Jump to content
Shiloh Discussion Group

Ozzy

Member
  • Content Count

    1,901
  • Joined

  • Last visited

  • Days Won

    303

Ozzy last won the day on November 17 2020

Ozzy had the most liked content!

Community Reputation

839 Excellent

3 Followers

About Ozzy

  • Rank

Profile Information

  • Gender
    Male
  • Location
    Reynella, South Australia
  • Occupation
    Writer
  • Interests
    Family history research, car restoration with daughter, travel...
    Welcome to my SDG page: the image at top is of Dubuque's Governor's Greys, which became Company 'I' of First Iowa Vol. Inf. Regt. (Uniform worn Battle of Wilson's Creek, 1861.)
    My book, 'Falling through the Hornet's Nest' (Martin Samuels) is now available at Amazon.com as ebook. My book 'Shiloh was a Sham: the untold story of the iconic Civil War Battle,' explaining how Shiloh fit into Lincoln and Stanton's grand scheme, became available April 2016, on Amazon as e-book. My latest project, 'The Struggle for Pensacola, 1860 - 1862' was published 8 OCT 2020 as Amazon e-book.

    I can be contacted at bzmax03@chariot.net.au by any SDG member so inclined.

Recent Profile Visitors

9,887 profile views
  1. Ozzy

    Ex Post Facto

    Having heard it asserted that "Prentiss was not a very good officer" and that "the ill considered actions of General Prentiss in not joining one of the backward movements led to his capture," the following article from Missouri Daily Republican of 16 July 1861 page 2 col. 5 is presented in rebuttal: The men-in-ranks were aware of the seniority games being played in Illinois and Missouri, even before the first encounter between General Benjamin Prentiss and "General" Grant on 17 August 1861.
  2. Ozzy

    New and Improved

    The following video from middle of 2019 is an exemplary sample of tours now conducted at Shiloh NMP making use of corrected terminology. The “Dense Thicket” with its briars, brambles and thorns is finally given pride of place along “This Line” (the temporary name for the poorly identified Sunken Road, which was never really sunken, “just washed out in a few places” with deep wagon ruts, not really useable by infantrymen.) CONGRATULATIONS to everyone who assisted in making these changes come about. As we say in Australia, “I am gobsmacked.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VzvStI2fneY A Shiloh Battle Walk posted by Paul Vivrett 10 SEP 2020
  3. Had a read of the above link a few days ago and have been considering how to respond: 1) A comparison could be made between the after battle treatment given to Myer’s 13th Ohio and Behr’s 6th Indiana (Morton Battery) and why the disparity in treatment occurred. 2) An examination of the Ohio regiments and leaders accused of poor performance (71st Ohio, 13th Ohio Battery, 53rd Ohio, Colonel Thomas Worthington) could be conducted to determine validity of the charges, and who was to blame. 3) An assessment of General Hurlbut’s performance on Sunday 6 April 1862 could be conducted to determine if that leader succeeded or failed (and if he failed, decide if the interaction with Myer’s 13th Ohio Battery was the cause of that failure.) Along which course would you like to proceed?
  4. Ozzy

    Question of Patronage

    Well done Sean Chick! If I can expand on your correct answers: Benjamin Prentiss “had benefit of a politician; not a very good one.” At start of the National Emergency, Illinois Governor Richard Yates appears to have supported Prentiss (sent him to Cairo to command the situation there.) After the death of Senator Stephen Douglas in June 1861, Orville H. Browning was parachuted into the empty Senate seat… and assumed “support” of fellow Quincy resident, Benjamin Prentiss. McClernand was the “Leading Congressman from Illinois” and provided his own patronage; and managed to finagle patronage from President Lincoln (of the opposite political party.) McClernand kept Lincoln appraised of “the real story” regarding operations out West through frequent letters (much in the same way Ulysses Doubleday kept President-elect Lincoln appraised of the situation at Fort Sumter in 1860/61.) These out-of-official channel letters acted as counterpoint to Official Army reports. John A. Logan appears to have benefited from patronage of John McClernand early on; and subsequently received “support” of President Lincoln (because Lincoln needed southern Illinois Democrats to remain loyal to the Union.) Over time, the self-actualized John Logan became his own patron. John Fremont. As first Republican candidate for President (1856) Fremont established a connection with Lincoln after the November 1860 election. Non-West Point army officer and self-made millionaire (actual net worth disputed; but a wealthy man) with strong political connections in Missouri (married into the Democrat Benton Family) Fremont was sent by President Lincoln to Europe as Special Emissary, with mission “to buy up all the serviceable small arms and light artillery pieces available.” These weapons helped arm the North… and Fremont’s purchase took them out of the market for possible sale to the South. For his support, Fremont was anointed Major General and put in command of Department of the West, based at St. Louis.
  5. Had to read through the attachment to “The Western Theatre in the Civil War (The Unlucky 13th at Shiloh)” a couple of times to glean the full story. But, if true, it is damning: Captain Myers reported with his battery to Savannah “about the 20th of March” and was told by the Commanding General [on 20 March 1862 this would be Major General Grant] to “take your company on shore at Pittsburg Landing, and go up on the bank and search out ground for [your] camp wherever [you] please, and wait for further orders.” These orders did not come until early April, when it appears Burrow’s 14th Ohio Battery was transferred from Hurlbut to McClernand, and Myer’s 13th Ohio Battery was assigned to BGen Hurlbut. (Hurlbut indicates the 13th Ohio Battery reported to him for duty on Friday 4 April.) [A similar re-assignment resulted in Munch’s Minnesota Battery and Hickenlooper’s 5th Ohio Battery reporting to BGen Prentiss at about the same time…] As regards the performance of the 13th Ohio Battery on the morning of 6 April 1862 there appears to be a combination of bad luck; poorly considered decision as regards battery placement; and inexperience of the officers and men of the 13th Battery. The lack of familiarity with BGen Hurlbut did not help matters. The hit accomplished by Confederate Artillery (believed to be Robertson’s Alabama) which exploded the ammunition chest likely killed and disabled horses and panicked the men. Such a lucky strike, with resultant thunderous roar and shrapnel, would likely have panicked any green unit: the men of the 13th Ohio Battery were unfortunate that THEIR unit was the one so affected. But, the attempt to “pin the blame” on Stephen Hurlbut was misguided: BGen Hurlbut did not direct Myer’s Ohio Battery to Pittsburg Landing without adequate instructions; and BGen Hurlbut was not responsible for the explosion of the ammunition chest. An excellent, thought-provoking article...
  6. Ozzy

    Henry Stark

    Rbn3 Excellent find! These 1862 letters contain a treasure trove of information IRT conditions at Pittsburg Landing, Leaders (and acting-leaders) and rumours of “Halleck is coming…” (expressed mid-March 1862.) The changed camp ground of 52nd Illinois is of interest; as is Captain Newton’s knowledge of surrounding terrain and neighboring camps. Knowledge of the operation against Island No. 10 and the likelihood of guerrilla war expressed. Interesting mention of “clearing woods and cutting down trees” but no mention of doing anything with the felled timber (think abattis.) Also interesting that Don Newton had "knowledge of all the regiments from Illinois at Pittsburg Landing" but failed to mention the arrival of BGen Benjamin Prentiss. And interesting that Colonel Wilcox was briefly brigade commander. Thanks for sharing these well-written letters! All the best Ozzy
  7. Every successful General benefitted from “patronage” of a political nature: even U.S. Grant and William T. Sherman, while decrying “political generals” had their own political patrons. General Grant had Elihu Washburne; and Sherman had his brother, Senator John Sherman of Ohio, and the politically connected Ewing family. Question: Who were the patrons of the following men? Benjamin Prentiss John McClernand Henry Wager Halleck George B. McClellan Lew Wallace Stephen Hurlbut John A. Logan John Fremont Albert Sidney Johnston Braxton Bragg PGT Beauregard
  8. Nothing was more surprising for me than to realize the strong connection between soldiers engaged at the Battle of Shiloh and the early Rebel occupation of Pensacola Florida: it was as if the Battle for Pensacola was fought on 6 April 1862 in Tennessee. Of the regiments of infantry, artillery and cavalry Braxton Bragg brought north, twelve had significant exposure on the Gulf Coast (Mobile to Pensacola) in MGen Bragg’s area of responsibility. Of the senior commanders and leaders engaged on the Confederate side at Shiloh, at least a dozen had served under Bragg during the previous year. And when it is accepted that five of Bragg’s officers had gained significant night-fighting experience during service in Florida, the potential for “continuing the contest of Sunday, April 6th past sundown” is revealed as very real, with likely outcome “undetermined.” It could have been General Beauregard who was responsible for not finding out the result of a night action at Shiloh; it could have been the introduction of the Federal gunboats; it could have been the tardy resupply of ammunition to the Confederate front line… But, having not been tested, we will never know. What we do know: on May 9th 1862 the public buildings, fortifications, and “everything of potential use to Federal invaders” were put to the torch on Pensacola Bay, in conjunction with Confederate evacuation. Braxton Bragg had lost the Battle for Pensacola in Tennessee and abandoned that strategically essential deepwater port, forever. More Shiloh connections, as well as the importance of Fort Pickens and Pensacola are detailed in my new book: “The Struggle for Pensacola, 1860 – 1862.” Available on Amazon.com since 8 October 2020.
  9. Oliver Boardman entered the Sixth Iowa Volunteer Infantry as Private, and mustered out as Sergeant. A member of Company E, Boardman was attached to the bulk of the regiment that waited for the enemy to come to them; then withdrew north and northeast, maintaining loose contact with Sherman's Fifth Division through most of Day One. And the bulk of the 6th Iowa remained east of Owl Creek throughout Day One. The most interesting unit of the 6th Iowa during April 1862 was Company D. Attached to the single gun of Lieutenant William Mussman (Behr's Morton Indiana Battery) Company D (and Company K) found itself on the wrong side of Owl Creek on April 6th, yet managed to get across Owl Creek in company with Mussman (and it appears the single artillery piece was put to use after the other five pieces belonging to Behr were captured, although details are scant. https://www.nps.gov/civilwar/search-soldiers-detail.htm?soldierId=BC378583-DC7A-DF11-BF36-B8AC6F5D926A Oliver Boardman's entry.
  10. National treasure and esteemed Civil War historian Ed Bearss passed away on 16 September 2020. He was 97. The Marine Corps veteran was known for involvement in furthering knowledge of Fort Donelson and the Vicksburg Campaign, but Ed Bearss wrote accurate, detailed papers on wide-ranging aspects of the Civil War (most recently an excellent paper describing the Battle of Santa Rosa Island near Pensacola Florida was uncovered.) And the involvement of Ed Bearss in raising of USS Cairo, now on permanent display at Vicksburg, is not to be forgotten. The family requests that those interested in commemorating Ed's legacy make a contribution to The American Battlefield Trust: http://Www.battlefields.org/remembering-Ed-Bearss.
  11. 1776 Project Several years ago mention was made of the approaching 250th Commemorations of the Founding of America as an independent nation. Today, President Trump signed the 2020 Constitution Day Proclamation establishing the 1776 Project, commencing the program of 250th Anniversary recognition: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pt8NLUWAYU4 The White House post of 17 SEP 2020. The Civil War was a Constitutional crisis; and the Battle of Shiloh was one important episode in the resolution of that crisis.
  12. Great find on L. D. Sandidge (there are any number of undiscovered gems yet to be revealed in the Southern Historical Society Papers.) What makes Sandidge's report compelling: he was one of a very few men who rode from the extreme left to the extreme right during the Battle of Shiloh; acquiring a better feel for the events of 6 and 7 April 1862 than Beauregard, or even Albert Sidney Johnston. On the Federal side, only Grant and one or two of his staff officers accomplished a similar feat. There's nothing like “being there” to gain an appreciation for the lay of the land.
  13. Edmund H. Cummins of the Maryland Line, Virginia State Forces from May 1861, subsequently incorporated in the PACS as Engineer officer, was assigned to General PGT Beauregard after Bull Run (CSA Staff Officers page 39.) In Roman's biography of General Beauregard (page 158) it is claimed that “First Lieutenant Cummins was to be given command of the Rocket Company” [the rockets appear to have been intended as a signal device.] When the Rocket Company was disallowed by Richmond, now-Captain Cummins continued on as member of Beauregard's staff [Signals Officer.] An interesting Letter dated 20 OCT 1861 from General Beauregard to President Davis concerns the General's desire for a Rocket Company; and questions SecWar Judah Benjamin's authority to disallow Beauregard's request. Unfortunately, this Letter was sent during the Beauregard vs. Davis dispute regarding “credit for success at Bull Run; blame for lack of pursuit to Washington” and did not elicit a favorable response from President Davis. When General Beauregard departed Virginia for Kentucky, meeting General Albert Sidney Johnston at Bowling Green early February 1862 [see Letter of 30 JAN 1862, Roman pages 492 - 493] he brought Captain Edmund Cummins along. Initially, it was intended for PGT Beauregard to replace MGen Polk as commander of Fort Columbus; then it was decided (by General A.S. Johnston) that Polk would remain in command of Fort Columbus, under command of General Beauregard. And Beauregard's assignment was formalized as responsibility for “The Department of the Mississippi” [usually indicated as Army of the Mississippi] between Johnston's Department No.2 and MGen Van Dorn's Trans-Mississippi. Island No.10 and New Madrid fell under Beauregard's purview; so when Fort Columbus was evacuated, key staff of Beauregard (Trudeau and Captain Cummins) were initially sent to Island No.10 to assist with developing the strong defence there. But, both James de Berty Trudeau and Edmund Cummins were withdrawn from Island No.10 before that position collapsed. And both officers were present at Battle of Shiloh [see General Beauregard's Shiloh Battle Report page 6: “Captain Cummins, signal officer, was also actively employed as a staff officer both days.”] Still investigating what were the duties performed by Captain Cummins and his team at Shiloh...
  14. Confederate Signals Although technically assigned to General Beauregard, it appears Captain E. H. Cummins may have acted as Signals Officer for the Army of the Mississippi at Shiloh. What were his duties? What tools and other resources (manpower) did he use? This is in early stages of investigation. But a book recently uncovered, Military Memoirs of a Confederate (1907) identifies the man at the top of the Confederate Signals Department early in the war: Captain (later Brigadier General) Edward Porter Alexander. [E. P. Alexander was an associate of Major A. J. Myer before the war, and assisted with development of U.S. military signals.] With a little effort, the tasks performed by Rebel Signals Operators at Shiloh and Corinth may be revealed. https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/000454546 Military Memoirs of a Confederate by BGen Edward P. Alexander (1907). [On pages 15 - 16 Alexander outlines the tasks and difficulties of laying out Signal Stations preparatory to Battle of (First) Manassas.] N.B. Of general interest: Edward P. Alexander was offered command of the Confederate Signal Corps, but declined, preferring to remain in the field. The position was subsequently awarded to William Norris, who held the rank of Major for the bulk of the war; and who established the Confederate Secret Service as a component of the Signal Corps, with direct links to Secretary of State Judah Benjamin and a network of agents operating as far north as Montreal Canada. The Confederate Secret Service with its Maryland Line [secure communications] and links to Mosby and other action agents is still not fully understood... but more information is revealed every day.
  15. What if... Farragut was supposed to take possession of Vicksburg, like he did at Natchez; Farragut miss-read his orders/ did not get clarification for “what to do after taking control of the Prime Objective of New Orleans” Farragut did not realize the bluffs at Vicksburg were so high; Farragut, not realizing the height of Vicksburg's bluffs, sent the weapon that could have engaged the top of those bluffs – David Dixon Porter's mortar schooners – away out of the Mississippi to “await further orders at Ship Island” (and Porter employed those mortars against Forts Gaines and Morgan, and mostly expended all the remaining, hard-to-replace 126-pound explosive shells) Farragut left his infantry force (commanded by MGen Benjamin Butler) behind in New Orleans/ Algiers instead of bringing him north, up the Mississippi River (as suggested in Butler's orders) Farragut, by not chasing the Rebels away from Vicksburg; and by not landing 14000 men under Butler at Vicksburg, missed an opportunity (mentioned in Butler's orders) to take not only Vicksburg, but launch Butler east towards Jackson Mississippi, where Butler's force was supposed to act as “anvil” to Halleck's “hammer” and Beauregard's Rebels “the piece being worked” ...and with every likelihood, end Rebellion in the West; The linch-pin that brought the whole program (above) unstuck was President Lincoln removing McClellan from his role as “General in Chief of the Army” in March 1862 and assuming that role himself (with assist from Edwin Stanton); and no one realized that Farragut and Butler had not received clarification of their orders (originally issued by McClellan.) Wouldn't that be a tragic tale for the Union... if true?
×
×
  • Create New...