and the final “mutineers” (upon learning that Mulligan’s Regiment was on its way from Chicago “to deal with them”) gave up their struggle and boarded the cars for St. Louis. During the delayed departure, a barracks burned on March 19th, killing one private outright (and another soldier died of his injuries shortly afterwards.) It appears the first elements of the 17th Wisconsin began arriving at St. Louis on March 25th 1862. The men of Company E were on hand March 26th and were assigned detached duty from the straggling 17th Wisconsin on board the steamer, Imperial. The relatively new paddle steamer appears to have arrived at St. Louis on March 25 or 26, but Imperial did not leave until March 28th. And this “lingering about St. Louis” tends to indicate “special cargo” (either provisions, ammunition, beef cattle or mules or wagons.) The men of Company E (and possibly Company H, as well) stopped at Cairo; was manifested to stop at Paducah; and arrived at Pittsburg Landing before April 3rd. If the cargo was mules or beef cattle, those may have been unloaded at the holding pen at Metal Landing, just south of Fort Henry. Any other cargo was likely transported to Pittsburg Landing (and the men of the 17th Wisconsin, Company E (and possibly Company H) unloaded that cargo there. The Imperial departed, and is reported as having arrived at St. Louis by April 8th (only to depart again on April 9th for service back at Pittsburg Landing as Hospital Boat.) The men on detached service from the 17th Wisconsin are recorded as joining the Second Division (McArthur’s Brigade) and were likely present during the Battle of Shiloh. But there is no evidence of “how active” were the contributions provided by Companies E or H in the fight of April 6 or 7. First problem: there are no casualties recorded. Only Private Ebenezer Wescott’s letters indicate limited participation by “some men” of the 17th Wisconsin (possibly in conjunction with McArthur’s force, or perhaps attached to the 16th Wisconsin in vicinity of the Hornet’s Nest); and if so engaged, that 17th Wisconsin contribution was led by First Lieutenant James McDermott Roe. The Captain of Company E (John McGowan) disappeared during the Battle of Shiloh… as did a number of men of the Companies E and H (two from Co. E and five from Co. H are recorded as deserters at this time.) Captain McGowan eventually turned up, but he subsequently resigned his commission in July 1862, changed his name to McGourin, and lived quietly in Washington State until his death in 1900. Meanwhile, Colonel Doran and the bulk of his 17th Wisconsin arrived at St. Louis and went into camp at Benton Barracks until about 10 April 1862. Transported to Pittsburg Landing by middle of April, the Regiment joined the Sixth Division (BGen McKean) and Colonel Doran took command of the 1st Brigade (Peabody’s Brigade.) Attached to the 1st Brigade were the 16th Wisconsin, 17th Wisconsin, 21st Missouri and 25th Missouri. LtCol Adam Malloy took command of the 17th Wisconsin in Colonel Doran’s absence. And the Wisconsin Irish Brigade joined the Siege of Corinth. References: http://genealogytrails.com/wis/military/cw/17thWIInfReg.html 17th Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry rosters and casualty records http://content.wisconsinhistory.org/cdm/compoundobject/collection/quiner/id/18036/show/17678/rec/75 Quiner's Scrapbooks (pages 25 - 35) https://www.findagrave.com/memorial/50481045/john-mcgourin Captain John "McGowan" McGourin at find-a-grave https://www.findagrave.com/memorial/43664851/james-mcdermott-roe Then- Lieutenant James McDermott Roe of Company E 17th Wisconsin who is credited by M. Ebenezer Wescott with "leading Company E at Battle of Shiloh." Roe was promoted to Captain, and was wounded at Vicksburg. When his term of service with the 17th Wisconsin expired, he joined the newly-organized 189th Ohio Infantry as Lieutenant Colonel.
  40. 1 point
    I think the burden of proof, in this case, would be on the one making the supposition. Not the one disagreeing. Otherwise, it is character assassination by conspiracy theory.
  41. 1 point
    Following the Battle of Shiloh, and the service of the 14th Wisconsin with Buell's Army of the Ohio on Day Two, the 14th Wisconsin Infantry was tasked with provost marshal duties, and remained at Pittsburg Landing while Henry Halleck led his Army of the Mississippi south towards Corinth. After the Occupation of Corinth end of May 1862, and the pursuit by Major General Pope of Beauregard's Army withdrawing to the south, the 14th Wisconsin helped process the thousands of Confederate prisoners sent north by Pope for transport to Northern POW camps. In addition, the men of the 14th Wisconsin were among the first to learn that "Major General Pope estimated the remaining Rebel Army under Beauregard to number only 30,000 men." [This figure was wildly inaccurate, and led leaders in Washington, and General Halleck, to believe the Rebel Army in the West was disintegrating before their very eyes. And this "Success" led to Pope and Halleck being called East for "Important duties in Washington." ] Reported in OR 10 part one and two, the above details are further verified by letters written by Private James K. Newton, 14th Wisconsin, Company F and Private Newton's letters are contained in A Wisconsin Boy in Dixie: Civil War Letters of James K. Newton (first published 1961 and edited by Stephen Ambrose.) James Newton's letters detail involvement of the 14th Wisconsin at Shiloh; the two months of provost duty at Pittsburg Landing; and involvement with the Vicksburg Campaign. References: https://ir.uiowa.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com.au/&httpsredir=1&article=11025&context=annals-of-iowa https://books.google.com.au/books?id=Rihx0ZU10RoC&pg=PA185&lpg=PA185&dq=abraham+john+logan+vicksburg+mine&source=bl&ots=lvFv9lctsX&sig=ACfU3U33shApGD5jy43VOTylDhzazIctag&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwi896Cqt_LhAhWKWX0KHS_5B384ChDoATAAegQIBxAB#v=onepage&q=Savannah&f=false A Wisconsin Boy in Dixie (limited access at Google Books)
  42. 1 point
    Oh, that was so helpful to me. My gggrandther was McKoins. You are wonderful Ozzy, thank you so much. Nice to meet you both
  43. 1 point
    Sometimes you find details where you least expect them... and this autobiography is a real gem: Reminiscences of a Soldier's Wife by Mary Logan https://archive.org/details/reminiscencesas02logagoog/page/n8 The view from Cairo of "what was taking place, just across the Ohio River" (...and I was going to just list the "important bits" relevant to us at Shiloh Discussion Group): pp. 100 - 116 Muster and drill in Southern Illinois (31st Illinois Infantry, Colonel Logan -- Member of Congress) pp. 116 - 118 Battle of Belmont (as experienced by those waiting for the Troop Transports to return) page 120 The 31st Illinois meets General Grant pp. 121 - 122 Fort Henry pp. 122 - 126 Fort Donelson (where Colonel Logan is wounded. His wife, Mary, describes her efforts to retrieve him from the battlefield.) pp. 127 - 129 The move up the Tennessee River to Pittsburg Landing (reflects a civilian's understanding of what took place) page 129 Major General Halleck in command. page 130 General Halleck is called to Washington (and General Grant resumes command...) But, the most important bits are "what came afterwards..." pp. 130 - 131 The relationship of Generals James B. McPherson and John Logan pp. 159 - 161 The replacement of Army of the Tennessee Commander John Logan with O. O. Howard pp. 162 - 168 Incredible exchange of letters after the war between William T. Sherman and John Logan, reflecting on "interpersonal relationships" involving Sherman, Logan, O. O. Howard, George H. Thomas and Ulysses S. Grant. pp. 170 - 172 Another illuminating exchange between Grenville Dodge and John Logan (regarding Dodge, Logan, WT Sherman and George Thomas). If you want to understand "why Union commanders related to each other the way they did," and "why friction seemed to appear from nowhere" (and how those interpersonal relationships impacted actual "fighting of the War"), then this is a good place to start... "Harmony" Ozzy
  44. 1 point
    We took a day trip over to Shiloh on Saturday to enjoy the beautiful weather and walk around for the day, also because it's pretty much been forever since we've stopped by the park. As is customary on every visit, we have our dog, Beauregard, pose for a picture next to his namesake road over by Fraley Field. Not sure why they replaced the old Beauregard sign, even the Visitors Center couldn't really give us an explanation as to why it happened, which is fine, it was simply curiosity if anything.
  45. 1 point
    On the above list of passengers aboard the Tigress, another name has been added: Douglas Putnam Born in Ohio in 1838, Douglas Putnam was trained as clerk (financial industry) and departed his home near Marietta before 1860 to settle in Galena Illinois (where he became friends with William Rowley, who joined the 45th Illinois Infantry late in 1861). Shortly after outbreak of war, Putnam offered his services as “financial agent” and became part of financial agency “I. N. Cook,” handling large sums and making regular disbursement of pay to soldiers in the Volunteer Army [reference to I. N. Cook found in Papers of US Grant vol.5 pages 139 - 140.] Putnam (a civilian contractor with no rank) was sent to Cairo about August 1861, assigned the duty of Paymaster. It was while serving at Cairo through that Winter that Douglas Putnam became associated with Richard Oglesby, John McClernand, Flag-Officer Andrew Foote, and Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant. Subsequent to General Grant’s victory at Fort Donelson, and likely due the increased number of Staff accorded the new Major General, Grant remembered Douglas Putnam, and brought him into his “military family” as Paymaster. When General Grant was released from arrest in mid-March 1862, Paymaster Putnam was installed in his own office aboard Tigress, and made the voyage to Savannah Tennessee, arriving on the 17th. During the remainder of March and early April, Douglas Putnam was present at numerous “pay parades” and disbursed funds to the soldiers camped at Pittsburg Landing. But, his pay activities were put on hold when fighting erupted Sunday, April 6th. And with the conclusion of the Battle of Shiloh on April 7th, Putnam made his way north aboard a steamer bound for Cincinnati. Back in Ohio, he became part of the drive to get up the 92nd Ohio Volunteer Infantry. Needing a character witness, Douglas Putnam requested one from Major General Grant… who gladly provided that document to Governor David Tod of Ohio. Putnam joined the 92nd OVI as “First Lieutenant and Adjutant,” but was soon elevated to Major. And at the Battle of Chickamauga, Lieutenant Colonel Putnam was wounded (and wounded again on Missionary Ridge.) Douglas Putnam survived the war, returned briefly to Ohio, and then settled in Kentucky, where he became a Director of the Ashland Coal and Iron Railway Company for the rest of his life. References: “Reminiscences of the Battle of Shiloh” by LtCol Douglas Putnam, Jr. (1889) found in pages 197 – 211 of MOLLUS (Ohio Commandery) vol.3 (1890). https://archive.org/details/sketcheswarhist00commgoog/page/n201 https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=coo1.ark:/13960/t15m6t13x;view=1up;seq=1093 Biography of Jay Cooke, financier of the Union war effort (begins page 1037 of Ohio in the War: her statesmen, her generals… by Whitelaw Reid (1868). http://www.cincinnaticwrt.org/data/ccwrt_history/talks_text/moffat_soldiers_pay.html Soldiers Pay [during the Civil War] by William C. Moffatt (1965) [presented to Civil War Round Table of Cincinnati January 1965.] https://www.kcchronicle.com/2014/03/11/a-look-into-a-civil-war-strongbox/a8nooaz/ Examination of 200-pound Paymasters Box (11 MAR 2014) by Brenda Schory. Papers of US Grant vol.5 pages 139 – 140: MGen Grant to Governor Tod. https://www.findagrave.com/memorial/93324038/douglas-putnam Paymaster Douglas Putnam.
  46. 1 point
    Mona Your point is correct IRT ample fresh water available at Pittsburg Landing. In addition, water provided "defense," of sorts: swollen Snake Creek and Lick Creek provided impassable barriers, early on... natural moats. And Lew Wallace was likely maintained at Crump's Landing, both to keep him removed from interference with Brigadier General Sherman (as you have previously suggested), and to continue that sizable force at Crump's to act IAW Jomini as "Strategic Reserve" [Art of War pages 128 - 135.] Cheers Ozzy
  47. 1 point
    The American Battlefield Trust has begun 2019 with a bang, publishing "Shiloh in 4 Minutes" on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ipNrAvDIO8U Post of 16 JAN 2019: Shiloh in 4 Featuring the narration and analysis of Dr. Timothy B. Smith, this fact-packed episode introduces Fraley Field; discusses the timing and drivers of Confederate movement north; General Grant trading space for time on Day One (with the arrival of Federal reinforcements making certain the outcome on Day Two.) It would be a challenge for anyone to do a better job of summarizing Battle of Shiloh. Bravo Zulu!
  48. 1 point
    Grant’s Little Jokes For the past year or two, every instance of a joke or funny story attributed to U.S. Grant has been recorded as it was encountered; not as productive a venture as might be supposed, because General Grant projected an image, a presence, of “serious, no-nonsense gravitas.” Grant appeared “too busy to be funny; too seriously engaged to allow humor to color his simply-business, deadly serious professional conduct.” While preparing this discussion paper, the following assertion of Grant’s humor emerged: https://warstoriescast.com/2017/10/24/library-conversation-with-dr-john-marszalek/ Worth a read to get someone else’s take on the subject. Meanwhile, here are jokes and funny stories attributed to Ulysses S. Grant: · “You can’t march through that swamp, Jacob Ammen. I will send transports for you next week [to ferry you across from Hamburg Landing to Hamburg, after you and your men complete a 12-mile march.]” · “There is a water battery. Study it well.” – Said to Surgeon John Brinton during trip up Cumberland River aboard towboat W.H.B. in response to Brinton’s question, “What is a water battery?” And smacks of “Get me a left-handed monkey wrench.” · Allowing Brigadier General William Tecumseh Sherman to persist in calling his force “the First Division,” knowing that conduct would irritate Brigadier General John McClernand, in command of the original First Division. · The initiation and continuance of “the Shell Game” at Pittsburg Landing (claiming General C.F. Smith was still “at Pittsburg Landing,” but “just temporarily absent due to illness” in order to install W.T. Sherman as “acting commander of the campground.”) The joke was at the expense of John McClernand… again. · “General Grant intends to give you the opportunity to be shot in every important move” – Grant to Lew Wallace, via aide William Hillyer, following the success (at the cost of Wallace disregarding orders) at Fort Donelson. · In Missouri in 1861, General Grant advanced his troops and in process, heard about a local woman, Mrs. Selvidge, renowned for her home cooking. But when Grant fronted up to the cook’s home, he was told by her that, “She could not prepare a meal for the General because a squad of his cavalry had visited earlier, and cleaned her out – ate everything she had, except for a pie.” The General had a look at the pie, handed Mrs. Selvidge fifty cents, and turned to depart. “Aren’t you going to take your pie?” asked the cook. “Oh, no. Hold onto it for me.” And General Grant mounted his horse and took his departure. At his new headquarters, Grant determined the identity of the cavalry unit, and sent its commander the following order, just before midnight: “Having visited Mrs. Selvidge and eaten almost everything she had, except for one pie, you will depart immediately for Mrs. Selvidge’s and eat that pie, too.” · After enjoying success at Fort Donelson, Grant “knew” that the next logical step was occupation of Nashville. And he was disheartened by delay and procrastination, most revealed by Brigadier General Don Carlos Buell, who asserted, “The Rebels may have departed, but they have every intention of returning to Nashville” – a claim that newly minted Major General Grant did not believe. But, in “showing his acceptance of Buell’s claim,” Grant pressed upon Buell the offer of BGen C.F. Smith’s division, in order to secure Union possession of Nashville… and he had Buell put that request in writing… and then sent Smith from Clarksville to Nashville. Rbn3 in a post of 3 MAR 2017 offers the following: “Undistinguished and often shabby in appearance, Ulysses S. Grant did not recommend himself to strangers by looks. He once entered the Desoto House at Galena, Illinois, on a stormy winter's night. A number of lawyers, in town for a court session, were clustered around the fire. One looked up as Grant appeared and said, "Here's a stranger, gentlemen, and by the looks of him he's travelled through hell itself to get here." "That's right," said Grant cheerfully. "And how did you find things down there?" "Just like here," replied Grant, "lawyers all closest to the fire."
  49. 1 point
    Right..I didnt put all this in my comment.I guess Grant thought he didnt want that valuable timepiece to become lost/captured.
  50. 1 point
    Below is an outline of some of the events leading up to the battle of Shiloh. Each event is color-coded. Events relating to the Confederates are listed in Red. Those relating to the Union are in Blue. Some events may pertain to both sides but are shown in either red or blue. This will usually signify a victory by that side - the Union capture of Fort Henry is described in blue, for example - or to indicate that the event is more closely associated with one side than the other. The main sources for this timeline are Wiley Sword's Shiloh: Bloody April, Larry J. Daniel's Shiloh: The Battle That Changed the Civil War, Edward Cunningham's Shiloh and the Western Campaign of 1862, and Series 1, Volume 10 of the Official Records. A few other sources not listed here were also used to try and clarifiy some of the dates as much as possible. Times shown on April 5th are approximate and not meant to be exact. ------------------------------------------------------- September 1861 - General Albert Sidney Johnston arrives in Nashville, Tennessee, to assume command of Confederate Department #2. The vast command stretches from the Appalachian Mountain range all the way to Indian Territory west of the Mississippi. Fall/Winter 1861 - Johnston establishes a 400 mile defensive line between the Mississippi and Appalachians. Running mostly through Kentucky, the line is formidable on paper, but quite thin in reality. November 18th, 1861- Major General Henry W. Halleck is placed in command of the Union's Department of the Missouri. Halleck will be the main player on the Union side in the events leading up to Shiloh. January 19th, 1862 - Battle of Mill Springs, Kentucky. This northern victory breaks the eastern end of Johnston's defensive line, placing eastern Tennessee in danger of a Union invasion. An invasion that does not materialize. February 2nd - A combined Union army/navy expedition leaves Cairo, Illinois, bound for Fort Henry on the Tennessee River, just south of the Kentucky border. The fort, along with nearby Fort Donelson on the Cumberland, is considered a weak spot in the Confederate defensive line. February 5th- General Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard arrives in Bowling Green, Kentucky. The "Hero of Fort Sumter" has been sent west as second in command to Albert Sidney Johnston. Johnston, focused on Bowling Green, assigns Beauregard command of the troops between the Tennessee and Mississippi rivers. February 6th - Fort Henry falls to Union gunboats, piercing Johnston's defensive line. The one-sided battle is over before the supporting Union army under Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant can arrive to take part. The fall of Fort Henry is a major turning point in the campaign leading to Shiloh, and in the war itself. February 8th - Halleck attempts to replace Grant with Ethan Allen Hitchcock, a retired Army officer. The attempt is unsuccessful. February 11th- Outflanked by the loss of Fort Henry, Confederate forces begin evacuating Bowling Green, Kentucky. Union troops will occupy the town a few days later. February 16th - After a siege of several days and a failed breakout attempt, Fort Donelson surrenders to Grant's army. Some 12,000 to 15,000 southern troops are taken prisoner. The victory earns Grant a promotion to major general of volunteers. February 17th - In response to the growing crisis in Kentucky and Tennessee, the first of several Confederate reinforcements arrive in Corinth, Mississippi from the Gulf Coast. February 16th - 23rd- Following the loss of Fort Donelson, Albert Sidney Johnston evacuates Nashville and withdraws his troops some forty miles southeast to Murfreesboro. This effectively cuts him off from his forces in western Kentucky and Tennessee, now under Beauregard. For the next several weeks, Beauregard and Johnston will operate independently of each other. February 25th - The Army of the Ohio, under Brigader General Don Carlos Buell, occupies Nashville for the Union. Commanding the Department of the Ohio, Buell is independent of Halleck. The two are reluctant to cooperate with each other. Buell has been reluctant to move at all, but the fall of Fort Henry soon changes this. February 28th - Johnston's army heads south from Murfreesboro, on the first leg of a journey that will eventually lead to a junction with Beauregard's forces in Corinth, Mississippi. March 1st - During a patrol up the Tennessee, Union gunboats shell a small Confederate detachment at Pittsburg Landing, driving it inland. A landing party is sent ashore resulting in a brief firefight. March 2nd - Columbus, Kentucky is abandoned by southern forces. With the evacuation of Columbus, the withdrawal from Johnston's original defensive line is now complete. March 4th - Halleck strips Grant of active command by ordering him to remain at Fort Henry. This action is the result of what Halleck considers unprofessional behavior on Grant's part. Historians generally consider it professional jealousy on Halleck's part. Command of Grant's army is turned over to Major General Charles F. Smith. March 7th - Union troops begin arriving at Savannah, Tennessee, on the east bank of the Tennessee River. With a few exceptions, most of the men will remain on board the transports. March 11th - Halleck is promoted to command of the newly created Department of the Mississippi, effectively consolidating Union command in the Western Theater. Buell's Army of the Ohio is now subject to Halleck's orders. March 12th - C.F. Smith skins his leg while climbing into a boat on the Tennessee. Though a seemingly minor injury, a resulting infection will soon incapacitate the highly respected officer. March 12th/13th - A Union division under Brigader General Lew Wallace crosses the Tennessee from Savannah to Crump's Landing. Initially placed to support a raid on the nearby Mobile & Ohio Railroad, Wallace's division will remain in the vicinity of Crump's Landing until April 6th. March 13th - As the domino effect from the loss of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson continues, Confederates abandon New Madrid, Missouri, on the Mississippi River. The move isolates the defenders of Island #10, a nearby stronghold located in a large bend of the Mississippi. The island will surrender on April 8th, after which only Fort Pillow will remain between the Union Navy and Memphis to the south. March 14th - A Union detachment under Brigader General William T. Sherman attempts a raid on the Memphis & Charleston Railroad east of Corinth, Mississippi. The raid is called off the next morning due to heavy rain and torrential flooding. March 16th - Union troops begin occupying Pittsburg Landing on the west bank of the Tennessee. Sherman eventually sets up his division headquarters a few miles from the landing near a small log building known as Shiloh Meeting House. On this same day, following orders from Halleck, Buell's army leaves Nashville on an overland march of some 120 miles, bound for Savannah and a junction with Grant's army. March 17th - Grant arrives at Savannah following his reinstatement to active command of the Army of West Tennessee. He establishes his headquarters in Savannah and settles in to await the arrival of Buell's army. March 20th - The first units of Johnston's army arrive in Corinth, thus forming the all-important junction with Beauregard. March 23rd- Albert Sidney Johnston arrives in Corinth. On this same day, Johnston orders Earl Van Dorn to bring his army across the Mississippi from Arkansas. Van Dorn will not arrive in time to take part at Shiloh. March 29th - Johnston designates the combined force at Corinth as the Army of the Mississippi. April 1st- Johnston receives dispatches from Confederate President Jefferson Davis and his military adviser, Robert E. Lee, urging him to go on the offensive. Although the letters undoubtedly strenghten his resolve, Johnston has already decided to attack. The only question is when. April 2nd - A defensive move by Lew Wallace west of Crump's Landing is misinterpreted by Johnston & Beauregard as a probable attack on a nearby Confederate outpost. A rapid chain of events soon follows, with the two men agreeing that the time has come to move on Grant at Pittsburg Landing. April 3rd- Beauregard draws up what will later become a highly controversial plan for the coming attack on the Union army. The plan is approved by Johnston and the advance begins the same day. Johnston himself leaves Corinth the next morning. April 3rd- With C.F. Smith confined to a sickbed with a tetanus infection, temporary command of his division is given to Brigader General William H. L. Wallace. The forty-year-old volunteer officer has recently been promoted from colonel for his role at Fort Donelson. April 4th - Poor planning, poor roads, miscommunications and inexperience cause several delays in the Confederate advance. Despite this, Johnston orders the attack to commence the following morning. April 4th- Reports of enemy activity to the south of Shiloh Church are largely dismissed in the Union camps. Late in the afternoon a pickett post from Sherman's division literally disappears. A patrol sent to investigate unexpectedly clashes with southern troops supported by artillery. News of this encounter causes some concern throughout the landing area, but Sherman - the informal camp commander at Pittsburg Landing - brushes aside any thoughts of being attacked. Unknown to Sherman, the units encountered are the advance force of the Confederate army. April 5th 2:00 a.m. - Intermittent showers give way to a deluge during the night, turning the roads into quagmires and causing a further delay in the advance. The army is already badly strung out, with some units in line of battle near the Union army and others still miles (and hours) behind schedule. The attack is set for 8:00 a.m. 12:00 p.m. - Still more delays, as many outfits have yet to arrive at their assigned place in line. The attack, already several hours late, shows no signs of beginning anytime soon. 1:00 p.m. - The lead division of Buell's army arrives at Savannah. Brigader General William Nelson, commanding the division, believes Grant's army to be in a precarious position and is anxious to cross his men to Pittsburg Landing. Grant dismisses his concerns and later tells one of Nelson's brigade commanders that transports for crossing the river will be sent later in the week. 2:00 p.m. - As the Confederate battle line slowly begins to take shape, still more problems plague the struggling units to the rear. It will be hours before everything is finally set. 4:00 p.m. - Following a review of his division, Brigadier General Benjamin Prentiss receives a report of southern troops nearby, watching from the woods. He orders out a patrol to investigate. 4:00 p.m. - A regimental commander in Sherman's division becomes alarmed by enemy activity nearby and orders his men into line of battle. Sherman sends a message telling the officer to "take your damned regiment back to Ohio," adding that there is no enemy nearer than Corinth. 5:00 p.m. - Following yet more delays and setbacks, Beauregard actually suggets that the army cancel the attack and return to Corinth. "They will be entrenched up to the eyes," the angry and dejected general says of the Yankees. A surprised Johnston overrules him and orders the attack to take place at daylight the next morning, telling a friend that "I would fight them if they were a million." 7:00 p.m. - The patrol from Prentiss' division returns and reports that a march of three miles has turned up no enemy troops. In truth, the Confederate army is less than two miles away. The exact route taken by this patrol remains something of a mystery, and it appears that the patrol's commander may have filed a misleading report of the distance covered. Prentiss believes the report and is convinced that no danger exists. 8:00 p.m. - During an informal council of war, Beauregard again expresses his concerns that the advance has been detected and that the enemy will be waiting for them. Johnston listens but is not convinced. The attack will go forward as planned. 10:00 p.m. - Hearing of enemy activity just beyond the lines, Colonel Everett Peabody, commanding the First Brigade of Prentiss' Sixth Division, suggests to Prentiss that the division be made ready to receive an attack. Prentiss rejects the idea that the army is in danger and takes no action. ***** After spending part of the day at Pittsburg Landing, Grant returns to Savannah convinced that the army is safe. That night, he sends a note to Halleck that concludes, "...I have scarcely the faintest idea of an attack (general one) being made upon us, but will be prepared should such a thing take place." As Grant writes these words, some 44,000 Confederate troops are less than two miles from his army, poised for the attack he believes will never come.
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