Jump to content
Shiloh Discussion Group

Search the Community

Showing results for tags 'observation'.



More search options

  • Search By Tags

    Type tags separated by commas.
  • Search By Author

Content Type


Forums

  • Welcome Center
    • Welcome
    • Board FAQ
    • Posting Guidelines
    • Announcements
    • Suggestion Box
    • Shiloh Timeline
    • Howdy
    • Campfire
    • Birthday Wishes
    • Pop Quiz!
  • Storm Clouds
    • Fort Henry
    • Fort Donelson
    • Retreat from Kentucky
    • Advance to Pittsburg Landing
    • Build-up to the Battle
  • A Place of War
    • The Battle of Shiloh
    • April 6th
    • April 7th
    • Eyewitness Accounts
    • Personalities
    • Army of the Tennessee
    • Army of the Ohio
    • Army of the Mississippi
    • The Union Navy
    • Local Civilians
    • Aftermath & Impact
  • Weapons & Ammunition at Shiloh
    • Artillery
    • Small Arms
  • A Place of Peace
    • Visiting Shiloh
    • History of the Park
    • News About the Park
    • Videos
  • Anniversary Hikes
    • 2017 Anniversary
    • 2016 Anniversary
    • 2015 Anniversary
    • 2014 Anniversary
    • 2013 Anniversary
    • 2012 Anniversary
    • 2011 Anniversary
    • 2010 Anniversary
    • 2009 Anniversary
    • 2008 Anniversary
    • 2007 Anniversary
  • Back to the Future
    • Shiloh on the Web
    • Resources
    • Help With Board Problems

Blogs

  • Wrapin About the War
  • Crazyhop's Blog
  • Damnyankee @ Shiloh
  • dudits' Blog
  • Conscripted Arkansans at Shiloh

Calendars

  • Community Calendar

Group


AIM


MSN


Website URL


ICQ


Yahoo


Jabber


Skype


Location


Occupation


Interests

Found 1 result

  1. Rebel Intelligence

    While reading through the Reports of the Union and Confederate Navies, I happened upon a Letter dated December 9, 1861, sent from Memphis by D. M. Frost to the Honorable E. C. Cabell. The letter details Mr. Frost's observations during his recent stay in St. Louis; and while in transit south down the Mississippi River from that Federal Headquarters: http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/cgi/t/text/pageviewer-idx?c=moawar&cc=moawar&idno=ofre0022&q1=Pittsburg+Landing&view=image&seq=838&size=100 Contained in the letter: estimation of 35,000 Union troops available in Missouri for an 'expedition into the Confederacy' assessment of Halleck's intentions: to advance upon Fort Columbus from Cairo, latter part of December/early January; strength of force would be 75,000 men; 20-30 Federal gunboats, some with 2 1/2 inch armour plate would assist the Federal army; 30 mortar rafts (each one carrying a 13-inch mortar) would be towed into the area of operation; ultimate analysis: Halleck intended to 'take Fort Columbus at any cost' (even if it meant 20,000 casualties). The writer assesses the strength of Fort Columbus: 'tolerably well fortified' with the usual field works to the east (landward side) and a steep bluff to the west (river side) providing sufficient protection. Fort Columbus was positioned so as to hurl plunging fire against armored gunboats... But the Union mortars 'will play havoc, and may demoralize green troops.' Also, Mr. Frost acknowledges that there are 'few experienced officers in the Columbus garrison.' Fort Pillow was also visited; and Frost pronounces it 'a greater natural strength than Fort Columbus,' with sixty guns able to cover the whole of the river with their arc and range. Fort Pillow promises to be 'a great fall-back position (if that eventuality should arise.)' Concerning the state of affairs in Missouri: 'General Price has called for an additional 50,000 troops; and he should get them.' Once 50,000 troops are available, they should move on St. Louis (to hold Halleck at that place, and prevent his Southern Expedition.) Afterwards, Frost advises: 'take Fort Leavenworth and the $8 million worth of military stores there... and cripple the Hannibal & St. Joseph RR on the way to Leavenworth.' As a final bit of advise, D. M. Frost states: 'We must keep Fort Columbus and Fort Pillow strong, in order to protect Memphis [Memphis is too important to lose.] And we must assist the fight in Missouri.' The reasons I found this letter of value: the awareness (by Confederate operatives) in December 1861, that 'mortars were coming' the belief that Halleck would assault Columbus head-on, once the mortars arrived; acute awareness of the physical defenses of St. Louis (initiated by Lyon and Fremont; halted by Halleck) acknowledgement of the importance of the Hannibal & St. Joe RR This letter expresses the Confederate belief in the state of affairs, as they existed in the west at that time: Fort Columbus was the target that Halleck was determined to bring down. But General Halleck found another way to turn Columbus... without mortars... without a head-on assault... Fort Henry.
×