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  2. Certain Confederate units do not have a lot of sources about their actions. Some of this is merely a lack of anything outside of the official records. For others the paucity is so bad it is hard to know what they did for large stretches of time. I am posting this as I get to the final phase of research as I prepare my book on Shiloh. If anyone has a lead or an idea, please feel free to post it. Infantry 31st Alabama There is one vague source but little else outside of Trabue’s report and a few mentions here and there. What is intriguing is that Trabue makes i
  3. Perry could you send me a message with details? I am not on facebook anymore.
  4. Everything is set for our tenth annual Epic Trek at Shiloh this November. Click the link below to read the announcement on our Facebook page. Feel free to contact me with any questions, and I hope to see everyone there! https://www.facebook.com/groups/shilohdiscussiongroup/permalink/10159188446946352/ Perry
  5. Treatment of Myer vs. Behr Behr and the 6th Morton Indiana Battery · Brigaded with 1st Brigade (McDowell) of Sherman’s Fifth Division; · After early morning April 6th operations in vicinity of Owl Creek Bridge, all 5th DIV forces were ordered to fall back [towards the crossroads] at about 10 am. · This “backward movement” became confused as racing mule teams pulling wagons headed east along the Purdy Road, blocking the redeploy of Buckland’s Brigade further north, across that road… and Waterhouse’s Battery was captured… and the charging Rebels contin
  6. Brigadier General Hurlbut Although originally from South Carolina (where Lieutenant William T. Sherman met him during the Second Seminole War mobilization) Stephen Hurlbut relocated north and practiced Law in Illinois and was active in local politics in that state. Following Lincoln’s Inauguration during the Secession Crisis, Stephen Hurlbut offered to go south and investigate “the true state of affairs in and around Charleston.” Upon his return north, after revealing his intelligence that “There were no Union men to be found there; they are preparing for war” Hurlbut was awarded with app
  7. Perhaps most revealing: on page 210 of OR 10 part 1 General Hurlbut admits, "...the transaction [of the 13th Ohio Battery abandoning their post in disarray] was seen by 4000 brave men, who never showed their backs to the enemy..." Knowledge of this unpalatable event would have been witnessed, become subject of camp rumours... and more than passing interest would have prompted fellow soldiers (who stood and fought) to enquire... to demand, "What became of them?" The tragic stampede of the 13th Ohio Battery can be explained, but not excused. To condone such "cowardice" (lack of resolve
  8. Unsure where this video has been hiding for seven years... only today ran across it. And for those concerned about "lack of emphasis on the Union Right at Shiloh, Day One," this video attempts to address some of the Hornet's Nes... oops... THICKET bias. And John McClernand's "inability to play nicely with others" is revealed as root cause of his problems. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2FGFzBDFErY History Reclaimed: McClernand by Dark Sarcasms 7 APR 2014.
  9. From my reading of the Battle of Shiloh, BGen Hurlbut was required by Sherman to provide him reinforcements: Hurlbut sent Veatch’s Brigade west, and it supported McClernand. BGen Prentiss also requested reinforcement: Hurlbut took personal command of his remaining two brigades and led them south, towards the sound of the guns. Acting-commander Sherman did not order Hurlbut south; and U.S. Grant was yet to arrive by boat from Savannah. BGen Stephen Hurlbut moved his force south, intending to join Prentiss in vicinity of the Sixth Division camps, but Prentiss’ withdrawing men were encountered 10
  10. Seemingly a study on any unit being reported as having cowardly conduct could be an interesting topic. The 71st Ohio's story of flight has been fairly well proven to be an exaggeration, and seemingly there is some evidence that the 13th Ohio Battery suffered from an unfair account from Hurlbut as other reports I mention in the two blog posts allude to. I do not know enough of Hurlbut to surmise if he warrants a pass or fail grade.
  11. I'm sorry. I've been away from the group for a while and just now saw your question. If you look at this map on my ShilohDiary website (https://shilohdiary.files.wordpress.com/2009/09/easternrockhillmap.pdf), the cave would have been directly behind (north of) the location noted as "The Duncans' House." I have not explored the location thoroughly enough to determine if the cave still exists, but C.D. Rickman told me that he remembered seeing it while playing on that property as a child in the 1950s. It was C.D.'s childhood memories of the hill, cave and creek that led us to look at this proper
  12. Ozzy

    Ex Post Facto

    Having heard it asserted that "Prentiss was not a very good officer" and that "the ill considered actions of General Prentiss in not joining one of the backward movements led to his capture," the following article from Missouri Daily Republican of 16 July 1861 page 2 col. 5 is presented in rebuttal: The men-in-ranks were aware of the seniority games being played in Illinois and Missouri, even before the first encounter between General Benjamin Prentiss and "General" Grant on 17 August 1861.
  13. Ozzy

    New and Improved

    The following video from middle of 2019 is an exemplary sample of tours now conducted at Shiloh NMP making use of corrected terminology. The “Dense Thicket” with its briars, brambles and thorns is finally given pride of place along “This Line” (the temporary name for the poorly identified Sunken Road, which was never really sunken, “just washed out in a few places” with deep wagon ruts, not really useable by infantrymen.) CONGRATULATIONS to everyone who assisted in making these changes come about. As we say in Australia, “I am gobsmacked.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VzvStI2fneY
  14. Had a read of the above link a few days ago and have been considering how to respond: 1) A comparison could be made between the after battle treatment given to Myer’s 13th Ohio and Behr’s 6th Indiana (Morton Battery) and why the disparity in treatment occurred. 2) An examination of the Ohio regiments and leaders accused of poor performance (71st Ohio, 13th Ohio Battery, 53rd Ohio, Colonel Thomas Worthington) could be conducted to determine validity of the charges, and who was to blame. 3) An assessment of General Hurlbut’s performance on Sunday 6 April 1862 could be con
  15. After my first post about the 13th Ohio Battery, I came across a few more sources and hence have done a follow up post: More on the Unlucky 13th at Shiloh!
  16. Rbn3

    Henry Stark

    The 52nd suffered a "crisis of command" it seems because of a series of events. Sweeney was promoted, Wilcox was gone to Chicago (still not sure what the "business" was that caused Halleck to order him there, but maybe a court martial?) Stark more or less disappeared early. No field grade officer remained to write a report. "Charles D. Tewksbury draft memoir transcription, Fifty-Second Illinois Folder: 3, for his wounding “in the early part of the engagement by a falling limb” story. Philander to Editor, April 9, 1862, for account of “wound from a shell early in the day;” Historical Memo
  17. Thank you for sharing that letter. It is true that the good battery commander might have been stretching to fit a narrative, but it also helps to confirm for me that the 13th was more likely placed in a bad spot.
  18. Also, where exactly does the story of Stark being hit by a tree limb come from? The Barto letter should be in the Abraham Lincoln Library (they have a ton of stuff). Where though does "Philander to Editor, April 5, 1862, James Compton Biographical Folder" come from? Both should go a long way towards explaing what went wrong on in the 52nd Illinois, and why they fled when Cleburne's shot up brigade attacked in their vicinity.
  19. One matter complicating this is Robertson. He was a good battery commander, but also strict, mean, and committed war crimes later in the conflict. Was he being unusually magnanimous to the 13th Ohio Battery (they were after all fellow artillerymen), bragging, or did he want to take Hurlbut down a peg? check out the attached letter from SNMP. Also included are accounts from the 52nd Tennessee and 10th Mississippi. They are not directly related, its just how the file was sent to me. Robertson Mosier Learned letters - Robertson Battery, 52nd TN, 10th MS.tif
  20. Once you wrote the Yates part about Prentiss, it all came back to me. He played a pretty important role in 1861 in Illinois, so it is understandable he was annoyed about having Grant over him. For McClellan, the Blair family is likely the best overall answer. I almost put Lincoln for McClernand. It is true, but with two cavaets. First they were not friends and came from opposing parties. McClernand campaigned against Lincoln in 1860 and 1864. They even faced off in court a few times. But they had a decent working relationship, and did work a court case together. It is notable that af
  21. Well done Sean Chick! If I can expand on your correct answers: Benjamin Prentiss “had benefit of a politician; not a very good one.” At start of the National Emergency, Illinois Governor Richard Yates appears to have supported Prentiss (sent him to Cairo to command the situation there.) After the death of Senator Stephen Douglas in June 1861, Orville H. Browning was parachuted into the empty Senate seat… and assumed “support” of fellow Quincy resident, Benjamin Prentiss. McClernand was the “Leading Congressman from Illinois” and provided his own patronage; and managed to finagle patr
  22. I am with you, Sean. A poorly suited position, taken under fire immediately, a direct hit on a caisson within moments of moving into position...all these seem to add up to a bad situation more than one of cowardice. Most likely Robertson exaggerated, as most were prone to do, but when you take his comments in context of other comments of the 13th, Hurlbut excepted, then the picture seems again to be one of circumstances.
  23. Thanks for posting these Newton letters. The experience of the 52nd Illinois on April 6 needs to be better understood. I think their retreat late in the afternoon is a key reason the Union lines collapsed when it did. The lack of discussion of the regiment in the battle's after action reports (at least among those published) is curious.
  24. Benjamin Prentiss: Good one. He was a politician but not a major one. John McClernand: John McClernand Henry Wager Halleck: He seems to have owed his position to the support of Winfield Scott. Halleck, while a master of army politics, was not quite so good at getting patrons among the politicians. George B. McClellan: Montgomery Blair Lew Wallace: I think Oliver Morton, although from a different party, took a shine to Wallace. Stephen Hurlbut: Abraham Lincoln, who thought Hurlbut was one of the finest public speakers in the country. John A. Logan: John A. Logan
  25. I have always seen what happened to them as a perfect storm. They were poorly placed by Hurlbut, poorly trained, and poorly led. One thing I recently ran into was the Captain Felix Robertson's thoughts on the matter. He felt their withdrawal was due to both his accurate cannon fire and a lack of infantry support. Robertson did not think that Hurlbut's first position on the south end of Sarah Bell Field was ever occupied, but rather Hurlbut said the division was positioned there after the battle to cover what happened to the 13th Ohio Battery. It would be a scandal sending a green battery far a
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