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Ozzy

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Everything posted by Ozzy

  1. From my reading of the Battle of Shiloh, BGen Hurlbut was required by Sherman to provide him reinforcements: Hurlbut sent Veatch’s Brigade west, and it supported McClernand. BGen Prentiss also requested reinforcement: Hurlbut took personal command of his remaining two brigades and led them south, towards the sound of the guns. Acting-commander Sherman did not order Hurlbut south; and U.S. Grant was yet to arrive by boat from Savannah. BGen Stephen Hurlbut moved his force south, intending to join Prentiss in vicinity of the Sixth Division camps, but Prentiss’ withdrawing men were encountered 1000 or so yards north of Camp Prentiss. So Hurlbut quickly arranged a defensive line to halt the Rebel advance; and that initial defensive line was not ideally placed… Part of that hurried initial placement was Myer’s 13th Ohio Battery. One source indicates Hurlbut ordered the battery into position, expecting it to take advantage of local terrain, and was surprised when Myer went into battery on the wrong side of the crest. Another source states: “General Hurlbut ordered Myer to that exact position.” And another source indicates Hurlbut ordered Myer’s Battery moved forward to the desired position, via orders sent through an aide who brought Myer and his battery up from the rear. Will we ever learn the Truth? Unlikely, due the bias of all the key witnesses and participants. But based upon Stephen Hurlbut’s subsequent actions, at Shiloh and afterwards, I do not believe he intentionally sacrificed Myer and his 13th Ohio: there was either a communication breakdown; or General Hurlbut assumed Captain Myer knew his job better than was actually the case. References: SDG topic “Stephen A. Hurlbut” Major David W. Reed’s “Battle of Shiloh and the Organizations Engaged” OR 10 part 1 page 209 [Hurlbut indicates, “Myer positioned his battery too far forward, so as to lose advantage of the slope.” I believe this refers to “wrong side of the military crest” of a hill, or local prominence: by taking position slightly in rear of the true crest (the military crest) the terrain itself provides some protection from enemy fire.] Page 208 – Stephen Hurlbut: “I ordered Captain Myer to come into battery ON THE REVERSE SLOPE OF A CREST OF GROUND…” (emphasis by Ozzy.) Page 208 – Stephen Hurlbut: “The 13th Ohio was brought forward by repeated orders through my aides.”
  2. Ozzy

    Ex Post Facto

    Having heard it asserted that "Prentiss was not a very good officer" and that "the ill considered actions of General Prentiss in not joining one of the backward movements led to his capture," the following article from Missouri Daily Republican of 16 July 1861 page 2 col. 5 is presented in rebuttal: The men-in-ranks were aware of the seniority games being played in Illinois and Missouri, even before the first encounter between General Benjamin Prentiss and "General" Grant on 17 August 1861.
  3. Ozzy

    New and Improved

    The following video from middle of 2019 is an exemplary sample of tours now conducted at Shiloh NMP making use of corrected terminology. The “Dense Thicket” with its briars, brambles and thorns is finally given pride of place along “This Line” (the temporary name for the poorly identified Sunken Road, which was never really sunken, “just washed out in a few places” with deep wagon ruts, not really useable by infantrymen.) CONGRATULATIONS to everyone who assisted in making these changes come about. As we say in Australia, “I am gobsmacked.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VzvStI2fneY A Shiloh Battle Walk posted by Paul Vivrett 10 SEP 2020
  4. Had a read of the above link a few days ago and have been considering how to respond: 1) A comparison could be made between the after battle treatment given to Myer’s 13th Ohio and Behr’s 6th Indiana (Morton Battery) and why the disparity in treatment occurred. 2) An examination of the Ohio regiments and leaders accused of poor performance (71st Ohio, 13th Ohio Battery, 53rd Ohio, Colonel Thomas Worthington) could be conducted to determine validity of the charges, and who was to blame. 3) An assessment of General Hurlbut’s performance on Sunday 6 April 1862 could be conducted to determine if that leader succeeded or failed (and if he failed, decide if the interaction with Myer’s 13th Ohio Battery was the cause of that failure.) Along which course would you like to proceed?
  5. Ozzy

    Question of Patronage

    Well done Sean Chick! If I can expand on your correct answers: Benjamin Prentiss “had benefit of a politician; not a very good one.” At start of the National Emergency, Illinois Governor Richard Yates appears to have supported Prentiss (sent him to Cairo to command the situation there.) After the death of Senator Stephen Douglas in June 1861, Orville H. Browning was parachuted into the empty Senate seat… and assumed “support” of fellow Quincy resident, Benjamin Prentiss. McClernand was the “Leading Congressman from Illinois” and provided his own patronage; and managed to finagle patronage from President Lincoln (of the opposite political party.) McClernand kept Lincoln appraised of “the real story” regarding operations out West through frequent letters (much in the same way Ulysses Doubleday kept President-elect Lincoln appraised of the situation at Fort Sumter in 1860/61.) These out-of-official channel letters acted as counterpoint to Official Army reports. John A. Logan appears to have benefited from patronage of John McClernand early on; and subsequently received “support” of President Lincoln (because Lincoln needed southern Illinois Democrats to remain loyal to the Union.) Over time, the self-actualized John Logan became his own patron. John Fremont. As first Republican candidate for President (1856) Fremont established a connection with Lincoln after the November 1860 election. Non-West Point army officer and self-made millionaire (actual net worth disputed; but a wealthy man) with strong political connections in Missouri (married into the Democrat Benton Family) Fremont was sent by President Lincoln to Europe as Special Emissary, with mission “to buy up all the serviceable small arms and light artillery pieces available.” These weapons helped arm the North… and Fremont’s purchase took them out of the market for possible sale to the South. For his support, Fremont was anointed Major General and put in command of Department of the West, based at St. Louis.
  6. Had to read through the attachment to “The Western Theatre in the Civil War (The Unlucky 13th at Shiloh)” a couple of times to glean the full story. But, if true, it is damning: Captain Myers reported with his battery to Savannah “about the 20th of March” and was told by the Commanding General [on 20 March 1862 this would be Major General Grant] to “take your company on shore at Pittsburg Landing, and go up on the bank and search out ground for [your] camp wherever [you] please, and wait for further orders.” These orders did not come until early April, when it appears Burrow’s 14th Ohio Battery was transferred from Hurlbut to McClernand, and Myer’s 13th Ohio Battery was assigned to BGen Hurlbut. (Hurlbut indicates the 13th Ohio Battery reported to him for duty on Friday 4 April.) [A similar re-assignment resulted in Munch’s Minnesota Battery and Hickenlooper’s 5th Ohio Battery reporting to BGen Prentiss at about the same time…] As regards the performance of the 13th Ohio Battery on the morning of 6 April 1862 there appears to be a combination of bad luck; poorly considered decision as regards battery placement; and inexperience of the officers and men of the 13th Battery. The lack of familiarity with BGen Hurlbut did not help matters. The hit accomplished by Confederate Artillery (believed to be Robertson’s Alabama) which exploded the ammunition chest likely killed and disabled horses and panicked the men. Such a lucky strike, with resultant thunderous roar and shrapnel, would likely have panicked any green unit: the men of the 13th Ohio Battery were unfortunate that THEIR unit was the one so affected. But, the attempt to “pin the blame” on Stephen Hurlbut was misguided: BGen Hurlbut did not direct Myer’s Ohio Battery to Pittsburg Landing without adequate instructions; and BGen Hurlbut was not responsible for the explosion of the ammunition chest. An excellent, thought-provoking article...
  7. Ozzy

    Henry Stark

    Rbn3 Excellent find! These 1862 letters contain a treasure trove of information IRT conditions at Pittsburg Landing, Leaders (and acting-leaders) and rumours of “Halleck is coming…” (expressed mid-March 1862.) The changed camp ground of 52nd Illinois is of interest; as is Captain Newton’s knowledge of surrounding terrain and neighboring camps. Knowledge of the operation against Island No. 10 and the likelihood of guerrilla war expressed. Interesting mention of “clearing woods and cutting down trees” but no mention of doing anything with the felled timber (think abattis.) Also interesting that Don Newton had "knowledge of all the regiments from Illinois at Pittsburg Landing" but failed to mention the arrival of BGen Benjamin Prentiss. And interesting that Colonel Wilcox was briefly brigade commander. Thanks for sharing these well-written letters! All the best Ozzy
  8. Every successful General benefitted from “patronage” of a political nature: even U.S. Grant and William T. Sherman, while decrying “political generals” had their own political patrons. General Grant had Elihu Washburne; and Sherman had his brother, Senator John Sherman of Ohio, and the politically connected Ewing family. Question: Who were the patrons of the following men? Benjamin Prentiss John McClernand Henry Wager Halleck George B. McClellan Lew Wallace Stephen Hurlbut John A. Logan John Fremont Albert Sidney Johnston Braxton Bragg PGT Beauregard
  9. Nothing was more surprising for me than to realize the strong connection between soldiers engaged at the Battle of Shiloh and the early Rebel occupation of Pensacola Florida: it was as if the Battle for Pensacola was fought on 6 April 1862 in Tennessee. Of the regiments of infantry, artillery and cavalry Braxton Bragg brought north, twelve had significant exposure on the Gulf Coast (Mobile to Pensacola) in MGen Bragg’s area of responsibility. Of the senior commanders and leaders engaged on the Confederate side at Shiloh, at least a dozen had served under Bragg during the previous year. And when it is accepted that five of Bragg’s officers had gained significant night-fighting experience during service in Florida, the potential for “continuing the contest of Sunday, April 6th past sundown” is revealed as very real, with likely outcome “undetermined.” It could have been General Beauregard who was responsible for not finding out the result of a night action at Shiloh; it could have been the introduction of the Federal gunboats; it could have been the tardy resupply of ammunition to the Confederate front line… But, having not been tested, we will never know. What we do know: on May 9th 1862 the public buildings, fortifications, and “everything of potential use to Federal invaders” were put to the torch on Pensacola Bay, in conjunction with Confederate evacuation. Braxton Bragg had lost the Battle for Pensacola in Tennessee and abandoned that strategically essential deepwater port, forever. More Shiloh connections, as well as the importance of Fort Pickens and Pensacola are detailed in my new book: “The Struggle for Pensacola, 1860 – 1862.” Available on Amazon.com since 8 October 2020.
  10. Oliver Boardman entered the Sixth Iowa Volunteer Infantry as Private, and mustered out as Sergeant. A member of Company E, Boardman was attached to the bulk of the regiment that waited for the enemy to come to them; then withdrew north and northeast, maintaining loose contact with Sherman's Fifth Division through most of Day One. And the bulk of the 6th Iowa remained east of Owl Creek throughout Day One. The most interesting unit of the 6th Iowa during April 1862 was Company D. Attached to the single gun of Lieutenant William Mussman (Behr's Morton Indiana Battery) Company D (and Company K) found itself on the wrong side of Owl Creek on April 6th, yet managed to get across Owl Creek in company with Mussman (and it appears the single artillery piece was put to use after the other five pieces belonging to Behr were captured, although details are scant. https://www.nps.gov/civilwar/search-soldiers-detail.htm?soldierId=BC378583-DC7A-DF11-BF36-B8AC6F5D926A Oliver Boardman's entry.
  11. National treasure and esteemed Civil War historian Ed Bearss passed away on 16 September 2020. He was 97. The Marine Corps veteran was known for involvement in furthering knowledge of Fort Donelson and the Vicksburg Campaign, but Ed Bearss wrote accurate, detailed papers on wide-ranging aspects of the Civil War (most recently an excellent paper describing the Battle of Santa Rosa Island near Pensacola Florida was uncovered.) And the involvement of Ed Bearss in raising of USS Cairo, now on permanent display at Vicksburg, is not to be forgotten. The family requests that those interested in commemorating Ed's legacy make a contribution to The American Battlefield Trust: http://Www.battlefields.org/remembering-Ed-Bearss.
  12. 1776 Project Several years ago mention was made of the approaching 250th Commemorations of the Founding of America as an independent nation. Today, President Trump signed the 2020 Constitution Day Proclamation establishing the 1776 Project, commencing the program of 250th Anniversary recognition: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pt8NLUWAYU4 The White House post of 17 SEP 2020. The Civil War was a Constitutional crisis; and the Battle of Shiloh was one important episode in the resolution of that crisis.
  13. Great find on L. D. Sandidge (there are any number of undiscovered gems yet to be revealed in the Southern Historical Society Papers.) What makes Sandidge's report compelling: he was one of a very few men who rode from the extreme left to the extreme right during the Battle of Shiloh; acquiring a better feel for the events of 6 and 7 April 1862 than Beauregard, or even Albert Sidney Johnston. On the Federal side, only Grant and one or two of his staff officers accomplished a similar feat. There's nothing like “being there” to gain an appreciation for the lay of the land.
  14. Edmund H. Cummins of the Maryland Line, Virginia State Forces from May 1861, subsequently incorporated in the PACS as Engineer officer, was assigned to General PGT Beauregard after Bull Run (CSA Staff Officers page 39.) In Roman's biography of General Beauregard (page 158) it is claimed that “First Lieutenant Cummins was to be given command of the Rocket Company” [the rockets appear to have been intended as a signal device.] When the Rocket Company was disallowed by Richmond, now-Captain Cummins continued on as member of Beauregard's staff [Signals Officer.] An interesting Letter dated 20 OCT 1861 from General Beauregard to President Davis concerns the General's desire for a Rocket Company; and questions SecWar Judah Benjamin's authority to disallow Beauregard's request. Unfortunately, this Letter was sent during the Beauregard vs. Davis dispute regarding “credit for success at Bull Run; blame for lack of pursuit to Washington” and did not elicit a favorable response from President Davis. When General Beauregard departed Virginia for Kentucky, meeting General Albert Sidney Johnston at Bowling Green early February 1862 [see Letter of 30 JAN 1862, Roman pages 492 - 493] he brought Captain Edmund Cummins along. Initially, it was intended for PGT Beauregard to replace MGen Polk as commander of Fort Columbus; then it was decided (by General A.S. Johnston) that Polk would remain in command of Fort Columbus, under command of General Beauregard. And Beauregard's assignment was formalized as responsibility for “The Department of the Mississippi” [usually indicated as Army of the Mississippi] between Johnston's Department No.2 and MGen Van Dorn's Trans-Mississippi. Island No.10 and New Madrid fell under Beauregard's purview; so when Fort Columbus was evacuated, key staff of Beauregard (Trudeau and Captain Cummins) were initially sent to Island No.10 to assist with developing the strong defence there. But, both James de Berty Trudeau and Edmund Cummins were withdrawn from Island No.10 before that position collapsed. And both officers were present at Battle of Shiloh [see General Beauregard's Shiloh Battle Report page 6: “Captain Cummins, signal officer, was also actively employed as a staff officer both days.”] Still investigating what were the duties performed by Captain Cummins and his team at Shiloh...
  15. Confederate Signals Although technically assigned to General Beauregard, it appears Captain E. H. Cummins may have acted as Signals Officer for the Army of the Mississippi at Shiloh. What were his duties? What tools and other resources (manpower) did he use? This is in early stages of investigation. But a book recently uncovered, Military Memoirs of a Confederate (1907) identifies the man at the top of the Confederate Signals Department early in the war: Captain (later Brigadier General) Edward Porter Alexander. [E. P. Alexander was an associate of Major A. J. Myer before the war, and assisted with development of U.S. military signals.] With a little effort, the tasks performed by Rebel Signals Operators at Shiloh and Corinth may be revealed. https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/000454546 Military Memoirs of a Confederate by BGen Edward P. Alexander (1907). [On pages 15 - 16 Alexander outlines the tasks and difficulties of laying out Signal Stations preparatory to Battle of (First) Manassas.] N.B. Of general interest: Edward P. Alexander was offered command of the Confederate Signal Corps, but declined, preferring to remain in the field. The position was subsequently awarded to William Norris, who held the rank of Major for the bulk of the war; and who established the Confederate Secret Service as a component of the Signal Corps, with direct links to Secretary of State Judah Benjamin and a network of agents operating as far north as Montreal Canada. The Confederate Secret Service with its Maryland Line [secure communications] and links to Mosby and other action agents is still not fully understood... but more information is revealed every day.
  16. What if... Farragut was supposed to take possession of Vicksburg, like he did at Natchez; Farragut miss-read his orders/ did not get clarification for “what to do after taking control of the Prime Objective of New Orleans” Farragut did not realize the bluffs at Vicksburg were so high; Farragut, not realizing the height of Vicksburg's bluffs, sent the weapon that could have engaged the top of those bluffs – David Dixon Porter's mortar schooners – away out of the Mississippi to “await further orders at Ship Island” (and Porter employed those mortars against Forts Gaines and Morgan, and mostly expended all the remaining, hard-to-replace 126-pound explosive shells) Farragut left his infantry force (commanded by MGen Benjamin Butler) behind in New Orleans/ Algiers instead of bringing him north, up the Mississippi River (as suggested in Butler's orders) Farragut, by not chasing the Rebels away from Vicksburg; and by not landing 14000 men under Butler at Vicksburg, missed an opportunity (mentioned in Butler's orders) to take not only Vicksburg, but launch Butler east towards Jackson Mississippi, where Butler's force was supposed to act as “anvil” to Halleck's “hammer” and Beauregard's Rebels “the piece being worked” ...and with every likelihood, end Rebellion in the West; The linch-pin that brought the whole program (above) unstuck was President Lincoln removing McClellan from his role as “General in Chief of the Army” in March 1862 and assuming that role himself (with assist from Edwin Stanton); and no one realized that Farragut and Butler had not received clarification of their orders (originally issued by McClellan.) Wouldn't that be a tragic tale for the Union... if true?
  17. The computer I am presently using is slightly more than a year old, purchased after my previous, four year old computer froze up on me (and took everything not backed up on memory stick.) Reviewing my notes, in April, May, June 2018 I was seeking information on Braxton Bragg; and was particularly curious why the General never got around to writing Memoirs... and discovered those works were in the pipeline (to be assisted/ ghost written by E. T. Sykes.) And somewhere during the course of investigation, that brief report by Captain Sykes relating to the Battle of Shiloh popped up... But it was one of those files I had not backed up, and lost on the hard drive with the old computer. And the only details I can recall: the article was written about 1873; it seems to have been submitted to General Bragg; there were two or three such reports written by E. T. Sykes about other battles he participated in (but because they were not Shiloh, I did not copy those.) Sorry I cannot be of more help... Ozzy
  18. I revisit this topic to remind everyone that Patton Anderson (who Braxton Bragg stated "was his best friend") was the original subject (of a Quiz topic in June 2018.) But, there is more to reveal... Because, the Patton Anderson - Braxton Bragg connection was discovered while searching for "potential ghost writers approached to assist with construction of Braxton Bragg's Memoirs." So, without further ado, those three men: Kinloch Falconer (approached in about 1870) William Thomas Walthall (approached after 1870, but went on to assist Jefferson Davis with Rise & Fall of the Confederacy) Edward Turner Sykes (approached by Bragg after Kinloch Falconer, it appears E.T. Sykes, Adjutant for the 10th Mississippi at Shiloh and briefly on the Staff of Patton Anderson, was the man selected to "assist" with Bragg's Memoirs. Volumes of documents were provided to Major Sykes... but for some reason, nothing except a few "sketches" ever eventuated, one of which was posted a day or two ago on SDG as "The 10th Mississippi Story"). Always more to the story... Ozzy [See next post...]
  19. Ozzy

    Seat of War Map

    Copy of photograph taken from site of house used by BGen McClernand as HQ building (which was destroyed after Battle of Fort Donelson.) Image found in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War (p.400) published by The Century Company (1887).
  20. Well Done on finding this information; and Thanks for providing a link to the Diary. The view of the conflict (the entire War) from a Southern perspective is enlightening. And it further verifies the Truth that, “We claim we know everything about Shiloh” ...at our peril. [On review of the Diary, there are interesting idiosyncrasies: the description of “Ellsworth vs. Jackson” at Alexandria May 1861; the labelling of Action of 18 July 1861 as Battle of Bull Run (a common mistake during the first few days following the engagement, which was later termed “Battle of Blackburn's Ford”); the adjustment of arrival times in Kentucky in SEP 1861 making it appear as if the Federals took Paducah before the Rebels took Hickman and Columbus; ignoring the result of Grant vs. Floyd/Pillow/Buckner at Fort Donelson on 16 FEB 1862...] And another reference (ongoing research) to Daniel Beltzhoover: https://www.emmitsburg.net/archive_list/articles/history/civil_war/belzhoover.htm
  21. 8 SEP 1861 Action at Fort Columbus As is known, BGen U.S. Grant took possession of Paducah on 6 SEP 1861 (and as Hank likes to say, “the War went downhill for the Confederacy from there” ...or words to that effect.) Less well known, the Rebel force that invaded Kentucky from the South, taking Hickman and the heights at Columbus, still were potential threat to Grant's small force at Paducah. What to do? Before dawn on 8 SEP 1861 BGen Grant directed Commander Stembel (Gunboat Lexington) to support an expedition under command of Colonel G. Waagner to Rebel-occupied Columbus and determine the enemy strength. The gunboat Conestoga (Lieutenant-Commanding Phelps) joined enroute from Cairo and the two gunboats closed the Rebel position and drew fire from artillery mounted on the bluff. Then CDR Stembel threw several shells into Lucas Bend... and as if by magic, two Rebel gunboats appeared. The Federal gunboats withdrew, chased briefly by one of the Rebel boats; Lexington and Conestoga were back at Cairo before noon. By this action and observation, the force at what became Fort Columbus was estimated as 2000 men and six pieces of artillery... not enough to threaten Paducah. The two Illinois infantry regiments and Willard's Battery (in total, about 2000 men) were deemed sufficient, for the moment. But just to be sure, Isaac Pugh's 41st Illinois Infantry was sent to Paducah on September 8th. Reference: OR (Navy) vol.22 pages 326 – 329.
  22. One of the few remaining Staff officers remaining to be identified held the position of Scout. On review of “The Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston” by his son, Wm. Preston Johnston (1880) on page 554 that man is identified as Major B. B. Waddell. In addition, in a 3 APR 1862 communication from MGen Bragg, Chief of Staff to MGen Hardee (see below), reference is made to the same man: “Captain Waddell, of General Beauregard's staff, with two guides will report to you.” Not specifically assigned to General Johnston, Major Waddell appears to have become “Chief Scout for the Army of the Mississippi.” http://shilohdiscussiongroup.com/topic/42-correspondence-confederate-april-3-1862/?tab=comments#comment-177 mention of Waddell. Entry at NPS: https://www.nps.gov/civilwar/search-soldiers-detail.htm?soldierId=973F6ADC-DC7A-DF11-BF36-B8AC6F5D926A Entry page 170 https://archive.org/stream/cu31924030921096#page/170/mode/2up of "Confederate Staff Officers" has Captain B. B. Waddell indicated as "VADC to General Beauregard 6 APR 1862."
  23. As for shirkers at Shiloh, the two States besmirched: Tennessee and Ohio. Tennessee was pointedly mentioned in a Letter from Mrs. Bragg to General Bragg (and in a subsequent letter, he agreed with her observation.) Tennessee also suffered from “that regiment” that even Breckinridge and Isham Harris could not control... leading to General Johnston trying his hand... leading to the General's death. On the Federal side, Ohio was the one that had to overcome the bad reputation: EVERYONE knew about the 53rd Ohio and their Colonel, who told them to, “Run and save yourselves.” And in front of Brigadier General Hurlbut, Myer's 13th Ohio Light Artillery deserted its six guns immediately after a lucky hit from Rebel Artillery (thought to be Robertson's) exploded their ammunition chest. And there was the 71st Ohio (Rodney Mason), which was supposed to be with Stuart on the far left... but no one could recall seeing them. And of course, Buell's Army of the Ohio received bad press outside of Ohio for arriving at Savannah DAYS later than he should have... [This caused unexpected enmity, because many soldiers from Ohio claimed it was IOWA soldiers who were at the waterfront in their thousands; and that IOWA regiments had been captured at sunrise in Prentiss' Camp.] It is wrong to paint “everyone from there” with the same brush, but it is human nature. [In the case of “Prentiss was captured early in the day,” it took him many months to retrieve his reputation – and the reputations of soldiers captured with him – after the incorrect reports in newspapers circulated... everywhere. And he and 2000 others were stuck in POW camps until OCT/ NOV 1862, without ability to address those charges.] [Also interesting to note: both William T. Sherman and Ulysses S. Grant were originally from Ohio; yet both avoided the "Ohio Tar Brush" that appeared at Shiloh.]
  24. Joseph Rich was obviously biased against Lew Wallace: a man whose Division had been promised to the 12th Iowa all day, yet failed to deliver. [Although not delivered to POW Camp, Joseph Rich was captured with many other wounded men -- perhaps as many as 300 -- yet left behind, mostly in the Camp of the 3rd Iowa, because it was too much trouble to remove wounded prisoners that could not walk from the battlefield. Two other captured wounded known to have been left behind: David W. Reed (Father of Shiloh NMP) and BGen WHL Wallace.] Lew Wallace's Division had been promised to most of the other Shiloh defenders, as well. [Apparently, LtCol James B. McPherson knew where Lew Wallace was going to be installed... but he arrived too late, and remained on the far right of the Union line, where the Third Division started Day Two.]
  25. Major Dudley Haydon reached Richmond end of April/ early May 1862. He carried with him 1) a Letter from Brigadier General William Preston to Johnston's son dated 18 APR 1862, 2) his Diary (from at least January, perhaps back to OCT 1861 when he joined General Johnston's Staff at Bowling Green) 3) eye-witness accounts of General Johnston's death from the other members of Staff, 4) knowledge of Staff meetings and Councils of War in the days leading up to Shiloh, 5) knowledge of General Johnston that he could share with Wm. P. Johnston (who had not seen his Father since SEP 1861). Either with the help of reporters, or on his own, Major Haydon's “Rough Notes of the Battle of Shiloh” appeared in 3 May 1862 edition of Richmond Daily Dispatch, Front Page, center column. General Beauregard's courier-delivered report was not printed by Richmond Daily Dispatch until 10 May (and was on page 2, running three columns in length.) [Shortly after placing Colonel W. P. Johnston "on his Staff," President Davis also gave the Colonel his own room in the Executive Mansion. Therefore, I believe anything Dudley Hayden shared with W. P. Johnston was shared with President Davis.] As for that June 1862 meeting between Colonel W. P. Johnston and General Beauregard in Mobile (after the General's removal from command, replaced by Bragg) ...THAT would have been one uncomfortable discussion.
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