Jump to content
Shiloh Discussion Group

Stan Hutson

  • Content Count

  • Joined

  • Last visited

  • Days Won


Posts posted by Stan Hutson

  1. Then again, I don't know how much that time mattered.  The Confederates were disorganized, thus part of the reason they stopped.  Had they continued on the attack, being so disorganized, I venture that the disorganization would have caused even more ill coordinated attacks, and potentially, disaster for the Confederates, if that makes sense.

    • Like 2

  2. It is interesting to note that not all the Confederates "cooked and ate" all of their rations.  Some lost theirs due to accident, and the short notice prevented some from cooking theirs.  I imagine, just the "slow march" from Corinth to Shiloh, the mud, and thus slow supply trains all added to the end result of ration issues by the morning of the battle.  It makes one wonder if aides, and indeed Brigade and Division commanders were informing Johnston that food was a problem.  

  3. 5 hours ago, mona said:

    interesting...he writes of the order to prepare 5 days rations...in other letters/reports it has been 3 days.



    In the letter I posted written by Lt. Hugh William Henry of the 22nd Alabama, he also states they were ordered to cook 5 days rations.  He states, "Last Thursday our Brigade received orders to cook five days' rations and to march to Monterey.  Owing to a delay in getting up the rations we only got two days' provisions cooked and the balance was loaded on a wagon.  The wagon overturned and we lost 3 days' rations."

    He also makes note that they were "half famished", and "as weak as water".  


    • Like 1

  4. I realize it is just one regiment in a large battle, but I often wonder if A. S. Johnston knew how somewhat unorganized many of the regiments in the Army were, i.e. the 26th Alabama Infantry.  The organization was not led by Maj. Chaddick, but actually by Colonel John G. Coltart of Huntsville.  I have posted before the letters of Lt. Benjamin J. Gaston of the 26th Alabama.  Just 3 days before the battle, Gaston was writing and stated that he did not know the "number" (regimental designation) of his unit.  I have seen other historians and writers erroneously attribute the leadership of the 26th to Chaddick rather than Coltart.  My his memory always shine bright, but from memory in Shiloh Bloody April, even Wiley Sword mentions Chaddick being the commander of the unit.  When Gladden's men stopped in the Federal camp, well, upon renewing the attack, at that point Coltart was wounded, and Chaddick took temporary control of the unit.  Coltart received a severe foot wound, but, he had it tended to behind the lines and then returned to the fight.

    It seems amazing to me that many men went in to that fight not knowing who their commanders were nor their regimental unit designation.  It is mentioned that some units were getting ammo resupplies for six hours, aka they were disorganized.  Again, I can totally see how given the facts mentioned in the first paragraph.  This seems reminiscent of Bjorn's April hike, The Division That Never Was.  Johnston had to have known this state of disorganization, even before the battle began, and how it would/could bring massive confusion on the field.

    Pictured are Colonel John G. Coltart and Lt. Col. William Davidson Chaddick, 26th Alabama Infantry.  The Major of the 26th Alabama at the time of Shiloh was Andrew D. Guinn/Gwin/Gwynne (several different spellings); Gwynne was severely wounded in the arm by a shell as noted in his service records.  After Shiloh, he was appointed Lt. Col. of the 38th Tennessee Infantry.

    Colonel John G. Coltart, 50th Alabama Infantry-color.jpg

    Lt. Col. William Davidson Chadick, 2650th Ala Inf and 4th Ala inf Captain and Chaplain.jpg


    • Like 2

  5. This is rather intriguing.  The first question that comes to my mind is wondering how many men were in the 1st Louisiana Cavalry at the time of Shiloh.  This is all speculation as I do not have access right now to the OR's for guidance.  Lots of what if's.  I know many Alabama cavalry soldiers were "farmed out" as scouts, couriers, etc., and did not act together as a unit for all intents and purposes.  I wonder if the same could be said of the 1st Louisiana Cavalry.  If they operated as a solid whole unit, under Forrest, however, I do not see how they could be neglected in records; nor do I see how they could not be mentioned in Forrest's operations at Shiloh, particularly if they numbered over 100 men. 

    The verbiage or rather how the story is articulated in the original article leads me to think they were on the Confederate right flank, near the river, the entire time.  They may have not joined Forrest in his movements near the Sarah Bell cotton field.  The story seems to mix "general Shiloh history" with the actions of the regiment. 

    Although not as good as Fold3, civilwardata.com only lists one member of the regiment as being wounded.  IF, again, IF, they only lost one man wounded, that does not seem to indicate they were in any thick fighting.  One way or another, it seems to indicate that there were a lot of Confederate horsemen "operating" on the Confederate right and/or Forrest had more men under him than I thought.  

    • Like 1

  6. http://tcc230.tripod.com/


    The following short history was taken from the website above:


    In February, 1862, Brigadier General Buckner ordered the 1st Louisiana Cavalry to operate on the north side of the Cumberland River, opposite Fort Donelson, to prevent any Union artillery from establishing across from the Fort. From this assignment until April, 1864, the 1st Louisiana Cavalry Regiment fought exclusively outside of their home state.

    After the fall of Ft. Donelson, the regiment was ordered back to Nashville and remained there until Union forces started showing up on both sides of the river. The regiment was then ordered Franklin, Tennessee and to serve as the rear guard. While in route, Capt. G. Scott and a detachment of 40 men were sent to halt the harassment of a Union cavalry unit that was following. At Granny White's Pike, Capt. Scott and his detachment attacked the 100 man detachment of the 4th Ohio Cavalry, killing 12, routing the troopers and burned their tents. The 1st La. Cavalry detachment lost 1 killed and 1 mortally wounded. The remainder of the trip to Franklin was uneventful and marked the first engagement of a long record of engagements for the regiment.

    At Shiloh, the 1st La. Cavalry was a part of Col. Nathan B. Forrest's Cavalry on the extreme right of the Confederate line. Repulsed the opening attacks on the 7th of April but had to finally give way to reinforcements of fresh troops of the Union forces.

    • Like 1

  7. Scott's Cavalry regiment was the 1st Louisiana Cavalry and from what I found on the net, it shows they were operating under Forrest at Shiloh.  Very odd that they are not independently listed in the OR's, that I can see.  Did a little research and found the obituary, plus another online source, showing one Martin Costley, 1st Louisiana Cavalry, Company L, wounded at Shiloh.  So, they were there it seems.

    The original article you posted is very odd and hard to follow.  Very generic "history" of the battle, almost written as if the writer was not there, just rehashing the Shiloh battle story.  If they were with Forrest, it leads one to wonder if they followed Forrest away from guarding bridges and joined in the attack near the Sarah Bell cotton field?  



    • Like 1

  8. I wonder what the back story is on this.  I am sure there were other commanders who probably wanted to recover other fallen soldiers at Shiloh, and probably would have given the chance.  I can see why the body of the Governor would want to be recovered, but the Major?  Just makes me think that if Beauregard gave the nod to Breckenridge to send a flag of truce, other officers would have gotten wind and would have wanted to send their own envoy(s) for similar purposes.

  9. The 47th Tennessee Infantry were the only reinforcements the Confederates received on the 2nd day of the Battle of Shiloh.  This article is neat summation of the 47th Tennessee, the weapons they carried, and their action in the battle.  Interesting short piece to read.


    Below:  Col. Munson Hill of the 47th Tennessee Infantry, wearing fraternal garb.

    Col. Munson Hill, 47th Tennessee Infantry.jpg

    • Like 2

  10. One of my cousins was alongside the 17th.  Captain Jesse Riley Dodd, Company F, 31st Indiana Infantry.  Said to have been wounded at Shiloh, but still looking for paper proof that he was.  I have often wondered how things might have transpired differently had Lauman's men not been moved around as they were, but rather just steadily fell back.

  11. When I refer to "green troops", I mean basically civilians.  Basically no drill, never fired their weapons.  Putting troops THAT green on the front lines is just insane.  By sheer luck, they stood their ground.  But, say had those green troops all run when the first shots were fired.  The Confederates would have readily destroyed the other veteran units due to sheer weight of numbers.  But, what if's.  

    When looking at the Federal perspective it can't be said that "no attack was expected at Pittsburg Landing" AND ALSO say, "we were not surprised on April 6th".  Those statements totally contradict one another.  The Federals were surprised, plain and simple.  Having said that, I think the Confederates were actually surprised when the dawn patrol came along.  Hard to know if the Confederates were expecting it, or if when it happened they thought the weight of the whole Federal Army was about to come crashing down.

    Lastly, yes, Lew Wallace.  I believe it simply is smoke and mirrors.  Watch what the left hand is going while the right hand is actually at play.  You hit the nail on the head Ozzy.  By distracting the masses with Wallace being lost and late, the questions that really needed to be answered were swept under the rug.  Point 5 is spot on.  

    • Like 1

  12. I think the soldiers serving in the position of orderly were the unsung heroes of the battle.  Most of us know, well, largely, Shiloh and it's terrain, where we are at, and how to get from point A to point B.  Put it this way, we have a better understanding of the battlefield than the Confederates did.  I can't imagine being sent, as an orderly, to go find "General so and so and give him this message and then return back to me".  Simply finding someone out in that large vast tract of battlefield acreage seems impossible alone, much less then finding ones way back.  I think the orderlies did a good job of it, to say the least.

    • Like 1

  13. I agree with Bjorn and his observation, in relation to points 3 and 4, that by placing green troops to encamp in your most advanced positions, some who had never fired their muskets, and likewise sending forward troops into line with no ammunition, was, well, a major mistake.  How any military officer can allow such a tactical faux pas to take place is mind boggling. Not entrenching, Point 22, is one thing, but putting rookies in the front line of your army as your first defense, again, that placement of troops was not thought out to any extent.  Either it was done on purpose, and whoever issued the orders for such a camp layout is an idiot, or it was not thought out, and still someone is an idiot, because it should have been thought out.  The buck stops at Grant.  It is hard enough to maintain control of an Army when you are with the Army, much less when you are hanging out at the Cherry Mansion and not “in the field”.  I think you are right Ozzy.  Grant was sly on this account.  Praise your friends and those you want to see shine, barely mention others, again, to leave room for scapegoats, say nothing to shed blame on yourself (Grant’s late arrival). 

    I, for one, have never thought much of Lew Wallace’s arrival in any shape, form, or fashion.  His absence had no influence on the first day of battle.  But, his arrival did influence the 2nd day, much more than he gets credit for IMHO.  Was Wallace going to come in on the first day and somehow single handedly deliver a crushing blow to the Confederates?  Looking back is hindsight 101.  We know the number of troops involved.  At the time, the combatants did not.  Wallace was not going to go blindly plowing in not knowing what was ahead of him.  So, the whole, “when did Wallace get his orders, why the counter-march, how did he get lost”, all the blah blah blah associated with Wallace has always puzzled me as to why modern historians are so engulfed by it. 

    • Like 1

  14. Pvt. James S. Matthews, Company C, 4th Illinois Cavalry (his rank at Shiloh was Private it appears).  Matthews served as orderly for Gen. John A. McClernand at Shiloh.

    Residence Joliet IL; a 17 year-old Clerk.
    Enlisted on 10/7/1861 at Camp Hunter, IL as a Private.
    On 10/7/1861 he mustered into "C" Co. IL 4th Cavalry 
    He was discharged for promotion on 10/31/1863
    On 10/31/1863 he was commissioned into "A" Co. US CT 3rd Cavalry 
    He was Mustered Out on 1/26/1866
    * 2nd Lieut 10/31/1863 (As of Co. A 3rd USCT Cavalry)
    * 1st Lieut 8/26/1865 
    He was described at enlistment as:
    5' 7", light complexion, brown eyes, brown hair
    Other Information:
    born in New Jersey
    Sources used by Historical Data Systems, Inc.:
     - Illinois: Roster of Officers and Enlisted Men
     - Index to Compiled Military Service Records
     - Official Army Register of the Volunteer Force 1861-1865
     - Illinois State Archives @ http://www.ilsos.gov/isaveterans/civilmustersrch.jsp
    (c) Historical Data Systems, Inc. @ www.civilwardata.com

    James S. Mathews, Company C, 4th Illinois Cav, orderly for Gen. John A. McClernand at Shiloh.png

    • Like 2

  15. Interesting that the names of Grant's telegraph operator and Bodyguard/orderly are unknown for the Shiloh time period.  Many General's would have more than one orderly, however, so that various messages could be carried at various times.  Having said this, I imagine that if Thomas D. Holliday would not have been killed at Shiloh, that his service as Sherman's orderly would have been lost to history.  His name is, probably, only remembered because he was killed while serving as Sherman's orderly.  

    • Like 2

  16. C.C. Harris, in his image, is wearing what appears to be a frock coat.  His rank of first sergeant is displayed on his coat sleeves.  He wears what most refer to as a Mexican War/mechanics hat.  Great image.  He later served as a 1st Lieutenant in Forrest's cavalry.

  17. On 4/18/2018 at 1:40 AM, Ozzy said:


    Thanks for posting this valuable, in-depth analysis by Bjorn Skaptason of Prentiss's Division. We tend to take for granted that the Sixth Division was under-sized, and inexperienced when fighting erupted morning of April 6th 1862. Yet, there was more experience (25th Missouri, 21st Missouri and 18th Missouri; as well as General Prentiss, Colonel Peabody, Colonel Moore, and Major Powell ) than we recognize; and as for "under-sized," truth be known, on the morning of April 6th, all of the elements required for a full-sized division were present at Savannah and Pittsburg Landing, but someone dropped the ball. And that someone was not Benjamin M. Prentiss.

    "The Division that Never Was" gets viewers to think (again) about a subject with which we believed we were familiar. And, as with all of your videos, this one demonstrates the value of "getting another perspective" of a "widely-understood subject."

    All the best



    I can imagine that, had Peabody lived, well, actually, I wonder what would have happened?  I am sure Prentiss would have had him arrested and brought up on charges.  Too many "what if" scenarios, and I do not like what if's.  But I wonder what would have happened had that been the case.

  • Create New...