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Posts posted by Ron

  1. Thanks for the answer Jim.  Don't hurry to catch up with me in age.  Slow down and enjoy life.  I would enjoy going to Shiloh Park but its not in the cards now.  Thanks for the invitation to visit you but can't just now.  Tell Mona I said hello.


  2. Jim,

    Thanks very much Jim.  Yes, I'm still interested in the local civilians of the time of the battle.  I just finished reading a article about this topic last week but reading this article reminded me of how much I have forgot.  I really don't like to do that because it was such a effort to accumulate the information the first time.  I'm not getting younger.  If you can contact the grandson Wicker again, I am interested in talking to him about the family.  I appreciate your continued interesting the subject.  

    I'm curious as to is older, you or me.  If you are 80 or older, you lose.

    Did you see my post about the camp of the 16th Wisconsin being moved.  During some work on the battlefield after the war, the road was moved to allow a clearer line of sight.  Don't remember when this was.  I posted it on the group web site.  Let me know and I will post it again.   

    I wish it was me that moved to Shiloh instead of you.  If you need shoveling snow, don't call me.



    • Like 1

  3. Just received my copy of "Courage and Devotion" from Amazon at good price and no delivery charge.  It is a good book, very interesting while giving a good biography of the battery.  It mentions about a dozen other artillery batteries.  Discussion of other campaigns, battles, casualties and personnel assignment and losses.  Author is Bruce R. Kindig, book is from Author House, Bloomington Indiana  47403.  The ISBN nbr 978-1-4969-1836-9 and the printer's web site is www.authorhouse.com.  Telephone number is 1-800-839-8640.

    Very good book, I recommend it.  It answers many questions such as why did the battery have six officers when only five was authorized?  All of the six officers were needed to fill vacancies, Capt. Scott, the battery commander in 1864 had replaced Capt. Bankhead but was now sick.  Lt Marsh was wounded, Lt Watson was wounded and taken prisoner,  Lt. Peters was absent without leave, and he never returned.  Lt. Doscher was also a prisoner at this time.  So who is left to command the battery?  Nobody!  The battery was disbanded on December 9, 1863 on Missionary Ridge. 

    Enjoy reading the book, I did.


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  4. Yes Perry, your are right.  This road is the Hamburg-Savannah road looking north towards the Snake Creek Bridge (not seen in the picture). 

    Jim,  not the Beauregard Road.  All you have to do is drive about 3 miles in a NE direction.

    Mona, Again, very good.  I'll say you are exactly right.  If you move north on the road about 500 yards and drive a nail into the road, you got it.  I hope Perry sent you the grand prize. 

    A point of observation is that the road is very flat with no high or low spots. If this is true, this would mean the road had been improved with a new surface and rolled flat.  This road, in the picture, looks very serviceable for use in modern times except for the lack of the Snake Creek Bridge.  Its my belief this road was used by the visiting tourists in earlier times.  All you got to do is remove the tree trunk.

    Look close at the picture.  I think you will agree that you see a chain under the tree trunk hanging from one side only.  If so, this is probably the chain used to close the road in days long gone.  


    (yes, I am still alive and kicking, just late in responding)


    • Like 1

  5. Hello Ozzy,

    I would never question General Robert E Lee on anything except the weather, perhaps.  The position of Chief of Artillery in the western confederate army remained vacant until about August when Major James H Hallonquist was promoted to Lt. Col. and  appointed as Chief of Artillery.  This appointment was at the start of the Kentucky campaign in summer 1862 resulting in the Battle of Perrysville.  Actually, his selection for this job proved to be a bad choice.  He seemed to concentrate on minor matters and let others try to handle the important affairs of the artillery service. 


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  6. I'm glad that Mona' answer of the River Road was the road in question.  The picture showed a presently unused road what seems to have been used in past times.  Mona's answer is correct and that means my answer would have been correct also.  Congrats Mona.


    • Like 2

  7. Ozzy,

    To help relieve any possible of confusion by the readers, remember that the army organization established four corps early in the forming of the rebel army.  The four corps were Polk's gathering at Jackson and Humboldt with troops at Union City to the north, a gathering at Lexington to watch the Tennessee River banks, Bragg's Corps at Corinth, Iuka and Grand Junction.  Detachments were spread through the area, one of which was a small unit at Pittsburg Landing, another at Burnsville Mississippi and others.  Bragg's units watched the Tennessee River banks to observe the movements of the federal troops and naval units.  There were many smaller confederate units spread through the countryside to observe the enemy, a detachment at Eastport on the river, Cheatham's division was at Purdy and Chalmer's brigade was in the vicinity of Hamburg and Monterey.  Mixed in with these infantry units were the detachments of cavalry scouts who were observing the union boats and their movements on the river.  During this time, the retreat through central Tennessee was still moving south and then west to Burnsville, Iuka and finally Corinth.  These troops were Hardee's troops from Bowling Green KY and Crittenden's troops from Somerset KY, after their defeat at Mill Springs and their retreat from Eastern Kentucky to Nashville.  

    The concentration of the confederate forces came from all directions, each with their own time factors, and supply needs.  They had poor transportation when that was available.  This concentration took place over two weeks considering that some units had a long march over poor roads and suffered with the bad weather.  The rain made for muddy roads that soon deteriorated into horrible mud ruts and the rain water flooded what was left.  The full confederation of forces did not occur until later, at different times (days) and units were spread out the country side in a larger radius from Corinth that many are not aware of.  In point of fact, when the army marched out of Corinth on April 3rd, some of the units were still not concentrated with the entire army, such as Cheatham's division came from Purdy and Breckinridge's entire Reserve Corps came from Iuka MS and Tuscumbia AL.  Polk's Corps still had units moving to Corinth along the railroads but these units did arrive in Corinth to organize into brigades.  Small detachments of the Second Corps under Ruggles and later Bragg, were still moving to the main concentration at Corinth. 

    For a better understanding of the movements of the confederate forces, and there were many of varying size, you must consider the time factors, weather including the rain, the condition of the roads and many normal factors of a military factor. Also, remember that General Orders #8 issued by Colonel Thomas Jordan caused confusion among the commanders and delayed their movements.  Col. Jordan was guided in writing the march orders by using a copy of Napoleon's orders issued for the Battle of Waterloo.  I believe that this last is a example of what not to do. 

    Enjoyed your posts


    • Like 1

  8. This position, Chief of Cavalry is difficult to identify who was the army Chief of Cavalry.  Difficult because who ever was selected did not last long.  Colonel James M Hawes had served as colonel of the 2nd Kentucky Cavalry just before the outbreak of the civil war.  Earlier he served a two year tour of duty at the cavalry school in Saumur, France.  General Albert Sidney Johnston requested Colonel Hawes' promotion to Brigadier General to fill this position, chief of cavalry.  He was appointed to this rank and this command on March 5, 1862.  He record as chief of cavalry for the one month he held this command was spotty.  After the Battle of Shiloh, he requested assignment to a infantry command.  His further service was in Tennessee, in Arkansas and in Mississippi during the Vicksburg campaign.  Later he was in command at Galveston Island Texas, where he was at the end of the war. 

    The position of Chief of Cavalry was not filled until later when officers like, Forrest, Wheeler, Wharton, Wirt Adams became available.       

    • Like 1

  9. All right, All ready, What's the secret or two that Mona spilled the beans on.  you brought it up but then left us hanging.  I can't get to sleep wondering what they can be.  If you don't tell us what they are, I will send my flock of flying bulls direct to your location.  Just think how much fun that will b

    come on Mona, fill us in. 



  10. On my trip to Shiloh about 1999, I wanted to photograph the confederate plaques that had mention of artillery positions.  This because I had noticed that the movements of the rebel batteries were hard to follow because of gaps in their narration (positions).  A certain plaque was mentioned and I found its position on the Trailhead map, so off We went (wife and me) but sadly, the plaque was missing from its location as was the cannon which had been on display nearby.  I thought of calling the park to report it missing but I then thought they already knew about it being missing. So,  I did not call to report it missing and I now realize that Mona's post above confirms that they knew it was gone.  At that time, the plaque and the cannon were both gone.  Oh well, many more cannons and plaques to photograph.  My surprise is that a cannon I knew was missing has now been confirmed and a little history of the cannon is given.  I enjoyed these above posts.  Thanks


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  11. Perry,

    Congratulation's and a job well done to you.  The discussion group went along through 10 years with your good leadership.  I read your message about the origin of the group and was surprised because I thought it was started earlier then 2007.  My big enjoyment has been reading all of the fine articles (posts) by the many knowledge members.  I still regret the passing of Art Bergeron.  My biggest regret is not getting to any anniversary trip to Shiloh and meeting the other members.  My wife and I made two trips, (2000, 2005) just before the group started up.  Too soon.  I enjoyed both trips a lot specially the second trip.  During this trip, I got out of the car and walked into the woods to read some tablets that were not visible from the road.  It was this walking that increased my interest and enjoyment of Shiloh.    I was encouraged to go home and start writing my book about Shiloh..  I'm still working on it.

    Congratulations to Perry and every member who has enjoyed all of the fine posts.  Remember, work back to the earlier posts because they are very interesting. 


    (I do miss not meeting any of you in person). 


    • Like 5

  12. The howitzer in the above picture is difficult to identify because of the angle of the photo but it appears to be a howitzer, not a gun, and is most likely of naval design.  It a small but heavy in size of shot, as a naval weapon, it appears to be a carronade.  A carronade was designed to be a small heavy weapon but shooting a heavy destruction round.  If I'm correct , it was from a period of 1780 to 1825 time period.  They were not for field use. 


  13. The practice of naming civil war batteries with their official designation (all batteries had a official name) ran afoul of the practice of naming the same battery (or batteries) for the commander and or his replacement.  Any replacement battery commander could have the battery use his name.  If there was 10 replacement battery commanders during the war, then the ended with this battery having 11 names, 10 replacements and the official number.  The box I have of index cards for the civil war batteries, confederate only, is stuffed to overflowing. 


    • Like 1

  14. Roger,

    You are correct, many factors created and continued to add to the battlefield confusion.  You can add to the confusion, the time and effort it cost Colonel Russell trying to control the Brigade.  Yes, things did break down into small battles of small numbers of soldiers.  It was described as a soldier's fight by some authors.  In the later hours of the day, fighting began to fall off.  It may have allowed some rest to the men but the fighting on the second day took away any rest they may have got on Sunday night.  The fighting was, on Monday, very bad.   It very seldom happened that all of the component units of a military unit somehow got lost from the main body.  This is an example of a confused scattered military unit.  At most, Colonel Russell commanded only one regiment.  BAD BAD BAD 

    I plan to compose another report about Russell's Brigade.  This time, it will be about the second day of the battle.  You may find the second day of the battle much more surprising as the fighting was just as bad as on the first day.  The second day battle I describe as the "Most Secret Battle of the Civil War".  It has been overlooked by most authors for far too long.  An example of why this is the case, one author used seven chapters to describe the first day's battle of 245 pages.  But described the second day battle in one chapter of 35 pages.  I found this to be the case in most of the books of the Battle of Shiloh.

    LET ME ASK YOU, WHY WOULD SOMEONE WHO HAS AN INTEREST IN THE CIVIL WAR AND POSSIBLE THE BATTLE OF SHILOH, IGNORE THIS SECOND DAY BATTLE WHICH I FOUND TO BE JUST AS INTERESTING AND MORE MYSTERIOUS AS MOST OTHER BATTLES.  Here is a hint for you to increase your knowledge, study the casualties, sick, wounded, deserters.  Notice the treatment and handling of them.  A army cannot live, fight, maneuver with food, water, ammo, horses and wagons to move the troops but this what they had to do on Monday and overnight on Tuesday.  



  15. Jim,

    Your answer is almost correct but falls a little short.  But Cheer up, you are so close that you are the winner.  Yes, the high spot is just beside the Bark Road just east of the gravel pit shown on the map on the south side of Bark Rd.  The map indicates the highest elevation on or near the battlefield is 600' high.  This location is east of the split off to the Eastern Corinth road. The Bark Road proceeds east to meet the River Road just above the ford over the Lick Creek.  This height is still the highest point on the park.  I am using a 1969 map of the area published by the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Geological Survey. I can bring your prize lunch to you if you don't mind a cold sandwich.  Maybe the flock of bulls can deliver it to you.  Perhaps my mention of the flock of flying bulls scarred a lot of people off. 


    I thought I had you people stumped.  Oh well, try again.


  16. Hello Mike,

    Here is some info about the 22nd Tennessee Infantry Regiment, I hope it helps.  You are right about the difficulty of finding info about the regiment.  besides the 22nd Tennessee, the 12th, 13th and the 47th Tennessee Regiments were in the operations of the 22nd Tennessee.  So, you need to study the history of all four  Tennessee regiments, but also study the history of the 12th/47th Tennessee consolidated regiment.  These last operated as a single regiment from August to October, 1862.  On June 16, 1862, the 12th and 22nd Tennessee Regiments were consolidated into the 12th Tennessee Regiment (consolidated). This merged unit operated only from June until October, 1862, when it was consolidated with the 47th Tennessee Regiment.  Are you confused yet?  All of these regiments served in Mississippi, Tennessee and East Tennessee. 


    At the Battle of Shiloh, the 22nd Tennessee Regiment was in Colonel R. M. Russell's brigade of Brig. Gen. Clark's Division of Polk's I Corps.  The brigade was supported by Bankhead's Tennessee Battery, it came up the Corinth Road and veered into in the Rhea Field near 8 a.m. and joined the fighting.  The 22nd Tennessee had a strength of 675 men present (Est).  It was commanded by Colonel Thomas J Freeman.  Russell's brigade continued its attack into the Rhea Field where it engaged the 57. Ohio about 8:30 a.m. and by 9:30 a.m. , pushed the Ohio Regiment back through their camps and into positions along the east branch of the Shiloh Creek Ravine in the northern Rhea Field.  This was near the extreme northern border of the Rhea field, 500 yards above where their line started the battle.  The regiment was in good condition having suffered only an estimated 25 casualties, down to 650 men at present.  At 10:00 am, Colonel Russell organized his brigade for a new attack by splitting his brigade into two parts, the left wing had the 11th Louisiana and the 22th Tennessee, total of 1,150 men (part A).  The right wing had the 13th Tennessee and the 12th Tennessee with 1,250 men (Part B).  The left wing attack progressed slowly through difficult terrain.  It was discovered that only 7 companies, out of the 20 companies of the two regiments, made the attack and they became stalled in the Shiloh Branch Ravine.  The right wing made better progress as all 20 companies of the two regiments made the attack and they moved onto the Shiloh Church plateau, above the Shiloh Branch Ravine.  The brigade strength was now, 1,150 of the right wing and the left wing was down to 1,050 men.  


    Sometime after 10:30 am, a further split apart of Russell's Brigade occurred when the 12th Tennessee, under Lt. Col. Bell moved to the east and attacked McAllister's Union Battery in the northwest corner of the Review Field (Part C).  This attack was led by Brig. Gen. A.P. Stewart and was composed of the mentioned 12th Tennessee and Stewart's 4th Tennessee, both supported by Stanford's Mississippi Battery.  Brig. Gen. Hindman was severely wounded in this attack when his horse was hit by a shell from McAllister's Battery.  The general got on his feet, shouted to the troops and collapsed and was removed from the field.  The attack continued across the 800 feet of the Review Field and came under a heavy fire of the union battery and the 45th Illinois.  The Tennessee troops got to 30 paces away from the union battery, halted and fired a heavy volley and then rushed forward and drove off the union defenders.  Capt. McAllister was able to remove 3 of his guns but left 1 gun abandoned on the field.  The 4th Tennessee suffered 31 dead and 160 wounded in this battle.  The 12th Tennessee continued forward to the Main Corinth Road equal distance between the Woolf field and the Duncan Field.  After this action, the 12th Tennessee moved towards the Duncan field and joined up with Shaver's Brigade.   


    Meanwhile, the other two elements of Russell's Brigade (parts A and B) continued an attack towards and through the "Crossroads" where the Main Corinth Road and the Purdy road met.  The fighting at the "Crossroads" was heavy against Raith's and Hildebrand's union Brigades.  This fighting began about 10:00 a.m. and continued to about 11:30 a.m., this length of time in the fighting underlines the severity of the fighting.  It has been suggested that the battle in this area was more severe, with resulting battle casualties greater than other areas of the Shiloh Battlefield that have been more highlighted.  Part A of the brigade, commanded by Colonel Russell, the brigade commander, continued in the heavy fighting at the "Crossroads" with about 1,100 men, their attacked successfully pushing back the union defenders back to McClernand's camps located along Sherman's Camp Road and the fighting above the Woolf Field and below the Jones Field seesawed back and forth for several hours.  Meanwhile, The right wing of Russell's Brigade, with only the 13th Tennessee was fighting in the low wooded land below the Purdy Road, east of the "Crossroads".  This fighting was less severe than at the "Crossroads" but still the advance was difficult.  This action began near 10 a.m. with a combined strength for the three elements of Russell's Brigade of 2,275 men and continued to near 11:30 a.m. with an estimated 2,000 present.  The 22nd Tennessee had about 500 still with the colors. 


    Close to twelve noon and until 2 p.m., an odd situation occurred.  At this time, Russell's brigade became divided into four separate maneuvering units.  This is very uncommon for a brigade to be split into four subunits. 

    Unit A was still the 13th Tennessee commanded by Colonel A J Vaughn and was still in the woods on the west side of the Duncan Field.  The regiment was supporting Stanford's Battery and later, both the regiment and the battery joined Ruggles' Line of Artillery. 

    Unit B, the 11th Louisiana was fighting above the "Crossroads" supporting Trabue's attack until it became confused when McClernand's Division attacked out of the Jones Field.  It was confused because it did not know whether to support Trabue's attack or resist McClernand's attack.  The confusion ended at 12:30 pm when Colonel Marks led the regiment north into the woods below the Jones Field.  This move was to oppose McClernand's Division.  The fighting got heavier with the confederates pushing McClernand's troops back.  This weakened the union line that Sherman built up in the middle of them Jones field. 

    Unit C, composed of the 12th Tennessee, of 475 men, was fighting on the Main Corinth Road under General A. P. Stewart and supporting Bankhead's Battery.  About 1 p.m., the regiment is believed to have moved back to a ravine to get water and ammunition.  It returned to the battle about 2 p.m., now with 425 men. 

    Unit D, This unit had only the 22nd Tennessee Regiment and small element of the 11th Louisiana under command.  Colonel Thomas J Freeman was the commander of this Unit and had about 500 men in the line.  They had been fighting in the woods above the Water Oaks Pond.  Close to 2 p.m., the Regiment moved up in the woods to just below the Jones Field.  The fighting had been severe as the regiment lost about 100 men by 2 p.m.


    In the time period between 2 p.m. and 4 p.m., Russell's Brigade continued to be split into four separate combat units.  Colonel Russell was still the brigade commander but who exactly he commanded is unknown.  The brigade was in the woods above the Wolff Field, and the woods below the Jones Field, and in the woods west of the Duncan Field.  All together, the regiment had 1,150 effectives in the ranks. 

    Unit A, the 13th Tennessee commanded of 375 men by Colonel A J Vaughn, was supporting Stanford's Battery west of the Duncan cabins.  little fighting here as Ruggles' artillery fired against the union positions along the Sunken Road, still some stray shells found Vaughn's Regiment.  The regiment had about 325 men in line. 

    Unit B, now commanded by LT. Col. Robert H Barrow replacing Col. S F Marks.  The 11th Louisiana was the only regiment in the Unit and it took part in Stewart's temporary group's attack on the Duncan cabins.  The attack drove out the union defenders but the regiment was separated from both Stewart's temporary unit and Russell's Brigade.  The regiment had about 300 men still with the colors at 4 p.m. but  lost all contact with their commanders.  It wandered around the battlefield until it was stuffed into a emergency group late in the battle. 

    Unit C, commanded by Lt Col Bell had the 12th Tennessee of 375 men in the ranks.  At 2 p.m., the regiment was at the Shiloh Branch Ravine getting water.  It was ordered to move east on the Purdy Road, below the Sunken Road positions of the union army and to provide support to General Bragg's troops.  It seems to have been engaged only lightly to 4 p.m.  It had about 325 men present.

    Unit D, still commanded by Colonel T J Freeman with 350 men present.  The 22nd Tennessee, the only regiment present, moved east from the woods below the Jones Field, crossed the Tilghman Branch Ravine to the east bank of the ravine.  This move brought the regiment into closer proximity to the circle forming around the fragments of Prentiss' union troops in the Hell's Hallow.  The regiment had close to 300 men present at 4 p.m.  



    After 4 p.m., the brigade was divided into three Units.  Unit A, led by Col. A. J. Vaughn with 375 men present, was supporting Stanford's Battery still in Ruggles' line of artillery but was soon to move forward.  Sometime after 4 p.m., Unit C, the 11th Louisiana Regiment, dissolved into many small groups of men.  The regiment was no longer effective during attacks because a single regiment could not bring a mass of infantry and cannon on a single point of a attack.  The 350 men of the regiment were lost for effective service against the union troops.  It is unclear how this happened.  Unit B, were separated from the other regiments but did manage for two of the regiments of the brigade, to join together.  This Unit now had 725 men in the ranks.  The Unit operated west of General Prentiss's surrender site in Hells Hallow and accepted the surrender of some of the federal troops.  They had moved over the Tilghman Branch Ravine, moved east into the Stacy Field where their forward movement ended while gathering the federal prisoners.  Most of the fighting was over by 6 p.m. or shortly after.  Combined, the brigade had 1,250 men in the ranks but many were tired, out of ammunition, had no food or water, and did not where their commander was  Many small groups of men were scattered over the battlefield and did not rejoin with the brigade until the next day if at all.



    In the evening hours, after 6 p.m., the Brigade reformed when 3 of its regiment's met and joined up.  These three regiments were the 12th Tennessee (325 men), 13th Tennessee (325 men), 22 Tennessee (300 men) still in the vicinity of the Stacy Field.  In the evening darkness, they moved down the Corinth Road, towards the Shiloh Church Plateau and set up campsites on the plateau among the ruins of the battle.  The casualties of the battle still laid, on the ground including dead and wounded.  The nearby field hospitals operated with the greatest efforts by the small staffs.  The doctors preformed many emergency operations.    They were camped near General Beauregard's Headquarters.  Most of the union tents had bullet holes in them, some were burned but the rebels enjoyed the items they found in the tents, food to eat and water to drink.    The brigade had an estimated 1,250 men available at 6 p.m. for duty but had only about 1,000 later in the day, as many had deserted and ran down the Corinth Road, to get away from the dangers of the battlefield.  The last regiment of the Brigade, the 11th Louisiana under Capt. J E Austin, with 300 men, also bivouacked on the Shiloh Church Plateau unknown to other regiments of the brigade.  They were later attached to General Anderson's Brigade on Monday morning.  

    While this account of Colonel Russell's Brigade is as accurate as possible, much research was put into the info  just provided.  All of the after action strength figures mentioned are calculated by myself based on the research already mentioned.   The strength figures given before the battle or before brigade attacks are from the several sources referred too, included the "Official Reports" of the War of the Rebellion.  I have used a formula to determine the number of casualties a regiment suffered. Your questions are welcomed but if you want to argue, line forms to the right.  I hope you will enjoy this and find it useful.  


    • Like 2

  17. Locate the location of the highest elevation on the Shiloh plateau, some call it the Shiloh Hill.  Please tell us what the elevation is.  The entire area of the battlefield and approach roads are included to find this point.  The prize for the correct answer is a meal at McDonalds, in Shelby Township Michigan.  You know that you can not pass up a meal as good as this.


    Watch out for the flock of bulls.

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